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This thesis examines Average procedures in Genoa during the seventeenth 
century (1590-1700). Genoa was the capital of an oligarchic Republic, ruled by 
an elite of patricians actively involved in maritime trade, shipping, international 
finance and credit. Average, in particular General Average (GA), is a procedure 
to redistribute among all parties involved – shipowners and merchants – 
unexpected costs arising during the course of a maritime expedition, due to 
damages or other expenses. This is one of the oldest surviving maritime rules, 
whose origins predate Roman law. 
The port of Genoa constitutes a privileged observation point in the early 
modern Mediterranean. Allied to the Spanish Empire, the Republic adopted a 
policy of political neutrality in order to survive the great changes that 
characterized the international scenario. Thanks to the administrative and 
economic policies adopted, the port was one of the main redistributive 
emporium in the Mediterranean, acting also as a fundamental hub for the 
economy of the region.  
This dissertation develops around two well-defined layers. On the one hand, I 
investigate the Genoese regulations governing Average and its development 
from the medieval to the early modern period. I discuss, for example, the 
parallelisms, mutual influences and divergences with respect to other 
Mediterranean regulations. On the second layer, Average procedures drawn up 
in Genoa have been processed and inserted in the AveTransRisk database in 
order to elaborate statistical series. These series, structured around intervals of 
years selected on a sample basis, allowed reconstructing the trends of maritime 
trade calling at the port of Genoa. The sources analysed, unpublished and 
particularly rich in information, have also allowed further observations regarding 
the structure of early modern international maritime trade, Mediterranean 









Questa tesi esamina le procedure di ‘avaria’ marittima a Genova nel corso del 
diciassettesimo secolo (1590-1700). Genova fu la capitale di una repubblica 
oligarchica, retta da una élite di patrizi attivamente coinvolti nel commercio 
marittimo, nell’armamento e in operazioni di finanza e credito internazionale. 
L’avaria marittima, e in particolare l’avaria generale (GA), è invece una 
procedura volta a ridistribuire i costi imprevisti che sorgono nel corso di una 
spedizione marittima, dovuti a danni o a spese di altra natura, tra le parti 
interessate: armatori e mercanti. Si tratta di una delle più antiche consuetudini 
del diritto marittimo, le cui radici risalgono al diritto romano. 
Il porto di Genova costituisce un punto di osservazione privilegiato nel 
Mediterraneo di età moderna. Alleata dell’impero spagnolo, la repubblica adottò 
una sempre più marcata politica di neutralità che le permise di sopravvivere ai 
grandi mutamenti che caratterizzarono lo scenario internazionale. Grazie alle 
politiche amministrative ed economiche adottate, nella prima età moderna il 
porto si impose come uno dei principali empori nel Mediterraneo, fungendo 
anche da fondamentale punto focale per l’economia della regione. 
La tesi si sviluppa su due piani ben precisi. Da un lato si indaga la normativa 
genovese che regola le Avarie e i suoi sviluppi dall’età medievale alla età 
moderna. Si riprendono, ad esempio, i parallelismi, le influenze reciproche e le 
divergenze rispetto alle altre normative mediterranee. Sul secondo piano, le 
informazioni tratte dalle procedure di avaria redatte a Genova sono state 
elaborate e inserite nel database AveTransRisk per elaborare delle serie 
statistiche. Tali serie, strutturate intorno a intervalli selezionati a campione, 
hanno permesso di ricostruire i trend del commercio marittimo facente capo al 
porto di Genova. La documentazione consultata, inedita e particolarmente ricca 
di informazioni, ha inoltre permesso di formulare ulteriori osservazioni in merito 
alle strutture del commercio marittimo internazionale in età moderna, al 
commercio di cabotaggio mediterraneo e alla gestione del rischio di mare da 
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Measures and Currencies Conversion Rates 
 
The currency and measurement provided in this section are based on 
information found in metrology handbooks. Where possible, this data has been 
cross-referenced with Average sources, in which exchange rates are often 
included. 
Throughout the dissertation, reference is made to the vessels’ tonnage. The 
term ‘tonnage’ is used here in the meaning of maximum net load that can be 
stowed below deck, which is the one in which it was consistently used in the 
Genoese sources of the time. It corresponds to the freight tonnage or tonnellata 
di nolo or tonneau d’affrètement.1 
 
Weight measures2: 
1 cantaro = kg. 47.64. 
1 mina = kg. 90.985. 
1 lasto or lastro = 25 mine = kg. 2,274.6.3 
1 Genoese salma = 4 cantari = kg. 190.56. 
1 Sicilian salma = 2.36 mine = kg. 214.72. 
 
Liquid measures: 
1 wine barrel = lt. 79.5.4 
1 mezzarola = lt. 158.04. 
 
Currencies: 
The main currencies found in Average sources are Genoese lire, which are 
generally used in calculations from 1590 to around the third quarter of the 
century, and Spanish silver pieces of eight, which is the currency for those 
Average calculations drafted at the end of the century. This latter coin was 
equivalent to the Spanish real or dollar and became widely used in international 
                                                          
1 F.C. Lane, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, The Economic History Review 17/2, 1964, 213-
233, 216.  
2 G. Giacchero, Il Seicento e le compere di San Giorgio, Genoa, 1979, 695-696. 
3 For the sake of simplicity, this value has been calculated as equivalent to 25 mine. The 
exchange rate in the sources examined varied between 25 and 27 mine. Giacchero quotes 
Finetto Oberto, who valued the Polish and Danzig lasto equal to 25 mine, the Hamburg lasto to 
27 mine and the Amsterdam lasto to 25.5 mine. 
4 For the sake of simplicity I have chosen the value used at the end of the seventeenth century. 
In 1606, for example, a wine barrel measured 78.36 lt. 
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trade. Genoese lire were subdivided into soldi (of which there were twenty to a 
piece) and denari (of which there were twelve to a soldo). Prices are expressed 
in the sources using a point to separate each unit of value, for instance, 
5.17.10. 
 
1 Genoese lira = 20 soldi = 12 denari. 
1 Sicilian scudo (1699) = 5.10 Genoese lire.5  
 
 
Genoese lira/silver conversion 
rate6 
 
1594-1596 8.362 gr. 
1597-1629 8.176 gr. 
1630-1631 6.512 gr. 
1632-1642 6.236 gr. 
1643-1646 6.132 gr. 
1647-1653 5.661 gr. 
1654-1659 5.411 gr. 
1660-1670 5.256 gr. 
1671-1674 4.972 gr. 
1675-1740 4.841 gr. 
 
 
Genoese lire per 1 Spanish piece of 
eight7 
 
1594 2.19.6 lire 
1600GA 3.2 lire 
1601/1601GA 3.1 lire /3.3 lire 
1632 4 lire 
1638GA 4.2 lire 
1639GA 4.2 lire 
1643 4.2 lire 
1647 4.8 lire 
1653 4.12 lire 
1656 4.14 lire 
1659 4.16 lire 
1669GA 4.16 lire 
1671 5 lire 
                                                          
5 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50367. 
6 G. Felloni, G. Pesce, Le monete genovesi. Storia, arte ed economia nelle monete di Genova 
dal 1139 al 1814, Genoa, 1975, 210. 
7 This tabled is based on the one in Giacchero, Il Seicento, 694. To the values reported by 
Giacchero I added the conversion rates found in the AveTRansRisk online db. These are 
available through the ‘advanced search’ function on http://humanities-
research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk/search/advanced/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
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1675 5.2 lire 
1695GA 5 lire 
1696GA 5 lire 
1698GA 5 lire 
1699GA 5 lire 
1700GA 5 lire 
1702GA 5 lire 
 
GA = Based on GA sources 
 
 
Genoese lire per 1 Genoese silver 
scudo8 
 
1591GA 3.4 lire 




1605-1607 4.12 lire 
1608 4.14 lire 
1609-1610 4.14-4.16 lire 
1611 5-5.2 lire 
1612-1615 4.10 lire 
1616 4.18-5 lire 
1617-1619 5-5.4 lire 
1620-1622 5.4 lire 
1623-1626 5.7-5.10 lire 
1627 5.11 lire 
1628-30 5.12-5.14 lire 
1631 5.15-5.18 lire 
1632-1637 5.18-5.19 lire 
1638 5.19-6 lire 
1639-
1642/1640GA 
6/ 5 lire 
1643-1645 6.2 lire 
1646-1648 6.8-6.10 lire 
1649-1655 6.12-6.16 lire 
1656 6.18 lire 
1657-1660 7 lire 
1661-1668 7.4 lire 
1669 7.6 lire 
1670-1672 7.8 lire 
1675 7.12 lire 
 
GA = Based on GA sources 
 
                                                          
8 This tabled is based on the one in Giacchero, Il Seicento, 694. To the values reported by 
Giacchero I added the conversion rates found in the AveTRansRisk online dd. These are 
available through the ‘advanced search’ function on http://humanities-




F. Oberti, Aggiustamento universale overo corrispondenza che hanno i pesi e le 
misure di tutte le cose l’una con l’altra…, Genoa, 1672. 
P. Rocca, Pesi e misure antiche di Genova e del Genovesato, Genoa, 1871. 
A. Martini, Manuale di metrologia ossia misure, pesi e monete in uso 
attualmente e anticamente presso tutti i popoli, Turin, 1883. 
M. Giagnacovo, Appunti di metrologia mercantile genovese. Un contributo dalla 






There was no standardised spelling in the seventeenth century. The notaries 
and officials who wrote the documents examined in the following pages 
translated foreign names of both people and vessels into seventeenth-century 
local vernacular Italian. Juan Sanchez, for instance, becomes Giovanni Sances, 
and so on with other foreign names. The vessel Merchant of Dover becomes Il 
mercante di Dover. There is no correct spelling and we cannot always be sure 
of the original name or pronunciation. I have therefore adopted the names given 
by the sources throughout this dissertation. 
Regarding the roles on board a vessel, I employed the original terminology 
whenever possible. The main exception is the use of the Italian word ‘capitano’. 
This has been translated with the word ‘shipmaster’ throughout. I left the term 
patrone when the sources used it. What was known as patrone in early modern 
Genoa could be both the ‘master’ and the ‘owner’ of a vessel.1 In Genoa in the 
fifteenth century, the most influential patroni were the owners of large vessels 
who negotiated with the government to obtain broader control and intervention 
powers in everything related to maritime shipbuilding.2 Luciana Gatti, a scholar 
of early modern Mediterranean maritime history, pointed out how the patrone 
was usually both master and owner of a small vessel.3 In the case of larger 
vessels, the expression patronus in terra was used to indicate the main owner 
of the vessel, who was in charge of the maritime business. The patronus in 
maris was often a secondary owner who was in charge of navigation. Carats 
(carati) were the shares of ownership in which a vessel was divided in Genoa 
among the caratisti, the shareholders. In the seventeenth century, the term 
patrone began to be used exclusively for masters and owners of small vessels. 
The nautical dictionary of Simone Stratico, published in 1813, defines him as 
indifferently captain or master of a merchant vessel. In particular, captain or 
master of a small tonnage vessel. Stratico compared him to the English ‘master’ 
                                                          
1 See the definition of Patrone in ‘Roles on board merchant ships during the seventeenth 
century’, available on 
https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity
/roles/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
2 M. Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave e magistrature marittime: i Conservatores Navium’, Miscellanea 
Storica Ligure II/1, 1970, 57-91, 59-60. 
3 L. Gatti, Navi e cantieri della repubblica di Genova (secoli XVI-XVIII), Genoa, 1999, 413. 
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or ‘commander’.4 Subsequent nautical dictionaries, and this is particularly 
evident in that edited by Francesco Corazzini, take up Stratico's definition and 
sanction the erroneous equivalence between patrone and captain.5 More details 
on the different roles on board and their translation in the main European 
languages can be found in the table of roles compiled by the ERC project, 
Sailing into Modernity.6 
Regarding vessel types, I stuck to the original terminology used in the 
sources. The characteristics of the vessels listed in the table below could vary 
significantly depending on the period, the site of construction or their use. 
 







Nave/Navi 95-595  3 2 23-70 Big armed vessel. 
Sails.  








476-1,190  2-4   Armed vessel, often 




10-24  2 1 15+rowers Light Mediterranean 




 1-2 1 6-12 Light Mediterranean 




4-7 1-2 1 6-15 Light Mediterranean 




20-200 2-3 2 18 Mediterranean armed 




4-29 1-2 1 3-10 Light Mediterranean 
vessel. Rows and/or 
sails. 












167-334   9 Mediterranean 
vessel. 
 
                                                          
4 See the definition of Padrone, in S. Stratico, Vocabolario di Marina in tre lingue, I, Milan, 
1813, 327. 





The table is based on data provided by Luciana Gatti.7 Preference was given to 
data from sources from the second half of the sixteenth to the seventeenth 
century. The word ‘nave’ in seventeenth century Italian could also refers to a 
generic vessel. For this reason, I did not employ the vessel type ‘nave’ in the 
dissertation, unless I had information on the vessel’s tonnage. 
The first document that makes up an Average procedure is the shipmaster's 
report. In the sources, this document, despite the theoretical distinctions, is 
indifferently referred to as consolato, testimoniale, manifesto or otherwise. I 
minimise the use of these terms and, where present, they refer to the 
terminology used in a specific document, not to its drafting criteria. For this 
reason, I have decided to use the term ‘report’ throughout. 
With regards to places, I have always adopted that name which will be most 
familiar to a non-specialist Anglophone reader. I have thus used the common 
English names of major Italian cities (Venice, Naples, and so on) rather than 
their Italian names. I have used [?] after place names that could not be 
identified. 
Shipmasters in the examined sources usually employed the expression Merci 
diverse (‘miscellaneous goods’) to refer to mixed cargoes loaded in boxes, 
barrels, bales, crates, packages, bundles, etc. This expression has been 
translated throughout the text with the current formula of ‘General Cargo’.8 
All dates here have been given according to our modern calendar, which is 
the Gregorian calendar beginning on 1 January. Genoa adopted the Gregorian 
calendar immediately after the publication of the Papal bull Inter gravissimas in 
1582.9 
I have kept the names of magistracies in their original language. This is to 
avoid a proliferation of different translations being adopted in Anglophone 
scholarship on Genoa. 
All citations have been translated. When needed, I inserted the original text in 
the footnote. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. I have 
expanded abbreviations in order to aid legibility. 
                                                          
7 Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 145-245. 
8 On the definition of General Cargo, see ‘General Cargo’, in Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, 2005. Available on https://www.thefreedictionary.com/general+cargo, 
accessed on 29/06/2021. 
9 On the different timing with which European countries adopted the Gregorian calendar, see A. 
Cappelli, Cronologia, cronografia e calendario perpetuo. Dal principio dell'era cristiana ai nostri 
giorni, Milan, 1930. 
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Finally, I have capitalised the words General Average (GA), Particular 
Average (PA) and Average (meaning GA and PA with no particular distinction) 
throughout where the words refer to a maritime Average. When referring to a 
mathematical average, I have used lower case. 
 
Abbreviations used: 
ed. = editor/edition 
eds. = editors 
r. = recto 
v. = verso 
cc. = carte 
chap. = chapter 
par. = paragraph 
n. = number 




Archival References and Abbreviations 
 
The documents in the Archivio di Stato di Genova examined in this dissertation 
are usually bound in filze. Each filza contains several hundred documents 
(mostly loose sheets and files) held together by a string through a central hole 
and protected at the ends by two covers of equal dimensions.1 Each filza is 
numbered, but the sheets inside it are usually not. Within each filza, the cases 
are generally usually arranged in chronological order. That is why I referred to 
documents in a filza either by specifying the date in which they were drafted, or 
by specifying their corresponding ‘id number’ in the AveTransRisk database.2 
The archival references follow the format: archive – archival series – 
subseries – case number (when available) – date of drafting. 
 
Abbreviations pertaining to archival references are as follows:  
Archivio di Stato di Genova = ASG 
Conservatori del Mare = CdM 
Notai Giudiziari = NG 
Notai Antichi = NA 
Archivio Segreto = AS 
Biblioteca = Bibl. 
Manoscritti = ms. 
San Giorgio = SG 
Archivio Storico del Comune di Genova = ASCG 
Magistrato dell’Abbondanza = MA 
Manoscritti = ms. 
Padri del Comune = PdC 
Biblioteca Civica Berio = BCB 
Centro di studi e documentazione di Storia economica “Archivio Doria” = ADG 
Biblioteca Universitaria di Genova = BUG 
Manoscritti = ms. 
  
                                                          
1 See P. Carucci, Le fonti archivistiche: ordinamento e conservazione, Rome, 1998. 
2 References will be given directly in the online database, according to the following formula: the 
voyage has been recorded in the AveTransRisk online db with the id 50xxx. The voyages are 
numbered from 50000 to 50895. The database is available on http://humanities-














Noi partimmo da Iolco una mattina come questa, ed eravamo tutti giovani e 
avevamo gli dèi dalla nostra. Era bello varcare, senza pensare all’indomani. Poi 
cominciarono i prodigi. 
 
Era un mondo più giovane, Mélita, i giorni come chiare mattine, le notti di 
tenebra spessa – dove tutto poteva succedere. Di volta in volta i prodigi erano 
fonti, erano mostri, eran uomini o rupi. Di noi ne scomparvero, qualcuno morì. 
Ogni approdo era un lutto. 
 
Ogni mattina il mare era più bello, più vergine. La giornata passava nell’attesa. 
Poi vennero piogge, vennero nebbie e schiume nere. […] Non era il mare il 















In the past decades, maritime history enjoyed a revival and entered the 
mainstream of historical research. This led to a series of methodological 
problems, also in connection with its relation to global history.1 According to 
many historians, the bond between maritime and global history emerged since 
the age of geographical discoveries: in fact, maritime travel became the medium 
that allowed the emergence of networks of global communications and 
exchange.2 Maritime history, however, has been tightly linked also to European 
imperialism, as the control of maritime routes was often a necessary 
requirement before beginning military and political expansion on land. This is 
true, especially, if we consider maritime studies on the British Empire.3 The new 
challenge of contemporary ‘imperial’ history, according to Maria Fusaro, is, 
therefore, to avoid making them ‘imperialistic’.4 
The presence of small Republican states in early modern Europe, often 
looked at as alternative and ‘secondary’ political systems compared to the main 
monarchic kingdoms, can help to overcome the ‘imperialist’ perspective.5 Small 
states usually did not have the political and military power to control maritime 
routes: they had to overcome this problem in some other way. One possible 
solution, for example, was the adoption of neutrality policies that allowed the 
development of emporia. It is for this reason that Genoa was selected as an 
observation point for the Mediterranean world at a time of swift changes. 
Although its role might appear as secondary compared to the main European 
nation-states, we must keep in mind, on the one hand, the role of its patrician 
class in international finance, and on the other hand, the importance of the 
traffic calling at the port of Genoa. This dissertation aims at analysing its main 
trade dynamics using an unpublished and almost unknown source: the Average 
                                                          
1 M. Fusaro, A. Polonia eds., Maritime History as Global History, St. John’s, 2011. 
2 M. Fusaro, ‘Maritime history as global history? The methodological challenges and a future 
research agenda’, in Fusaro, Polonia eds., Maritime History, 267-282, 274. 
3 G. O'Hara, ‘‘The Sea is swinging into view’: modern British maritime history in a globalised 
world’, The English Historical Review CXXIV/510, 2009, 1109–1134. 
4 Fusaro, ‘Maritime history’, 276. See, as an example of a new kind of imperial, global and 
maritime history, S. Strootman, F. van den Eijnde, R. van Wijk eds., Empires of the sea. 
Maritime power networks in world history, Leiden-Boston, 2020. 
5 A. Holenstein, T. Maissen, M. Prak eds., The Republican Alternative. The Netherlands and 
Switzerland compared, Amsterdam, 2008. 
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procedures.6 At the same time, I study the influence of normative rules and of 
Genoese jurists’ texts in the legal evolution of this institution within an 
international perspective. 
Genoa is located at the Northern edge of the Tyrrhenian Gulf, surrounded by 
growing rival centres, like Livorno, Marseille, and Nice. During the early modern 
period, this small Republic, traditionally perceived as a ‘weak’ state, managed to 
survive and maintain its independence in the political and military struggles that 
ravaged across Europe.7 From 1528, it was a close ally of the Spanish Empire.8 
The Genoese granted loans (the so-called Asientos) to the Spanish monarchy 
and, in return, they obtained formal and informal privileges that allowed them to 
get profitably involved into trade and finance operations in the “Empire on which 
the sun never sets”. The Republic’s independence and ‘free trade’ also rested 
on this alliance. Because of the reforms carried out in that year, later modified in 
1576, the Republic adopted an oligarchic system: the main patrician families, 
who often also owned fiefs inland and had multiple commercial and financial 
interests, shared among them all political power. The ruling class coincided with 
the state's economic elite.9 Following changes in the European economy, the 
interests of the Genoese patricians gradually expanded from trade to finance, 
although they managed to maintain a balance between shipping, trade, 
manufacturing and finance. Some historians refer to the years between the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth century as the “age of the Genoese”.10 
The port’s administration and functioning played a fundamental role in the 
economic policies of the patriciate. Even today, the region’s economy still 
                                                          
6 This dissertation, as will be explained later, is part of the research on Average fostered by the 
ERC AveTransRisk project. Alongside the present research, there are also other Ph.D. 
candidates working in this field from different perspectives. See G.P. Dreijer, The power and 
pains of polysemy: General Average, maritime trade and normative practice in the Southern 
Low Countries (fifteenth-sixteenth centuries), unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Exeter/Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2021; J.A. Dyble, General Average in the free port of Livorno, 
1600-1700, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter/University of Pisa, 2021; L.M. Wade, 
Privilege at a premium: insurance, maritime law and political economy in early modern France, 
1664-c. 1710, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2021. 
7 M. Fusaro, Political economies of empire in the early modern Mediterranean. The decline of 
Venice and the rise of England, 1450-1700, Cambridge, 2015, 92. 
8 A. Pacini, ‘“Poiché gli stati non sono portatili…”: geopolitica e strategia nei rapporti tra Genova 
e Spagna nel Cinquecento’, in M. Herrero Sanchez, Y. Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, C. Bitossi, D. 
Puncuh eds., Génova y la Monarquia Hispanica (1528-1713), II, Genoa, 2011, 443-456. 
9 See C. Bitossi, Il governo dei magnifici. Patriziato e politica a Genova fra Cinque e Seicento, 
Genoa, 1990. 
10 F. Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, III, The perspective of the world, 
London, 1984 (1st ed. 1979), 157. 
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revolves mainly around the port of Genoa.11 The availability of money, the 
speculative attitude and, above all, the need to rely on maritime trade, for 
example to import foodstuffs for the population’s consumption and raw materials 
for the manufacturing sector, made the shipping sector vital. The ruling class, 
because of its direct interest in activities related to maritime trade, carefully 
looked after port management, the maintenance and the expansion of its 
infrastructures. These is evidence of a long-run Genoese investment strategy 
on maritime trade. About 30% of the total tonnage of merchant vessels in the 
Mediterranean stopped in the port of Genoa in the first half of the sixteenth 
century.12 
Data from Average sources in the State Archives in Genoa allows the 
analysis of the routes calling at the port. In order to understand its complexity 
and potentiality, it is necessary to provide some further information. GA is a 
legal instrument, with ancient origins probably predating Roman law, and 
nowadays still applied, to share risks in a maritime voyage between all the 
participants: shipmaster, ship-owners, and cargo owners.13 The Average 
institution is one of the most important, but also one of the most complicated 
topics in maritime law. According to Bill Yancey, former president of the US 
Average Adjusters Association, this institution is characterised by “the most 
esoteric obscurities”.14 
The GA principle relates to the common proportional liability of all participants 
in the sea venture to contribute to the loss of one or a few of them, incurred to 
save the vessel otherwise in distress (such as throwing cargo overboard to 
keep a vessel afloat until rescued). It is a spreading risk technique: it 
redistributes amongst all stakeholders unforeseen expenses that can occur to 
                                                          
11 The port of Genoa is the second largest Italian port for cargo handled. The cargo terminal has 
a maximum annual capacity of 550,000 TEU (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit), see 
https://www.portsofgenoa.com/it/porto-di-genova.html, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
12 C. Costantini, La repubblica di Genova nell’età moderna, Turin, 1978, 164. 
13 As Andrew Chamberlain pointed out at the 2018 Lloyd’s seminar on general average, this 
legal tool is enjoying a new life in recent years. The main reason is due to the financial crash of 
2008. In a general average procedure occurred before this year, the vessel’s value was the 
main contributing element, covering 80 or 90% of the damage. After the financial crisis, the 
cargo became the main contributor, which is one of the many similarities with old general 
average procedures. See https://maritime.knect365.com/general-Average/, accessed on 
29/06/2021. 
14 L.J. Buglass, General Average and the York/Antwerp rules, 1974, American Law and 
Practice, Baltimore, 1974, ix. See also G.N. Hudson, ‘The York-Antwerp Rules: Background to 
the Changes of 1994’, Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 27/3, 1996, 469. The York 
Antwerp rules of 2016 are available for consultation on the website of the Comité Maritime. See 
 http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Work%20Product/York-
Antwerp%20Rules%202016%20(Final).pdf, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
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ship or cargo from the loading to the unloading. For this reason, we could refer 
to GA as a form of mutual protection. Particular average (PA), on the other 
hand, refers to damages that befall only the owner of the damaged goods or 
ship as the damage was due to unforeseen circumstances, it was not a 
voluntary sacrifice and did not produce a common benefit. 
In the expression ‘General Average’, the word ‘Average’ is equal to ‘loss’ or 
‘damage’. Since the medieval period, chroniclers and notaries used this word to 
describe any kind of damage, not necessarily related to sea voyages.15 The 
term itself (German Haverei; Dutch averij; French avarie; Italian avaria) derived 
probably from the Arabian awarıa, meaning ‘damaged goods’.16 ‘General’ refers 
to ‘common to everyone’. The word average is the English transliteration of the 
Italian word avere or averia.17 In some of the modern languages in use in 
countries with a strong shipping tradition, GA is referred to as avarie commune 
in French, averia gruesa in Spanish, averij grosse in Dutch, havarie-grosse in 
German, avaria generale or comune in Italian. They all serve better to convey 
the real meaning of the institution than the English translation, because of the 
ambiguity that the term ‘Average’ implies, compared to its everyday use18. 
Lawrence Duckworth, in 1905, still pointed out that: “The expression ‘Average’, 
as used in maritime law, is a foreign word […]. It has been regarded for nearly 
eighteen centuries as an unintelligible, or doubtful, symbol”.19 
The need to compare the formal rules with the daily practice in order to 
highlight any divergence led to a research structured along two axes. The first 
one is the legal and jurisprudential analysis, as I shall investigate the evolution 
of Genoese rules concerning the management of Average procedures 
alongside the functioning, more generally, of the main magistracies involved in 
                                                          
15 Even in Genoa, we can easily find this word meaning ‘damaged’. 
16 This is one of the more recent theories, but it is not the only one. See A. Addobbati, 
‘Principles and rules on general average: notes on legislation and case-law between Middle and 
Modern Ages’, in M. Fusaro, A. Addobbati, L. Piccinno eds., Sharing risk: general average and 
European maritime business (VI-XVIII centuries), London, forthcoming. 
17 In the city states of Italy (Venice, Pisa and Genoa) and in Valencia the term avaria was 
already used from the second half of the thirteenth century. It appears in Dutch and Hanseatic 
legal sources in the sixteenth century. In the 1551 Ordinance of Emperor Charles V for the 
Netherlands (art. 28, 41 and 42) and in the Hanseatic Sea Law of 1614 (VIII; XII, art. 2) a 
distinction between general and particular Average was already made. See E. Frankot, Of Laws 
of Ships and Shipmen. Medieval maritime law and its practice in urban Northern Europe, 
Cambridge, 2013, 31. First use in medieval Italy is in the Constitutum Usus of the City of Pisa, 
dated around A.D 1160. The Italian word avaria still means ‘damage’. It was used with the same 
meaning in some Genoese codes dated around twelfth century, see M. Curtellazzo, P. Zolli, 
Dizionario etimologico della Lingua Italiana, 1/A-C, Bologna, 1998, 94-95. 
18 An etymological overview is in M. Hopkins, A handbook of Average, London, 1884, 1-13. 
19 L. Duckworth, The Law affecting General and Particular Average, London, 1905, 1. 
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port activities. Genoese lawmakers adopted a combination of elements from 
Roman law, their customary laws and the Consolat de Mar written in Barcelona 
in the fifteenth century. The analysis considers the corpus of laws produced by 
the Republic's lawmakers and the related opinions provided by jurists. 
Whenever possible, the normative texts and the jurists’ legal opinions will be 
studied keeping in mind what emerges from the daily practice of managing 
Average procedures in Genoa. This analysis also allows to test the credibility of 
the Lex Maritima and Lex Mercatoria theories, which will be discussed in the 
conclusion. 
The second axis of the research, the quantitative one, consists in the 
identification and reconstruction of specific trends concerning maritime trade 
calling at the port of Genoa. This analysis takes into account, where possible, 
the wide, albeit fragmentary, historiography on Genoese maritime trade in the 
early modern period, and aims to be part of the broader scenario of the 
historiographic framework relating to seventeenth century Mediterranean trade. 
Traditional Genoese historiography is mainly based on fiscal sources 
(anchorage taxes, taxes on cargo, etc.), my research uses instead Average 
reports, grouped into files concerning individual voyages. In fact, the 
shipmasters themselves requested the competent authorities to start the 
procedure, just as it was the merchants or their insurers who took the initiative 
in the appeal procedures against any ‘unequal’ decision. For this reason, these 
sources have a wealth and breadth of information that fiscal sources do not. 
Moreover, since GA is a mutual institution, the documents do not present the 
systematic underestimates of the values of ships and cargoes that affect fiscal 
sources.20 The data from single voyages allows both micro- and macro-
economic analysis. Each voyage, when compared with others with similar 
characteristics (port of departure, port of arrival, type of vessel, type of incident, 
etc.), can be analysed and classified as an exemplary or exceptional case. The 
incorporation and processing of data extracted from these documents into 
statistical series can also shed light on the specific characteristics of 
international commercial shipping in the early modern period. 
As mentioned, this dissertation intends also to contribute to the studies 
carried out so far on the maritime history of the Republic of Genoa. The 
Genoese Republic, to use an expression of Count Giuseppe Gorani (1740-
                                                          
20 As it will be seen, expenses related to GA procedures were usually low. 
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1819), a Milanese writer and diplomat in the service of the Austrian monarchy, 
was “the most envied, the most denigrated and the least known” among all the 
maritime republics.21 Studies on Venice, for example, are far more.22 This 
‘diversity’ caused a relative isolation of the historical researches on Genoa.23 A 
rich tradition of local Genoese historians exists, though, and some of their 
researches are of very high quality.24 Yet such researches often suffer from the 
weaknesses of the ‘local history’ genre: a strictly regional scope. Nevertheless, 
the publications of foreign scholars on the Republic of Genoa during the second 
half of the twentieth century partly reinvigorated this field. It was an English 
scholar, Frank C. Spooner, that invented the already cited expression “age of 
the Genoese” when referring to the history of the Republic between the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, in particular, to that of its 
businessmen’s relations with the Spanish monarchy.25 According to Fernand 
Braudel: 
 
For three-quarters of a century, ‘the Genoese experience’ enabled the 
merchant-bankers of Genoa, through their handling of capital and credit, to 
call the tune of European payments and transactions. This is worth studying 
in itself, for it must surely have been the most extraordinary example of 
convergence and concentration the European world-economy had yet 
witnessed, as it re-oriented itself around an almost invisible focus. For the 
focal point of the whole system was not even the city of Genoa itself, but a 
handful of banker-financiers. And this is only one of the paradoxes 
surrounding the strange city of Genoa which, thought apparently so cursed 
by date, tended both before and after its ‘age of glory’ to gravitate towards 
                                                          
21 Quotation in G. Assereto, ‘Dall’amministrazione patrizia all’amministrazione moderna: 
Genova’, in L’amministrazione nella storia moderna, I, Milan, 1985, 95-159, 95. 
22T.A. Kirk, Genoa and the Sea. Policy and Power in an Early Modern Maritime Republic, 1559-
1684, Baltimore, 2005, IX. 
23 G. Felloni, Dall'Italia all'Europa: il primato della finanza italiana dal Medioevo alla prima Età 
moderna, in A. Cova, S. La Francesca eds., Storia d’Italia. Annali, 23, La Banca, Turin, 
2008, 93-149. 
24 Regarding Genoese history, see, for example, L. Bulferetti, C. Costantini, Industria e 
commercio in Liguria nell’età del Risorgimento (1700-1861), Milan, 1966; Costantini, La 
Repubblica di Genova; G. Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi del portofranco genovese: 11 agosto 
1590-9 ottobre 1778, Genoa, 1972; G. Giacchero, Economia e società del Settecento 
genovese, Genova, 1981; E. Grendi, Introduzione alla storia moderna della Repubblica di 
Genova, Genova, 1976; E. Grendi, ‘Problemi e studi di storia economica genovese (secoli XVI-
XVIII)’, Rivista storica italiana LXXXIV, 1972, 1022-1059; G. Doria, P. Massa eds., Il sistema 
portuale della Repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1988. The Ligurian region has a wealth tradition of 
‘micro histories’ which, focusing on social and institutional aspects, have shed light in an original 
way onto more ‘economic’ mechanics. In particular, see E. Grendi, Il Cervo e la Repubblica. Il 
modello ligure di antico regime, Turin, 1993; O. Raggio, Faide e parentele. Lo Stato Genovese 
visto dalla Fontanabuona, Turin, 1990. 
25 This expression, commonly referred to Braudel, was actually invented in French by Frank C. 
Spooner, cited by Felipe Ruiz Martin, an historian of Spanish finances during early modern 
period, and finally revived by Braudel in 1984. 
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the summit of world business. To me Genoa seems always to have been, in 
every age, the capitalist city par excellence.26 
 
The renewed interest on Genoese history touched only marginally maritime 
trade topics, although the same patricians involved in financial activities, or their 
closest relatives, were also active in this field. As stated by Giuseppe Galasso, 
far more missing elements than presences mark maritime history in Italy.27 
Genoa still lacks an organic research on its seaborne trade in relation with the 
strategies adopted by its mercantile class.28 According to Maria Fusaro there is 
a real “historiographical schizophrenia regarding Genoa, on the one hand hailed 
as the cradle of global financial capitalism, and on the other described as a 
‘failed state’”.29 Edoardo Grendi, one of the foremost historians on Genoa in the 
early modern period and one of the founders of Italian microhistory, 
meaningfully employed the expression an “historiography without masters” to 
describe the literature on Genoa. The Annales described him as “the best 
expert on the least popular – and most difficult to understand – of Italian trading 
cities”.30 
As already mentioned, Genoese historiography made extensive use of fiscal 
sources to reconstruct maritime traffic trends, as the serial reconstructions 
carried out between the 1960s and the 1980s by Giorgio Doria and Edoardo 
Grendi.31 The latter, in particular, pointed to the need for specific studies on 
Genoese maritime trade. According to Grendi, such studies would only be 
possible through in-depth studies of archival sources. He referred in particular 
to the potential offered by the Genoese notarial archives. The State Archives of 
Genoa preserves the oldest and one of the largest notarial collections in the 
world.32 The abundance of the sources and the lack of indexing of the folders in 
which the documents are kept, however, make this type of research very 
                                                          
26 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 157. 
27 G. Galasso, ‘Il Mezzogiorno e il mare’, in A. Fratta ed., La fabbrica delle navi. Storia della 
cantieristica nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia, Naples, 1990, 11. 
28 P. Calcagno, ‘Uno dei “Tirreni” di Braudel: scambi commerciali nell’area marittima ligure-
provenzale tra XVII e XVIII secolo’, Mediterranea, ricerche storiche 33, 2015, 79-106, 82-83. 
29 Fusaro, Political economies, 92 and bibliography quoted therein. 
30 “meilleur connaisseur de la plus mal connue - et la plus difficile à comprendere - des villes 
marchandes italiennes”, in ‘Le choix des Annales’, in Annales, 43/1, 1988, unnumbered page. 
31 G. Doria, ‘La gestione del porto di Genova dal 1550 al 1797’, in Doria, Massa eds., Il sistema 
portuale, 135-197; E. Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale di Genova (1500-1700)’, in E. Grendi ed., La 
repubblica aristocratica dei Genovesi: politica, carità e commercio fra Cinque e Seicento, 
Genoa, 1987, 307-364; E. Grendi, ‘I nordici e il traffico del porto di Genova: 1590-1666’, Rivista 
Storica Italiana LXXXIII/1, 1971, 23-71. 




complex. Carlo Bitossi, a scholar of the political history of the Republic, referred 
to the Genoese archival sources as a “complicated abundance”.33 
Giuseppe Felloni, working in roughly the same years as Grendi, was one of 
the few to perceive the potential of a synthesis operation starting from the serial 
processing of judicial and notarial Average sources. He published an article 
based on the Genoese evidence for the years 1599, 1600 and 1601.34 This 
research, therefore, follows in the footsteps of Felloni and followed over the 
years by other Italian scholars such as Marcello Berti in the 1970s, and, more 
recently, Luisa Piccinno.35 
As far as the juridical-normative side of the present research is concerned, 
the main historiographical references were, inevitably, the studies of Rodolfo 
Savelli and Vito Piergiovanni. Savelli, in particular, published numerous works 
on the statutes of Genoa and of its territories, also editing the critical edition of 
these sources.36 In addition to his studies on the laws enacted by the Genoese 
Republic, Piergiovanni worked extensively on the treatises of the main Italian 
jurists of the medieval and early modern period, in particular Giuseppe 
Casaregi, who worked in Genoa before moving to Florence in the early 
eighteenth century as a judge of the local Rota.37 The conceptual normative 
frameworks that emerge through the work of Savelli and Piergiovanni, and the 
direct reference to the normative sources, have been assessed in the light of 
recent institutionalist studies. In particular, Sheilagh Ogilvie has criticised the 
assumption that Ancien Régime institutions arised and survived because they 
were economically efficient.38 There is a tendency to believe that if a particular 
                                                          
33 Bitossi, Il governo dei magnifici, 22. 
34 G. Felloni, ‘Una fonte inesplorata per la storia dell’economia marittima in età moderna: i 
calcoli di avaria’, in Wirtschaftskräfte in der europäischen Expansion, 2, Stuttgart, 1978, 37-57. 
35 Berti, in particular, seems to operate autonomously and at the same time as Felloni, 
exploiting the Average sources in Tuscany to analyse the danger of the main sea routes leading 
to the port of Livorno. See M. Berti, ‘I rischi nella circolazione marittima tra Europa nordica ed 
Europa mediterranea nel primo trentennio del Seicento ed il caso della seconda guerra anglo-
olandese (1665-67)’, in S. Cavaciocchi ed., Ricchezza del mare ricchezza dal mare: secc.13-
18. Atti della trentasettesima Settimana di studi, 11-15 aprile 2005, Bagno a Ripoli, 2006, 809-
839; M. Berti, ‘Il “rischio” nella navigazione commerciale mediterranea nel Seicento: aspetti 
tecnici e aspetti economici’, in S. Di Bella, S. ed., La rivolta di Messina 1674-78 e il mondo 
mediterraneo nella seconda metà del Seicento: atti, Cosenza, 1979, 271-332. On this see topic, 
see also L. Piccinno, ‘Rischi di viaggio nel commercio marittimo del XVIII secolo’, in M. Cini ed., 
Traffici commerciali, sicurezza marittima, guerra di corsa. Il Mediterraneo e l'Ordine di Santo 
Stefano, Pisa, 2011, 159-179. 
36 R. Savelli, Repertorio degli statuti della Liguria (secc. XII-XVIII), Genoa, 2003. 
37 V. Piergiovanni ed., Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica tra Genova e l’Occidente medievale e 
moderno, I-II, Genoa, 2012. 
38 S. Ogilvie, ‘'Whatever is, is right'? Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe’, The 
Economic History Review 60/4, 2007, 649-684. 
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economic institution has endured for centuries, as might be the case with the 
GA institution, it must have been ‘efficient’.39 Such beliefs often overlook the fact 
that not necessarily what is rational is also efficient, or the presence of external 
factors that lead to compromise solutions that could benefit only a part of the 
society. The evolution of Average regulations in Genoa, from this perspective, is 
a demonstration of how difficult it is to draw a progressive line and to make 
assessments regarding the bureaucratic-administrative efficiency of Ancien 
Régime institutions. 
This research on Genoese Average procedures is based on normative and 
notarial sources. As regards the former, the essential reference is represented 
by the Statuti Civili of the Republic enacted in 1589.40 These ruled, among other 
things, on the operational application of Average and established a new 
magistracy, the calcolatori. The statutes continued to be reprinted without 
change until the early eighteenth century.41 They were in force, therefore, for 
the entire period considered in this thesis. The text of the Statuti Civili will be 
analysed in detail with regard to Average procedures and compared with the 
Consolat de Mar, the main Mediterranean body of rules of the time in this field, 
in order to assess similarities, differences and mutual influences. I also 
investigated the origins of some GA rules through the analysis of the older 
statutes of the Genoese colony of Pera on the Black Sea, controlled by the 
Republic from 1155 to 1453. I then integrated this with the analysis of jurists’ 
treatises. The main points of reference were the works of Carlo Targa and 
Giuseppe Maria Casaregi.42 Their treatises explicitly refer to Chapters from the 
Statuti Civili and often also cite legal judgments of which the authors had direct 
experience. However, these also provide summaries and reflexions derived 
from the authors’ experiences: these were not works of pure erudition, but 
rather handbooks for administrative legal personnel and maritime traders, who 
needed clear and practical rules to follow, not the precise genealogy of legal 
sources, or the presentation of the contradictory ways in which they were 
applied and conceived. 
                                                          
39 Ogilvie, ‘Whatever is, is right?’, 652. 
40 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589. See the 
transcription in Appendix I. 
41 BUG, Laura gg.II.27, Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae Januensis, 1707. 
42 G.M. Casaregi, Discursos Legales de Commercio, I-II-III, Venice, 1740; C. Targa, 
Ponderationi sopra la contrattatione marittima, Genoa, 1692. 
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This brings us to notarial and administrative sources.43 At its core, this 
dissertation draws from the Atti dei Calcolatori and the Atti Civili folders in the 
Genoa State Archives, in the collections of, respectively, the Notai Giudiziari 
and the Conservatori del Mare. In spite of the different archival location, which, 
as will be seen below, corresponds to different competent magistracies (the 
calcolatori and the Conservatori del Mare), the sources are consistent and 
follow a very similar structure throughout the period under examination. 
The Atti dei Calcolatori are part of the notarial documentation, and preserve 
the Average procedures (both PA and GA) drawn up by the calcolatori. In 
Genoa private notaries frequently acted as chancellors and secretaries of the 
magistrates' courts.44 This explains the particular archival location of these 
folders, kept among the notaries' documents and labelled as Atti dei Calcolatori. 
The following notaries working for the calcolatori have been identified: Orazio 
Fazio (1590-1608), Giovanni Agostino Gritta (1606-1616), Giovanni Benedetto 
Gritta (1636-1663).45 
A reform, examined in the third chaper, partially changed the procedure from 
the second half of the seventeenth century: the Conservatori del Mare extended 
their jurisdiction over Averages. The archival evidence is filed differently from 
that of the Atti dei Calcolatori: alongside Average procedures, for example, 
there are court cases between shipmasters and crews or merchants, or sea 
loan contracts. However, the documentation does not seem to have any 
significant gap for the second half of the seventeenth century: Atti Civili (1654-
1697, 1699-1700). 
Although the sources apparently cover the whole of the second half of the 
seventeenth century, part of the documentation is missing. In order to complete 
the long-term analysis and to gather further information, I used also the files of 
the Testimoniali all’estero segreti (1635-1796). These contain the reports of 
shipmasters requesting the initiation of an Average procedure, which the 
competent magistracies, due to inherent vice or substantial errors, did not 
validate.46 The use of a variety of archival collections has allowed me to follow 
the evolution of the procedural process beyond the simplistic reconstructions 
                                                          
43 Further information on the archival locations of the sources mentioned in these pages can be 
found in the bibliography. 
44 See V. Piergiovanni, ‘Il notaio nella storia giuridica genovese’, in V. Piergiovanni ed., Per una 
storia del notariato nella civiltà europea, II, Milan, 1994, 73-89. 
45 Although it has not been possible to identify the name(s) of the notaries in the period from 
1617 to 1635, there are hundreds of procedures for each available year. 
46 Further information and theories on these sources are in par. 5.5. 
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offered by legislation and jurists. At the same time, the hundreds of procedures 
thus available allow to assess the divergence between rule and practice in this 
area of maritime law. This divergence is one of the peculiarities of maritime 
trade over the longue durèe, and a most interesting analytical element which is 
usually mentioned in the literature, but not properly investigated. 
The large amount of the archival documentation led me to select specific 
samples. This selection was based on several elements: the availability of 
primary evidence; the significance of the periods examined; and the possibility 
of comparing the data with existing or ongoing studies on Genoese – or 
Mediterranean – maritime trade and/or on Average sources. More precisely, I 
decided to concentrate on the following periods, better contextualised in the 
Fourth Chapter: 
 
- 1599-1601. During these years, following the most acute phase of the 
Northern Invasion, Genoese trade partially returned to its traditional 
routes, i.e. Sicily and Mediterranean Spain. Intra-Mediterranean trade and 
grain from Sicily and raw wool from Spain dominated as cargoes. 
- 1639-1641. This interval is situated within the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648), a conflict that eroded Spanish hegemony over Europe and the 
Mediterranean. Genoa maintained its neutrality and its merchants made 
ample use of Northern ships to carry their cargoes, even on the most 
traditional routes. 
- 1668-1670. This was a period of relative trade stagnation, and this is 
confirmed by Averages’ evidence. Local Mediterranean shipping 
dominated, involving smaller vessels and capitals. The role of Genoa as a 
redistributive emporium for colonial goods, in particular from Portugal and 
Cadiz, became more evident. 
- 1698-1700. The main feature of this period was the ‘forced’ reapproach 
with France, following the 1684 French attack. Most of the cargoes came 
from Sicily and Spain, and were carried by French ships. Northern 
shipping remained of vital importance for extra-Mediterranean trade. 
 
The documentation and notes left by Felloni to the Department of Economics of 
the University of Genoa greatly helped the identification and investigation of the 
archival documentation. He created a paper card format to collect the main 
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information concerning Average reports and calculations. The cards he filled in, 
which are preserved at the Centro di studi e documentazione di Storia 
economica “Archivio Doria”, cover almost all the documentation from the Atti dei 
Calcolatori.47 Consultation of the paper cards, compared with the original 
sources to supplement missing information, provided an initial guideline of vital 
importance.48 
All data obtained from Average procedures in the archives from the years 
mentioned above has been uploaded and is freely available in the 
AveTransRisk database.49 This database was created within the framework of 
the European project Average-Transaction Costs and Risk Management during 
the First Globalization (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries) (grant agreement n. 
724544), led by Maria Fusaro. This project involved the collaboration of 
scholars working in different countries - Italy, Spain, England, France, Malta, 
Belgium and the Netherlands - and in different fields of historical studies - 
economic history, legal history, maritime history, etc. The project aims to offer a 
historical analysis of the Average institution and its impact on economic 
development through a comparative investigation of procedures between 
different European countries. In this perspective, the Genoese sources I 
analysed and recorded into the database has actively supported it. 
The database to date contains information on 858 sea voyages based on 
Genoese sources. The starting model for the entry form, developed using Office 
Microsoft Access Database software (.accdb), was the paper form made by 
Felloni for his study during the 1970s, already mentioned. The Access template 
                                                          
47 ADG, Felloni 1, 3-8, 10-11, 1589-171e. Felloni's recording continued with a sample analysis 
of documents from the eighteenth century, when the Magistrato d'Avaria, a sub-office of the 
Conservatori del Mare, began operating. Felloni choose a sample of the documents in the 
Conservatori del Mare collection and, in particular, from the folders Esibite in Avarie, 1695-
1714; Testimoniali fatti a Genova, 1709-1796; and Calcoli d'Avaria, 1714-1777. It is likely that 
the eighteenth-century samples were used simply to assess the consistency of the sources and 
their comparability with those from the previous centuries. His pioneering research, however, 
came to a halt when Felloni moved on to reorganise the archives of the Casa di San Giorgio, a 
project that took him until 2012 to be completed (http://www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/, accessed 
on 29/06/2021.). Felloni’s cards do not mention the Atti Civili. It is probable that he did not notice 
the presence of Average procedures there. 
48 Felloni, for instance, often did not record the more ‘narrative’ information in the 
documentation. He was mainly interested in the ‘accounting’ part of the procedure. 
49 As already stated, references will be given to consult a source directly in the online database, 
according to the following formula: the voyage has been recorded in the AveTransRisk online 
db with the id 50xxx. The voyages are numbered from 50000 to 50895. 
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is an evolution of the paper card initially conceived by Felloni, modified to 
include also the data he ignored.50 
A standard Average procedure consists of a report and a damage 
apportionment calculation. The report is a transcription, often through the use of 
formulae and expressions whose use has been consolidated over time, of the 
events that occurred during navigation leading to the Average act. It is narrated 
by the shipmaster before the authorities in the first port in which he stopped 
after the accident. The report contains all the elements relating to the maritime 
voyage, often with an abundance of details concerning the accident – or 
accidents – that occurred during navigation. 
The calculation, although quickly referring to the information contained in the 
previous report, is an estimate of the value of the vessel, the cargo and, if 
certain conditions were met, the freights. These values are complemented by 
the calculation of damage to the vessel or to the cargo, and that of all 
administrative and unforeseen expenses. The total of damages is divided by the 
total of contributing values to derive the percentage of contribution on each 
individual asset. The sources therefore have a ‘narrative’ and often social 
component – the report – which help to reconstruct some of the dynamics of 
maritime trade in the early modern period, and an ‘accounting’ and economic 
component – the calculation – which provide information about the capital 
involved in the sea voyage, and the incidence of damage and unforeseen 
expenses in sea transport. Often these documents contain the names of the 
merchants involved and other documents which help to shed further light on the 
dynamics of individual sea voyages. An Average procedure may consist of a 
single sheet containing only the shipmaster's report, or of a rich dossier 
containing several documents, court cases and petitions produced by the 
various parties involved. 
Although the sources maintain a high level of uniformity and comparability 
throughout the seventeenth century, the formulation and refinement of the data 
entry template has presented numerous challenges from a conceptual, as well 
as technological, point. The main features of the Access template are presented 
                                                          
50 The main changes to the Access template reflect the need to add transcriptions of the original 
documents and records of the events that occurred in navigation. Interaction with Ian Wellaway, 
the project's IT technician, was crucial to the changes to the Access tabs. He further modified 
the interface from time to time to better suit the needs of this research. 
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below to give an idea of the criteria followed and the potential for research.51 In 
addition to an initial ‘summary’ box, it has been decided to create a series of 
tabs relating to the different areas into which the information from an Average 
procedure can be divided. The information in the summary box follows this 
order: type of cargo; port of departure; any intermediate stop; port of 
destination; fortouitous event and Average act. The tabs are categorised as 
follows: 
 
- Vessels. This tab contains all information about the vessel, the 
shipmaster and the crew. In particular, the most frequently used fields for 
Genoese sources are those relating to the name of the vessel, its type, its 
tonnage, the name of the shipmaster and his origin, whether a city or a 
country. 
- Legs. This tab contains a list of all stops made by the vessel. For each 
port, is indicated the date of arrival and departure. For each port, the reason 
for the stop (load cargo, unload cargo, pick up supplies, etc.) and the type of 
stop (origin, scheduled stop, forced stop, destination, unknown) is also 
specified. Ports are geo-localised at the moment of entry, thus allowing the 
rapid creation of maps over intervals of years and for specific types of stops. 
- Risk-corpo/Risk-noli/Risk-carico/Risk-equipaggio/Risk-total. Several 
assets contribute to the apportionment of an Avarage damage: the vessel, 
the freight, the cargo and, in rare cases, the crew's goods. Each type of asset 
is recorded in a separate table. The values are almost always given in 
Genoese lire. Even when other currencies are used, the exchange rate with 
the lira is always given in the ‘from source’ section for each cargo item or in 
the ‘further information’ section. In the case of freights and vessels, part of 
the value could be ‘non-contributing’, as will be seen later. This information is 
also given in the template. The risk-total table shows the total risk and the 
sums of the tables described above. 
- Reports. This tab contains all the information related to the shipmaster's 
report. Apart from the space for the date and the type of report, this section is 
divided into three subsections. The first one contains the summary of the 
report and a space for the transcription. The second one contains the data of 
                                                          
51 I have chosen to follow the structure of the Access template and not the one in the 
AveTransRisk online database as the latter, although accessible online, is still being refined and 
its structure may vary. 
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the witnesses called to validate the shipmaster's statements, their age, their 
role (as they are often part of the crew) and their city of origin. The third 
subtab contains data on the unforeseen events that occurred during the 
voyage. For each event, in addition to the summary and the transcript, a 
series of key words are given that allow it to be classified in particular 
categories (storm, strong wind, shipwreck, hostile encounter, etc.). This 
facilitates research on a large scale. 
- Averages. This tab records the data related to the calculation. The first 
items in this tab show the type of Average, GA or PA (General Average or 
Particular Average). There is also a table that automatically calculates the 
number of days required to complete the procedure from the time the report 
is deposited in Genoa until the calculation is approved by the relevant 
magistracy. The list of damages follows. For each item of damage, the 
amount of expenditure and any explanatory notes are reported. The total 
awarded table below shows the total damages and/or expenses incurred. 
The descriptive box shows the contribution rate transcribed, when present, 
directly from the calculation. The calculation section contains further 
information about the timeframe for approval of the calculation. Following the 
drafting of the calculation, in fact, a few days passed before it was approved 
by the competent authority. 
- Documents. This miscellaneous section contains the informations related 
to any type of document attached to the procedure other than the report or 
the calculation. Supplements to previously issued testimonies, legal cases 
and memoranda, bills of lading and more can be found in this tab. For each 
additional document, the date of drafting is indicated, alongside with the 
name of the document. There is also a space for a summary and a transcript. 
- Sources. The last tab contains the archival references to trace the 
original document within the Genoa State Archives. Documents in Genoa are 
collected in filze made of separate sheets, not in registers, so it can 
sometimes be difficult to locate a document. Fortunately, the individual 
procedures are often numbered in pencil and, in any case, having the 
database with all the Average procedures in a single filza, it is easy to go 




In addition to the tabs listed so far, there is a section devoted to metrological 
equivalences. This section contains all the equivalences of the various units of 
measurement or foreign currencies, converted by the Genoese notaries 
themselves into local units of measurement and currency. This information, for 
example, was essential for the elaboration of the conversion table for Genoese 
lire and pieces of eight shown in the ‘Measures and currencies’ section, or for 
the statistics on Sicilian wheat prices in Grap 4.8. Most of the data in the 
AveTransRisk database, as noted, is placed in special cells to facilitate indexing 
and processing for statistical purposes. The online database has a convenient 
advanced search function that allows customised searches on any type of 
parameter entered in the database. The results of advanced searches can also 
be downloaded in Excel or other formats to facilitate further processing by 
scholars. 
The structure of this work reflects the need to provide an overall picture of the 
early modern maritime trade of the Genoese Republic, and to investigate 
specific peculiarities from a micro perspective. To this end, and with the aim of 
providing the essential elements to frame the cases under examination, the 
First Chapter analyses the process of formation and strengthening of the 
Republic from the medieval period to the seventeenth century, a period 
characterised by frequent civil wars and attempted coups. The reforms of 1528 
and 1576 then brought a period of relative political stability. Understanding the 
mechanisms underlying the economic policies of the Republic, with particular 
reference to maritime trade, allows to understand the role of Genoa in the 
European political arena. 
The port itself, both its organisation in terms of infrastructure and its 
administrative and financial features, are analysed in the Second Chapter, 
highlighting the specialisation of the Genoese magistracies involved in its 
management. It will discuss the importance of the Casa di San Giorgio, a 
particularly complex institution involved in the activities and financing of the port 
complex in parallel and in symbiosis with other authorities. As I will show in 
detail, the Conservatori del Mare were the main governmental body for the 
management of Average procedures. They traditionally held jurisdiction over all 
procedures, problems and disputes concerning vessels entering and docking in 
the port. There was no lack of jurisdictional conflicts and tensions between the 
interests of the main families who had the monopoly of this magistracy and, for 
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example, those of the shipmasters who arrived in Genoa to unload cargoes and 
declare their Average report, or those of the other merchants involved. 
The Third Chapter focuses on the analysis of the credit and risk management 
tools available to maritime trade operators in Genoa. This overview is 
necessary both to contextualise the role of Average practices as a maritime risk 
management tool and to better understand the evolution of the regulatory 
framework and the application of the rules themselves. This is followed by an 
observation of the strategies of control and protection deployed by the 
magistracy of the Conservatori del Mare. Its members also acted as judges in 
case of litigation. I will analyze their efforts, during the seventeenth century, to 
limit the fraudulent practices linked to the Average reports. 
Average procedures constitute a very interesting lens through which I 
investigated maritime trade calling at the port of Genoa. The processing of the 
data in the database, sorted into the four sample periods already mentioned 
(1599-1601; 1639-1641; 1668-1670; 1698-1700) allows to reconstruct the main 
trends in maritime trade to or from the port of Genoa during the seventeenth 
century. The research criteria used and the results were integrated and 
compared with the studies of Felloni, Grendi and Doria. An attempt was made 
to clarify the visualisation of the main traffic flows which, in each period under 
examination, connected the port of Genoa to the main ports of call in the 
Mediterranean and Northern Europe. The total number of voyages recorded in 
the database, as will be seen, constitutes a sufficiently reliable sample 
compared to the total traffic. It is also possible to make observations on the 
cabotage navigation carried out by small Ligurian and Mediterranean vessels, a 
type of navigation which usually escapes the analysis of historians.52 Paragraph 
4.5 contains a quantitative analysis of several macrotrends based on Average 
sources, like the presence of foreign shipmasters, the structure of Genoese 
grain trade or the main maritime risks faced by vessels in the Mediterranean. 
                                                          
52 This term, possibly deriving from the Spanish cabo, cape, refers to the navigation carried out 
mainly along the coast by small vessels in search of advantageous freight contracts. For a more 
exhaustive definition see A. Lefebvre D'Ovidio, G. Pescatore, Manuale di diritto della 
navigazione, VII ed., Rome, 1990. Some historians, such as Ricardo Benavent, use more 
differentiated categories, such as “cabotaje corto” and “cabotaje largo”, but it would be difficult 
to find precise distinctions between the different types of navigation. See R. Franch Benavent, 
‘El comercio en Mediterráneo español durante la edad moderna: del estudio del tráfico a su 
vinculación con la realidad productiva y el contexto social’, Obradoiro de Historia Moderna 17, 
2008, 77-112, 81. 
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The last Chapter, finally, is based on a selection of cases studies which, due 
to their complexity, lie on the borderline of the regulations examined in the Third 
Chapter and provide an example of a qualitative analysis on early modern 
maritime shipping. In spite of the statutory provisions and the interpretations of 
the jurists of the time, some cases elude an immediate attempt to classify them 
in the main categories of Average events. I divided them in two main types 
(shipwreck or piracy) and I analysed them by taking into account all possible 
hypotheses to explain why they were considered as Average documents. 
Although they are not particularly numerous in comparison with the total number 
of cases recorded, they allow us to capture a variety of original and atypical 
situations that can foster future researches. The observation of these cases, 
perhaps even better than the study of legal texts, allows to observe the 
boundary between what was considered an Average and what was not. Finally, 
the last section will focus on frauds and rejected Average reports. In particular, I 
will show some of the strategies that merchants and shipmasters could use in 
relation to the Average institution. These particular cases also offer some 
examples of those macrotrends observed in the Fourth Chapter. 
The analysis carried out for the seventeenth century sources also aims to 
trace a new path of investigation in the field of Genoese maritime history for the 
following century and which, it is hoped, can be further enriched by comparison 
with analyses relating to other ports or new documentation. The relative 
homogeneity and wealth of the documentation for the eighteenth century will 
allow in the future to complete the Genoese regulatory framework, to work on 
new data on international maritime trade and to observe the regulatory evolution 
of Ancien Régime Europe. The eighteenth century, especially with regard to the 
history of Genoa, is an under-studied period of swift changes. The 
documentation preserved in the Genoese state archives seems to survive even 
the French domination and the first years of the Restoration (1796-1817). 
Obviously, a more in-depth investigation or the selection of subsequent intervals 
may also reinforce or, in some cases, challenge the hypotheses suggested in 
the following pages.  
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1.1 A Fragile Stability: Internal Politics and Public Order in Genoa 
 
The Republic of Genoa in the early modern period was a small state 
surrounded by expanding monarchies. It was a financial centre with its own 
merchant marine and an élite of powerful patricians engaged in all sorts of 
businesses, while also being in charge of the Republic’s political 
administration.1 The institutional development of Average in Genoa reflected the 
specific characteristics of Genoese maritime economy.2 GAs are rich and 
multifaceted sources which, in synergy with existing studies on the Republic of 
Genoa, can help scholars investigate maritime trade, both on a micro and 
macro-economic level. Proximity between public power and private interests 
affected the strategies underlying what we might call proto-economic policies. In 
particular, the Genoese oligarchy managed the port with efficiency and 
autonomy, while appointing different magistrates for the administration of 
specific sectors. The same is true for disputes in civil, maritime and merchant 
justice that were quickly resolved. Extra-judicial dispute resolution was also very 
common.3 However, the slow growth of the oligarchic class that ruled the 
Republic between the sixteenth and the eighteenth century and the functioning 
of the state itself, in terms of institutions and foreign policy, were the result of a 
series of choices and circumstances dating back to previous centuries.  
Therefore, this preliminary Chapter is a necessary excursus that deals with 
the role of Genoa on the international scene during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, alongside with its institutional development from consular municipality 
in the medieval period to oligarchic Republic following the 1528 reforms. I will 
highlight the main developments that determined the features of the Republic of 
                                                          
1 G. Felloni, ‘Il ceto dirigente a Genova nel secolo XVII: governanti o uomini d’affari?’, in Atti 
della Societá Ligure di Storia Patria, vol. 38, 1998, 1323-1340; Bitossi, Il governo dei magnifici. 
For a comparison with the medieval period, see Q. Van Doosselaere, Commercial agreements 
and social dynamics in Medieval Genoa, New York, 2009; E. Basso, Strutture insediative ed 
espansione commerciale. La rete portuale Genovese nel bacino del Mediterraneo, Cherasco, 
2011. 
2 A. Zanini, ‘La Superba: its institutions and fortunes’, in J. Bober, P. Boccardo, F. Boggero eds., 
A superb baroque. Art in Genoa, 1600-1750, Washington, 2020, 5-21. 
3 V. Piergiovanni, ‘Dottrina e prassi nella formazione del diritto portuale: il modello genovese’, in 
Doria, Massa eds., Il sistema portuale, 9-36. 
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Genoa in the seventeenth century. This is essential in order to clarify the 
context structure and peculiarities, before dealing with the functioning of the 
average institution in the Third Chapter.  
With the progressive extension of the Municipality of Genoa into the Riviere 
(the neighbouring coastal regions), borders were established that remained 
more or less unchanged for most of Genoa’s history.4 Its dominion extended 
along the coast from Monaco to the West, bordering with Savoy and France, to 
Lerici to the East, next to Tuscany. The hinterland is squeezed between the sea 
and the Apennines, with only a small area extending beyond them, the 
Oltregiogo. This was a strategic region for land trade routes towards Lombardy 
and Northern Italy.5 The overall land extent of mostly hilly or mountainous 
areas, was minimal, only 4,000 square kilometres. The development of 
manufacturing activity in the region was also affected by the lack of raw 
materials that had to be imported via maritime routes.6 These are the reasons 
why, from its gulf on the Ligurian Sea, Genoa has always linked its existence to 
maritime trade and territorial expansion. Moreover, numerous other institutional 
entities would coexist in this narrow land, including episcopal cities, private 
fiefdoms, and lordships of some families or other states, as can be seen in 
Map 1.1.7 
During the medieval period, the Genoese state would not only experience a 
great commercial development, but would also build an overseas colonial 
dominion in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.8 At the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, because of Ottoman expansion and the wars with other 
                                                          
4 M. Schnettger, C. Taviani eds., Libertà e Dominio. Il sistema politico genovese: le relazioni 
esterne e il controllo del territorio, Rome, 2011; G. Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori della 
Repubblica di Genova in Età moderna’, in Doria, Massa eds., Il sistema portuale, 221-258. 
5 V. Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare. Un lento itinerario tra V e XIII secolo’, in 
G. Assereto, M. Doria eds., Storia della Liguria, Rome-Bari, 2007, 28-36; P. Guglielmotti, 
‘Genoa and Liguria’, in C.A. Benes, ed., A Companion to Medieval Genoa, Leiden, 2018 49-61. 
See also R. Pavoni, Liguria medievale. Da provincia romana a stato regionale, Genoa, 1992. 
6 P. Massa, Lineamenti di organizzazione economica in uno stato preindustriale. La repubblica 
di Genova, Genoa, 1995, 12. 
7 See Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 195-198; Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul 
mare’, 28-36. 
8 C. Taviani criticized the use of the term ‘colony’ to define these territories. Such term was 
never used in the sources and it implies an administrative difference that does not seem to have 
been taken into consideration by the legislators. See C. Taviani, ‘The Genoese Casa di San 
Giorgio as a micro-economic and territorial nodal system’, in W. Blockmans, M. Krom, J. Wubs-
Mrozewicz eds., The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe 1300-1600: 
Commercial Networks and Urban Autonomy, London-New York, 2017, 177-191, 185. 
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states, this dominion had shrunk to the islands of Capraia and Corsica.9 
Moreover, because of its weak army and navy, made up mostly of mercenaries 
or militias, Genoa had to stipulate agreements or alliances with its neighbours, 
especially with France or Spain. And yet, Genoa always tried to preserve its 
political independence, even though only in the eighteenth century did it slowly 
develop a more articulated neutrality policy.10 Throughout the early modern 
period, the Republic of Genoa tried to improve and control every administrative 
and political tool likely to guarantee a constant and vital chain of supplies and 
commodities to the capital. Policies enacted by the Genoese elites could be 
seen as efforts to keep a certain margin of independence as well as the city’s 
role in international trade flows, in which it would often play a relevant role.11 
 
Map 1.1 Genoese territory in the second half of the fifteenth century
Source: C. Costantini, La repubblica di Genova nell’età moderna, Turin, 1978, 8 
 
According to the research conducted by Steven Epstein, in Genoa between 
1338 and 1538, there were fourteen peasant revolts, eleven revolts 
                                                          
9 L. Piccinno, ‘A city with a Port or a Port City?’, in Blockmans, Krom, Wubs-Mrozewicz eds., 
The Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe, 1300-1600, London, 2017, 159-
176, 161-163. 
10 The French bombing of Genoa in 1684 and the Spanish was of succession (1700-1714) 
marked the failure of the alliance with Spain, see C. Bitossi, La repubblica sfida il re Sole, Bari, 
2011. On the neutrality policies see also L. Garibbo, La neutralità della repubblica di Genova. 
Saggio sulla condizione dei piccoli stati nell’Europa del Settecento, Milano, 1972; A. Alimento 
ed., War, trade and neutrality. Europe and the Mediterranean in seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Milan, 2011. 
11 Costantini, La Repubblica di Genova, 323-325. 
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spearheaded by the nobility, seven joint revolts (peasant and nobility), six riots 
led by the Fregoso family, and one civil war.12 Genoese political authority was 
quite weak, compared to other republics, such as Venice, for example, and its 
history is characterised by constant struggles for internal hegemony, thus 
preventing any long-term faction’s rule. Yet, the government and the ruling 
elites remained more or less the same. Throughout its history, this is evidence 
of the exceptional ability of the political establishment to adjust to leadership 
changes. According to Guglielmo Assereto, the belief that the Genoese state 
was highly unstable should be considered as a historiographical cliché.13 
Genoese rulers followed needs and strategies that were different from those of 
‘territorial’ states, more heavily based on agriculture. As a matter of fact, Arturo 
Pacini wrote that the different idea of state developed by the Genoese is due to 
Liguria’s unique geography features.14 
One of the reasons for frequent government changes lies in the complex 
Genoese ruling class and their idea of state. These men managed to preserve 
their power from the origin of the Comune in the twelfth century until the end of 
the eighteenth century. The different groups and factions would change shape, 
structure and name according to political circumstances. Between the 
fourteenth and the seventeenth century, from time to time they would split into 
Guelphs and Ghibellines, Black and White, nobiles and populares, Old and New 
nobles.15 The 1528 reform tried to bring to an end conflicts through the creation 
of the Alberghi, which, however, failed to reach this objective, and were 
abolished in 1576. All these steps led to the celebrated ‘union’, a concept 
constantly championed and recalled by annalists and historians during the 
sixteenth century and beyond.16 Thanks to this union, a fragile socio-political 
balance managed to last from 1576 to 1797.  
Family groups who monopolistically held public, often inherited offices, made 
up the Genoa nobility. This process began in the twelfth century, during the 
                                                          
12 See S. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528, Chapel Hill, 1996. 
13 Assereto, ‘Dall’amministrazione patrizia, 95-159; Grendi, Introduzione alla storia 
moderna, 214. 
14 A. Pacini, I presupposti politici del “secolo dei genovesi”. La riforma del 1528, Genoa, 
1990, 84-85. 
15 Black and Whites were respectively equivalent for Ghibelline and Guelph. This division was a 
Genoese peculiarity, as in other parts of Italy only the Guelph themselves were divided in Black 
and Whites. See Pacini, I presupposti politici, 29-30.  
16 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 16-19. 
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development of the Commune, which replaced the ancient episcopal rule.17 The 
ruling class was initially made up of lower-rank nobility, who had moved to town 
following the economic and political decline of feudal governments. Officers 
belonging to the bishop-count circle would complement it. As administration and 
taxation experts, they were most suitable to run the government.18 Genoese 
elites had been the protagonists of the city's political life since its dawn, leading 
its merchant trade and the city’s expansion on the mainland and on international 
trade routes, especially towards the East, the so-called Levante. Because of its 
mountainous and hilly geography, Liguria’s hinterland was not much fertile, 
hence city merchants would rarely invest their money in crops.  
Still, as we can see from Map 1.1, noble families had their fiefs and owned 
property and land in the hinterland.19 Due to personal interest and political and 
military weakness, the Republic kept within itself the different above-mentioned 
small states and fiefs. It would also face frequent opposition from leading 
European powers that were interested in controlling the area.20 For all these 
reasons, relations between Genoa (the ‘Dominant’) and the Dominion were 
quite complex.21 Additionally, Genoese families constantly aimed at establishing 
good relations with families in the Riviera, through patronage or alliances, in 
order to exploit the land surrounding the city during frequent clashes for power. 
The Commune had only two major land-related concerns: protecting the 
Apennine passes to guarantee safe access to Po-valley region, and maintaining 
control over the cities in the Riviera, in particular over Savona.22 
                                                          
17 On the figure of the Count-Bishop, see A. Gamberini, ‘Vescovo e conte: la fortuna di un titolo 
nell’Italia centro-settentrionale (secoli XI-XV)’, Quaderni Storici 46/138, 2011, 671-695. 
18 A. Lercari, ‘La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria dal Comune consolare alla repubblica 
aristocratica’, in M. Fracanzani, I. Quadrio, M. Zorzi eds., Le aristocrazie cittadine. Evoluzione 
dei ceti dirigenti urbani nei secoli XV-XVIII. Atti del Convegno (Venezia, 20 ottobre 2007), 
Venice, 2009, 227-362, 234. See also Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare’, 26-38. 
19 A. Zanini, ‘Strategie politiche ed economia feudale ai confini della Repubblica di Genova 
(secoli XVI-XVIII). Un buon negotio con qualche contrarietà’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia 
Patria 45, 2005, 5-238. 
20 See V. Piergiovanni, ‘Il sistema europeo e le istituzioni repubblicane di Genova nel 
Quattrocento’, in Piergiovanni ed., Norme, scienza e pratica, 3-10. 
21 The Spanish ownership of Finale is a clear example of foreign interference in the Genoese 
consolidation of its territorial state. I will discuss it in the next Chapters. See P. Calcagno, ‘Una 
schermaglia di antico regime: la “partita” del Finale fra Genova, Milano e Madrid’, in M.H. 
Sánchez, Y. Ben Yessef Garfia, C. Bitossi, D. Puncuh eds., Génova y la Monarquía Hispánica 
(1528-1713), II, Genoa, 2011, 459-494; Zanini, ‘Strategie politiche ed economia feudale’, 5-238; 
G. Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di Genova’, 221-258. 
22 On the strategical value of Savona, see P. Calcagno, Savona, porto di Piemonte. L’economia 
della città e del suo territorio dal Quattrocento alla grande guerra, Novi Ligure, 2013; G. 




During the thirteenth century, Genoa’s political and economic success on the 
international scene went hand in hand with fiercer rivalries between the city 
factions of the Guelphs, also known as Rampini, and the Ghibellines, also 
known as Mascherati. These factions were struggling for power in most Italian 
cities. Theoretically, they were supporting either the Papacy or the Empire.23 
However, this distinction overlapped the division between nobiles – 
descendants of the consuls who had governed the city in the communal phase 
–, and populares – partly corresponding to merchants, artisans, shopkeepers, 
etc. In turn, the populares were divided into artifex (artisans) and mercatores 
(merchants).24 Nobiles vs. populares is undoubtedly the longest lasting conflict 
affecting the life of the Republic of Genoa. In part, it even survived the sixteenth 
century reforms. 
Each faction aimed to influence access to public offices, in order to fashion 
the composition of the city administration’s ranks to its own advantage.25 
However, the divisions within the Genoese elites were not so clear-cut, as they 
may seem from the outside, for they would not represent clearly separated 
groups. Members of a faction could be active within the Genoese community for 
some matters and concurrently (or subsequently) take sides with a different 
group. As pointed out by Edoardo Grendi, some members of the ruling class 
changed faction during their political careers, often just for political or economic 
                                                          
23 M. Ascheri, Le città-Stato, Bologna, 2006; C. Capra, G. Chittolini, F. Della Peruta, Corso di 
storia, I, Storia Medievale, Florence, 1995; H. Pirenne, Medieval cities: their origins and the 
revival of trade, Princeton, 2014 (1ed. 1925). 
24 Pacini, I presupposti, 22-23. 
25 On the conflicts between nobiles and populares, see G. Petti Balbi, ‘Genesi e composizione 
di un ceto dirigente, i “populares” a Genova nei secoli XIII e XIV’, in G. Rossetti ed., Spazio, 
società, potere nell’Italia dei Comuni, Naples, 1986, 85-103; E. Grendi, ‘Un esempio di arcaismo 
politico: le conventicole nobiliari a Genova e la riforma del 1528’, Rivista storica italiana 
LXXVIII/4, 1966, 948-968; E. Grendi, ‘Capitazioni e nobiltà genovese in età moderna’, Quaderni 
storici IX/26, 1974, 403-444; E. Grendi, ‘Profilo storico degli alberghi genovesi’, Mélanges de 
l’Ecole Française de Rome LXXXVII/1, 1975, 241-302; E. Grendi, ‘Problemi di storia degli 
alberghi genovesi’, in La storia dei genovesi, I, Atti del convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle 
istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova (Genova, 7-9 novembre 1980), Genoa, 1981, 183-197; G. 
Forcheri, ‘Dalla Compagna al Popolo’, in La storia dei genovesi, I, 73-89; A. Agosto, ‘Nobili e 
popolari: l’origine del dogato’, in La storia dei genovesi, I, 91-120; G. Barni, ‘La divisione del 
potere nelle costituzioni Adorno del 1363 e del 1413 (Nobili e Popolari)’, in La storia dei 
genovesi, I, 121-158; C. Cattaneo Mallone, ‘La nobiltà genovese dal Boccanegra alla riforma di 
Andrea Doria’, in La Storia dei genovesi, IV, Atti del convegno di studi sui ceti dirigenti nelle 
istituzioni della Repubblica di Genova (Genova, 28-30 aprile 1983), Genoa, 1984, 97-137; G. 
Forcheri, ‘Dalle Regulae costituzionali del 1413 alla Riforma del 1528’, in La Storia dei 
genovesi, IV, 7-29. See also G. Balbi, ‘Boccanegra Simone’, in Dizionario Biografico degli 
Italiani, IX, Rome, 1968, 37-40; V. Piergiovanni, ‘Il senato della Repubblica di Genova nella 
riforma di Andrea Doria’, Annali della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza IV/1, Genoa, 1965, 230-275; A. 
Petracchi, ‘Norma e prassi costituzionale nella serenissima Repubblica di Genova: La riforma 
del 1528’, Nuova rivista storica LXIV, 1980, 43-80; M. Nicora, ‘La nobiltà genovese dal 1528 al 
1700’, Miscellanea storica ligure, II, Milan, 1961, 217-310. 
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convenience.26 Francesco Guicciardini summarised this complex pattern as 
follows:  
 
And all these divisions are so confused that often those who are of the same 
side, against the opposing party, are also among themselves divided into 
various parties, and, on the contrary, they join with those who follow another 
side.27 
 
In 1257, there was a breakthrough. That year, due to the political supremacy of 
burghers over the recently urbanized nobility, the Podestà, formerly the political 
leader of the commune, was abolished and replaced by the capitano del popolo. 
Guglielmo Boccanegra, the first capitano del popolo, supported by the 
populace, expelled the nobles from the city.28 His rule, however, was short. 
Following Boccanegra’s fall, in 1262, the nobles came back and took over the 
role of capitano del popolo, which became their own prerogative.29 Ghibelline 
and Guelph exponents of the nobility would hold it alternatively: the Doria and 
Spinola ruled for the Ghibellines, the Fieschi and Grimaldi for the Guelphs. An 
abbot flanked the noble capitano del popolo as a guardian of populares’ 
interests.  
Long-lasting political instability, with actually no prevailing faction, and 
strongly fragmented main parties, would let new international players enter the 
fray. Since the fourteenth century, the main factions were increasingly relying 
on the strength and support of foreign powers, particularly interested in Genoa’s 
international alignment. Thus in 1311, after conflicts between the various 
parties, the Genoese placed themselves under the rule of the Holy Roman 
                                                          
26 Grendi, ‘Profilo storico degli Alberghi’, 24. The vicissitudes of Adamo Centurione are a clear 
example: he was a wealthy merchant who accumulated a fortune in trading and finance with 
Spain. He was a prominent element of a predominantly White Albergo. He was registered as a 
White in an undated list from early sixteenth century; he changed faction before 1521, the year 
in which he was among the councillors of San Giorgio. In the following years, he appeared 
among the Boni viri de tabula as a Black noble. ASG, ms. 87, Consigli delle classi, cc. 61r.-71t. 
Centurione sits among the Consiglieri di San Giorgio in 1521, as reported in ASCG, ms. 443, 
1521, 295. 
27 “E si confondono in modo tutte queste divisioni che spesso quegli che sono d’una medesima 
parte, contro alla parte opposita, sono eziandio tra se medesimi divisi in varie parti, e per 
contrario congiunti in una parte con quegli che seguitano un’altra parte”, F. Guicciardini, Storia 
d’Italia, II, Turin, 1971(1ed. 1537-1540), 655. 
28 R. Sabatino Lopez, ‘Boccanegra, Guglielmo’, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 11, 1969; 
A.M. Boldorini, ‘Guglielmo Boccanegra, Carlo d'Angiò e i conti di Ventimiglia (1257-1262)’, Atti 
della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie III/1, 1963, 139-199. 
29 The podestà played the role of moderator between factions, as he had to be a foreigner and 
not in any relation with the city clans. The capitano del popolo, and later the doge, on the other 
hand, were the expression of a specific clan or faction within urban society. See G. Cama, 
‘Banco di San Giorgio e sistema politico genovese: un’analisi teorica’, in G. Felloni ed., La Casa 
di San Giorgio: il potere del credito, Genoa, 2006, 109-120, 114. 
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Emperor Henry VII. He tried to broker an agreement between the factions in 
town.30 Subsequently, the Guelphs, allies to the King of France and opposed to 
the Emperor’s authority, expelled the Ghibellines. In 1318, they yielded to the 
rule of Pope John XXII and Robert of Anjou, king of Naples and count of 
Provence. These new rulers abolished the capitano del popolo, leaving only the 
abbot who supported a vicar appointed by the King. In 1331, the city officially 
surrendered to the king of Naples. Robert of Anjou, as requested by a mixed 
delegation of Genoese Guelphs and Ghibellines, managed to mediate a truce 
between them. The Ghibelline Doria and Spinola families were allowed back in 
town.31 Already in 1335, these families returned to power with a new capitano 
del popolo. However, any attempt to re-establish this old arrangement failed. 
On 23 September 1339, the election of a new abbot turned into the popular 
acclamation of the first doge, Simone Boccanegra, Guglielmo's nephew, who 
was opposed to the nobles.32 The doge’s mandate was supposed to last for life 
but, in Genoa, factions would always be against a long-lasting rule by a single 
individual.33 In addition, Boccanegra’s election had resulted from a riot aimed at 
excluding the nobility from power. As a result, nobles could no longer hold any 
of the city main offices.34 The noble families, however, opposed Boccanegra 
with the help of populations from the Riviera and the duchy of Milan. In 1353, 
this coalition succeeded in driving out the doge and imposing a Milanese rule. 
The principle of equal distribution of public offices among families was slowly 
brought back again. In any case, the control of the populares over the doge 
appointment lasted until 1528.  
Boccanegra managed to return to Genoa in 1356 when he ousted the 
Milanese with the support of Ghibelline troops from Tuscany. Following his 
death, few populares families – the Guarco, the Montaldo, the Fregoso and the 
Adorno – would take part in the struggle for the dogeship. Progressively, it 
became a prerogative of the members of the Adorno and Fregoso families 
alone. They were called cappellazzi, mere aggregators of factions scarcely 
                                                          
30 M. Jones, The New Cambridge Medieval History, VI, c. 1300-c. 1415, Cambridge, 2000, 534. 
See also G. Petti Balbi, ‘Uno dei fallimenti di Enrico VII: la signoria di Genova (1311-1313)’, Atti 
della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie LIV/2, 2014, 5-36.  
31 G. Petti Balbi, ‘L’assedio di Genova degli anni 1317-1331: maligna et durans discordia inter 
gibellinos et guelfos de Ianua’, Reti Medievali Rivista VIII, 2007, see 
https://doi.org/10.6092/1593-2214/129, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
32 Petti Balbi, ‘Boccanegra Simone’, 37-40. 
33 Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare’, 33. 
34 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 25. 
55 
 
characterized by common social purposes.35 The Adorno were the leaders of 
the Ghibelline faction, while the Fregoso led the Guelphs. Noble families would 
side with either of them, for reasons that often escape historical reconstruction. 
The Fieschi and the Grimaldi – Guelph nobles – together with the Spinola – 
Ghibelline nobles – supported the Adorno. The Doria – popular Ghibellines – 
supported the Fregoso – popular Guelphs.36 The nobiles never lost their 
influence on the city’s political life.37 
In 1363, Gabriele Adorno, former vicar of Boccanegra and doge after him, 
promulgated the Regulae Communis Januae. According to these rules, twelve 
all-popular Anziani were to be appointed, six from the mercatores and six from 
the artifex. During their four-month term, they had to support the doge, as I will 
show later.38 The Regulae remained in force until 1528, when they were 
replaced by the so-called ‘Dorian’ reforms. Under these Regulae, the division 
between Nobiles and Populares was formalised. The names of the members of 
the two factions were recorded in a book periodically updated by the two 
vicedoge, chosen among the populares. In order to be elected to public offices 
one had to be listed in this book.39 
Between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Genoa’s political life was 
deeply troubled by bitter disputes between factions that could result in the 
arrival of foreign rulers. During most of the fifteenth century, the members of the 
Adorno and Fregoso families would take turns in ruling the city, with short 
intervals of foreign rulers supported by the Milanese and the French. During this 
whole period, the ancient nobility – except for the Fieschi, Doria and Spinola, 
faction leaders in the Riviera – were sitting on the fence.40 Giorgio Adorno 
(1413-1415) during his dogeship, in order to ease social tensions, enacted the 
Reguale Reipublicae Genuensis: the seats in the Council of the Anziani and in 
the other magistracies were to be equally distributed among nobiles and 
                                                          
35 R. Musso, ‘La tirannia dei cappellazzi. La Liguria tra XIV e XVI secolo’, in Assereto, Doria 
eds., Storia della Liguria 39-50.  
36 F. Casoni, Annali della Repubblica di Genova del secolo decimo sesto, I, Genoa, 1799, 21-22 
(1ed.1708). See also H. Sieveking, ‘Studio sulle finanze genovesi nel medioevo e in particolare 
sulla casa di S. Giorgio’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria XXXV, 1905-1906, 1-261, 20-
21, 155-159. 
37 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 28. 
38 According to Vitale, there was an equal division of the offices between the Guelphs and the 
Ghibellines, see V. Vitale, Breviario della storia di Genova: lineamenti storici ed orientamenti 
bibliografici, Genoa, 1955, 140. 
39 C. Cattaneo Mallone, I "politici" del medioevo genovese: (ricerche d'archivio). Il Liber civilitatis 
del 1528, Genoa, 1987, 109; Lercari, ‘La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria’, 238. 
40 Lercari, ‘La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria’, 237. 
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populares. The division between Guelphs and Ghibellines overlapped this 
criterion; however, these labels were progressively losing their original meaning. 
The terms Bianchi (White) and Neri (Black), slowly replaced those of 
Ghibellines and Guelphs. 
 
1.2 “Franza o Spagna, Purché se Magna”41: Comparing Models 
 
During the Italian Wars (1494-1559), Genoa became strategically more 
important for the main parties involved. This process is evident in the different 
policies adopted by France and Spain regarding the Republic of Genoa.42 Most 
probably, the type of rule imposed over Genoa and its territories by these two 
monarchies affected all subsequent alliances of the Genoese. The ruling class 
was perfectly aware of their key role: the city was the gateway to the Italian 
peninsula for France, as well as an access to the sea for Milan. As a frontier 
region, it had to be adequately supported and defended. As to Spain, the 
Republic was unrivalled in what Parker called “the way to Flanders”.43 From 
1499, Genoa was under the rule of France, following the annexation of the 
Duchy of Milan to the dominion of Louis XII. Despite popular uprisings in 1506-
1507 and the brief dogeship of Paolo da Novi, the French government lasted 
until 1512. At least at the beginning, it enjoyed the favour of the nobility, as 
privileged interlocutors of the King.44 
Louis XII resorted to feudal investitures in order to win over the great noble 
families in Liguria and Lombardy, thus displeasing the populares. He managed 
the territory of Genoa as the rest of his Kingdom. Therefore, he used the same 
strategies he adopted in France to rule over the country and dominate local 
politics, without paying much attention to any specific local circumstances. In 
particular, Louis XII granted fiefdoms to reward the members of the nobility who 
were loyal to him. The Fieschi family for example, owners of a vast territorial 
                                                          
41 This is an Italian proverb, literally meaning “France or Spain, until we eat”. It was perhaps 
Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) who invented this proverb. First, he was Florence's 
ambassador in Spain and then, back home, he supported the 1526 Cognac Agreement and the 
alliance with France to weaken Charles V’s hegemony over Italy. This proverb applies well to 
Genoese internal conflicts for power in early modern period. 
42 M. Mallett, C. Shaw, The Italian Wars: 1494–1559, Harlow, 2012; J. Black, European 
Warfare, 1494–1660. Warfare and History, London, 2002. 
43 G. Parker, The army of Flanders and the Spanish road 1567-1659, Cambridge, 1972. See 
also W. Brulez, ‘L'exportation des Pays-Bas vers l'Italie par voie de terre, au milieu du XVIe 
siècle’, Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations 3, 1959, 461-491. 
44 Lercari, ‘La nobiltà civica a Genova e in Liguria’, 240. On the Doge Paolo da Novi, see 
Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 11-13. 
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domain in the Levante and defined by Jacque Heers as “un état montagnard”, 
were the King’s privileged interlocutors.45 In 1499, Gian Luigi Fieschi was 
appointed governor of the Riviera di Levante, which means the territories 
belonging to the republic East of Genoa.46 Repeated concessions to the 
requests made by Savona, in the Western Riviera, and attempts to change the 
local political-institutional system, added up to the conflict.47 The nobles, 
therefore, sided with the King. During the uprisings in 1506, the French, driven 
out from Genoa, reorganised their forces from Savona to conquer back the 
capital and restore the French rule. Under these circumstances, it was difficult 
for the populares to prevail over the nobility.  
However, interferences by the king's representatives in the most disparate 
matters, particularly in civil justice, slowly drove even the nobles to side against 
the king. The governor chosen by the king, for example, had the right to appoint 
all major judicial bodies. Moreover, in June 1509, Louis XII began to 
autonomously appoint officers and magistrates even in the Ligurian Riviera, with 
increasing concern among the citizens. In 1510, the Genoese managed to 
obtain a higher degree of autonomy. Venice and the Papacy organised an anti-
French offensive, laying siege to Genoa. The anti-French forces hoped for a 
popular uprising.48 However, the city sided with the king and rejected the 
invading armies. This success earned the favour of the king. Louis XII decided 
to recall his commissioners from Genoa. The king had never specified their 
mission, which had worried Genoese authorities. In general, during this period 
of French rule, the division between nobiles and populares was clearly 
exacerbated. The new fiefs had tipped off Genoa’s territorial balance, while the 
city judicial bodies were under continuous attacks from the French authorities. 
Although the French were ousted in 1512, the Adorno and Fieschi remained 
tied to France. The new doge, Ottaviano Fregoso, came to power in 1513 with 
Spanish support and the consent of Leo X.49 According to Oberto Foglietta, a 
contemporary historian, who was an opponent of the Doria and sided with the 
                                                          
45 J. Heers, Gènes au XVe siècle. Activité économique et problèmes sociaux, Paris, 1961, 599. 
46 V. Vitale, ‘Fieschi, Gian Luigi, il Vecchio’, in Enciclopedia Italiana, 15, Rome, 1932. 
47 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 52; E. Pandiani, ‘Controversie tra Genova e Savona durante il 
pontificato di Giulio II’, in Savona nella storia e nell’arte, Genoa, 1928, 167-202; C. Russo, 
‘L’arbitrato di Giulio I nella secolare lotta tra Genova e Savona’, Atti della Regia Deputazione di 
Storia Patria per la Liguria, sezione di Savona XXIV, 1942, 4-130. 
48 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 74-75. 
49 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 58; G. Brunelli, ‘Fregoso, Ottaviano’, in Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani, 50, Rome, 1998. 
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populares, the direction of Genoese politics and the need for a ‘unitary’ reform 
were already clear since Ottaviano Fregoso’s dogeship.50 The doge wanted to 
reunite the various factions and the Republic’s territories. For this reason, for 
example, he forced Savona – which under the French rule had enjoyed some 
degree of autonomy – to comply with the old agreements. Fregoso’s 
government distinguished itself for massive recourse to large assemblies of 
citizens, looking for broad consensus to overcome factionary fights.51 On the 
initiative of the doge, however, during an offensive led by the French sovereign 
Francis I in 1515, Genoa left the Hispanic-pontifical alliance and sided again 
with France. Ottaviano Fregoso gave up the doge title to become Governor of 
Genoa on behalf of the King of France, upon payment of a loan of 80,000 scudi 
to the King. The French rule lasted until 1522. However, the heterogeneous 
composition of the Fregoso faction, in which not everyone supported this 
sudden change of front, and the voluntary nature of this alliance, prevented 
Francis I from carrying on the pro-noble policy of Louis XII. However, there were 
new sources of conflict. The Genoese conquest of Gavi and Ovada domains, 
for example, previously owned by the noble Trotti and Guaschi families, broke 
all relations with France. The disagreement concerned borderland and key 
strategic positions for trade and defence. The Genoese army occupied these 
areas, but France demanded the government to leave them again to the Trotti 
and Guaschi.52 Actually, the pressing need of the Genoese state was to 
guarantee its land integrity. Thus, its willingness to accept the French rule 
depended also on this. The Grand Council of France, however, reached an 
agreement with the Trottis and Guaschis. Furthermore, already in 1519, Francis 
I asked Genoa for more money, arguing that this was a tribute rightfully owed to 
the king by his subjects. The requests intensified after the death of Emperor 
Maximilian I, when the French ruler sought to acquire the imperial title for 
himself. However, many bankers from Genoa, second only to the Fugger, are 
known to have sponsored the election of the future Charles V.53 
                                                          
50 O. Foglietta, La Repubblica di Genova, Bologna, 1997 (1ed. 1559). On Foglietta see C. 
Bitossi, ‘Foglietta, Oberto’, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 48, 1997. 
51 E. Pandiani, Genova ed Andrea Doria nel primo quarto del Cinquecento, Genoa, 1949, 160. 
52 Pacini, I presupposti politici, 80-84. 
53 R. Ehrenberg, Le siècle des Fugger, Paris, 1955, 44. See also R. Ehrenberg, Capital and 
finance in the age of the Renaissance: a study of the Fuggers and their connections, Fairfield, 
1985. Francis I requested money to the Republic in the spring 1519, see ASG, AS, Lettere 
principi alla repubblica di Genova 2780, 1519. 
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According to Arturo Pacini and Claudio Costantini, the alliance with the 
Empire and Spain, formalized in 1528, was the political result of an economic 
decision made in the early 1520s.54 Following the Turkish advance in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, the interests of Ligurian merchants had largely shifted 
westward, particularly to Spain and Portugal.55 The financial businesses of the 
wealthiest Genoese families, for example, were often intertwined with political 
and military events of the utmost importance. The Sauli financed the descent of 
Charles VIII to Italy in 1494, while the Grimaldi, Fornari and Vivaldi were among 
the financiers of Charles V against Francis I, as already discussed, even while 
Francis I was ruling in Genoa. 
Following the defeat of Francis I in the imperial election, obstacles to the 
alliance with France became even more evident. The political and commercial 
isolation that the Genoese merchants encountered in the territories subject to 
Charles V became unsustainable. The latter had also gained control over the 
duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of Naples, effectively hindering Genoese trade 
throughout the peninsula.56 Moreover, when examining Genoese foreign policy, 
provisioning was a constant concern. Being a city totally committed to 
commerce, industry and finance, and without a suitable hinterland for large 
cereal crops, Genoa depended on other Mediterranean areas to feed its 
population. In particular, safeguarding the supplies of Provençal (French) and 
Sicilian (Spanish/Imperial) grain was paramount. The revived conflict between 
the main European powers jeopardized access to those markets, thus the need 
for grain markets played an important role in strategic decisions at the 
international level. Ottaviano Fregoso himself, addressing Francis I, reported 
how the wealth of the city strictly depended on this trade: “not getting fruit from 
the earth at all, except only for the industry that induces traffic and trade”.57 In 
March 1522, for example, Genoa sent two ships under Commissioner 
Tommaso Italiano to seize all the vessels loaded with grain that he would 
encounter.58 Meanwhile, Spanish troops besieged the city. The Genoese 
defended themselves by buying time and hoping for French support.  
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The choice between France and Spain was clearly a difficult one, which 
would obviously lead to the exclusion from either market. However, there was 
the imperial assurance to restore the Republic and appoint a trusted Genoese 
citizen as the new doge, probably Girolamo Adorno, who was travelling together 
with the Spanish troops. The French, on the other hand, would continue to 
leave their own governor in Genoa. Agostino Giustiniani wrote that Charles V 
acted wisely because he knew and respected the proverb according to which 
only the Genoese would be able to run Genoa: 
 
[...] and he knew very well, His Majesty, the truth of the proverb, which said 
that if Genoa does not take Genoa the whole world would not take Genoa, 
and therefore [he] resolved to make use of the Adorno faction.59 
 
A direct French rule and the Spanish (or imperial) ‘protection’ alternated 
depending on which of the two main factions – the Adorno’s or the Fregoso’s – 
was prevailing. The fact that the two great powers had different institutional 
models played an important role. Under the French rule, the magistrates made 
their important decisions in the presence of the royal governor; they were 
subject to his supervision. Under the Spanish rule, on the other hand, an 
ambassador represented the king in the city. His control capacity, however, 
depended on the presence of trusted people in the state’s establishment.60 In 
practice, the Spanish protection offered better guarantees of independence and 
room for manoeuvre than the more direct French rule, which was a true 
governorate.61 
The way in which the Genoese conducted the negotiations during the 1522 
Spanish siege, with the exclusive intention of buying time and waiting for the 
French army, was perhaps at the origin of the subsequent sack of the city on 
the 30 and 31 of May 1522. Following the sack, pro-Spain Antoniotto Adorno 
(1522-1527) became the new doge. Already at this time when the imperial 
alliance was being put to test, Genoa had to deal with a more respectful 
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interlocutor to discuss its needs. The debt of over 40,000 scudi incurred by the 
Adorno with their supporters forced them to beg for the emperor’s benevolence. 
They sought to obtain an official backing from him. Charles V granted it with 
patent letter dated 20 December 1523.62 The sack, the blockage of trade with 
Lombardy, and unsafe sea routes, had weakened the city’s economy while tax 
revenues had dropped. During the Spanish attack in Provence in 1524, Adamo 
Centurione, consul, banker, and later Andrea Doria’s ‘finance minister’, pleaded 
the emperor to let Genoa get free access to the grain in Provence in exchange 
for its support in war.63 This would have allowed Genoa to preserve both its key 
supply centres. The attack, however, failed because of Marseille's resistance.64 
Conflicts of jurisdiction and administration still remained: the compulsory draft 
to the anti-French league of July-August 1523; the methodical exploitation of 
Genoese financial resources and of the city's strategic position; some secret 
negotiations between Charles V and France in May 1524 concerning Genoese 
territory; the pressures during the Morone conspiracy,65 the emperor’s 
resistance in accepting Genoa’s demands for free traffic in Spanish territories. 
For all these reasons, the government was poorly tolerated in the city.66 After 
the expulsion of Antoniotto Adorno, the troops of Cesare Fregoso and Andrea 
Doria, supported by the French, gave birth to the last foreign government, by 
the French governor Teodoro Trivulzio. Under his rule, the reform began, later 
to be completed by Andrea Doria. 
However, the French government proved to be highly unpopular: Francis I 
failed to bring Savona back under the Republic’s rule and refused to push 
through a reform of Genoa’s political bodies.67 Upon expiry of the agreement 
between Doria and Francis I, and after a few months of negotiations followed 
with apprehension in all European courts, the admiral went under the service of 
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Charles V. In September 1528, Doria entered Genoa.68 The city, weakened by 
the plague and the recent war, opposed almost no resistance and went again 
under Spanish rule. The contribution from Doria’s and Genoa’s galleys, new 
emperor’s allies, was fundamental to continue his fight for supremacy in Italy. 
This turnaround, not unusual in Genoese foreign policy in previous decades, 
also had obvious economic reasons. As early as 1519, a fundamental 
agreement had been finalised between Genoa and Spain. This document – 
originally a simple addition to the 1493 peace treaty between the Republic and 
the Iberian monarchy – sought to smooth out any economic divergences: i.e., 
managing mercantile disputes, ruling on possible reprisals, etc.69 The king’s 
subjects would fall under the jurisdiction of Genoese law etiam tam mari quam 
terra, in omnibus locis subditis iurisdictioni ianuensi, and viceversa.70 Thus the 
courts of the place where the law had been breached would have been the 
appropriate judiciary courts. Maritime legislation in Genoa was already strictly 
linked to Iberian customs, as we can see from the circulation, in Genoa, of the 
Consolat de Mar drafted in Barcelona in the thirteenth century.71 It probably 
succeeded the French rules known as the Roles d’Oleron.72 The Consolat de 
Mar was a key reference, as I will show in the Third Chapter, even in Genoese 
Average procedures. Genoese jurists cited and used it until the eighteenth 
century.73 
There were common interests well beyond the 1528 reform. Ideological, 
strategic, political and economic reasons contributed to bringing Genoa into the 
Spanish sphere of influence, even though the recent plunder was still a vivid 
memory. During the French rule, the Genoese had to waive their formal 
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freedom by accepting a governor appointed by France. Conversely, by 
remaining under the Spanish/imperial orbit, the State could maintain its 
republican structure. This basic difference affected the way power was wielded 
and might have been one of the main reasons for siding with Spain. For 
example, according to Pacini, France and Spain adopted different ways of 
exploiting Genoa’s resources and reflected the way they looked upon Genoa. 
Francis I asked for contributions as if the Republic of Genoa were part of his 
own Kingdom.74 Conversely, Charles V, since 1524, did not collect any taxes 
with his own officers, but rather resorted to loans from Genoese bankers, which 
would bring him great financial benefits.75 Still, we cannot underestimate the 
benefits of trade with France and the ‘opportunity cost’ of this choice for 
Genoa.76 
The Republic of Genoa did its best to avoid the duties involved in political 
alliances. It did not want to be subjected to Spanish foreign policies and tried to 
keep a minimum margin of manoeuvrability.77 This alliance was an expression 
of mercantile opportunism, made ‘honourable’ and justified by republican pride. 
The forces underlying Genoa’s political survival in European mercantile and 
financial markets and the survival, on a smaller scale, of its internal social and 
political balance, were difficult to govern. 
 
1.3 The Creation of an Oligarchic Republic 
 
Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the city was either a subject of 
the French king or an ally of the Iberian Catholic kings and then of the Holy 
Roman Emperor. Keeping their formal independence was a constant concern of 
the Genoese elites. Traditionally, most historiography about Genoa identifies 
the date of 1528, the stable alliance with Spain and the Dorian reforms as the 
reasons for the end of the bitter conflicts that had characterized Genoa’s 
government. Genoa thus entered a new foreign policy phase: Andrea Doria 
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became the guarantor of both the newly enacted reform and the new political 
alliance.78 
The issue of Genoa’s positioning on the European stage and the need for an 
institutional structure and system of unitary power had distant origins: not even 
the 1528 reorganization could provide a lasting solution. The drafting of the 
Libro di Pace e Concordia (date unknown, after 19 July 1506) was a first 
attempt at creating the ‘union’ as an outcome of popular uprising.79 It derived 
from the oath made to each other by some Genoese citizens: they undertook to 
reject the logic of factions, as soon as the ‘law of two thirds’ was to be 
approved. According to this law, which was immediately repealed upon the 
reinstatement of the French rule, magistracy offices had to be equally 
distributed not only between nobiles and populares, but also between the three 
orders of nobiles, populares, and craftsmen. The populares tried to overcome 
their factional division in order to increase their representative power. Until then, 
a greater unity of the nobility, as we have seen, was otherwise sufficient to 
guarantee their de facto dominance. The populares were far too divided among 
themselves.  
To safeguard their power, the nobles aimed to further strengthen internal 
divisions: the Adorno and Fregoso were the ideal tools to maintain the status 
quo. The Genoese nobility conceived society as an opposition between nobles 
and all other citizens, and the noble class in Genoa were merchants just like 
other citizens. Even some of the great populares families like, for example, the 
De Franchi, De Fornari, Promontorio, Sauli and Giustiniani would act like 
nobles, although they would be formally categorised as merchants and 
bankers.80 Challenging the superiority of the noble class was tantamount to 
attesting to a homogeneous ruling class of citizens involved in commercial and 
production activities. Despite alternating events, this homogeneous social 
structure could be established only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.81 
According to a manuscript by Giovanni Battista Cicala, another reform 
attempt took place in 1525.82 The Republic’s government appointed twelve 
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citizens – six nobiles and six populares – with the specific task of reforming the 
government.83 The circumstances looked propitious. Spain had just suffered a 
military defeat at Varazze and its authority was weakened, allowing the 
Genoese to aim at long overdue reforms. The promise of a long-awaited union 
with the populares was a political move. It was also useful to overcome political-
military difficulties and keep citizens united during a new offensive by the 
French who were leading the siege by sea and by land.84 The union was 
supposed to put an end to Adorno-Fregoso’s alternating rule pattern, and let the 
Republic take a neutral position between Spain and France. At the same time, 
the approval of any government system reform had to be obtained from Charles 
V. However, the unexpected imperial victory in the battle of Pavia, (10 March 
1525), and the capture of King Francis seriously weakened the position of 
reform advocates.85 Suddenly, it was no more urgent for the emperor to find an 
alternative to the proven loyalty of Antoniotto Adorno and his dogeship. Despite 
further attempts to demand reforms, especially from the Genoese ambassador 
Adamo Centurione, Madrid's attitude became cautious and evasive.86 In the 
previous months, a reformers’ committee had worked successfully and enforced 
some likely new measures: already between February and March 1525, there 
was news of a list of twenty-eight Alberghi to which Genoa’s families were to be 
assigned, similarly to the system that would be adopted later in the 1528 
‘Dorian’ reforms.87 
The cumbersome presence of the Adorno and Fregoso families and their 
catalyst role in factionary struggles were still the main obstacles, in addition to 
the lack of imperial support. Any reform would have to address their monopoly 
on the dogeship. In order to separate the fate of Genoa from the wars in Italy 
and from external powers, the institutional system of the Republic itself had to 
be reformed and the role of the lifetime doge done away with or in any case 
diminished. In 1527-1528, the reform plans, briefly taken up again during the 
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end of the French rule, were handed out practically unchanged to the pro-
Habsburg Andrea Doria. 
While there are no doubts about the importance of this decisive choice, the 
role of artifex attributed to Andrea Doria, often deemed as the sole mastermind 
and promoter of the Republic’s new structure, is disputable.88 After the already 
mentioned coup by Doria, on 12 September 1528, the aristocratic Republic of 
Genoa was established. The Genoese ruling class was perfectly aware of local 
political instability. In the next two centuries, the city would be governed by a 
sovereign aristocracy, mostly made up of the members of those families that for 
different reasons had participated in Genoa’s public life in previous centuries.  
Between 1527 and 1528, the magistracies appointed to draw up the new 
’constitutional’ laws of the Genoese state pursued two goals: reorganizing the 
institutional framework and putting an end to factional clashes, in the name of 
an ideal concept of ‘unity’. The already cited magistracy of twelve reformers – 
six nobiles and six populares – was entrusted with reorganizing the law. 
However, already in October 1528, two nobles, Simone Centurione and Filippo 
Cattaneo, succeeded in replacing two populares members of this magistracy. 
While the reasons for this change in the board’s composition are unclear, they 
hint at a prevailingly nobiles imprint to future reforms.89 
To bring order into Genoa’s ruling class, those entitled to participate in the 
government were divided into twenty-eight Alberghi through a formal process of 
ascrizione (enrolment) in the Liber Civitatis. This ledger reported every 
member’s name; candidates were selected or randomly chosen from this 
book.90 
What are these Alberghi? Edoardo Grendi defined an Albergo as a 
“demotopographic” institution. On the one hand, it aggregated families by 
surname; on the other hand, urban spaces were shaped by it, according to 
socio-political and cultural principles.91 They were in place even prior to the 
1528 reform. They were partly the result of faction changes, but also of the 
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establishment of multi-family groups without the obligation to take side with any 
particular faction. An Albergo could be established after a power sharing 
agreement or to certify the management of common goods.92 This peculiar 
procedure of family structure consolidation in a horizontal sense was perhaps 
the legacy of Genoese feudal system. Indeed, in Liguria, even before the 
establishment of the Commune, all male sons of a feudal lord would inherit their 
father’s estate. Parcelling out of power was the inevitable result of this process. 
The Albergo, therefore, was most probably designed to offset an excessive 
dispersal of power between groups: small families were absorbed by a larger 
one, taking on its surname and coat of arms or, in some cases, small families 
could join together and take on a new common surname.93 
Some of the main nobiles families originated in this way: the Cattaneos, for 
example, were born from the union between the Ghibelline Della Volta and the 
Guelph Mallone. The Imperiales were born out of a group of Ghibelline families 
after Emperor Henry VII conquered Genoa in 1311.94 Even some populares 
followed this model, as in the case of the remarkable Alberghi of the De Franchi 
and Giustiniani. The members of the same Albergo were required to live in the 
same neighbourhood. Here, they had their main residence, the loggia, 
warehouses and often a private church.95 The area of residence in the city 
impacted on the Alberghi: there were the Spinola of Lucca and the Spinola of 
San Luca, the Di Negro of Banchi and the Di Negro of San Lorenzo, etc. When 
recorded in the Liber, each member would get a double surname: for example, 
Silvestro Invrea, belonging to a family aggregated to the Albergo Doria, would 
be named Silvestro Invrea Doria.96 
The institutionalization of the Alberghi was an original experiment, not without 
drawbacks: some important families, such as the Serra and De Mari, failed to 
meet the requirements for the creation of an Albergo and had to join an existing 
one. In particular, they did not have the six houses in the city, or the six 
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branches of the same family, required for establishing an Albergo. In addition, 
often, the eponym families would not recognize the aggregates as their equal. 
This system would also feature some important exceptions. The Adorno and 
Fregoso, for example, were banned from giving their name to an Albergo, to 
avoid the conflicts experienced in the past. The important Cybo family, on the 
other hand, could establish an Albergo even if they failed to meet the 
requirements. This was a unique concession granted to them because one 
Cybo family member was at the time archbishop of Genoa.97 
The 28 Alberghi were ranked according to size, lineage, and members. The 
aggregation criteria are not quite clear. In many cases, the relationship with the 
Albergo’s eponym families or residence contiguity had priority. In many other 
cases, the associations were completely at random. The Alberghi and families 
did not coincide with Black and White divisions. In some Alberghi consisting of 
former nobiles (Salvago, Cattaneo, Pinelli, Gentile) and populares families 
(Costa, Levanto, Oneto), there were both White and Black individuals. 
Conversely, there was no mixing between nobiles and pupulares. 
The patrician Agostino Franzoni, a member of the New Nobles (former 
populares), in his book published in 1636, visually represented this new order, 
with all the coats of arms of the families constituting the twenty-eight Alberghi 
and those recorded in the period following the 1576 reform, which, as we shall 
see, abolished the Alberghi.98 His work was a careful historical investigation, 
even if the drawings are not complemented by any written text. In every table 
related to each of the twenty-eight Alberghi, like the Doria here below, the coats 
of arms are arranged according to a well defined hierarchy: the coat of arms (or 
its two or three versions) of the eponym family of the Albergo is in the centre. It 
is sided by the coats of arms of the families associated before 1528. Further, 
away from the central coat-of-arm, there are those of the families that joined the 
Albergo after the constitutional reform. 
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Image 1.1 Coats of arms of the Genoese patriciate




Divisions between factions, however, were not to disappear quickly. 
Following this new grouping, the members of the nobility reintroduced a careful 
division between former nobiles and former populares for access to the main 
political offices. While any name evoking past divisions was officially banned, 
the terms of New Nobles and Old Nobles became the official substitutes for 
populares and nobiles. The New Nobles were more numerous, but they only 
had four Alberghi out of twenty-eight. Each time a magistrate was elected 
following the principle of alternation between Alberghi, they were clearly at a 
disadvantage.99 
 
Table 1.1 The Twenty-eight Alberghi created by the 1528 Reform  
 
Calvi Di Negro Grimaldi Pinelli 
Cattaneo Doria Imperiale Promontorio
p 
Centurione Fieschi Interiano Salvago 
Cibo Fornarip Lercaro Saulip 
Cigala Gentile Lomellini Spinola 
De Franchi Giustinianip Negrone Usodimare 
De Marini Grillo Pallavicino Vivaldi 
Source: Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 25. p = All-populares grouping 
 
Table 1.2 Family composing the ‘Old Nobility’ 
 
Bernissone Da Passano Imperiale Ponte 
Biassa De Gradi Interiano Raggio 
Bracelli Della Rovere Lecavela Ravaschiero 
Caldi De Mari Lengueglia Re 
Camilla De Marini Lercaro Ricci 
Carmendino Di Negro Lomellini Salvago 
Cattaneo Doria Malocello Serra 
Cebá Fieschi Mottino Spinola 
Centurione Galiani Negrone Squarciafico 
Cibo Gentile Pallavicino Usodimare 
Cigala Ghisolfi Pansani Vento 
Clavesana Grillo Piccamiglio Vivaldi 
Cogno Grimaldi Pichenotti 
Corso Gualterio Pinelli 
Source: Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 25 
 
After 1528, therefore, the traditional internal divisions reappeared with the labels 
of Old Nobles and New Nobles, taking up Genoa’s political life for the next half-
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century.100 At the same time, the terms of ‘portico di San Luca’ and ‘portico di 
San Pietro’ also became popular as synonyms of ‘Old’ and ‘New’. They were 
named after the meeting places of the two factions at the opposite sides of 
piazza Banchi. Both Old and New Nobles looked upon ‘aggregates’ – those 
enrolled after the reform – with contempt and considered them almost as a 
separate class.101 
Only those recorded in the Liber Civilitatis were entitled to take part in the 
government. However, they were not allowed to engage in mechanical arts. 
When the Liber was first drafted, there were around 1,500 registered 
individuals: eight hundred populares and seven hundred nobiles.102 Under 
applicable inheritance rules, political power was to be handed down to 
legitimate male children, who also had to be enrolled in the Liber.103 Each year, 
seven non-registered citizens could apply to be added to the official list. Among 
these, until 1546, there were also entitled individuals who had failed to be 
recorded in 1528. Applicants had to be approved by the Maggior Consiglio.104 
They had to be born of a legitimate marriage, could not engage in mechanical 
arts, never been charged with heresy, sedition or shameful sins, and were 
required to lead an upright life within their family compound.105 
At the end of the sixteenth century, Genoa’s noble class consisted of about 
200 families. They were only 135 at the end of the eighteenth century, even if 
many new families had achieved noble status during that time.106 During these 
centuries, some of the oldest families died out, while there was a relative 
stability in the total number of new families, with frequent replacements. 
Furthermore, we know that in the Liber Civilitatis, which later became Liber 
Nobilitatis, over six hundred and forty families were recorded between 1528 and 
1797.107 Many of them were entitled to rule, but the implicit condition was that 
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only few should actually be appointed. Carlo Bitossi observed that in the history 
of the Genoese oligarchic Republic, we constantly find the same families. 
Moreover, only few of the New Nobles managed to get to the highest offices. In 
particular, there are recurrent names in the main magistracies: six among the 
New Nobles (Balbi, Brignole, De Franchi, Durazzo, Invrea, Sauli) and seven 
among the Old Nobles (Cattaneo, Doria, Gentile, Grimaldi, Lomellini, Negrone, 
Spinola).108 
This oligarchy ruled the state, but they were also actively involved in 
commerce, finance and navigation.109 While Bitossi identified a core of 
unchanged noble families ruling the Republic, Grendi and other scholars 
claimed that there was a distinction between the New Nobles, who were mostly 
merchants, and the Old Nobles, who were increasingly becoming financers. 
During the seventeenth century, the capitalistic oligarchy that owned nine-tenths 
of the city's wealth managed its own capital, and benefited from a wide range of 
opportunities and networks, while also being in charge of the Republic’s 
treasury.110 Government bonds, operations at the Fairs of Bisenzone,111 real 
estates, etc. were the most common types of investment. They would also 
heavily invest in international trade, shipping companies, manufacturing, 
insurance, etc.112 The names of important Genoese families are constantly 
found among those merchants involved in Averages analysed in the next 
Chapters.113 Genoa’s nobility continued to be an active and enterprising class 
both as passive investors and as entrepreneurs. Private enterprise had paved 
the way to the financial expansion between the fifteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, supported by the Republic’s government and its institutions.114 An 
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extensive credit network controlled by the Old Nobles, for example, managed 
funds related to asientos at the Spanish court.115 Some leading families of the 
New Nobles – such as the Airolo, Balbi, Brignole-Sale, Durazzo, Invrea, 
Moneglia and Saluzzo families – joined them in their lucrative businesses.116 
They worked in strict interdependence with the Spanish crown: this strategy 
pushed the Genoese economy toward high finance.117 Fernand Braudel 
recalled the expression “Age of the Genoese” to describe the period from 1557 
to 1627, “[…] of a rule that was so discreet and sophisticated that historians for 
a long time failed to notice it”.118 According to Bitossi, recent works on Genoese 
history are now expected to further ‘stretch’ the age of the Genoese towards the 
first half of the sixteenth century and the mid-seventeenth century.119 
In addition to financial activities, the frequent presence of Genoa’s noble 
names in Average documents and the capitals they employed implies that 
maritime commercial activities remained important. Although I do not have 
enough data yet to state this with absolute certainty, throughout this dissertation 
I have provided a re-evaluation of the Genoese noble class’ role within the 
maritime sector. Claudio Marsilio highlighted the importance of Genoese 
involvement in the Spanish silver trade, with businessmen carrying silver from 
the main Spanish Mediterranean ports (Barcelona, Cartagena, Denia, and 
Alicante) to Genoa. From here, they re-routed the cases of silver towards 
England, the Netherlands, and beyond.120 Genoese patricians had their own 
galleys and, when these were not enough or were not available, they hired the 
Republic’s galleys or others from Spanish squadrons. Between 1528 and 1716, 
when the private galley squadron was disbanded, numerous asentistas 
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belonging to the Genoese nobility replaced it: Centurione, Cicala, De Mari, De 
Marini, Doria d'Angri, Doria di Melfi, Grillo, Grimaldi, Imperiale, Lomellini, 
Negrone, Sauli, Serra and Spinola.121 Moreover, if we consider Genoese 
financial brokers (Durazzo, Pallavicini, Spinola, Invrea, Pichenotti, Moneglia and 
Balbi) and the abovementioned Spanish ports involved, there are many 
similarities with the information on Genoese trade found in GAs. The 
management of the Tunisian island of Tabarka is another example. Thanks to 
an asiento signed in 1543 with the Spanish crown, the Lomellini family were in 
charge of lucrative coral fishing in the waters around the island, as well as its 
subsequent shipping.122 
 
1.4 The Evolution of the Oligarchic Republic 
 
Doria defined the period from 1528 to 1576 as the phase when “the noble class 
tried to get unified”.123 Indeed, the changes introduced by the Dorian reforms 
were not sufficient to guarantee the desired union, even if they had reorganised 
the functioning of the Republic itself. The 1528 reforms, for example, imposed a 
two-year limit on the Doge’s term.124 Although the doge could run for a second 
term, Giacomo Maria Brignole was the only re-elected doge and during his 
dogeship, in 1797, the Republic collapsed.125 The two year-limit would 
guarantee a frequent turnover in the Republic’s top administration offices, while 
preventing monopoly by any faction. The doge, together with the Collegi – the 
Senate and the Chamber – held what today is referred to as the executive 
function. The Senate managed most of the government business.126 It consisted 
of eight members, called senators or governors, increased to 12 after the 1576 
reform. Senators remained in charge for two years and, at the end of their term, 
they became procurators for the next two years in the other Collegio, the 
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Chamber.127 Therefore, eight procurators would sit in the Chamber: they were in 
charge of public finances, voted new laws and acted as a court of appeal. The 
doge, together with the Collegi, formed the Signoria, the body jointly responsible 
for government’s decisions. Former dogi would also sit in the Chamber as 
lifetime procurators, after their previous activities had been checked by an 
important constitutional and accounting supervising authority, namely the five 
Supremi Sindacatori.128 Andrea Doria was one of them. He designed the office 
on himself: he would be a lifetime Sindacatore and held the primacy in the 
council as its Prior. As a personal recognition, also Sinibaldo Fieschi was 
granted the unique privilege of becoming Supremo Sindacatore for life. Finally, 
the outgoing members of the Collegi, also called togati, formed the three 
permanent Giunta: Giunta dei Confini, Giunta di Giurisdizione, Giunta di Marina. 
They would deal with foreign policy issues, relations with the Church and trade, 
with frequently overlapping tasks and powers.129 One quarter of the Collegi, 
Senate and Chamber, was renewed every semester, choosing the new 
members out of a selection of 120 individuals, called Seminario, then decreased 
to 90. The Minor Consiglio would compile and filled up the Seminario list every 
year. Since it was possible to be listed back in the Seminario, the most 
influential patricians were repeatedly listed. They were called gentiluomini del 
Seminario: they formed the inner circle of the oligarchy, monopolizing the top 
government circles. The gentiluomini di attendenza were much more numerous. 
These were patricians trying to get a job in one of the various magistrates and 
other Republic’s offices.130 
Then there were the Consigli. The two Consigli shared legislative power. 
They worked together with the Collegi in the approval phase: 400 people 
formed the Maggior Consiglio, while the Minor Consiglio was made up of 100 
members. After 1652, its number increased to 200.131 The Consigli elected the 
doge and chose the 30 electors who each year would replace part of their 
members. They had the power to amend constitutional laws and appoint the 
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chiefs of the main magistracies.132 The Maggior Consiglio, formed by 400 
members chosen from the Liber Civitatis, elected the eight senators from a list 
previously made by 28 councillors, one for each Albergo. 
Different magistracies were in charge of the remaining political and 
administrative functions. Each of them had limited powers and responsibilities 
linked to their scope, as I will show in the next Chapter. Depending on the 
institution, its members could be elected, directly appointed, or randomly 
chosen from a list. In order to make sure that the new entries would always be 
supported by more experienced people, a partial turnover was maintained in 
each administrative body.133 According to an estimate carried out by Felloni, in 
Liguria and Corsica together, the Republic employed 800-900 nobles in public 
offices lasting up to 2 years.134 Because of this great need for public officers 
working in the state’s bureaucracy, fines and penalties had to be introduced in 
case of desertion from duty. Over time, pragmatically, even non-listed citizens 
could also apply for minor offices. 
Following the 1528 organisation implemented by Andrea Doria, the nobiles 
could once again aspire to the position of doge. On the other hand, the status of 
populares was officially equated to the nobiles, without any formal distinction. 
The institutional solution followed a precise rationale: increasing the 
representative structures (Consigli) with elective, consultative and even 
decision-making functions; distribution of the doge’s power, who became almost 
equal to the senators – heirs to the old Collegio degli Anziani – with the support 
from the procurators (the Collegi); establishment of a supervisory authority, the 
Supremi Sindacatori, whose activity was in turn checked by the Minor 
Consiglio.135 Alongside with the Supremi Sindacatori, there were the Sindacatori 
Ordinari, in charge of supervising less important offices.136 Another feature of 
Genoa’s political system was the frequent use of ‘temporary’ laws, which had to 
be renewed after a few years. While allowing some flexibility and easy strategy 
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adjustments in response to changing scenarios, it would also prevent the 
development of long-term strategies in the most varied fields.137 
Even if the 1528 reforms and the division into Alberghi can in part help us 
understand and explain Genoese political life, many elements remain unknown, 
especially in the following decades. Nobiles and populares, Guelphs and 
Ghibellines, the Adorno and Fregoso, they all reflected a highly mobile, almost 
inconsistent political organisation. This very feature has hindered research on 
general Genoese history, usually forcing historians to focus on well-determined 
periods and aspects. Factions, coup attempts, and other important political 
system distortions remained even after the 1528 reform, recognised by many 
historians as a final pacification. For this reason, it is also difficult to retrace the 
various groups’ ability to coagulate, break up, and re-assemble with new 
features. Understanding the reasons why individuals would behave in a certain 
way is complicated, while departing from applying the same labels used so far 
to investigate their economic and private decisions is difficult. Yet, a sufficiently 
reliable interpretation is possible only by studying their actual actions. Indeed, 
within the new system there were further divisions: different degrees of wealth, 
a different distribution of the rich and poor between New and Old Nobles; 
quantitative inequalities between the Old and New Nobles are all parameters of 
instability. A report on Genoa, dated to 1597 by Giorgio Doria, clearly described 
this situation: 
 
In this city, the ones who rule are not always those who ought to, as reason 
and the law dictate, but rather the richest [...]. I say that, as much as in 
appearance she is governed by the ottimati [the aristocracy], with regard to 
the factions the New [Nobles] have, by chance, the superiority [...], in effect 
[...] it is all the rich who really rule.138 
 
Judging by this report, the Republic of Genoa looked more like a plutocracy 
than an aristocracy. The connections between political power, finance and trade 
are hard to retrace. Historians have for a long time referred to a “turn to finance” 
in the strategies of the Genoese elites. Yet, their involvement in maritime trade 
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lasted at least until the end of the seventeenth century.139 For this reason, the 
study of Average shedslight on the businessmen, their constant involvement in 
maritime trade and their investments. For example, GAs provide data on the 
merchants involved in shipping headed to Genoa, on the freights and carried 
goods. The main Genoese families were involved in trade with Spain or 
Southern Italy, together with foreigners residing in the city, thus forming a 
diffuse network of shared interests.140 The nobles entertained business 
relationships with the Spanish ambassadors sent to Genoa, with the Spanish 
viceroys in Southern Italy, and had a network of agents and brokers spread all 
across Europe.141 At the same time, during the seventeenth century, there were 
massive investments in port infrastructures and policies were enforced to 
strengthen the role of Genoa.142 All these elements will be taken into account in 
the next Chapters. 
The riots following the division into Alberghi led to sweeping institutional 
changes. The 1547 laws, called the garibetto, and the Leggi di Casale in 1576 – 
the outcome of anti-loyal movements in the previous year – were fundamental 
steps confirming contrasts between citizens.143 
The garibetto was the political response to the failed Fieschi’s conspiracy. 
Following the pacification of inner borders, the political weight of the Fieschi 
family – owners of numerous fiefdoms in the Levante hinterland – had 
decreased. Parallel to the relative decline experience by the feudal nobility, the 
nobles involved in the main mercantile and financial circuits got richer, above all 
those that had businesses with Spain, like Adamo Centurione, the Grimaldi, 
Doria, Spinola, De Mari, and Pallavicini.144 Thus, the Spanish alliance could be 
seen as a proto-political and economic strategy closely interconnected with the 
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measures adopted in the seventeenth century, as I will show in the Second 
Chapter. 
Therefore, with the support of the papacy and France, Gian Luigi Fieschi 
attempted a coup in 1547. His goal was to bring the Republic back under 
French rule. The conspiracy was a failure, although the Fieschi succeeded in 
getting rid of Giannettino Doria, commander of Andrea Doria's squadron of 
galleys. In the aftermath of the uprising, the Republic, the Duke of Parma, 
Andrea Doria himself and the emperor partitioned Fieschi’s properties. 
However, to avoid Charles V installing a garrison under the pretext of the city’s 
defence in case of new riots, Doria and his circle proposed an amendment to 
the 1528 laws, the garibetto, implemented in November 1547.145 According to 
this measure, an electoral body made up of Collegi, Banco di San Giorgio, 
Sindacati Ordinari and Sindacati Straordinari was in charge of electing one 
hundred members of the Maggior Consiglio and the entire Minor Consiglio. This 
process would centralize power as desired by the New Nobles. In this way, they 
hoped they could compensate for the random factor implied in the drawing 
system applicable to the Alberghi, where the Old Nobles had the majority.146 
This solution did not eliminate all contrasts. Subsequent governments worked 
on other measures to avoid violent factional clashes; in 1569, for example, doge 
Paolo Moneglia announced that he intended to update the garibetto.147 
The subsequent Corsica War – a particularly long and costly conflict waged 
between 1553 and 1559 and between 1562 and 1569 – contributed to unifying 
the Genoese ruling class in the aftermath of the garibetto. On the other hand, 
the war and recurrent famines aggravated relations with Spain and increased 
social tensions.148 Philip II had even a secret plan to buy Corsica from the 
Genoese, exploiting the weakness of the Republic.149 Moreover, the Spanish 
crown was reluctant to repay the loans they had frequently taken from the 
Genoese. In 1557, the crown decided to suspend repayment of the royal debt 
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and to renegotiate the loan in a process called Quiebra.150 This event – usually 
wrongly defined as bankruptcy, when technically it was a debt renegotiation – 
undermined the creditors’ trust and triggered a liquidity crisis.151 The Spanish 
alliance allowed privileged interest rates to be applied, which, as we have seen, 
was justified by several political and economic reasons. In the following century, 
this issue would strongly emerge as a source of problems and obstacles, as I 
will show in the next Chapters. 
The war led to higher taxes, for example with the levy of a wine tax, and 
worsened living conditions for the population. Andrea Doria himself suggested 
to the Spanish king Philip II, son of Charles V, to take over the Republic of 
Genoa as a guarantor of its stability.152 After the war-related crisis, many 
wanted to go back to the 1528 regime, blaming the garibetto for the current 
economic situation. Oberto Foglietta, for example, in his 1559 Dialogo delle 
Cose della Repubblica di Genova, suggested a reform of the electoral system 
purely based on census – obviously more favourable to the New Nobles – to 
which he belonged.153 Further, with the death of Andrea Doria in 1560, the 
government lost an authoritative mediator. Following his death, the clashes 
between factions that had marked the previous decades resumed once again. 
To mark their distance from the New Nobles, the Old Nobles wanted to 
reinstate the old divisions between social classes. On the other hand, the New 
Nobles believed that the current system was too much in favour of the Old 
Nobles, headed by Matteo Senarega, the former Secretary of the Senate, and 
wanted to reform the Republic’s system.154 Among the New Nobles, there were 
still the same internal differences that had characterized the populares faction: 
families and groups had different standards of living and interests. In addition, 
many wealthy citizens complained that they could not be enrolled in the Liber 
and achieve noble status. Even a slow integration process contributed to 
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generating tensions. Between 1573 and 1575, more turmoil blocked 
government activities. In March 1575, the New Nobles, under pressure from the 
armed people on the streets, imposed the abolition of the garibetto and the 
enrolling of 300 nobles in the Liber.155 The Old Nobles fled the city, waiting for 
the support of the king of Spain. They started preparing a counteroffensive from 
the marquisate of Finale.  
For a whole year in Genoa there was only a moderate government made up 
of New Nobles, while the King of Spain not only failed to support the Old Nobles 
but, in 1575, he even imposed a ‘credit freeze’.156 The group in power that 
controlled Genoa was a line-up representing about 60% of the entire nobility, 
equivalent to 1,800-2,000 male individuals.157 Faced with this stalemate, the 
opposite factions accepted the mediation by a committee composed of one 
representative of the king of Spain, the Emperor, and the Pope each. The 
refounding of the political system, quickly accepted by both parties, started on 
the 12 March 1576. The last Genoese civil war ended with the return of the Old 
Nobles and the acceptance of about 90 new members into the Liber.  
The laws promulgated in 1576 are known as the Leges Novae or Leggi di 
Casale, from the place where negotiations had taken place. The new laws 
dismantled the Alberghi, together with the union of surnames, the division into 
Portici, and the garibetto. They ignored the Old Nobles’ claims of superiority. 
The number of new annual enrolments was raised to ten, of which seven from 
the city and three from the Riviera. Through a periodic strengthening of the 
ruling class, the rise of any homogeneous class antagonistic to the state would 
be prevented. Moreover, in the seventeenth century, applicants could also be 
enrolled in the Liber following a generous donation to the state’s treasury.158 
However, according to a 1670 survey, a full century after the enforcement of the 
Leges Novae, half of the marriages of the former Old Nobles were still with 
other Old Nobles, and only a quarter with the New Nobles.159 Following these 
negotiations, no new figure as Andrea Doria could emerge. All main members 
of the city elite made all decisions, confirming patrician class’ cohesion.  
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The first issue to be faced was to clearly define noble’s status.160 Under the 
1576 laws, ‘noble’ status was compatible with ship-owning and banking 
activities, tax collection and industrial and commercial enterprises, provided that 
the noble did not personally work in the shop. If he was a notary, the nobleman 
could draw up documents in his own house or in the hospitals, but he could not 
have a private office nor a desk in public spaces. Mechanical arts (related to the 
handling of raw materials or goods) were still incompatible. Under the Leges 
Novae, those who exercised mechanical arts were required to stop within the 
next two years.161 However, the nobles involved in mechanical arts managed to 
have exceptions approved one after another, until 1603: a sign of the 
heterogeneous composition of the noble class and of its multiple interests.162 
Therefore, only the sixteenth century structural reforms did allow a gradual 
building of a real ‘sovereign patriciate’, by those who had acquired the right to 
run the Republic.163 Doria defined the period following the 1576 reform as the 
“final unification”.164 From this moment on, all families recorded in the Liber 
Civitatis were deemed equal and eligible to public offices; they were also the 
only ones with the power to elect the main magistracies of the Republic. 
Unification had been slow but effective, aimed at joining the various sectors of 
the Genoese aristocracy together into a single body.165 The political stabilization 
necessary for the functioning of the Republic in the early modern period, as we 
have seen, required a profound reorganization of the city’s ruling class. The 
concept of civil nobility prevailed: being noble meant participating in government 
activities. This participation in no way excluded the exercise of banking, 
commercial or financial professions. The high level of conflict between the ruling 
factions and individuals remained a constant feature of the Genoese 
administration, influenced by both internal and external factors. Still, a fragile 
stability lasted until the end of the eighteenth century. 
Finally, in 1579, the stabilization process was completed. After four years of 
financial clashes, the Genoese took control of all leading international financial 
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exchange fairs – the so-called fiere di Bisenzone - by moving them to 
neighbouring and friendly Piacenza. In this way, they also managed to redefine 
financial services provided to the Spanish crown under more favourable 
conditions for them.166 Finally, most notably, the Collegi’s decree dated 16 
November 1581 officially established a unified honorary title for all the nobility, 
namely the title of magnifico to designate all those citizens registered in the 
Liber.167 This is the reason why Genoa could finally be formally defined as an 
aristocratic and oligarchic Republic.168 
 
1.5 The Republic throughout the Seventeenth Century 
 
Following the 1576 reforms, Genoese internal political balance remained 
substantially unchanged until the end of the eighteenth century. With these, the 
oligarchy in power agreed to preserve the balance which had been achieved 
after much political struggle, but this was not without criticism.  
While the distinction between Old and New Nobles had officially been 
dissolved, it survived, albeit implicitly, in the separation and rivalry between the 
former members of the two groups.169 This two-party process was still 
scrupulously adhered to during the decade of 1680, in the election of the doge 
as well as in the selection of the 30 voters and members of the Minor 
Consiglio.170 According to Bitossi, the use of partition mechanisms ensured 
control of the government to a compact group of individuals from different 
lineages to include Old Nobles alongside leaders of the New Nobles faction.171 
This criterion ensured cohesion among those families who had traditionally 
been in power, as well as the presence of a group of ‘recent’ ascension who 
was determined to maintain its own power.172 In the successive two centuries, 
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only a few institutional changes were made. Among these, as it will be seen, 
there was the promulgation of the Statuti Civili of 1589.173  
Much criticism from within the government regarded the Genoese Republic’s 
privileged relationship with the Spanish Empire, which Andrea Doria had 
inaugurated in 1528. The main issues included: institutional balance in light of 
Spanish interferences made by their representatives in town; the economic 
model to be followed, as it was feared that the decline of Genoese trade was 
due to excessive concentration of capital on the financial market of the Iberian 
asientos; as well as diplomatic and military strategies, as foreign policy 
appeared too closely linked to Spain.174 Spain, for example, prohibited the 
establishment of foreign diplomatic delegations in Genoa.175 As a solution to the 
latter, some patricians proposed strengthening the Republic's fleet to gain full 
jurisdiction over the Ligurian Sea: this project, as it will be seen, would lead to 
the Nuovo Armamento policies.176 
After the coronation of Henry IV of Bourbon and the end of the Wars of 
Religion in France (1589), encouraged by the difficulties of Spain, the pro-
French factions and parties reignited attempts to gain control over Genoa.177 
The beginning of the seventeenth century also saw the medieval idea of Empire 
lose ground due to growing distrust towards Habsburg authority.178 Progressive 
growth of the autonomist debate and the strengthening of an anti-Spanish and 
‘republican’ independent faction in Genoa characterized these years.179 
Between 1610 and 1620, for example, Ansaldo Cebà and Andrea Spinola, 
among the main supporters of political reformism, looked to Venice as a 
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possible model to imitate as a “strong and independent” Republic, not reliant on 
foreign monarchies.180 
Meanwhile, loans to the Spanish crown, which had reached their apex in the 
first few years of the seventeenth century, decreseased in volume over time 
because of the difficulties of the Spanish treasury, especially after 1606.181 This 
led to a gradual rebalancing of investments in favour of maritime trade as 
Genoese patricians considered both sectors to be of paramount importance. 
Moreover, maritime trade and naval forces were an essential part of the 
‘Spanish’ connection: according to Arturo Pacini, they were the most effective 
remedy to face the scattering of Spanish territories in the Italian peninsula, thus 
also providing business opportunities for Genoese patroni and merchants.182 In 
fact, the routes between Genoa, the Iberian Peninsula and the Italian domains 
of the Spanish monarchy were the main axis of Genoese short- and medium-
distance trade, as Average documentation clearly demonstrates.183 Many 
historians have used the metaphor of the gold chain – a strong and profitable 
bound, but still a bound – to illustrate the complex relationship between the 
Genoese Republic and the Spanish crown: a situation which was convenient to 
both allies in many ways.184 The routes of the Western Mediterranean survived, 
despite logistical and political-diplomatic challenges. The Genoa-Barcelona 
route, for example, mostly ran along the coasts of a rival power, the Bourbons 
of France, whilst the Gulf of Lion, with its unpredictable winds and its strong 
mistral, was one of the most dangerous and uncertain areas for Mediterranean 
navigation.185 Another route which Genoese vessels followed, along the 
Tyrrhenian Sea, also had areas, such as the Tuscan archipelago, which were 
particularly dangerous for navigation. The Lazio coast, instead, lacked in 
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landings on the coast up to Civitavecchia and both these areas were hunting 
grounds for Barbary and Christian piracy.186  
The quiebra of 1627, which left the Genoese financiers in credit of six million 
ducats, together with the war of Candia between Venice and the Ottoman 
Empire (1645-1669) were contributing factors that pushed Genoese capital 
investment towards naval forces and maritime trade.187 The 1627 quiebra, in 
particular, represented one of the most challenging times for the Genoa-Madrid 
axis. Historians often indicate it as the event that determined the end of the 
‘Genoese century’.188 Even in this case, however, the financial crisis that 
followed did not lead to a long-term political or diplomatic shift.189 Genoese 
loans were converted into juros, which were public debt bonds of long-term 
maturity, although their market value was lower than their nominal value.190 A 
great deal of Genoese capital was also reinvested in other sectors, such as 
Venetian, Roman, or other European state bonds.191 
Despite the internationally established networks, based more on commercial 
than diplomatic relations, the Genoese Republic was not safe from its long 
rivalry with the neighbouring Duchy of Savoy. On the pretext of Franco-Spanish 
hostility, in fact, it faced invasion by Franco-Savoyard troops in 1625.192 Duke 
Carlo Emanuele I, following the Genoese acquisition of the marquisate of 
Zuccarello in 1623 by Marquis Ottaviano del Carretto, had ordered the attack.193 
Zuccarello was an imperial fief in the hinterland of Albenga and a strategic 
territory for the control of the west Ligurian coast. Divergences between the 
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orders from Paris and the Duke's strategy, however, gave the Spanish troops 
enough time to help Genoa put stop to the invasion and the conflict ended with 
a return to the previous status quo. Without consulting its ally, however, Spain 
signed an armistice with France and left the duchy and the Republic to face 
each other in low intensity conflict in the years following.194 This resulted in a 
two-year period of turmoil supported by the Savoy (1627-1629) and a further 
attempt of aggression in 1672.195 Once again, there were no significant 
territorial consequences; this time, thanks to French mediation.196 Attempts of 
military expansion in the west of Liguria and the creation of a new free port in 
Villefranche (1612) were the marks of the growing importance of the Savoy 
state during the seventeenth century and the economic and military threat that it 
entailed for the Genoese.197 
The opponent’s growing audacity coincided with the weakening of the main 
ally of the Republic. The crisis of the Spanish imperial system in the fourth 
decade of the century – marked by the uprising of Catalonia (1640-1652) and 
the Portuguese war of secession (1640-1668), consequences of the impressive 
waste of men and resources in the Thirty Years' War and the hostility of France 
– benefited Genoese republican and anti-Spanish patricians.198 Some members 
of this faction even obtained key positions within the state administration. One 
example of this is the doge Agostino Pallavicini (1637-1639), who was the first 
doge to be symbolically awarded the royal crown.199 In 1637, there had been 
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the proclamation of the Madonna as ‘Queen’ of the Republic, an element that 
should have placed the state at the same level as the other European 
monarchies, though this was only theoretical; not even after the official 
endorsement obtained by the emperor in exchange for a donation in 1641, 
would this claimes royal status be taken seriously by the other monarchies.200 In 
February 1641, secret negotiations to establish a French embassy in the city 
were uncovered.201  
From a symbolic point of view, which was also a result of the decreased 
reliability of the Spanish partner and the military protection that this could 
guarantee, the Genoese sought to obtain the title of Serenissima from Venice 
and the royal dignity for their Republic from the papal court.202 The war of 
Candia (1645-1669) between Venetians and Ottomans which had broken out 
after the invasion of the island by the latter, seemed to offer a possible solution 
to this dilemma. Helping the island would have allowed the Genoese to obtain 
recognition, as a crowned head, of their equality with the Venetians and 
favoured, hopefully, possible expansion in the Levantine markets.203 However, 
negotiations with the Venetians did not lead to the desired outcome and the 
Republic of St. Mark lost its most important surviving possession in the 
Levant.204 
In addition to the need for visibility on the international stage, there was a 
growing fear of Spanish interference in the maritime trade headed to Genoa. On 
several occasions, Genoese claims for sovereignty over the Ligurian Sea were 
made to protect the vessels of all nationalities passing between Corsica and 
Liguria and in particular, Dutch ones loaded with cereals.205 In 1638, the 
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government approved strengthening the state’s fleet by experiment of the galee 
di libertà, a move which was badly received by the Spanish.206 Strengthening of 
the fleet was a double-edged sword: on the one hand it reduced the need for 
Spanish protection, on the other hand it damaged the interests of the Genoese 
asentistas de galeras, including the descendants of Andrea Doria, who 
employed Genoese labour and capital.207  
In the end, the origins of the policies of free port and neutrality lie, in part, in 
the decline of Spain.208 Free port, the genesis of which will be seen in the next 
Chapter, was conceived in 1590 to bring grain shipments on foreign vessels to 
Genoa, and Northern vessels, in particular.209 Over time, it evolved to perform 
different functions, particularly as an emporium for the transit and re-export of 
goods, in close competition with the nearby free port of Livorno.210 Following 
another crisis with Spain in 1654, the Genoese modified free port policy to 
support the arrival of foreign merchants to the city, with an imitation of the 
Livorno model.211 
Other reasons for disagreement with Spain came from diplomatic and 
territorial clashes. Philip IV and, in his name, the Duke of Olivares, were trying 
to curb the role of the Genoese hombres de negocio in Madrid and to reaffirm 
the role of Spain as guarantor of international politics.212 They even tried to 
prevent the creation of a strong Genoese dominion in Liguria. In 1646, for 
example, the Republic bought Pontremoli, on the border with Tuscany, thanks 
to an agreement reached with the governor of Milan in exchange for 200,000 
pieces of eight. However, the Spanish crown cancelled the purchase and sold 
this fief to the Grand Duke of Tuscany for only 625 pieces of eight.213 Spain did 
not want to damage relations with Tuscany by excessively favouring Genoa by 
                                                          
206 On the use of galleys with paid voluntary crew instead of the customary use of slaves, see 
Bitossi, ‘Il granello di sabbia’, 497. 
207 See B. Maréchaux, Instituciones navales y finanzas internacionales en el Mediterráneo de la 
época moderna. Los asentistas de galeras genoveses al servicio de la Monarquía Hispánica 
(1500-1650), unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2017. 
208 Regarding the evolution of free port policies, see Chapter Two. 
209 ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 11/08/1590. 
210 On the free port of Livorno, see C.S. Tazzara, The free port of Livorno and the 
transformation of the Mediterranean world, Oxford, 2017. 
211 Piccinno, Zanini, ‘Genoa: colonizing and colonized city?’, 290; T.A. Kirk, ‘Genoa and Livorno: 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Commercial Rivalry as a Stimulus to Policy Development’, 
History 86/281, 2001, 3-17, 13-14. 
212 This strategy also included inviting Portuguese bankers to operate at the court of Madrid in 
place of the Genoese, see J.C. Boyajian, Portuguese bankers at the court of Spain, 1626-1650, 
New Brunswick, 1983. 
213 See M. Giuliani, ‘La contesa tra Genova e Firenze per l’acquisto di Pontremoli (1647-1650)’, 
Bollettino Ligustico per la Storia e la Cultura Regionale, X/1-2, 1958, 163-171. 
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granting Pontremoli, which, on the contrary, did not represent a territory of 
strategic importance for the Grand Duke. Negotiations for Finale, on the other 
hand, a Spanish enclave in west Liguria and a constant source of concern for 
the Ligurian trade and for salt smuggling, led to nothing despite a Genoese offer 
of 800,000 pieces of eight.214 The crisis that followed failed negotiations ended 
in 1655 with the restitution of Genoese assets and interests that the Spanish 
had seized in Milan and Naples. In addition, the Spanish crown officially 
recognized the Genoese right to tax the salt brought to Finale: neither country 
was ready to give up the advantages offered by their alliance.215 Genoa 
obtained the marquisate of Finale only in 1713. Therefore, in spite of efforts to 
strengthen its territorial state, the Republic struggled to impose its dominion.216  
By the middle of the seventeenth century some form of precarious balance 
had been achieved. The state managed to suppress the popular uprising; there 
was peace with the Duchy of Savoy; Genoa had obtained the royal title; and the 
Habsburgs renegotiated their agreements with the Genoese businessmen after 
the quiebra of 1647. The republican party lost most of its influence.217 In 1659, 
the Republic recovered from the plague epidemic that had weakened it between 
1656 and 1657. Moreover, the peace of the Pyrenees between France and 
Spain allowed Genoese patricians once again to work in symbiosis with the 
Hispanic-Habsburg imperial system.218 A short period of dynamism began, 
characterized by the adoption of Nuovo Armamento policies, which were aimed 
at strengthening the Republic’s maritime forces. The Magnifici decreed an 
increase in the number of public galleys and established, in 1655, a special 
Nuovo Armamento Magistrate who was in charge of organizing convoys to 
protect vessels on the route between Cadiz and Genoa.219 From 1665 onwards, 
                                                          
214 Amongst reasons for concern, there was the fear of a new Finale-Livorno axis with the 
participation of non-noble Genoese, see Bitossi, ‘Il granello di sabbia’, 502. On relations 
between Spain and Finale see P. Calcagno, ‘Lo sviluppo del commercio finalese sotto la 
Spagna: danno e minaccia per la Casa di San Giorgio’, in A. Peano Cavasola ed., Finale, porto 
di Fiandra, briglia di Genova, Finale Ligure, 2007, 207-234; P. Calcagno, ‘«Al pregiudizio de la 
giurisdizione si aggiunge il danno pecuniario». Genova e la «piaga del Finale» nel XVII secolo’, 
Società e storia XXXI, 2008, 499-535; L. Lo Basso, ‘Finale porto corsaro spagnolo tra Genova e 
la Francia alla fine del Seicento’, in P. Calcagno ed., Finale fra le potenze di antico regime. Il 
ruolo del marchesato sulla scena internazionale (secoli XVI-XVIII), Savona, 2009, 137-155. 
215 Kirk, ‘La crisi del 1654’, 537-538. 
216 Ceccarelli, ‘Tra sovranità e imperialità’, 280. 
217 Maréchaux, ‘Cultiver l’alternative’, 692. The activities of some politicians such as 
Giambattista Raggio, Raffaele Della Torre or Gio Bernardo Veneroso are noteworthy. They are 
examined in Bitossi, ‘Il granello di sabbia’, 504-510. 
218 See C. Bitossi, ‘Un lungo addio. Il tramonto del partito spagnolo nella Genova del ‘600’, in La 
storia dei genovesi, VIII, Genoa, 1988, 119-135. 
219 Lo Basso, ‘Economie e culture del mare’, 82. 
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Genoese diplomacy succeeded in obtaining the reopening of links with the 
Levant and Izmir, extending the navigation conveyed to the Levant. This new 
route, however, had a short life.220 Only the smaller, privately operated convoys 
continued to trade following a new break down in relations with the Ottoman 
court a decade later.221 The Magnifici also started plans to establish new trade 
routes beyond the Mediterranean Sea.222 Already in 1647, it emerges that an 
attempt was made to create a shipping company for commerce with the Far 
East, while the commercial relations of some patricians with Rio de la Plata or 
New Spain at that time are well known.223 
After the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), Genoa had to face the growing 
importance of other players on the international market, like the growing United 
Provinces.224 In addition to this and following a new attack by the Savoy in 
1672, the Catholic king officially ceased to present himself as the “protector de 
la libertad de la Repùblica”.225 It was a matter of time before France, which had 
been trying to take Spain’s place since 1528, resumed diplomatic-military 
pressures. The apex of this strategy was the bombing of Genoa on order of the 
sovereign Louis XIV in 1684.226 This action was part of a wider French 
operation to impose its authority on the Mediterranean and decisive 
strengthening of the Royal Navy allowed for such a strategy. The French Navy 
fleet was increased from about twenty vessels in 1661 to 121 units in 1684, 
marking the beginning of a campaign of international ‘terrorism’, thanks to the 
use of modern bombing galeotte.227 In 1679 Sanremo and Sampierdarena, 
villages on the outskirts of Genoa, were bombed in reprisal for the missed 
greetings reserved to the French ships from the Genoese fortresses. In 1682-
83, it was the turn of Algiers, as punishment for the operations of the corsairs 
based in this port. After Genoa, in 1685, Tripoli was bombed, too.228 
                                                          
220 See O. Pastine, Genova e l’impero ottomano nel secolo XVII, Genoa, 1952. 
221 Lo Basso, ‘Economie e culture del mare’, 83. 
222 Bitossi, ‘Il granello di sabbia’, 498. Amongst the projects of expansion, there was also the 
long presiding idea of opening routes for oceanic navigation under the protection of the 
Portuguese. 
223 Felloni, ‘Il ceto dirigente’, 1339. 
224 M. Herrero Sánchez, ‘La quiebra del sistema hispano-genovés (1627-1700)’, Hispania LXV, 
2005, 115-152. 
225 Herrero Sánchez, ‘La quiebra del sistema’, 146. 
226 See Bitossi, 1684. La Repubblica sfida il Re Sole. 
227 See J. Peter, Les barbaresques sous Louis XIV. Le duel entre Alger et la Marine du Roi 
(1681-1698), Paris, 1997. 
228 Bitossi, 1684, par. 1. On this see also N. Matar, ‘Bombardment of Tripoli, Libya, by the 
French fleet, in Ahmad ibn Khaled al-Nasiri, in N. Matar ed., Europe through Arab eyes, 1578-
1727, Columbia, 2009, 210-212. 
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The requests of the French king were: disarmament of the new Genoese 
galleys, brought from 6 to 10 units thanks to the policy of the Nuovo 
Armamento; the opening of a salt warehouse in Savona for the supply of the 
French troops stationed in Casale Monferrato, in Piedmont; as well as the 
sending of a delegation to Paris to apologize for the alleged discourtesy to the 
French ambassador in Genoa, who had been a presence there since 1682.229 
Although the bombing damaged a large part of the city, the local militia and 
the Spanish troops sent from Milan repelled any attempt by French troops to 
land. Having survived these battles, the Republic sent its galleys, supported by 
a Spanish squadron, to plunder the French vessels between the Ligurian Sea 
and the Gulf of Lion. However, the hesitation of Spain, which signed a separate 
truce with France on August 10 and the French corsairs, forced the Genoese to 
sue for peace. The doge himself, Francesco Maria Imperiale Lercari, together 
with senators Marcello Durazzo, Giannettino Garibaldi, Agostino Lomellini and 
Paris Maria Salvago, met Louis XIV in Versailles on May 15, 1685 to apologize 
to the sovereign and accept his requests.230 
The subsequent election of doge Pietro Durazzo, an oligarch who was close 
to France, in 1685 can be seen as a political message of reconciliation.231 This 
event marked the beginning of separation from Spain. The only viable solution 
seemed to be a strict neutrality policy, which would also be useful in dealing 
with increasing competition from England and the United Provinces.232 
Neutrality during the war of the Augsburg League (1688-1697) demonstrated all 
the benefits of this policy.233 Neutrality could guarantee profitable opportunities, 
as long as it did not antagonize the belligerent states that saw every action to 
be an aid to one of the involved factions. 
The anti-Spaniards, therefore, did not succeed in overturning the axis of 
Genoese politics, which, if anything, moved towards a more marked policy of 
neutrality that was fully achieved in the eighteenth century. This, together with 
the strengthening of the free port, made Genoa an international emporium and, 
according to Diego Pizzorno’s definition, a ‘diplomatic-informative 
                                                          
229 Bitossi, 1684, par. 1. 
230 Bitossi, 1684, par. 6-7. 
231 Costantini, La Repubblica di Genova, 392. 
232 Assereto, ‘La guerra di Successione spagnola dal punto di vista genovese’, in Herrero 
Sanchez, Rocio Ben Yessef Garcia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds., Génova y la monarquia, II, 539-
584, 543. 
233 C. Bitossi, ‘L’antico regime genovese, 1576-1797’, in D. Puncuh ed., Storia di Genova, 
Genoa, 2003, 391-508, 467-468. 
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portofranco’.234 The ‘republican’ party were unsuccessful in creating a compact 
and opposing group of interests, nor in proposing solutions that did not clash 
with consolidated and transversal interests of the ruling class of the Republic. 
The French bombardment of 1684 and the disintegration of the Hispanic-
Habsburg imperial system during the Spanish War of Succession (1701-1714), 
as well as the acquisition of Finale in 1713, gave the Republic some ephemeral 
margins of manoeuvre, in a rapidly changing Europe.235 This situation, 
according to Carlo Bitossi, lasted at least until the 1730s, when support for 
France finally prevailed.236 
The neutrality policy focused on the importance of the capital’s port, its 
proper administration and the improvement of its infrastructure. Both before and 
after the weakening of the ties with Spain, the port played a key role in 
guaranteeing not only the survival but also the very independence of the 
Republic, because of the interests of several countries it sheltered.  
                                                          
234 Pizzorno, ‘La repubblica di Genova’, 3. It is interesting to observe the adoption of a neutrality 
politicy already back in the seventeenth century, during the War of Castro (1641/1649), see D. 
Pizzorno, ‘Genova e Roma nella crisi di Castro’, Studi Storici 2, 2015, 377-402. For the politics 
of neutrality of the Republic in the eighteenth century, see Garibbo, La neutralità della 
repubblica. 
235 The purchase of Finale was eventually possible thanks to intense diplomatic activity, the 
availability of money from the Casa di San Giorgio and, above all, diffidence of the new emperor 
Carlo VI towards Vittorio Amedeo II, see G. Assereto, G. Bongiovanni, «Sotto il felice e dolce 
dominio della Serenissima Repubblica». L’acquisto del Finale da parte di Genova e la Distinta 
relazione di Filippo Cattaneo De Marini, Savona, 2003. 
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2.1 Genoa Strategic Function for the Economy of the Republic 
 
A port was a fundamental res publica: all commercial operators who benefited 
from its infrastructures, even foreigners, theoretically became temporary 
subjects of the state and their goods were subject to specific local laws.1 
Between the medieval and early modern period, ports’ development in Europe 
became increasingly complex from an urban, programmatic and financial point 
of view.2 Special institutions were needed that could manage the growing traffic 
flows and build new infrastructures. These interventions resulted in the creation 
of specialized technical and administrative offices, as in the case of the Padri 
del Comune of Genoa, examined in the pages to follow.  
GA administration in Genoa, despite the references to Mediterranean shared 
customs and legal traditions, was closely linked to local institutional strategies 
and contingencies, at the centre of which was the port.3 A port is a shelter for 
vessels, a provider of facilities and services for trade, and a source of tax 
revenue for its state.4 The port reflected the city status in the international trade 
and allowed it to dominate the Republic’s subjected territories in Liguria and 
overseas. Since the medieval period, the port has been distinguished by its 
liveliness and dynamism, it had never been a military harbour, as the fleet of the 
Republic was always very limited in number, nor a port of call:5 despite the 
presence of an arsenale and two darsena, shipbuilding was a collateral activity, 
                                                          
1 Piergiovanni, ‘Dottrina e prassi’, 15. 
2 See E. Poleggi, ‘La costruzione della città portuale, un nuovo tema di storia’, in E. Poleggi E., 
Città portuali del Mediterraneo: storia e archeologia, Genoa, 1985, 7-10. Between the sixteenth 
and the seventeenth centuries, Genoa began to play a new role: namely, not only as an 
importer of supplies, but also as a major centre of re-exportation. See L. Piccinno, ‘Genoa. A 
city with a port or a port city?’, in W. Blockmans, M. Krom, J. Wubs-Mrozewicz eds., The 
Routledge Handbook of Maritime Trade around Europe 1300-1600: Commercial Networks and 
Urban Autonomy, London-New York, 2017, 159-176, 159-176, 165. 
3 Piergiovanni, ‘Dottrina e prassi’, 11. 
4 See S. Cavaciocchi, I porti come impresa economica: atti della diciannovesima Settimana di 
studi, Bagno a Ripoli, 1988; M. Sirago, ‘Il sistema portuale italiano in eta moderna’, in D. 
Romero, A. Guimera eds., Puertos y sistemas portuarios (siglos XVI-XX) actas del Coloquio 
internacional: El sistema portuario español, Madrid, 1996, 53-76. 
5 See G. Benvenuti, Le repubbliche marinare. Amalfi, Pisa, Genova e Venezia, Rome, 1989. 
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which was instead widespread in the Riviera.6 The port, however, was in an 
undoubtedly favourable position for unloading goods headed to the Po Valley 
or, for example, for the importation of cereals and raw materials from southern 
Italy, such as raw silk.7 Excluding galleys, which were mainly destined for 
military use, it is estimated that about 30% of the total tonnage of vessels sailing 
in the Mediterranean Sea stopped in the port of Genoa in the first half of the 
sixteenth century.8 The importance of the maritime trade that stopped in the port 
was the result of the oligarchy’s care and strategies.9 
As already noted, the rival or allied powers of Genoa recognized its function 
as a centre of transit and redistribution of goods as early as the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. These foreign powers exploited the port's potential as a 
commercial hub, as did Spain, or sought to seize it and/or encourage the 
creation of competing emporia, as did France, Savoy and Tuscany.10 At the 
same time, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Genoese 
businessmen expanded their business ventures through operations that 
guaranteed them the monopoly of alum from the mines of Mazarrón and Tolfa, 
a role in the slave trade with the American colonies, participation in Levantine 
trade with the Ottoman Empire or North Africa, a predominant role in foreign 
exchange fairs or a role as intermediaries and agents in the exchanges that 
took place in the Asian Spanish colonies, where they sold American silver in 
exchange for Chinese products.11 
                                                          
6 Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 19-40; L. Gatti, L’Arsenale e le galee. Pratiche di costruzione e 
linguaggio tecnico a Genova tra Medioevo ed età moderna, Genoa, 1990, 78-81. 
7 On silk manufacturing in Liguria see Massa, Lineamenti di organizzazione, 45-53. 
8 Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 164. 
9 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 89. 
10 See par. 1.5. 
11 Lopez, ‘Market expansion’, 445-464. Sauli and Di Negro families also managed Mazarrón 
mines, while the Grimaldi, Sauli, Di Negro and Pallavicino acquired temporary mining rights on 
Tolfa mines, see J. Delumeau, L’alun de Rome, XVe-XIX siecle, Paris, 1962, 38, 92-100, 106-
118, 169, 208-241. Grillo and Lomellini families obtained the asiento of American slave trade 
between 1663 and 1674, see M. Vega Franco, El trafico de esclavos con America (asientos de 
Grilo y Lomelin, 1663-1674), Seville, 1984. Genoese nobleman Gio. Agostino Durazzo 
managed to reopen trade with the Ottoman Empire, with the help of the Greek dragomanno 
Panaioti Nicolosio, whom was married to a Genoese noblewoman from the Calvo family, see 
Pastine, Genova e l’Impero ottomano. Since 1542, the Lomellini family bought from Spain the 
asiento of the red coral from Tabarka, a small island near Tunisian coast. From 1719, they 
shared their asiento with other members of Genoese aristocracy, see Piccinno, Un’impresa fra 
terra e mare. The Centurione, Cicala, De Mari, De Marini, Doria d'Angri, Doria di Melfi, Grillo, 
Grimaldi, Imperiale, Lomellini, Negrone, Sauli, Serra and Spinola gained the asiento for the 
transport of silver arriving from Spanish colonies that they re-exported to Europe and Flanders, 
see Marsilio, ‘The Genoese and Portuguese’, 77-78. The Genoese presence in the Philippines 
has never been studied, so we are unable to assess their relative importance. However, it is 
worth mentioning how, in the 1760s, the General of the Philippine galleys was Sebastián Rayo 
Doria [Raggio Doria], married to Ana Pestaño de la Cueva, daughter of Marcos, one of the most 
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The commercial success of the port of Genoa and the numerous Ligurian 
ships of all sorts that sailed the Mediterranean coincided with a total absence of 
other Ligurian ports.12 Andrea Spinola, patrician and future doge of the Republic 
(1629-1631), confirmed this when reviewing the main Ligurian ports and 
harbours in the early seventeenth century.13 In the western Riviera there were 
only insecure moorings in the bay of Alassio, towards Gallinara island, where 
vessels could find some shelter from strong winds,14 or in the bay of Vado and 
in Savona. Between Savona and Genoa, for about 50 km, Spinola did not 
identify other landings or beaches.15 To the eastern Riviera, the situation was 
no better: only Portofino offered some shelter and, perhaps because of its 
proximity to Genoa and the fact that it administratively depended from the 
Genoese Padri del Comune, it was among the few operating and functional 
ports of call in the area.16 Almost at the border with Tuscany, to the East, there 
was the gulf of La Spezia. Ports in this gulf enjoyed a relative margin of 
autonomy: Genoa had subjugated these communities often through 
conventions that had granted them a partial autonomy.17 However, their 
activities were limited to cabotage because of the lack of adequate 
infrastructures and a configuration of the territory that did not favour a coastal 
expansion.18 There was also a multitude of small moorings for the use of 
fishermen and, with a few exceptions, for small-scale trade. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
important merchants in Manila at that time, see L. Lo Basso, ‘Diaspora e armamento marittimo 
nelle strategie economiche dei genovesi nella seconda meta del XVII secolo: una storia 
globale’, Studi storici, 1, 2015, 138; on Manila see J. Gil, Los chinos en Manila (siglos XVI y 
XVII), Lisboa, 2011, 65-70. 
12 See ‘Introduzione’, in Doria, Massa, Piergiovanni eds., Il sistema portuale, 6. 
13 ASCG, ms. Brignole Sale 106 C 4, Andrea Spinola, Ricordi Politici, sixteenth century, 76-78, 
in Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 223-224. On Andrea Spinola see S. Buonadonna, M. 
Marcenaro, Rosso doge. I dogi della repubblica di Genova dal 1339 al 1797, Genoa, 2000, 123; 
C. Bitossi ed., Andrea Spinola, Scritti scelti, Genoa, 1981. 
14 Vessels sheltering at anchor behind this rock could also give rise to multiple collisions, as 
happened in 1698 to the lembo of the patrone Jo Baptista Bozanus, see ASG, CdM, 
Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero 285, 10/10/1698. For more details on this voyage see also 
par. 5.5. 
15 Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 223. 
16 Perhaps it is also for these reasons that shipmasters made a large number of Average 
declarations in Portofino, in greater numbers than in the other ports of the Republic, see 
AveTransRisk Online Database. 
17 Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’. 
18 Again, Average reports show a constellation of small ports and landings that were used in 
time of emergencies, such as Lèvanto, Sestri Levante, Santa Margherita, Lerici, Albissola 
Marina, etc., see AveTransRisk Online Database. 
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Sailors, shipwrights, cartographers and masters lived in Genoa, Savona and 
the towns along the Riviera, serving an economy based on the sea.19 The 
Ligurian patroni, shipowners and sailors, in particular, worked in cabotage trade 
with small and fast boats, guaranteeing traffic between the ports of the Riviera 
but also with part of the North-Western Mediterranean.20 The government of the 
Magnifici, however, deliberately neglected a state policy of support for smaller 
ports.21 The pre-eminence of the Genoese port determined the drainage of a 
consistent quota of the Republic's manpower and investments towards the 
capital.22 Many regulations date back to the medieval period, when Genoa 
gradually eliminated or ‘limited’ the few existing ports of call along the Riviera 
for military, fiscal or commercial reasons.23 For example, a 1440 decree stated 
that all communities subjected to Genoa were required to have their own goods 
to pass through customs formalities in Genoa.24 This requirement also aimed to 
consolidate the regional political and economic system through the 
concentration of business in the capital, in parallel with other measures such as 
internal co-optation within the ruling and merchant classes and a better 
organization of import, export and redistribution mechanisms.25 The decree, 
encouraging direct trade with the port of Genoa, was reconfirmed in 1519 and 
1526, causing the end of trade for ports such as Ventimiglia and Albenga. 
Savona was an exemplary case. It was the main alternative port of call in the 
region and, since the late medieval period, it was resentful of the capital’s 
authority. Already in 1504, Genoa implemented an embargo of the city, accused 
of an alliance with the French sovereign in exchange for independence.26 
Between 1525 and 1528, Genoa narrowed its harbour to just the darsena as a 
punishment for its alliance with France and as a marker of the settlement's 
                                                          
19 On the concept of ‘sea economy’ and the ‘maritime regions dynamics’, see M. Ciotti, 
Economie del mare: costruzioni navali, commercio, navigazione e pesca nella Marca 
meridionale in età moderna, Ancona, 2005, 17-41. 
20 L. Lo Basso, ‘Economie e culture del mare: armamento, navigazione, commerci’, in G. 
Assereto, M. Doria eds., Storia della Liguria, Bari, 2014, 76-86, 76. 
21 On a definition of ‘small port’ see G. Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori della Repubblica di 
Genova in età moderna’, in Doria, Massa, Piergiovanni eds., Il sistema portuale, 223. 
22 See L. Piccinno, ‘Il commercio marittimo e lo sviluppo del porto di Genova tra Medioevo ed 
età Moderna’, Università dell’Insubria, Facoltà di Economia, 12, 2004. 
23 V. Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare. Un lento itinerario tra V e XIII secolo’, in 
G. Assereto, M. Doria eds., Storia della Liguria, Rome-Bari, 2007, 28-36. 
24 C. Costantini, La Repubblica di Genova nell'età moderna, Turin, 1991, 326. 
25 L. Giusto, ‘Genova, i genovesi e i grani siciliani. Dinamiche sociali ed economiche; 
produzione, stoccaggio e commercio’, essay for the class on Documenti e Tecnologia, Bologna, 
2011, 1-29, 11. 
26 Assereto, La città fedelissima, 41. 
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complete submission.27 Still in 1571, the Magnifici feared that small ports such 
as Varigotti could compete with the capital city.28 Only harbours with beaches or 
single docks (as in Sanremo) survived.29 
The patricians concentrated all available resources on Genoa, according to 
what Guglielmo Assereto called the “logic of the city state”.30 The conception 
underlying this policy, as reflected in the words of the Genoese Padri del 
Comune, was based on the complete subjection of the minor ports of call, which 
were treated as: 
 
[…] muscles of the body, and also to the body it is more necessary to defend 
the head, on which the vital spirit of the whole body depends, than it is 
necessary to defend a member, without which he can still hold his head.31 
 
Strategic-military concerns motivated this policy. The political instability of the 
Republic, which the neighbouring powers tried to exploit on several occasions, 
led to the fear that enemies could seize a port in the Riviera to use it as a base 
for military operations or as a port of call for commercial competition: keeping 
the peripheric ports dependent on the capital would have discouraged these 
attempts.32 The fragmentary nature of the Ligurian territory, and the presence of 
enclaves under the control of foreign authorities such as Nice, Villefranche and 
Oneglia controlled by Savoy, or Finale in the hands of Spain, are examples of 
the vulnerability of the Republic.33 In the sixteenth century, in addition to the 
embankment of the port of Savona, the Genoese state also ordered the 
construction of a fortress to guard the Savona basin. Further fortifications were 
built in Vado and in the Gulf of La Spezia.34 
                                                          
27 The raging of the Franco-Spanish conflict delayed the execution of the 1523 Genoese decree 
for the dismantling of the port, see N. Cerisola, Storia del porto di Savona, Savona, 1968, 21-
77. 
28 E. Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale, naviglio mercantile e consolati genovesi nel Cinquecento’, 
Rivista Storica Italiana, LXXX/3, 1968, 593-638, 621. 
29 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 26. On Sanremo see N. Calvini, C. Gentili, La storia del porto 
di Sanremo, Sanremo, 1986. 
30 Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 254. 
31 “[…] muscoli del corpo, et pure al corpo è più necessario diffendere il capo, dal quale dipende 
il spirito vittale di tutto il corpo, che non è necessario di diffendere uno membro, senza il quale 
ancora può regersi il capo”, ASCG, PdC 316, 1638, in Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 241. 
32 Andrea Spinola, for example, feared that the creation of a new port would have posed a 
serious threat to the Republic: “correr non di meno pericolo di perder lo stato e la libertà”, in 
ASCG, Manoscritti Brignole Sale, 106 C 4, Andrea Spinola, Ricordi Politici, 76-77. 
33 On Finale see Calcagno, ‘Lo sviluppo del commercio finalese’, 207-234. 
34 See P. Calcagno, ‘Privateers and military mobile defense of the coasts: the Genoese case in 
the second half of the 17th century’, Studi storici, 4, 2014, 937-964; E. Beri, ‘Genova e la sua 
frontiera marittima fra XVI e XVIII secolo: difesa e controllo’, paper discussed in Frontiere. 
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The Senate of the Republic sent an administrator to each peripheral 
settlement and imposed restrictive taxation.35 The latter, whether he was a 
podestà, a captain, a sindaco or a governor, was responsible for the supervision 
of local finance and public works: he controlled and, if necessary, blocked any 
intervention on the port that went beyond the ordinary administration.36 
Moreover, Genoese authorities forcibly requisitioned the port equipment of the 
above-mentioned localities in order to carry out extraordinary maintenance work 
in the port of the capital.37 The local elites, on the other hand, often consisted of 
rentiers and landowners, who had little interest in investing the large sums 
required for the implementation and maintenance of an efficient port structure, 
especially considering the risks of interference from the capital.38 
However, as Genoese supremacy over the Ligurian territory strengthened 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some of the monopolistic 
regulations were broken through the granting of ad hoc agreements with the 
villages of the Riviera.39 
These villages constituted an indispensable resource to ensure connectivity 
through the region, given the difficulty of traveling overland.40 In every Ligurian 
community an intense shipbuilding, shipowning and seafaring activity 
developed, of which we find evidence in Average sources.41 In addition to 
moving goods according to the victualling of the territory of the Republic and its 
capital, in some cases the local patroni were able to carry out some commission 
trade.42 One such example is the voyage of Captain Andrea Bianchi di 
Bartolomeo from Lavagna, a village on the eastern Riviera. Bianchi di 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rappresentazioni, integrazioni e conflitti tra Europa ed America (secc. XVI-XX), University of 
Roma Tre, Rome, 20-22/06/2013. 
35 Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 227. 
36 See Assereto, ‘Dall’amministrazione patrizia, 59-159. 
37 As happened in 1590 and 1638, when Genoa forced Savona to lend its pontoon, a wooden 
float used to dredge the dock, see Assereto, La città fedelissima, 165. 
38 See, for example, the ruling class of Savona between seventeenth and eighteenth century, 
Assereto, La città fedelissima, 167-168. 
39 The Republic, for example, allowed Savona to collect an anchorage fee for the maintenance 
of the port, on an exceptional basis and with occasional renewals, in 1550, 1630, 1634 e 1699, 
see Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 235. 
40 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 15-40.  
41 See chap. 4. Average reports in the following Chapters will reveal the role of shipmasters and 
sailors from the Riviera in the Republic’s trade, as well as the importance of family and proximity 
ties among the crews. See for example the felucca of the patrone Santino Fugone of Sestri 
Levante. The crew was composed entirely of sailors from Sestri Levante, and during the course 
of the voyage, the patron met other vessels and captains all from this town. See ASG, NG 2084, 
21/03/1640, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id50238. The transcript of the report made 
by this patrone is in the Appendix VII. 
42 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 118. 
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Bartolomeo left Lavagna in August 1697 with an empty hold to load wheat in 
Cagliari. Finding no return cargo, he sailed from Cagliari to Palermo and 
Trapani, where he loaded salt for Genoa. The bad weather forced him to stop in 
Naples, where the general of the galleys of Spain ordered him to load oars 
destined for Sicily. Finally, driven by contrary winds, Bianchi di Bartolomeo 
shipwrecked in Calabria near Scalea.43 
The Genoese patricians did not cease to ensure that long-distance traffic, or 
the possible construction of infrastructures in smaller ports did not affect the 
interests of the capital. In 1661 a report read to the Collegi by a deputation of 
the Casa di San Giorgio, a semi-private body with multiple interests in the 
administration of the Republic, officially questioned the system of restrictions 
and privileges with the coastal centres developed as a result of the already 
noted decree of 1440.44 The salt monopoly, for example, managed directly by 
San Giorgio, was preserved through the control of the stapole in the coastal 
settlements.45 In the two-year period 1662-1663, the Collegi replied with a 
temporary revocation of all special agreements with the minor communities.46 
The monopolistic ambitions of the Genoese emporium, however, were not able 
to completely contrast the initiative of the villages of the Riviera. They obtained 
more operational space during the eighteenth century, when the Ligurian 





                                                          
43 ASG, CdM, Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero 285, 15/04/1698, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id50428. 
44 Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 364. 
45 The monopoly on salt was one of the most important sources of income for the Casa di San 
Giorgio. The defence of this privilege was constant throughout the early modern period, see 
Calcagno, ‘«Al pregiudizio de la giurisdizione si aggiunge il danno pecuniario»’, 499-535. The 
stapole were the places where salt was stored and sold under the monopoly regime, see 
Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 118. The annual consumption of salt in Genoa was on average 
4.6 tons and increased from the middle of the seventeenth century. The salt was also re-
exported from the city to the hinterland, see Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 153. 
46 Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 364-371. San Giorgio, recognizing the failure of this 
strategy and the fall in revenue due to illegal trade, reached an agreement with the various 
coastal communities: it established the payment of an annual fixed sum that slightly reduced the 
total revenue expected, see G. Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale, navigazione e traffici a 
Genova: un sondaggio tra le fonti per l’età moderna’, in D. Puncuh ed., Studi in memoria di 
Giorgio Costamagna, Genoa, 2003, 337-364, 350. 
47 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 118. See also B. Salvemini, ‘Negli spazi mediterranei della 
decadenza. Note su istituzioni, etiche e pratiche mercantili della tarda età moderna’, Storica, 51, 
2011, 7-51, 24. 
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2.2 The Customs Regime and the Free Port Policy 
 
Taxation was an important tool to reinforce the pre-eminence of the capital's 
port. In general terms, during the period under analysis taxation of vessels 
entering and leaving Genoa was relatively light.48 On the basis of an analysis of 
the operating costs for the maintenance of the port, however, it is evident that 
the charges imposed on the carriers using the port never provided adequate 
revenue for its needs.49 
The Padri del Comune, the magistracy in charge for the port’s administration, 
directly collected most of the taxes, while some of them were farmed out to 
private individuals or consortia in exchange for lump sums of money estimated 
on the basis of expected revenues.50 Many taxes had ancient origins and 
experienced some continuity between the medieval and early modern period. 
The oldest known is the fanali, levied from 1340 onwards in exchange for the 
service offered by the two lighthouses at the port’s entrance. The amount varied 
in proportion to the crew of each ship.51 From 1451, the Padri del Comune 
obtained the direct management of this tax, which in 1487 was raised to 18 
denari for each crew member.52 At least from the middle of the fifteenth century, 
there was a tax paid only by ‘small’ ships for the right to moor in the port, the 
gabella dello schifato, which was regularly farmed out.53 There was also a tax 
on anchorage, the iactus navium, for larger vessels.54 It amounted to 20 soldi 
for every 1,000 cantari (47,640 tons) of capacity.55 
In addition to the fee for mooring within the port, the Padri del Comune 
collected a tax for those that left, called Exitus navium, whose rates were 
                                                          
48 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 174-176. 
49 P. Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici dello sviluppo del porto di Genova tra medioevo ed 
età moderna (1340-1548)’, in Doria, Massa, Piergiovanni eds., Il sistema portuale, 37-134, 79. 
50 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 79; L. Piccinno, Economia marittima e operatività 
portuale. Genova, secc. XVII-XIX, Genoa, 2000, 92-93. On the system of contracts see G. 
Felloni, ‘Accumulazione capitalistica ed investimenti a Genova nei secc. XVI-XVII: uno sguardo 
d’insieme’, in G. Felloni ed., Scritti di Storia Economica, I, Genoa, 1998, 653-667. 
51 C. Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune della repubblica genovese, Genoa, 1865, 22-23. 
52 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 120-122. See also Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale’, 310-
311. 
53 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 251-252. 
54 The distinction between small and large vessels is unclear: initially, it was based on the 
presence of the castello di poppa. However, following the practice of removing this structure 
before entering the port, a decree of 1548 extended the anchorage tax to all vessels with a 
capacity of more than 1,500 cantari (71,460 kg.). See Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del 
Comune, 251-252. 
55 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 51-53. 
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stabilized from the end of the fourteenth century.56 From 1487, it was fixed at 
1.15 lire for single-deck vessels and 3.5 lire for all others. Other occasional 
charges were: the Introitus siverni Darsine, paid by the ships stopping in the 
Darsena for protection during the winter months;57 the tax on rigging, which 
affected the importation of rigging from Capo Corvo to Monaco, the boundaries 
of the coastal line of the Republic, with a tax of 4 soldi per cantaro (47.64 kg.); 
the molagium, introduced in 1487 and levied on all vessels entering the port of 
Genoa for the first time, with a tax of 25 soldi per 1,000 cantari (47,640 tons) of 
capacity.58 With taxes came tax collectors, who patrolled in boats up to two 
miles out to sea to prevent fraud.59 
Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, despite the 
new tax increases, charges on vessels entering the port of Genoa did not 
exceed 1,500/2,000 lire annually.60 Not even the increase of the iactus navium 
to 2 lire every 1,000 cantari (47,640 tons) in 1586, and the introduction of the 
payment of an annual tax for vessels of lesser capacity led to the financial 
balance.61 As already mentioned, these impositions were not sufficient to cover 
the costs of maintenance and expansion of the port.62 However, the Republic 
drained funds for the port from other sectors: extra-port revenues helped to 
balance the budget, keeping taxes on shipping carriers at a stable and relatively 
low level. The constant deficit and the habitual recourse to loans and levies on 
other assets suggests that the modest taxation responded to a precise strategy 
to channel Mediterranean traffic towards Genoa.63 
The value of goods imported annually by sea, and therefore their relative 
taxation, grew over time. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the value 
of incoming goods amounted to a total of about 8-10 million Genoese lire.64 Port 
traffic generated income that flowed between San Giorgio to which, as we shall 
                                                          
56 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 22-23, 120-122. 
57 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 82-83. 
58 Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale’, 312. 
59 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 17, 115, 131. From 1533 the Padri del Comune 
handed this tax to the Casa di San Giorgio, following a formal agreement. See Desimoni, Statuti 
Padri del Comune, 211-214. 
60 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 97. 
61 Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale’, 596-597. 
62 Accounting records from 1412 are in ASCG, Padri del Comune, scritture contabili (262 
registers, 1412-1812). See L. Saginati, L’archivio storico del Comune di Genova, Genoa, 
1974, 5-53. 
63 See, for example, the resources available to the Padri del Comune, described in the following 
pages. 
64 Felloni ‘Una fonte inesplorata’, 49,52. 
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see, were entrusted various taxes, and the Republic, estimated at 600-800 
thousand lire per year between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.65 
The system of taxation was substantially modified by the introduction of free 
port policies at the end of the sixteenth century. According to one of the best-
known definitions given in an eighteenth-century dictionary, this term referred 
to: 
 
a port where it is free to all merchants of any Nation to unload their goods, 
and to reload them when they have not been able to sell them, without 
paying any entry or exit fees […].66 
 
The free port, although it was born to face contingent needs, was also a 
significant economic policy tool specially designed to turn the port into a trading 
centre for the redistribution of goods throughout the Mediterranean. The rules 
governing its activities were rather confused, and mostly driven by the need to 
respond to the policies implemented by other competing ports.67 The Genoese 
government favoured above all the storage of goods in the port. Tax reductions 
were applied to specific types of goods, unlike other free ports such as the 
Livornese one, created to attract foreign merchants.68 
The stimulus to create the franchise in Genoa arose during the famine that 
affected much of the Mediterranean between 1590 and 1592.69 The Republic, 
as previously observed, lacked suitable areas to guarantee a sufficient 
production of cereals and survived only thanks to abundant imports from Sicily, 
Provence and other areas of the Mediterranean.70 According to the words of a 
                                                          
65 Giacchero, Il Seicento, 671-675 
66 “[…] un port où il est libre à tous marchands, de quelque Nation qu’ils soient, de décharger 
leurs marchandises, et de les en retirer lorsqu’ils ne les ont pu vendre, sans payer aucun droit 
d’entrée ni de sortie […]”, P.L. Savary De Brûlons, J. Savary De Brûlons, Dictionnaire Universel 
du Commerce, III, Geneva, 1750 (1ed.1741), 309. 
67 L. Piccinno, A. Zanini, ‘Genoa: colonizing and colonized city? The port city as a pole of 
attraction for foreign merchants (16th-18th centuries)’, in G. Nigro ed., Maritime networks as a 
factor in European integration, Florence, 2019, 290. On the spread of the free port institution 
and its various functions, see A. Iodice, Il porto franco, diffusione di un modello economico: 
politiche, attori, ideologie, mito. Due realtà a confronto: Genova e Marsiglia (1590-1817), 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Naples Federico II and University of Aix-Marseille, 
2017; Iodice, ‘L’istituzione del porto franco’, 19-33. 
68 See Tazzara, The free port of Livorno; S. Fettah, Les limites de la cite. Espace, pouvoir et 
société à Livourne au temps du port franc (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle), Rome, 2017. 
69 On the importance of the cereal trade and the increasing polarization of some regions of 
Europe, see S. Pelizzon, ‘Grain Flour, 1590-1790’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 23/1, 
2000, 87-195. 
70 According to an estimate by E. Grendi, out of 500,000 tons of grain necessary to feed the 
Republic with its 270,000 inhabitants in the middle of the sixteenth century, at least 350,000 
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memorial presented by some senators in 1606, already in 1568 and 1573 there 
had been “such a shortage of wheat that everyone was lost”.71 Supplies arrived 
in extremis, once from the Genoese possession of the Lomellini family of 
Tabarka, and once from Lombardy, allowed to avoid the famine.72 Another 
remedy was to temporarily decrease taxes on cereals arriving in the port.73 
The famine of the late sixteenth century was generalised across all the 
Mediterranean. With a decree of 11 August 1590, therefore, the Collegi issued a 
portofranco delle vettovaglie in the hope of attracting vessels loaded with 
cereals from all over Europe.74 The decree promised a “portus immunis” to 
Christians and infidels for the supply of the city. Any vessel loaded for at least 
two thirds of cereals would have benefited of a general safe-conduct of the 
duration of one year:75 
 
On behalf of the Most Serene Doge and Most Excellent Lords Governors of 
the Most Serene Republic of Genoa, every person is hereby notified that the 
two Most Serene Colleges have, by their decrees of the 11 of August of the 
last past year and of the 28 of January of the present year, granted free port 
in the present City and in the entire Dominion to any ships and other vessels 
of Christians and Infidels of whatever quality which, within one year from the 
11 of August, will bring into the present City and Dominion the said 
provisions. Provided that they have the two thirds of the entire load in 
wheat.76 
 
This legislation, rather than alleviating taxation on incoming ships, aimed to 
ensure the safety of shipmasters and merchants on board, while decreasing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
tons were imported from abroad. See E. Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale di Genova (1500-1700)’, in 
Grendi ed., La Repubblica aristocratica, 307-364. 
71 “[…] in tanta penuria di grani che ognuno era smarrito”, Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 27-28. 
72 On the ‘colonization’ of Tabarka between seventeenth and eighteenth century see Piccinno, 
Un' impresa fra terra e mare; S. Boubaker, ‘Les génois de Tabarka et la Régence de Tunis au 
XVIIème siècle et au XVIIIème siècle’, in R. Belvederi ed., Rapporti Genova-Mediterraneo-
Atlantico nell’Età Moderna, VII, Genoa, 1989, 275-295; A. Riggio, ‘Genovesi e tabarchini in 
Tunisia settecentesca’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, LXXI, 1948, 1-7. 
73 Kirk, Genoa and the sea, 6. 
74 ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 11/08/1590. 
75 This document was influenced by the customs reform issued in Livorno in 1566, see B. 
Mannini, ‘La riforma della dogana di Livorno del 1566’, Studi livornesi, 1, 1992, 65-107. 
76 “Per parte del Ser.mo Duce et Ecc.mi Sig.ri Governatori della Ser.ma Repubblica di Genova 
si notifica ad ogni persona qualmente i dua Ser.mi Collegi hanno per loro decreti fatti agli 11 di 
Agosto ultimamente passo et a 28 di Gennaro del presente anno, concesso porto franco così 
nella presente Città come in tutto il Dominio a qual si vogliano navi et altri navigli così de 
Cristiani come de Infedeli, et siano di che qualità si vogliano, che per lo spatio di un anno 
avenire doppo il detto giorno 11 di Agosto condurranno nella presente Città e Dominio delle 
dette vettovaglie purché di habbiano le due terze parti di tutto il carrico loro respettivamente 
[…]”. This text belongs to a decree of 1591 which summarized the first decree, in Latin, 
published on 11 August 1590. The 28 January 1591 decree extended the free port to the 
Riviera. See ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591. 
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taxes on landed cereals and exempting from taxation the unsold cereals re-
exported by sea.77 
At the same time, diplomats were sent and agents and merchants were 
contacted abroad to privately negotiate the purchase of wheat to send to the 
Republic: the network of contacts of the Genoese diaspora allowed to mobilize 
resources on several fronts.78 For example, the Senate sent Bartolomeo 
Cornaro to Provence and Languedoc to buy cereals. Once arrived, he 
collaborated with a Genoese merchant living there, Gio. Angelo Scorza.79 
Moreover, the Senate instructed Gugliemo Assereto in Florence and to Gio 
Batta Franchi in Naples to buy more cereals.80 Even in the main Flemish 
marketplaces, in particular Antwerp and Hamburg, where many Genoese 
commercial and financial operators resided, they were asked to find the 
necessary provisions and to commit themselves to spreading the news of the 
free port.81 Other agents, such as Pier Battista Cattaneo in Madrid and the 
courtier Orazio Pallavicino in London, succeeded in obtaining from the 
monarchs of these countries the safe passage of vessels bound for Genoa with 
cereals.82 
The first free port decree of 1590 granted a one-year import duty exemption 
to vessels arriving in Genoa loaded with cereals in the capital, to facilitate re-
exportation to the Riviera.83 On 28 January 1591, however, the sindaco of La 
Spezia addressed the Senate asking for the free port to be granted to his city as 
                                                          
77 The free port decree of 1595 was the first to officially establish customs exemptions on 
cereals: “Et così abbiamo risoluto concedere per cinque anni d’avvenire portofranco a tutti 
coloro che con navigli di maggior portata di mine trecento condurranno nel presente porto 
vettovaglie obbligate alla gabella del grano. In maniera che sia lecito a coloro ai quali 
spetteranno dettovaglie, o a cui d’esse havrà cura, stare in porto quanto gli accomoderà, et 
esse vettovaglie, o tutte o parte a piacer suo sbarcare in terra, e poi esse tutte, o scaricate o 
non scaricate portar per via di mare quanto più loro gusterà […]”, in ASG, AS, Propositionum 
1028, 09/04/1595. This model was followed in the subsequent decrees, as well. 
78 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 91. See also C. Brilli, M. Herrero Sanchez eds., Italian 
merchants in the early-modern Spanish Monarchy: business relations, identities and political 
resources, London/New York, 2017. Lo Basso, ‘Diaspora e armamento marittimo’, 137-155. 
79 Their mission failed due to the meddling of the Duke of Savoy Charles Emmanuel I, see 
Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 38-39. 
80 Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 54. 
81 See D.H. Andersen, P. Pourchasse, ‘La navigation des flottes de l’Europe du nord vers la 
Méditerranée (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)’, Revue d’Histoire Maritime, 13, 2011, 21-44. 
82 On Cattaneo’s instructions see ASG, AS, Lettere ministri Spagna 2419, 12/09/1591. See V. 
Vitale, Diplomatici e consoli della Repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1934, 83, 109, 166. On 
Pallavicino’s instructions, see ASG, AS, Litterarum ad principes et viros illustres 1868, 
12/10/1591. See also L. Stone, An Elizabethan. Sir Orazio Pallavicino, Oxford, 1976. 
83 “[…] fuit portus immunis quibuscumque navibus et aliis navigis conducentibus et seu que 




well: the same request came from the village of Arcola.84 In the following days 
other centres such as Sarzana, Sestri Levante and Savona asked to trade 
freely with Livorno and Tuscany to quickly stock up on cereals. When the 
Collegi realized that the situation would not improve, on the 28 January 1591 
they issued a decree, later reconfirmed on the 12 February.85 The free port was 
granted to all the Republic’s territories.86 In order to spread the news, on the 28 
January the Senate ordered captain Gio Delmar to patrol between La Spezia 
and Viareggio with a stock of printed bills promulgating the free port and 
licenses for access to the port. He was explicitly asked to approach those cereal 
vessels coming from the Netherlands, Hamburg, Danzig and other Northern 
ports, bound for Livorno or elsewhere, in order to persuade them to divert their 
precious cargoes to Genoa: 
 
Our noble beloved, since we know that many ships from Holland, Hamburg, 
Danzig and the Low Countries loaded with provisions are destined for Italy 
and many for Livorno [...] we thought of sending you to search for them as we 
do […].87 
 
The free port modified the fluxes of incoming and outgoing goods, introducing 
reductions and partial exemptions through decrees renewable from 
quinquennium to quinquennium or from decade to decade.88 There was no 
exemption from the anchorage tax, paid at the time of landing. The exemptions 
concerned mainly the taxation of goods that remained on board. If they were 
landed and stored in warehouses, the foreign merchant could leave without 
paying anything for unsold goods. In the same decree there was a general safe-
conduct towards patroni, sailors, merchants and other possible agents from 
“civil and criminal cases and public debts, with the exception only of the crime of 
                                                          
84 ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 1591. The sindaco of La Spezia was probably subordinate to the 
Podestà in charge of the control of the city according to the laws of 1576, see Forcheri, Doge e 
governatori, 187. 
85 ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591. 
86 “[…] concesso porto franco così nella presente città come in tutto il dominio […]”, in ASG, MA, 
Actorum 723, 12/02/1591. 
87 “Nobile diletto nostro, poi che sappiamo che molte navi di Olanda, Amburgh et di Anzich et 
paesi bassi carriche di vettovaglie sono destinate per Ittalia et molte con divisa destinate a 
Livorno […] habbiamo pensato di mandarvi in busca a esse si como facciamo […]”, in ASG, MA, 
Actorum 723, 09/02/1591. 
88 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 146. 
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offence to human or divine majesty”.89 On the 2 August 1591, however, a new 
edict limited the benefits of the free port to the capital alone.90 
The results of this policy for the supply of wheat were evident: in just a few 
months in 1592 about two hundred ships arrived in the city, many of which from 
Danzig and Lübeck, with a cargo of about 36,000 tons of cereals.91 In 1593 
limits of origin were introduced for vessels, beyond which the facilities of the 
free port would be granted. Only vessels coming from beyond the Strait of 
Gibraltar, for example, would be admitted free of charge and on the condition to 
have at least half of their hold full of cereals. Due to the difficulty of operating 
efficient controls on smaller vessels, the exemption was also limited to those 
with a capacity of more than 300 mine (27.3 tons).92 Towards vessels arriving 
from the East, the limits were more variable: to contrast the competition from 
Livorno, the renewals of the edicts moved the limits to Liguria, Lazio or Sicily.93 
With frequent variations with regard to the geographical limits, this system 
characterized the Genoese free port throughout its existence.94 
It was only in 1609 that the Senate ordered the creation of a general free 
port, extending the existing measures to almost all goods that transited through 
Genoa, with the exception of those coming from other ports of the Republic.95 
The debates to define the free port as an ordinary administrative and 
commercial tool had already begun in 1607, when the cereal shortage eased. 
The suspension of payments by the Spanish crown and the desire to enter new 
                                                          
89 ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 12/02/1591. 
90 ASG, MA, Actorum 723, 02/08/1591. 
91 See A. Roccatagliata, Annali della Repubblica di Genova dall’anno 1581 all’anno 1607, 
Genoa, 1873, 158. 
92 Giacchero, Economia e società, 17. 
93 The words West (Ponente) and East (Levante) are often employed when referring to 
Genoese territories West or East of Genoa. Even the Livorno customs reform of 1566, which 
had laid the foundations of the future Tuscan free port, had indicated the limits of origin of the 
goods in order to exclude the port of Genoa: “Tutte le mercanzie et robe ché sopra mare fuori 
delle cento miglia verranno in detto porto di Livorno, et in quello si scaricheranno, et che per 
ponente da Genova et per mezzodì da Corsica, et da indi in là, non havendo tocco da detti 
luoghi al porto di Livorno altro porto che di Livorno […]. Si possino in detta terra di Livorno et 
porto tenere un anno […] si possino per i detti padroni rinavicar fuori de’ supradetti termini delle 
cento miglia senza pagamento d’alcuna gabella […]”, see M. Baruchello, Livorno e il suo porto. 
Origini, caratteristiche e vicende dei traffici livornesi, Livorno, 1932, 124-125. In the Genoese 
decree of 1592 Gibraltar was the western limit. The eastern limits were more variable. The edict 
of 1609, for example, excluded the territories between Liguria and Rome, see ASG, AS, 
Propositionum 1030, 03/06/1609. 
94 The dismantling of the Banco di San Giorgio in 1799 led to the closure of the free port and the 
sale of the warehouses to repay creditors. It was reopened in 1805 when the Napoleonic 
Empire conquered Genoa and closed again after the fall of Napoleon. It resumed regular 
operations only from 2 May 1814 when the Savoy Kingdom annexed the Republic, see A. 
Brusa, Dal portofranco della Repubblica genovese al deposito franco dei giorni nostri, Milan, 
1953, 152-162. 
95 ASG, AS, Propositionum 1030, 12/02/1613. 
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supply circuits also played an important role in the configuration of the new 
rules. The general free port was born, therefore, also as an instrument to 
ensure a commercial alternative to the ties with the Iberian monarchy, as well 
as for contingent circumstances. It gradually evolved into long-term state 
economic policy.  
Shipmasters were required to deliver the bill of lading of their goods in order 
to enjoy the exemption and access to the warehouses. Moreover, they had to 
pay a sigurtà - a ‘security’ - of 2,000 scudi to discourage re-exports to Livorno: 
in case the shipmaster had re-embarked all the goods and had brought them to 
Livorno, in fact, he would have lost his sicurtà. If a shipmaster, however, had 
gone to Livorno and then returned to Genoa and resumed his business without 
having sold the cargo in Tuscany, he could regain his sigurtà regularly.96 The 
free port for cereals survived separately from the general one, with its own 
regulations and geographical limits. Goods could be transhipped from ship to 
ship by paying a 1% tax as opposed to the ordinary 7%. On land, they could be 
stored for six months by paying 3%, while the remaining 4% would be paid only 
in case of sale for domestic consumption.97 
From 1618 the Casa di San Giorgio, whose functioning will be illustrated 
later, obtained the management of the free port in agreement with the 
government. The Casa di San Giorgio was a semi-private body made up of 
Genoese patricians to which the Republic turned to when it needed capital, 
entrusting in return the collection of specific taxes and duties.98 For this reason, 
San Giorgio had an interest in almost every aspect of the state's fiscal policies. 
The interests of San Giorgio and of the businessman to whom the collection of 
taxes was sold almost coincided: the gabellieri were assured compensation for 
lost revenue due to facilitation or exemption of payments. The Casa di San 
Giorgio, on the other hand, dealt with the drafting of decrees and the application 
of rules, with wide decision-making power.99 
The regulation of 1618 attempted to formulate simpler and more liberal rules 
than the previous ones. For example, if a vessel had arrived in Genoa after a 
                                                          
96 Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 95-96. 
97 There were specific treatments based on the origin of the ships or the operations undergone 
by the goods (disembarkation, transfer, etc.); prices and tariffs varied from one decree to the 
next; direct navigation to the port of Genoa was favoured without intermediate stops; privileges 
were extended under different conditions to both vessels and people. See Piccinno, Economia 
marittima, 228-229. 
98 See G. Felloni ed., La Casa di San Giorgio: il potere del credito, Genoa, 2006. 
99 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 227. See also Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 168. 
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stop in a port excluded from the franchise, it could still sell the goods originally 
loaded in the regions beyond the territorial limits.100 Goods could be unloaded 
and stored for 18 months without paying any other fees, except for storage. In 
case of sale, they would have been subject to a 2% fee. If, as a result of a 
transaction, they were taken out of the Republic, they would have paid a 6% 
toll, only half of the tax on goods leaving the country by land. These facilitations 
tended, therefore, to favour the stay in the port of Genoa and its role as a 
redistributive emporium. 
In the renewal of 1623, there was a more organic regulation and a true 
declaration of ‘Portofranco libero, generale e generalissimo’, with the elimination 
of the sigurtà and the unification of the two free ports.101 Only a few categories 
of goods were subject to an absolute ban on duty-free entry, such as easily 
inflammable goods like tobacco or greasy wool.102 
The number of foreign vessels which ensured most of the exchanges, also 
with nearby Livorno, increased considerably starting from the first decade of the 
seventeenth century. According to Claudio Costantini, this increase was 
symptomatic of the widespread smuggling carried out by small cabotage 
vessels: it led to new requests for abolition of the privileges of the minor 
ports.103 The free port, if on the one hand did nothing but further strengthen the 
hegemony of Genoa on the region, on the other hand it also tried to foster an 
integrated exchange structure with other centres in the Republic. For example, 
starting from 1653 the Collegi launched a policy of lowering customs taxes in 
Savona, the objective of which was to strengthen re-export towards the Riviera. 
Goods arriving to Savona by sea could continue overland towards Piedmont 
and Monferrat.104 These attempts were frequent throughout the seventeenth 
                                                          
100 ASG, AS, Propositionum 1032, 29/01/1618. For the results of these new rules, see ASG, 
SG, ms. 75, 1618-1619. 
101 The spatial limits within which the goods were excluded from the exemption remained in 
force, Antibes in the West and Viareggio in the East. In each decree the expiry date remained 
ten years. The renewals were decided within these periods. The two free port would be 
separated again in the free port of 1653, see Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 119. 
102 ASG, SG, ms. 82, 11/02/1623. Greasy wools are wools that have not yet been washed or 
otherwise cleaned.These goods had to be unloaded in the warehouses of the Molo, except for 
‘Brazil’ tobacco, which could be brought into the free port. On this type of tobacco see U. Rossi, 
I tabacchi greggi italiani, Milan, 1937. Other excluded goods were olive oil, which had to be 
deposited in special warehouses in Sampierdarena; spirits; rum; liqueurs, destined for the 
gabelle warehouses or the one in Sampierdarena; books and prints, which could only enter the 
free port in special warehouses. 
103 Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 326. 
104 See the report presented by Francesco Maria Sauli and Niccolò De Mari on 26 June 1686, 
transcribed in Assereto, ‘Porti e scali minori’, 245, note 62. Savona obtained a minor concession 
in the free port edict of 1646. This edict allowed to receive freely the vessels inferior to 1,200 
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century and beyond. In addition, also because of the rivalry with Livorno, from 
the second half of the seventeenth century there were projects for a free port in 
La Spezia which could compete with the Tuscan port and work in synergy with 
the one in Genoa.105 Fear of stimulating new competition, however, led the 
Collegi to slow down and eventually abandon this project.106 
Alongside the development of the free port and the debates on the 
management of maritime trade, the state's financial commitment to the 
management of the port increased during the seventeenth century. This 
phenomenon can be observed not only in the massive works of modernization 
and expansion of port facilities, but also in the increase of taxes on shipping, in 
line with what was happening in other Italian ports.107 In 1638, in particular, a 
reform of the taxation system was passed which simplified the taxation criteria 
and remained in force until the fall of the Republic.108 This reform unified the 
taxes imposed on vessels, grouping them into a single anchorage tax, 
diversified on the basis of their capacity.109 This reform, as will be seen in the 
next Chapter, also made changes in Average procedures. As of this year, 
shipmasters suddenly ceased to declare the capacity of their vessels.110 The 
average annual revenue increased from 3,876.6 lire in the 1628-1637 period, to 
20,954.3.11 lire in the following decade.111 The revenue from the 
aforementioned tax on smaller vessels, although managed under contract, 
passed in the same period from 575.12.6 lire to 1,182.19.8 lire. In the same 
way, the recourse of the Padri del Comune to external loans decreased: the 
most relevant and constant loan, until that moment, had been the ordinary 
contribution paid by the Casa di San Giorgio annually, which began to decrease 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cantari (57,168 kg.) of capacity and with goods coming from beyond the limits of the free port 
coming from Livorno or Marseille, see BCB, Portofranco, misc. Genovese, 1646. 
105 Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 59-71. The first project, however, dated back to 1592, see 
ASG, AS, Propositionum 1028, 20/02/1592, 27/02/1592. 
106 The vote on this project in 1703 ended in the second round with 10 votes in favour and 12 
against, see ASG, AS, Portofranco 1011, 27/06/1703. 
107 The port of Venice, for example, had increased anchorage fees by almost 50% as early as 
1581 and they were further doubled by the end of the seventeenth century, see F.C. Lane, Le 
navi di Venezia fra i secoli XIII e XVI, Turin, 1983, 29, 39-40. 
108 See Grendi, ‘I nordici e il traffico’, 48-49. 
109 The tax was calculated on the basis of the tonnage of the vessels: only 4 lire per year for 
vessels with a capacity of less than 50 Genoese salme (9.5 tons); 8 denari per salma on 
vessels with a capacity between 50 and 800 Genoese salme (9.5-152.4 tons); 1 soldo and 6 
denari per salma on vessels with a capacity of more than 800 Genoese salme (152.4 tons). 
110 See ASG, NG 2084, 1640. 
111 This tribute increased from 16,000 annual lire in the period 1623-1644 to 8,937.10 lire in the 
period 1645-1656. See Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 178. 
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from 1645.112 For the first time in two centuries, there was a sharp increase in 
revenue.113 
However, the virtuous cycle was short-lived. From 1669, the anchorage fee 
was also farmed out, leading to a reduction in its revenue. The withdrawal of 
San Giorgio from the contribution to port expenses since 1682, following the 
increased autonomous funding and the plague epidemic that had decreased 
traffic and therefore the income of the Padri del Comune, led to abandon the 
policy of modernization and expansion of infrastructure and to concentrate only 
on modest works of extension and restoration of existing structures.114 Finally, 
the French bombardment of 1684 damaged port facilities and reduced traffic, so 
that between the end of the seventeenth century and 1751 there was a return to 
a chronic situation of budget deficit.115 
 
2.3 Management and Organization of the Port Area 
 
Port maintenance and expansion are closely related to the financial availability 
of the state and, therefore, to the related taxation policies. The complex 
articulation of a port's infrastructure is the result of the needs of economic 
operators and actors whose interests depended on its efficiency. Docks, 
lighthouses and warehouses are as important as the institutions and operating 
rules that made the loading, unloading and entry of ships as quick and efficient 
as possible.116 In Genoa, the available space in the port area became an 
increasingly valuable resource, especially after the establishment of the free 
port, to the point that, according to Ennio Poleggi, it was “a life-or-death motive 
that forces the ruling classes to perform actual urban planning acrobatics, as 
well as rapid programmatic and financial choices”.117 
                                                          
112 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 178. 
113 18 balance sheets closed with a deficit and 26 with a surplus between 1638 and 1681. See 
Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 178-179. 
114 From this phase on, the investments and expanses would fall only on the Padri del Comune. 
They concentrated their resources on the maintenance of the port apparatus. 
115 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 101; Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 180. 
116 See A. Polónia, ‘European seaports in the Early Modern Age: concepts, methodology and 
models of analysis’, Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 80, 2010, 17-39. 
117 “Una ragione di vita o di morte che costringe i ceti di governo a vere e proprie acrobazie 
urbanistiche, oltre che a rapide scelte programmatiche e finanziarie”, Poleggi, ‘La costruzione 
della città’, 8. 
115 
 
In the first half of the seventeenth century, the port hosted about 1,500 
vessels per year, with a capacity between 12 and 71.5 tons.118 The port could 
accommodate at the same time about 130 vessels, according to its 
administrators, although there were accidents due to overcrowding or to the 
winds, especially the libeccio (SW) wind.119 In the first two-thirds of the 
seventeenth century, an average of 5 vessels over 71.5 tons and 34 smaller 
vessels arrived weekly, without significant seasonal variations. The port 
entrance was large and sufficiently safe even during storms or night time: 
 
The port of Genoa is state of the art and very good for vessels, [...]. The 
entrance of this port is very large, being between the edges of a pier and the 
other the distance of a small Italian mile. He who wishes to enter this port by 
day may do so freely, paying attention to what he sees. And if he enters at 
night, he will have to orient himself by means of the above-mentioned light, 
which he will leave on his left a musket shot. And if, by bad luck, he enters 
during a storm, and you are discovered during the day, then you will have a 
fire to guide you above the edge of the Molo Vecchio [on the right], so that by 
navigating between the light and the fire you will be able to enter happily 
without collisions.120 
 
Between loading and unloading operations, frequent stallie,121 or simply slow 
commercial negotiations, the time spent in port could vary widely.122 In the 
harbour there were dozens of small boats that were responsible for transhipping 
and unloading ashore the cargoes of the ships that remained at anchor when 
there were no free docks or sufficient draught: at the end of the seventeenth 
                                                          
118 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 20. 
119 ASCG, ms. 58, Miscellanea di memorie genovesi, 1678-1679, 152 v, in Doria, ‘ La gestione 
del porto’, 152. 
120 “Il porto di Genova è fatto dall’arte et è buonissimo per navi, […]. L’entrata di questo porto è 
molto ampia, essendo fra le punte di un molo e l’altro di distanza di uno picciolo miglio italiano. 
Colui che vorrà entrare di giorno in questo porto potrà farlo liberamente, guardandosi da quello 
che vede. E se di notte, doverà governarsi con il fanale sudetto, il quale lascierà alla sinistra un 
tiro di moschetto. E se per mala sorte venisse con un tempo fortunale, e che di giorno vi 
habbiano discoperto, all’hora haverete per guida un fuoco sopra la punta del molo vecchio, 
acciò che voi navigando fra il fanale et il fuoco sudetto possiate felicemente entrare in meta di 
questi senza incontrare”, G.B. Della Rovere, Prima parte dello specchio del mare, Genoa, 1664, 
63. 
121 Stallia is a nautical term that refers to the amount of days spent in port to carry out loading or 
unloading. According to Carlo Targa's definition, “Stallia, dico non esser altro, che un termine di 
dimora, cosi denominato à stando o volontaria o forzosa, che può commettere tanto il Padron di 
Vascello in ricevere il carico quanto il Noleggiatore in darglielo in pregiudizio o dell'uno o 
dell’altro rispettivamente”, see Targa, Ponderationi, 165. For the current definition of this term, 
see P. Todd, Contracts for the carriage of Goods by Sea, Oxford, 1988, 88. 
122 If the unloading and loading of goods could take a ‘short’ time, between five/six and ten days, 
unforeseen events or obstacles could extend the stops by months. Examples of the extra costs 
incurred in these cases result from the analysis of Average reports. 
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century these service boats were about 120-130 units.123 A labour force of 
around 1,000 to 1,300 people between the mid-sixteenth and mid-eighteenth 
centuries worked between the docks and the warehouses. These men 
represented about 10% of the urban total workforce.124 About 300-400 men 
were employed only for the warehouses of the Annona (provisions) and those of 
the free port. The high level of trade and the large number of individuals 
involved determined logistical, administrative and financial needs that fostered 
the need for an accurate port administration. 
In Genoa all roads, instead of going towards the cathedral or the government 
palace, are oriented towards the port or the docks.125 The characteristic shape 
of the port was formed from the fourteenth century and did not undergo 
significant changes during the fifteenth century.126 Between 1550 and the first 
half of the seventeenth century, on the other hand, Genoa underwent not only a 
profound restructuring from an administrative/institutional point of view, but also 
the modernization or enlargement of the entire port area.127 The port, with all 
the loading and docking docks arranged in a radial pattern, was surrounded by 
a line of buildings called ripa that stretched for almost a kilometre, from the 
Piazza del Molo to the gate of Santa Fede (see Map 2.1).128 This line physically 
separated the space of the port from that of the activities connected to it and 
from the great patrician palaces behind. In the buildings arranged along the ripa 
were the stores of coopers, oar-makers, sailmakers, merchants and 
cartographers. Behind the ripa were the three public markets of the city: San 
Giorgio, San Pietro della Porta or Banchi, and Soziglia.129  
                                                          
123 Other individuals not registered in the Arti of the ‘minolli’, ‘nocchieri’ or ‘marinai’ could work 
with these vessels, see Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 141. On the assistance to vessels during 
disembarkation see also Piccinno, Economia marittima, 134-178. 
124 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 88,95. 
125 Massa, Lineamenti di Storia economica, 101. 
126 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 41-42. 
127 For example, the warehouse system underwent a vigorous expansion between 1550 and 
1650. The three darsene were also completely renovated between 1573 and 1648, see F. 
Podestà, Il porto di Genova, Genoa, 1913, 95, 98, 254-259. 
128 Poleggi, ‘La costruzione della città portuale’, 9. 
129 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 19. 
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Image 2.1 the city of Genoa 
Source: T. Salmon, La città di Genova, capitale del genovesato in Italia, 1751 
 
In the same area were located the main lodges of merchants, foreigners and 
not.130 Until the beginning of the sixteenth century, the main maintenance 
interventions were aimed at the rebuilding in stone of the main docks.131 
The main dock, called Molo Vecchio, delimited the basin on the eastern side 
and offered partial protection from libeccio wind.132 In the western part of the 
basin was a promontory called Capo di Faro.133 On it stood (and still stands) the 
lighthouse tower, used for signalling to vessels, in which burned an oil lamp, 
and iconic structure in all illustrations and descriptions of the port of Genoa 
known as ‘La Lanterna’.134 As reported by the annalist Agostino Giustiniani, who 
described the port in 1535, six docks branched off from the bank, whose names 
derived from the patrician families who lived near each of them or from the 
function that they covered: the first one, near the Molo Vecchio, was called 
Piazzalunga, later called Cattanei; the second one, Coltellieri or Vino dock, later 
called Chiavari; the third one, the Legne dock, later called Mercanzia dock; the 
fourth one was the Pedaggio dock, located next to the Customs building, near 
the Mint; finally, there were the Spinola and Calvi docks, the latter also called 
                                                          
130 E. Pandiani, ‘Le arti intorno al porto nell’età di Andrea Doria’, in G. Barni, F. Ruffini eds, Il 
porto di Genova nella mostra di palazzo San Giorgio, Milan, 1953, 21-214. 
131 See A. Boato, ‘Dalle cave ai cantieri: il mercato dei materiali lapidei a Genova in età 
medievale e moderna alla luce delle fonti d’archivio’, Archeologia Postmedievale, 17, 2013, 21-
32. 
132 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 56. 
133 See D. Roscelli, La Lanterna di Genova: le torri del mare, Genoa, 1991. 
134 On the iconic role of the lighthouse tower, see G. Giubbini ed., Genova nelle vecchie 
stampe, Genoa, 1970; E. Poleggi, Iconografia di Genova e delle riviere, Genoa, 1976. 
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Calcina dock.135 Each dock had its own station for the tax collectors. The 
toponymy of the docks recalled once again the importance of maritime trade for 
the main patrician families of the city and their interests in this traffic. These 
same families were often among the recipients of the goods, as can be seen 
from the bills of lading present also in the Average documentation.136 
Following the rebuilding in masonry of the main docks and the erection of the 
fortified port walls, completed between 1633 and 1635, a masonry quay was 
built along the coast which, creating a continuous road system, connected the 
two ends of the port to facilitate the transit of goods.137 
Some spaces within the basin were used for occasional drydocking and 
minor repairs, such as the area of Boccadebò, macello del Molo, San Marco, 
Marina di Sarzano and San Pier d'Arena, outside the urban area.138 There were 
also two darsene for the protection of vessels in case of bad weather: the 
darsena delle barche, or del vino, used for vessels dedicated to cabotage, and 
the darsena delle galere. The latter was used as a refuge for merchant vessels 
and warships.139 Finally, there was an arsenale for the construction and repair 
of galleys. It is good to remember, however, that the Republic in naval conflicts 
used mainly fleets made with vessels rented from private shipowners, while the 
shipbuilding activity was distributed along the Riviere.140 
The public warehouses were among the most important structures. Over the 
period, they were the object of significant works of enlargement and 
maintenance. Between some of the docks and the ripa there were public 
warehouses for the conservation of foodstuffs (called rebe or clape). From the 
name itself it is possible to deduce the goods that were intended, as for the 
                                                          
135 A. Giustiniani, Castigatissimi annali, 14r-14v. See Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 56. 
136 An interesting example concerns the GA of the ship Il mercante di Dover and his shipmaster, 
the Englishman Guglielmo Segent. Although there were several merchants involved, the main 
interested party in the ship's cargo was the Genoese patrician Francesco Spinola. He was the 
owner of a batch of sugar for which he appealed against the procedure. See ASG, NG 2084, 
1640. Recorded in the AveTransRisk database as the id50272. 
137 The first 500 metres of the port road were built between 1583 and 1601, while the remaining 
180 metres were completed between 1633 and 1640. These works were followed by a further 
enlargement, financed by San Giorgio, between 1641 and 1643, see Podestà, Il porto di 
Genova, 136-140. 
138 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 22. 
139 G.A. Nanni, ‘La Darsena del Comune’, in Barni, Ruffini eds., Il porto di Genova, 107-119. 
140 See E. Poleggi, ‘L’arsenale della Repubblica di Genova’, in E. Concina ed., Arsenali e città 
nell’Occidente europeo, Rome, 1987, 83-96. Since 1503 it would have been sold to private 
shipowners in exchange for an annual fee. Part of the structure collapsed in 1590 and it was 
totally rebuilt in the following years. See Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 168; Poleggi, 
‘L’arsenale della repubblica’, 83-84. 
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legumes raiba, the oil clapa, the fish clapa and the wheat raiba.141 There were 
twenty-two warehouses in 1550 only for salt, to which others were added in the 
course of the following century. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the 
Casa di San Giorgio owned 33 warehouses in the port area, including the free 
port warehouses, an overall increase of 69.3% of their volume compared to a 
century earlier.142 For wine, initially stored in cellars or in small warehouses 
rented by private individuals near the homonymous dock, four big public 
warehouses were reserved in the half of the seventeenth century.143 Also for oil, 
between the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, new warehouses were reserved inside the Ducal Palace, which 
reached in 1626 a capacity of more than 9,000 hectolitres.144 No less important 
was the expansion of the wheat warehouses, in particular as a result of free port 
regulations and the need to redistribute the provisions that arrived in Genoa to 
supply the territories of the Spanish crown. Between 1565 and 1633, the 
warehouses could store more than 9,000 tons of wheat.145 
The management of the free port forced a revision of the criteria with which the 
warehouses for the most valuable goods in colli were located in the city. From 
simple storage rooms while waiting for the completion of customs formalities, 
these spaces had to become buildings capable of hosting a large quantity of 
goods for significantly longer periods of time. Moreover, in order to avoid 
smuggling, spaces needed to be well separated from the urban areas and easy 
to monitor. From 1609 the old granary warehouses near the San Giorgio palace 
were used, but these had to be expanded a few years later.146 During the 
seventeenth century, these spaces formed an enclosed complex consisting of 
211 warehouses, permanently rented to private individuals or ‘public’, all 
managed by San Giorgio.147  
 
                                                          
141 The word reba or rayba indicated a public warehouse with a square generally situated in 
front of a market; the term clapa or chiappa indicated instead the place where the fish or oil 
market was situated, see Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 20-21. 
142 Podestà, Il porto di Genova, 62, 149. 
143 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 155-156. 
144 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 157. 
145 G. Costamagna, ‘I magazzini del magistrato del sale e del magistrato dell’abbondanza nel 
porto’, in Barni, Ruffini eds., Il porto di Genova, 167. 
146 The area grew from 1,700 square metres in 1609 to 3,700 in 1651 and 6,000 in 1675, see 
Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 157. 
147 See A. Brusa, Il portofranco della repubblica Genovese. Basi storiche e geografiche, Genoa, 
1948. On the rents paid for the warehouses in the free port see Piccinno, Zanini, ‘Genoa: 
colonizing and colonized city?’, 281-296. 
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Map 2.1 Genoa and its port in the seventeenth century
Source: my elaboration based on a map by P. Barberi, Genova antica e dintorni, Milan, 1974 
 
There were two doors of entry and exit, one towards the sea and one towards 
the city. The goods were unloaded near the Mercanzia dock or the Mandraccio, 
in order to be transported from the porters in the free warehouses or in other 
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buildings in case of lack of space.148 Between 1644 and 1645, another 
warehouse was added to these spaces in the western part of the port, where 
before stood the ancient hospital of San Lazzaro.149  
Beyond the proper use of infrastructure, one of the main concerns regarding 
the management of the Genoese port complex in the early modern period was 
the depth of the seabed. The increase in vessels’ capacity, and therefore in the 
draught, from the middle of the sixteenth century had made this an urgent 
problem.150 Ensuring a sufficient draught in all areas of the harbour would have 
allowed to speed up docking operations and to avoid accidents and collisions 
between ships stationed in the port. However, the techniques for dredging the 
seabed used in Genoa were antiquated, so that the work of digging and 
maintaining the minimum depth was constant between the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.151 On the 23 July 1601 Doge Agostino Doria intervened 
with an ordinance which ordered, without success, to keep the seabed at a 
depth of 4.96 metres.152 In 1680, for example, the depth between Molo Vecchio 
and Mandraccio in some points decreased from 5.5 to 2.6 metres.153 In the 
central area of the port, there was a crest called cavallo which posed a constant 
threat to the larger ships that waited in the port bay during unloading.154 
                                                          
148 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 226. The Mandraccio was the area between the Molo Vecchio 
and the ripa, an area that enclosed the entire port in the early medieval period. 
149 Brusa, Dal portofranco della Repubblica, 145. The enlargement of the free port warehouses 
would have been the most important enterprise carried out during the eighteenth century in the 
port area. 
150 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 143-144. The increase in the capacity of vessels in this period 
was a common phenomenon in the main Mediterranean ports and not only, see G.F. Bass, A 
history of seafaring based on underwater technology, London, 1972. F.C. Lane, for example, 
confirmed this trend for Venice, see F.C. Lane, Le navi di Venezia, 1983, 16, 20, 224, 287, 295, 
304, 306. In the seventeenth century the port of Marseille was also visited by vessels with a 
draft of 5 metres or more, compared to 3.5/4 of the galleys and smaller vessels used in previous 
centuries. See L. Bergasse, G. Rambert, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, IV, de 1599 á 
1799, Paris, 1954. 
151 In the comparative examination of the dredging systems used in Livorno, Venice, Corfu and 
Genoa made by B. Crescenzio, Genoa is in last place. In Genoa, small flat-bottomed boats 
were used on which the materials removed were piled up using hoes, while workers had to dive 
each time to remove the stones from the seabed. See B. Crescenzio, Nautica mediterranea, 
Rome, 1607, 543-544. Only in the second half of the seventeenth century was there a shift to 
mechanical devices like the bette, see Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 164. 
152 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto, 145. Even this depth was insufficient if one considers that in 
the major European ports, in order to allow the docking of the largest vessels, it was estimated 
that the depths should be between 8.93 and 10.42 metres, see Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 
163. 
153 W. Borghesi, Il Mediterraneo tra due rivoluzioni nautiche (secoli XIV-XVII), Florence, 
1976, 51. 
154 On 15 February 1670, for example, the patron Gio Battista Torello of Sestri Levante moored 
his vessel in the harbour. The waves during the night made the vessel hit the seabed several 
times, until it broke its keel, causing it to partially sink. See ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 86, 19/02/1670, 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the ID50719. 
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Finally, another pressing problem was the safety of the basin with respect to 
the Northern Tyrrhenian Sea’s winds and currents. In particular, storms could 
give rise to dangerous accidents in the port itself of which we find traces in 
Average documents. A significant accident occurred in the port on Easter 
Sunday 1640 to the English vessel Il Mercante di Dover, coming from 
Cartagena. As can be seen from the declaration of shipmaster William Segent, 
in the course of 4 hours a libeccio storm tore the moorings of several vessels in 
the bay and at the docks. They ended up colliding with each other, with much 
damage and the consequent filing of multiple GAs: 
 
[…] after having arrived in the present port, Sunday past 8 of the present 
morning, a storm of south-westerly wind arose, and a very heavy sea that 
lasted four hours in its greatest fury. It caused four ships that were moored in 
said port to tear their shore moorings. So they went away from their 
moorings, and with a great force on my ropes, which were underneath, they 
sawed off two of them. Then another Flemish ship moored on the right side 
of my ship named Il Romano, and another Flemish ship named Il Sole, 
moored on the left side, having also torn off part of their anchorages by the 
force of the wind and the sea, were pushed on me, hitting my ship for a long 
time with great damage. Having ripped two ropes, broken in pieces a small 
anchor, damaged the major anchor to the point that it will cost more than 200 
soldi to redo it, being in weight 22 cantari [1,048 kg.], and with the continuous 
beatings of said ships I have broken 2 hatches of the artillery, bypassed the 
artillery and broken the stairs, broken the stern gallery and all this has cost 
the ship and has greatly damaged beyond the damage caused to me in the 
rigging. And if I had not prevented this disaster by having hung out of my ship 
many woollen sacks, with which I resisted with less damage to the blows of 
said two ships, it can be doubted that my ship together with all the goods and 
merchandise would have been shipwrecked, for the salvation of which I also 
had to cut the cable that I had at the prow since the sea continually pushed it 
against me at the ropes. And if I had not done so, he would have sawn them 
off, showing that of all the said damage he claims, emendation and 
reparation, as well as of the expenses made for the said account, et hoc est 
[…].155 
                                                          
155 “[…] dopo esser giunto nel presente porto, domenica passata 8 del presente alla mattina, si 
levò una tempesta di vento lebechio, et mare grossissimo che durò quattro hore incirca nella 
sua maggior furia, che causò che quattro navi che erano in detto porto ormeggiate strappassero 
gli ormeggi di terra. Con che si allontanarono dal loro posto e facendo gran forza alle mie 
gumine che li erano sotto ne segarono due. Poi un'altra nave fiamminga ormeggiata dalla 
banda dritta della mia nave nominata Il Romano, et un'altra pur fiamminga nominata Il Sole, 
ormeggiata dalla banda sinistra, havendo strappato anch'esse parte delli loro ormeggi dalla 
forza del vento e del mare si furono spente addosso, urtando in detta mia nave per buon spazio 
di tempo con grandissimo danno di essa. Havendomi fatto strappare due gumine, rotto in pezzi 
un'ancora piccola, guasto l'ancora maggiore a segno che costerà il rifarla più di soldi 200 
essendo in peso cantara 22, e con le continue percosse di dette navi mi hanno rotto 2 portelli 
della artiglieria, scavalcato l'artiglieria e rotto li scaloni rotto la galleria di poppa e tutto il costato 
detta nave e grandemente dannificato oltre il danno causatomi nella sartia. E se non avessi 
prevenuto questo disastro con far appendere fuori dalla detta mia nave molti sacchi di lana, con 




The most important structural intervention to avoid these accidents was the 
realization of the Molo Nuovo. It was initially conceived as a breakwater for the 
protection of the port from the libeccio winds.156 The work, carried out according 
to the project of Ansaldo de Mari with the contribution of the Republic, San 
Giorgio and private subscribers, was almost entirely completed between 1638 
and 1643 with an initial financing of 2 million Genoese lire.157 The intervention 
significantly increased the port's functionality, bringing it to have about 3,000 
linear metres of docks suitable for mooring, a larger area than, for example, the 
competing ports of Livorno and Marseille.158 Even sixteenth century’s portolani 
reported how the construction of the Molo Nuovo significantly improved the 
safety of the port of Genoa for the moored vessels: 
 
If you come to moor at the port of Genoa in a libeccio storm, or if bad 
weather threatens you from that direction, do it this way: come close to the 
distance of a ship’s hull, and after you have passed it, being ready to set the 
mezzana sail, follow the wind, coasting along the Molo Nuovo at a distance 
of half a barrel, and less than that, while you don't have any vessels at the 
bow to hinder you. When you get almost to the middle of the Molo, drop an 
anchor from the left side of the bow and then from the right side, with a 
winch. Lay out your moorings on the Molo, securing yourselves against the 
columns with good ropes, so that you will be in a better position than at the 
Molo Vecchio, since there is not so much backwash.159 
                                                                                                                                                                          
insieme con tutte le robe e merci havesse naufragato, per salvezza delle quali mi convenne 
anco tagliar il cavo ad una piatta che avevo per prora per quanto che il mare me la spingeva 
continuamente addosso alle gumine. E se non havessi ció fatto me le avrebbe segate, 
manifestando che di tutto detto danno ne pretende, emenda e refacimento, come anco delle 
spese fatte per detto conto, et hoc est […]”, ASG, NG 2084, 09/04/1640, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk database as the id50272. 
156 It is famous, for example, the painting of the libecciata of 11 November 1613, which 
damaged or sank most of the vessels in the western part of the harbour, the one most exposed 
to the south-westerly winds. See J. Furttenbach, Newes Itinerarium Italiae, Hildesheim, 
1627, 203. 
157 It is the main investment in the port in the early modern period. The Molo Nuovo was a 
446.4-meter-long breakwater resting on an artificial reef, at a height of 7.4 metres above sea 
level, see Podestà, Il porto di Genova, 292-294. 
158 That square meterage was divided between 1,290 metres for the piers and the Molo 
Vecchio, 870 metres for the docks along the coast and 840 metres for the docks within the three 
darsene, see Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 150-151. Livorno’s and Marseille’s meterage were 
respectively lower of 33% (2,000 m) and of 43% (1,700 m), see D. Matteoni, Livorno, Bari, 
1985, 43,56; Bergasse, Rambert, Histoire de Marseille, 414. 
159 “Se con libeccio fortunale veniste a prender porto in Genova, o vero il tempo vi minacciasse 
da quella parte di fortuna, fate in questa maniera: venite ad accostarvi bene alla distanza di un 
corpo di vascello e, montata che l’haverete, essendo pronto a far vela della mezzana, 
orseggiate costeggiando il molo nuovo in distanza di mezzo fusto, e meno anchora, mentre non 
habbiate vascelli per prora che v’impedischino. E giunto che sarete quasi alla metà di esso, 
lasciate [p. 64] cadere un’ancora dall’occhio sinistro di prora e poi dal destro, con 




However, the Molo Nuovo did not offer complete protection from storms, as 
demonstrated by the accidents that continued to occur even after its 
construction. In 1641 the frigate of the patron Gio Grosso, for example, coming 
from Albissola, sank while it was moored between the Molo Nuovo and the Molo 
Vecchio because of a storm with a tramontana wind (N): 
 
[…] He left with his frigata loaded with iron, vessels, coal, musket barrels, 
and other goods, and his seamen from the place of Arbissola and a sack of 
money, always navigated with good weather until they arrived between the 
Nuovo and Vecchio Molo. There came such a cruel north wind fury that it 
sank the vessel, where it was still at the time of the present consolato, which 
[the vessel] then had to be recovered and in it was found to be lacking the 
goods that will be described below […].160 
 
To further protect the basin, it was necessary to extend the Molo Vecchio.161 
From 1649 and in the following 40 years, a new construction joined the Molo 
Nuovo to the mainland of Capo di Faro, on the western side of the bay. The 
strength of the currents, however, made it necessary to reinforce almost 
annually the Molo outer reef.162 
This century and a half of investments in the area, while greatly increasing 
the availability of warehouses and docks, did not result in a significant reduction 
in the risk factors. Of the 1,400,000 square metres available, only 200,000 
metres (14% of the total), were safely usable for commercial operations.163 
However, the efforts made by the Magnifici and the administrators of San 





                                                                                                                                                                          
gomene, che così sarete in miglior posta che al molo vecchio, non vi essendo tanta risacca o 
tirannia”, Della Rovere, Prima parte, 63-64. 
160 “[…] partito con detta sua fregata carrica di ferro, vascellami, carbone, canni per moschetti, 
et altre robbe, e suoi marinari dal luogo di Arbissola et un sachetto di denari, navigorno sempre 
con buon tempo sino di arrivati tra il Molo Nuovo e Vecchio. Venne furia di vento tramontana 
così crudele che fece affondare il vascello, ove ancora si ritrovava al tempo che fece il presente 
Consolato, quale poi ha fatto ricoverare et in esso ha trovato mancare le robbe che dirà in 
appresso […]”, ASG, NG2085, 26/02/1641, recorded in the AveTransRisk database as the 
id50300. 
161 Podestà, Il porto di Genova, 216-218. 
162 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 167. 
163 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 169; D. Presotto, ‘Aspetti dell’economia ligure nell’età 
napoleonica: i lavori pubblici’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, VII, 1967, 147-186, 156. 
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2.4 The Magistracies Involved and the Regulation of Trade 
 
The port of Genoa was characterized not only by a relatively complex 
organization of infrastructures and a low level of taxation, but also by the 
presence of a well-defined administrative structure. The Padri del Comune were 
in charge of the management of the port and its infrastructures, while the 
Conservatori del Mare had jurisdiction over the vessels in port and navigation in 
general. Other magistracies depended on the port traffic: these were the 
Magistrato dell’Abbondanza, in charge of the supply of cereals for the city and 
the Riviera, and the Conservatori di Sanità, in charge of public health and 
quarantine vessels that could spread contagious diseases. 
 
2.4.1 Padri del Comune 
 
In Genoa, most of the magistracies were collegial. Perhaps because of the 
need to maintain an efficient and tested institutional apparatus, there was 
continuity between the medieval and early modern periods.  
The Padri del Comune was the main port magistracy, as well as one of the 
oldest of the Republic.164 Their first mention, with the name of Sabarbarii portus 
et moduli, dates back to 1281.165 They had both surveillance and judicial 
jurisdiction over the port. The rules in their own statutes compensated for the 
paucity of information concerning port organization in the civil and criminal 
statutes of the Republic.166 
The activity of the Padri del Comune was formally regulated only in 1340, 
during the reorganization of the state wanted by doge Simon Boccanegra.167 In 
1363 doge Gabriele Adorno promulgated the Leges that, among other things, 
better developed this first nucleus of the legislation.168 Only after the reform of 
the French governor Boucicault (1403-1406), the name of the magistracy 
became that of Patres Communis Salvatores Portus et Moduli.169 The 
                                                          
164 Forcheri, Doge e governatori, 90. 
165 Podestà, Il porto di Genova, 18-19. 
166 V. Piergiovanni even theorizes the presence of two ‘legislative paths’, see Piergiovanni, 
‘L’organizzazione di una città portuale’, 430. 
167 Polonio, L’amministrazione della Res Publica, 43. 
168 These laws were mentioned in the previous Chapter, see C. Desimoni, A.T. Belgrano eds., 
Historiae Patriae Monumenta. Leges genuenses, Turin, 1901, 333-337. 
169 Desimoni, Belgrano eds., Historiae Patriae Monumenta, 963-976. 
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vernacular abbreviation of Padri del Comune supplanted the older Latin formula 
within fifty years.  
The port-management and extra-port responsibilities of the Padri were 
numerous. For example, it promulgated regulations prohibiting the careening of 
vessels in port or the entry of overloaded vessels, due to the risk of sinking,170 
and checked that the docks were not cluttered with overly bulky goods or that 
material used as ballast was not discharged into the harbour basin.171 In 
addition, it had to check whether incoming vessels were of good quality and 
able to dock safely,172 and could prohibit the departure of a ship if they 
suspected any irregularity.173 The Padri del Comune issued summary 
judgments against those who hampered the operativity of the port.174 The 
professional corporations involved in the various operations in the port area 
were formally under their control and had to abide by their rules.175 In addition to 
this, the Padri took care of everything that gravitated around the port, both as 
spaces and as taxes, such as the management of the sewage, the aqueduct or 
the issue of fishing licenses in the basin.176 Over time, the extra-port duties of 
the magistracy grew to the point that the Magnifici, in 1588, divided it into two 
separate bodies on the basis of their responsibilities, each composed of five 
units: Padri del Comune Conservatori del Porto e del Molo and Padri del 
Comune Conservatori del Patrimonio.177  
                                                          
170 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 244, 317. 
171 The statutes have several Chapters on rules to prevent the silting up of the port, as well as 
norms aimed at controlling the corporation of the minolli, those who took care of the transport of 
ballast, sand and debris outside the port, see Piccinno, Economia marittima, 489-490. 
172 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 70-71. 
173 The Padri del Comune were agents at the service of the Republic, so they enjoyed 
numerous privileges that strengthened their control. For example, their judgments were 
unappealable, they had precedence over other creditors against debtors, they could carry out 
forced expropriations, they did not have to comply with prescriptions, etc., see Desimoni, 
Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 24, 44, 47, 88, 91, 135, 319, 425. 
174 Piergiovanni, ‘Dottrina e prassi’, 23. They could, for example, prevent overloaded vessels 
from entering the dock for fear that they would sink, or watch over ballast transports out of the 
dock to ensure that material used as ballast was disposed of properly. See Piccinno, Economia 
marittima, 70-71. 
175 See Piccinno, Economia marittima, 134-178, 208-221, 230-246, 287-342. On guilds and 
corporations in Italy during early modern period see A. Guenzi, P. Massa, A. Moioli eds., 
Corporazioni e gruppi professionali nell’Italia moderna, Milan, 1999. 
176 Desimoni, Belgrano eds., Historiae Patriae Monumenta, 967. 
177 This new organizational structure would last for the next two centuries. The Conservatori del 
Patrimonio supervised the Arti (the guilds), managed the road network, the aqueduct, and urban 
cleaning. The Conservatori del Porto were in charge of port infrastructure, the granting of 
anchorage permits and authorizations for ship repairs on land. The two sections maintained a 
common office, unified accounting and equal work obligations. See Piccinno, ‘A city with a Port’, 
171; Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale’, 337-364. 
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The members of the Padri del Comune Conservatori del Porto e del Molo 
had an 18-month term and were organized as follows: two deputies for the 
“scrittura e condotto” and three for “altre faccende”.178 One of the five 
component magistrates of the office was also the Deputato al Porto.179 
Personally liable in case of irregularities, the latter employed the sotto sindaco 
di mare, the architetto di camera, the custode dell’ordigno and the custode del 
porto.180 The 1576 reforms established that the Minor Consiglio would handle 
their appointment.181 Technical management was coordinated by a small 
number of officials ranging from 4 to 8 units.182  
The statutes of the sixteenth century offer a detailed picture of the income of 
the Padri. They handled: a tax on legacies for pious deeds;183 the tax on the 
activity of the city's postriboli; the exitum navium and the molagium; the 
anchorage tax; the iactus; the right to take part of the arriving cargoes of wheat 
for the city’s provision, that the office could sell directly; the tax on fishing 
licenses and the cabella fanalium for the lighthouse on Capo di Faro.184 In 
addition to these taxes, the Padri del Comune collected part of the registration 
fees paid by aspiring members of the guilds involved in port activities.185 They 
collected rents on numerous warehouses, stores, houses and lands in the port 
area and outside the walls. All the other city magistrates, moreover, paid to the 
Padri del Comune part of the pecuniary sanctions that they ordered.186 
Another source of income was the revenue from certain luoghi held in the 
Casa di San Giorgio. The luoghi, as will be seen in more detail below, were the 
shares with which St. George lent capital to the state. Each luogo provided a 
                                                          
178 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 70. 
179 Although the earliest records of such a charge date back to 1715, it can be assumed that a 
similar figure was already operating in earlier centuries, see Piccinno, Economia marittima, 82. 
180 Detailed instructions for these various charges are preserved in a 1715 register kept in 
ASCG, PdC 755, 1715. 
181 A minimum of 3/5ths of affirmative votes was required for the election of a member of the 
Padri del Comune, see ASG, ms. 675, Magistrati coi quali si governa al presente la città. 
182 A group of 2-4 people supervised the operations, controlled the collection of taxes, and kept 
the accounts. The Guardiano della Lanterna was responsible for the lighthouse and signalling to 
vessels. The Custode del Pontone, with his helper, directed the dredging operations and those 
that required the boats of the Padri del Comune. Other officials or technicians (divers, 
architects, accountants, etc.) could be hired on a temporary basis for specific jobs, see Doria, 
‘La gestione del porto’, 171-172. 
183 V. Polonio, L’amministrazione della Res Publica genovese fra Tre e Quattrocento, Genoa, 
1977, 41. 
184 Vedi Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 55-72. 
185 Several Arti took part in port activities, whose members handled a wide range of tasks, like 
driving vessels to entering port, disembarking, packing, etc. On the Arti involved in the 
functioning of the port, see Piccinno, Economia marittima. 
186 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 23. 
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variable interest to its owner. In the event of an emergency, they could be 
resold or transferred to quickly obtain the capital.187 
Non-port revenues, i.e., not related to marine traffic, were higher than port 
revenues.188 This imbalance probably responded, as mentioned, to a precise 
policy of the Genoese authorities. It could be said that the entire city contributed 
to the financing of the port, thus allowing them to keep the charges on the 
maritime operators relatively low. 
The maintenance costs, on the other hand, could be mainly grouped into 
three categories: maintaining the seabed depth, care of the Molo Vecchio and 
the other docks, and the functioning of lights.189 These fell for the most part on 
the budget of the Padri del Comune. 
 
2.4.2 Conservatori del Mare 
 
The Padri del Comune were complemented by other magistracies linked to the 
maritime sector, among which the most important was that of the Conservatori 
del Mare. These had tasks related to the control of trade and navigation, 
inherited from magistracies operating in previous centuries such as the Ufficio di 
Mercanzia e Robaria190 and the Officium Gazariae.191 There was strong 
continuity between the medieval and early modern period. 
The origin of the Conservatori del Mare dated back to the creation of the 
Officium Maris on 15 October 1490 and the Conservatori delle Navi on 24 July 
1490.192 These two magistracies were the results of the requests from the 
                                                          
187 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 123 and following. See also G. Felloni 
ed., Amministrazione ed etica nella Casa di San Giorgio (1407-1805). Lo statuto del 1568, 
Florence, 2014. On San Giorgio see par. 2.5. 
188 Of all these revenues, the tax on legacies, as mentioned above, was the oldest and 
consisted of a tenth of each bequest for pious purposes. Later on, this levy would have been 
extended to all legacies and would have been applied both in the city and the Riviera, see chap. 
XXXIII, De deceno legatorum, in Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 44. In the 1470s this 
source of revenue would be replaced by 36 luoghi of San Giorgio, the functioning of which will 
be explained in the following pages, see Doria, ‘La gestione portuale’, 128. Another important 
income was the Introitus Casteleti, the tribute collected on the postribolo of Monte Albano from 
the middle of the fourteenth century, see cap. XXIV, Capitula postribuli, in Desimoni, Statuto dei 
Padri del Comune, 27-35. For a long time these two source of revenues represented the main 
income for the magistracy, far surpassing the income from the taxes collected in the port area 
such as the iactus navium or the anchorage tax. 
189 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 59. 
190 V. Piergiovanni, Lezioni di storia giuridica genovese: il Medioevo, Genoa, 1983, 89-91. 
191 Piergiovanni, Lezioni di storia, 85. 
192 Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 57-91; Forcheri, Doge, governatori, procuratori, 147-148. 
Magistracies composed of merchants and shipowners were common in cities with a strong 
mercantile vocation, such as Barcelona in this same period. See M.E. Soldani, ‘Arbitrati e 
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Genoese shipmasters and shipowners who demanded greater power of control 
and organization over the corporations engaged in the construction, repair and 
naval supplies, as well as the behaviour of crews and port discipline more 
generally.193 The Officium Maris inherited part of the judicial powers of the 
Gazaria, the Genoese maritime court with jurisdiction super factis et negotiis 
navigandi.194 Its judges were not legal professionals but merchants and trade 
experts. Precisely because they belonged to the same category as the 
merchants whose cases they were often called upon to judge, the functioning of 
this tribunal responded effectively to the needs of rapidity and fairness of trade, 
escaping the juridical and bureaucratic subtleties of the ordinary legal apparatus 
of the Republic.195 The Conservatori delle Navi were elected from among the 
major shipowners in the city and their delegates. It was, that is, the sanction of 
hegemony by the shipowning sector over all other interest groups involved in 
the shipping industry, such as shipwrights, caulkers, coopers, ironmongers and 
other minor corporations.196 The Conservatori delle Navi controlled the 
construction and careening of ships, their provisions, riggings, ropes and 
weapons, the behaviour of crews in port, safety regulations and harbour 
rescue.197 The only formal limitation was the principle of non-contradiction with 
the norms and prerogatives of the Officium Gazariae, which, as noted, were 
partially absorbed by the Officium Maris.198 This partial duality in the division of 
power in the maritime sphere was resolved following the 1528 structural 
reforms. All the competences of the Officium Maris and of the Gazaria, in fact, 
were transferred to the Conservatori delle Navi, later called Conservatori del 
Mare from 1573.199 
                                                                                                                                                                          
processi consolari tra Barcellona e l’oltremare nel tardo Medioevo’, in E. Maccioni, S. Tognetti 
eds., Tribunali di mercanti e giustizia mercantile nel tardo Medioevo, Florence, 2016, 83-105. 
193 Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 59. 
194 One of the collections of laws concerning this magistracy was promulgated in 1441. The 
name Gazaria was a reference to the lost Genoese colony inhabited by Gazarians in the 
Crimea. See Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, XLV; Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 60. See 
G. Forcheri, Navi e navigazione a Genova nel Trecento. Il «Liber Gazarie», Genoa, 1974. 
195 V. Piergiovanni, ‘Celesterio di Negro’, in Piergiovanni ed., Norme, scienza e pratica, I, 229-
224, 222. On this same topic, see B. Maréchaux, ‘«Non andare mai alla giustizia». 
Conflictividad maritima, medjacion y normas juridicas comunes entre Venecia y el imperio 
otomano (1600-1630)’, in M.H. Sanchez ed., Republicas y Republicanismo en la Europa 
moderna (siglos XVI-XVIII), Madrid, 2017, 205-228. 
196 Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 61. 
197 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 75. 
198 Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 61-62. 
199 Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 62-63; Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, XLV; Piccinno, 
Economia marittima, 75-76. According to V. Vitale, however, the Officium Maris was abolished 
at the end of the fifteenth century, see V. Vitale, Le fonti del diritto marittimo ligure, Genoa, 
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This magistracy functioned as a civil and criminal maritime court. Specifically, 
in the seventeenth century it was responsible for: settling disputes regarding 
freight, wages and delivery of goods, punishing officers, pilots and sailors who 
did not respect the contract of engagement, taking care of the maintenance of 
the barges for the storage and unloading of goods, keeping ropes and anchors 
available for vessels and avoiding accidents in case of bad weather.200 In the 
reform of 18 March 1602, the Conservatori also obtained complete criminal 
jurisdiction with respect to violations of police and safety regulations. This 
authority had been entrusted to the Rota Criminale since 1576.201 Among the 
powers obtained since 1602 were, for example: 
 
• Questioning witnesses and, if they refuse or make false statements, have 
them imprisoned and proceed against them with the same authority as the Rota 
Criminale; 
• Judging and meeting without regard to vacations and suspensions of 
activities for holidays; 
• Taking legal action against all individuals who were responsible for 
unloading and loading boats in the port, such as “i patroni delle chiatte, i camalli 
e altri”.202 
 
The intention of the Collegi was probably to rationalize the administrative and 
legal system concerning navigation, by concentrating the judicial power in the 
hands of a single magistracy. In this perspective the Conservatori – discussed 
in greater detail below – inherited the competence for the registration and 
approval of Averages from the Officium Gazariae. They, moreover, also had 
superior authority in port in case of bad weather, when it was essential to act 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1951, 31. On the uncertainties surrounding the name of this magistracy until 1573 see ASG, 
CdM, Atti Civili 1, 1575-1578. 
200 See Forcheri, Doge, governatori, 147-150. BUG, 716.C.V.15, Magistrati antichi e moderni, 
Consegli, Presidenze dal principio della repubblica, manuscript of the eighteenth century, 65v-
66r. 
201 However, in the case of corporal punishment or banishment of more than three years, they 
were to meet together with the praetor of the Rota Criminale. See G. Forcheri, ‘Il ritorno allo 
stato di polizia dopo la costituzione del 1576’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, LXXXIII/I, 
1969, 53-67. 
202 ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 17/03/1607, 119r, 127r. At the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the crisis of the Rota led to the resumption of previous institutional 
practices such as the use of merchant courts, formed by members of the city's elite, also 
because of a deep-rooted distrust against the jurists, see R. Savelli, Politiche del diritto ed 
istituzioni a Genova tra Medioevo ed età moderna, Genoa, 2017, 1-3. 
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promptly for the safety of the infrastructure and vessels in port.203 For example, 
the entire office had to move to the base of the docks in order to quickly give the 
necessary orders to avoid accidents. The Conservatori had their own 
warehouse at the Molo Vecchio where they stored anchors, shrouds and other 
equipment to lend to the vessels in case of need.204 They ordered the 
compulsory loan of this equipment, pledging gold or silver in any currency if 
there was time, where vessels in port needed it.205 
 
If, by chance, you find yourself during a storm at the Molo Vecchio, and you 
(God forbid) lack some mooring, or if in doubt you wish to protect yourself, 
you can, by firing a shot, ask for help, even at night, which will be provided to 
you with both ropes and anchors, with such punctuality as you will not find 
anywhere else in the world, paying only the rope at the fair price that it costs 
to the public, and an honest wage to the men who carries it. And in the year 
1655, on the 26 and 27 of December, during a storm, 22 ropes and 15 
anchors were taken out in one day and one night, a service that you will not 
find in any other part of Europe.206 
 
The magistracy consisted of three members. The shipmasters and shipowners 
present in Genoa, or their delegates, directly elected them. Following the reform 
of 18 March 1602, originally lasting five years, but made perpetual in 1607, the 
number of magistrates was increased to five and their appointment passed 
under the responsibility of the Serenissimi Collegi. The Collegi, in agreement 
with the Minor Consiglio, chose five nobles for a 20 months term. One member 
                                                          
203 Traces of this function can also be found in Average calculations, which will be explained in 
detail in par. 3.4. 
204 “[…] vien data facoltà al detto magistrato di poter prestare, o sia commodare, le agumene, et 
anchore à quelli vascelli che in porto per fortuna di mare o altro non havessero bisogno […]”, 
see ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 125v. 
205 Otherwise, the damage caused by the failure to return the equipment was suffered by the 
entire magistracy. With a law of 1556, if the magistrate did not have the pledge delivered, he 
himself was obliged to pay in case of failure to return it. The reform of 1602 recognized that in 
case of danger this penalty did not apply, “[…] non essendo ragionevole che ne i tempi di 
fortuna si lascino perire quei vascelli che non havessero comodità di pagare à dar castigo per 
detto costo perciò s’annullino e si aboliscano detti ordini […]”, see ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 
1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 126r. For an example of the application of this procedure see ASG, 
CdM, Atti Civili 85, 04/04/1669, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50672. 
206 “Se per sorte vi trovaste con fortuna al molo vecchio, e vi venisse (che Dio non voglia) a 
mancare qualche ormeggio, o dubbitandone voleste accautelarvi, potrete sparando un tiro 
addimandare aiuto, ancor che di notte, che vi sarà somministrato così di gomene come 
d’ancore, con tanta puntualità che nulla più in nessuna parte del mondo, pagando solo la 
gomena il giusto prezzo che costa al publico, et una honesta mercede a gli huomini che la 
conducono. E l’anno 1655 alli 26 e 27 di decembre si diedere fuora in tempo di fortuna 22 
gomene e 15 ancore in un giorno et una notte, assistenza che non troverete maggiore in 
nessuna parte di Europa”, Della Rovere, Prima parte, 64. 
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was elected every four months, in rotation.207 The Conservatori had a 
permanent staff made of a notary, an agent and a tragetta (a servant).208 While 
we do not have specifics on the tragetta's assignments, we do know that the 
agent patrolled the harbor with a small boat for routine surveillance and aided 
vessels in case of need.209 One of the five magistrates also acted as a 
sindaco:210 elected for a three-year term, he was entrusted with the collection of 
a tax of 6 soldi for every 100 Genoese salme (19.05 tons) on departing ships, 
as well as a tax of one soldo per balla of hemp “when intervening with the 
measuring officials to verify whether it is enough to be used to work [for the 
weaving process] or not”.211 
The magistracy relied on the following revenues: the contracting of the 
gabella on Piatte, Liuti and Sacchi, the collection of a tax of six soldi for every 
100 Genoese salme (19.05 tons) on the ships leaving the port and the proceeds 
from the sentences that they inflicted.212 One-third of the pecuniary sentences 
were collected by the sindaco, who was charged with conducting shipboard 
inspections and authorizing all vessels leaving the port.213 The law of 10 
December 1609 prescribed that the sindaco would also be responsible for 
visiting vessels arriving in port, examining bills of lading, crews, and any other 
relevant element: 
 
[…] and to know where they come from, where they are going, what they are 
loaded with, to know the number of seamen as well as of passengers and of 
every other thing completely and every morning he is obliged [the Sindaco] to 
                                                          
207 The 1602 reform was the culmination of a series of minor changes that occurred in 1569, 
1573, and 1576, see Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 65-66. With a further reform in 1605, in order to 
guarantee the rapidity of procedures in the maritime field, in which any delay could lead to 
further expenses and damages, they were authorized to proceed at any time, i.e. ignoring the 
normal office days indicated in the Statuti Civili, see ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 
27/05/1605, 104r. 
208 ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 126r. The tragetta, in Genoese 
dialect, was the servant of a magistracy. See the definition of ‘Tragetta’ in G. Olivieri, Dizionario 
Genovese-Italiano, Genoa, 1851, 514. 
209 He had to make sure, for example, that boatmen did not circulate around moored ships 
during the night, from 1 am until the Hail Mary of dawn, see ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-
1639, 24/07/1605, 126r-126v. 
210 Forcheri, Doge, governatori, 150. 
211 “[…] quando interveniva con li tareggiatori a riconoscer se sono sufficienti da mettere in 
lavoro e non altrimente”. In ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 125v. 
212 ASG, AS, Gride e proclami 1017/3, 11/02/1602, chap. 26. 
213 This role, lasting three years, was also entrusted with the collection of a tax of six soldi for 
every hundred Genoese salme (1.9 tons) of capacity on ships departing, see Forcheri, Doge, 
governatori, 150. He could also collect a soldo per bale on hemp “quando interveniva con li 
tareggiatori a riconoscer se sono sufficienti da mettere in lavoro e non altrimente”, see ASG, 
ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 24/07/1605, 125v. 
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come and make report to the Most Serene Doge and Most Illustrious of the 
Palace.214  
 
Many Average cases report on these visits, following which the sindaco 
provided an estimate of the value of the vessel.215 
It is reasonable to assume that there was a significant degree of overlap 
between the competences of the Conservatori and those of the Padri del 
Comune. There are no reports, however, of serious conflicts of jurisdiction 
between the two magistracies, which suggests a relatively peaceful 
coexistence. This emerged, for example, in the occasional collaboration in 
matters of common interest.216 
 
2.4.3 Other Magistracies 
 
Another magistracy involved in port activities, as well as occasionally in 
Average procedures, was the Office of Annona, also called Magistrato 
dell’Abbondanza. It was established in 1564 as an evolution of the previous 
Officium victualium.217 Its main task was to keep a reserve of 15,000 mine 
(1,364.77 tons) of wheat and 15,000 mine of millets ready at all times.218 
Following the creation of the first public ovens in the Ducal Palace during the 
famine of 1590-1592, moreover, the office obtained control over the 
mechanisms of production and sale of bread throughout the Republic’s 
territories.219 All cereals had to be contracted with the office, which decided to 
distribute them directly to millers, bakers, etc. and set production targets.220 
                                                          
214 “[…] et sapere d’onde vengano, dove vanno, di cosa sono carichi, informarsi del numero così 
de’ marinari come de’ passeggeri e d’ogni altra cosa compiutamente et ogni mattina sia 
obbligato [the Sindaco] a venire fare relatione al Serenissimo Duce e Illustrissimi di Palazzo”, 
Forcheri, Doge, governatori, 150.  
215 See, for example, a payment of 6 lire to the sindaco of the Conservatori, Stefano Garibaldo, 
for the estimate of the vessel Santa Maria e San Placito of the Genoese patrone Giovanni 
Assereto in 1600, in ASG, NG 636, 07/04/1600. Recorded in the AveTransRisk database as the 
id50213. 
216 As observed in Piccinno, Economia marittima, 78. 
217 See S. Origone, ‘L’Officium Victualium a Caffa nella prima metà del secolo XV’, in V. 
Giuzelev ed., Bulgaria Pontica Media Aevii, 2, Sofia, 1988, 398-426. 
218 See Giacchero, Origini e sviluppi, 19. Many of the towns in the Republic had their own Ufficio 
dell’Abbondanza. Between the late sixteenth century and 1640-1650 there were more than 40 
of them, see E. Grendi, ‘L’approvvigionamento dei grani nella Liguria del Seicento: libera pratica 
e annona’, Miscellanea Storica Ligure, XVIII/2, 1986, 1031. 
219 In 1645 the Maggior Consiglio agreed to the building of new public ovens between the 
Chiavari and the Cattanei docks, see Giacchero, Economia e società, 355. 
220 P. Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano in antico regime: un sistema federale sotto la 
sorveglianza dello stato’, Storia Urbana, 134, 2012, 75-94, 78.  
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The magistracy was headed by five “keen citizens” with non-renewable 
annual terms. Four of them came from the nobility, while the magistracy was 
presided over by a member of the Camera. The Collegi with the Minor Consiglio 
appointed them: once installed, the magistrates charged a deputation for the 
purchase of cereals, composed of two employees with a two-month mandate 
and a commissioner of warehouses to weigh the lots of cereals and supervise 
the work of the camalli, the local porters. They also employed minor officers for 
different and not always specified activities: a commissioner for the public 
ovens, a scritturale, a cashier, a sub-chancellor and a sindaco.221 The role of 
the sindaco was probably not very different from that of the sindaco of the 
Conservatori: he controlled all the cereals landings in the port and checked the 
vessels’ origins, the quantity of wheat on board, the selling prices, etc. He also 
supervised over the warehousemen and collected money for the magistrates. In 
addition, he was in charge of checking that no one bought wheat to resell it in a 
speculative way, i.e., that no one privately purchased more than 120 mine 
(10.92 tons) of wheat.222  
Constant cereal shortages in the Republic forced stocks to always be 
purchased on the market, and a significant portion of imported wheat arrived 
through the port. From an analysis of GA's practices, cereals bound for Genoa 
represented the vast majority of the cargoes that flowed to the capital.223 This 
magistracy therefore was an attempt by the state to guarantee a regular influx 
of supplies to the population. The Abbondanza did not have state revenues or 
taxes: it acted as a single large company specialized in wheat trade.224 Extreme 
diversification of markets, for example, was the strategy followed throughout the 
seventeenth century to cope with variations in price and availability.225 The 
magistracy, however, could count on the full support of the state, which adopted 
protective mechanisms such as the imposition of prices or diplomatic 
                                                          
221 Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano’, 79. 
222 Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano’, 79-80. 
223See http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
224 ASG, Senato, miscellanea 1092, 1591. 
225 The markets could experience significant price fluctuations depending on several factors 
such as privateers along the routes or wars that broke out in the countries where loads came 
from. Diversification strategies allowed to resort from time to time to the market that offered the 
product at the most convenient price. See, for example, the activity of the Raynolt firm for the 
purchase of grain in Genoa in M.C. Lamberti, ‘Mercanti tedeschi a Genova nel XVII secolo: 
l’attività della compagnia Raynolt negli anni 1619-1620’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia 
Patria, nuova serie, XII/1, 1972, 71-121.  
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pressures.226 In times of good harvests there were few who bought public 
bread, because many produced it themselves at home buying flour from 
suppliers or had other sources available to buy it at lower prices.227 There was, 
in fact, a fair amount of illegal production and sale of cereals outside the 
Annona circuits. According to Paolo Calcagno, illegal commerce was decisive in 
compensating for the shortcomings of state centralism, which was not able to 
effectively cover the entire territory, especially the inland areas.228 
Finally, another vital element was the sanitary supervision over arriving 
vessels. In Genoa, this task was entrusted to the Conservatori di Sanità.229 
Their first mention dates back to the fifteenth century, although their role was 
outlined precisely only between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century.230 The Conservatori checked the health conditions of arriving crews 
and goods and issued licenses attesting the good health of departing 
vessels.231 Since 1532, the magistracy managed the lazaretto at the mouth of 
the Bisagno River, where men and goods suspicious of being infected were 
obliged to undergo quarantine.232 It had civil and criminal jurisdiction over the 
entire territory of the Republic and had agents or guards in every community 
with a landing space.233 
The development of the free port and the greater volume of goods in the city 
increased the likelihood of contagion, making it necessary to better structure 
                                                          
226 There is no trace, however, of public rewards for navigation and trade, as was in use in 
Venice and Tuscany, see Grendi, ‘Genova alla metà del Cinquecento’, 147. 
227 Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano’, 81. 
228 See Calcagno, ‘Il dominio genovese e il grano’. 
229 For a detailed analysis of the Genovese sanitary polices, see G. Assereto, «Per la comune 
salvezza dal morbo contagioso». I controlli di sanità nella Repubblica di Genova, Novi Ligure, 
2011. Similar institutions existed in all major European ports. See for example, for Italy, C.M. 
Cipolla, Il pestifero e contagioso morbo. Combattere la peste nell’Italia del Seicento, Bologna, 
2012. 
230 The earliest records are from 1429 and 1463; however, this was a provisional magistracy 
that remained in place for the duration of the emergency, see G. Assereto, ‘Polizia sanitaria e 
sviluppo delle istituzioni statali nella repubblica di Genova’, in L. Antonielli, S. Levati eds., 
Controllare il territorio. Norme, corpi e conflitti tra medioevo e prima guerra mondiale, 
Rubbettino, 2013, 167-187, 167. 
231 According to the jurist Scipione Bussetti, on 2 February 1676 the office of the Conservatori di 
Sanità “[…] impedisce l’ingresso nelle città, scaccia gli abitanti dalle proprie case, incendia 
vascelli, abbruggia robbe infette, spiana le case e procede di fatto nell’irrogare le pene, così 
portando il pubblico beneficio […]”, see ASG, ms. 988, Istruzioni dell’illustrissimi signori ufficiali 
del Magistrato della Sanità e loro ministri, 1501-1796, 02/02/1676. 
232 T.O. De Negri, Storia di Genova, Milan, 1974, 651-652. 
233 In 1628 the sanitary police of the minor communities is reorganized, with the specification of 
the election structure, the powers and the relationships of each peripheral office with the central 
authority, see Assereto, ‘Polizia sanitaria e sviluppo’, 171-172. Similar general regulations can 
also be found for Livorno (1648), Marseille (1689) and Venice (1692), see D. Panzac, 




this magistracy, which was born as temporary.234 Initially, the magistrate was 
composed of four noble citizens, to whom a senator would be added as 
president from 1623. Their number was increased to five with the addition of a 
non-noble citizen from 1664.235 The Collegi and the Minor Consiglio appointed 
them.236  
The Conservatori had a permanent staff consisting of a sindaco, responsible 
for checking ships, verifying licenses, supervising goods and interrogating 
captains; a guard officer, at the sindaco's service on the Spinola dock, with the 
task of recognizing arriving ships and crews and receiving health licenses to be 
returned upon departure; a chancellor and a sub-chancellor who worked with 
the sindaco to verify the licenses; a sub-chancellor who kept the accounts of the 
office; a tragetta; a commissario; and a chaplain for the lazaretto.237 The 
magistracy collected any fine for the violation of health regulations.238 In 
addition, the Conservatori collected a fee for the granting of health certificates 
and received fees for the hostel in the lazaretto.239 
In Genoa, the ruling class kept the port administration in its own hands: its 
members, moreover, were in turn usually integrated into the city's mercantile 
and financial environment.240 All the magistracies examined thus far contributed 
to the management, both ordinarily and extraordinarily, of the port complex. 
Despite some overlapping of jurisdictions, it is possible to observe an increasing 
specialization of competences. In particular, significant improvements and 
expansions of port infrastructures were carried out in the period between the 
end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. All of 
this would not have been possible without the support of the State and its 
willingness to incur debt to meet the needs of the port.241 As a counterpart to the 
continuous indebtedness, the fiscal income of the port in modern times, as 
reconstructed by Paola Massa and Giorgio Doria, grew considerably over time, 
                                                          
234 In 1609 the free port was extended to all goods, while in 1623 it became the “Portofranco 
libero, generale e generalissimo”, see Giacchero, Origine e sviluppi, 119. 
235 The addition of a senator as president would date back to an act of 11 August 1623, while 
the number of members was increased to five by decree of the Senate on 10 December 1664, 
see Assereto, Per la comune salvezza, 20. 
236 Assereto, Per la comune salvezza, 19. 
237 Assereto, Per la comune salvezza, 41-42. 
238 S. Olivieri, ‘La normativa della Magistratura di Sanità di Genova (1500-1750)’, La Berio 1, 
1999, 7. 
239 Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale, navigazione’, 340. 
240 L. Lo Basso, ‘Il finanziamento dell’armamento marittimo tra società e istituzioni: il caso ligure 
(secc. XVII-XVIII)’, Archivio Storico Italiano 174/1, 2016, 81-106, 101. 
241 See Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’; Doria, ‘La gestione portuale’. 
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going from a thousand lira a year in the fifteenth century to about 2,000 lira in 
the sixteenth century and up to 50,000 lira in the late eighteenth century. 
However, as it has emerged from the documentation, these revenues were very 
often inadequate to the growing needs of one of the main Mediterranean and 
European ports. Contributors outside the port played a key role, especially the 
Casa di San Giorgio. 
 
2.5 An Increasingly Influential Partner: the Casa di San Giorgio 
 
Although the magistracies previously examined enjoyed their own tax revenues, 
the collection of most taxes throughout the Republic fell to another extra-state 
authority, whose role has so far been only hinted at. This was the Casa di San 
Giorgio, the consortium of public creditors that managed the state's public debt 
in exchange for fiscal, judicial, finance, coinage, and co-participation in the 
sovereignty of the Republic.242 
The Officium procuratorum Sanctii Georgii super diminutione debitorum was 
born between 1407 and 1408 during the French domination. Marshal 
Boucicault, governor of the city between 1401 and 1409, made an agreement 
for its implementation with the Consiglio degli Anziani and the Officium 
Provisionum, a kind of ministry of the treasury.243 The French administration 
needed capital for the planned reforms and for the control of the state 
apparatus. In 1417 it granted to San Giorgio civil jurisdiction, extended in 1469 
following the concession of the administration of territories previously belonging 
to the Republic; in 1445 it was entrusted with the direction of the state Mint and, 
in 1447, the Officium obtained its first territorial domain with full sovereignty on 
the city of Famagosta (Cyprus).244 The Casa obtained in 1408 the authorization 
                                                          
242 Vedi Cama, ‘Banco di San Giorgio’, 112. 
243 On the reforms during the governorship of Boucicault see V. Piergiovanni, Gli statuti civili e 
criminali di Genova nel Medioevo. La tradizione manoscritta e le edizioni, Genoa, 1980. It was 
common practice in Genoa to resort to private financing through the creation of compere or 
maone formed by patricians who obtained assets and tax revenues in exchange for the capital 
paid in. An example is, in 1350, the formation of the Compera magna Venetorum with an 
interest of 10% in exchange for a loan of 300,000 Genoese lire in the war against Venice, see 
D. Gioffré, ‘Il debito pubblico genovese. Inventario delle compere anteriori a San Giorgio o non 
consolidate nel Banco (sec.XIV-XIX)', Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria VI, 1966, 172-
173. 
244 Cama, ‘Banco di San Giorgio’, 112. 
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to exercise banking activities with the creation of the Banco di San Giorgio.245 In 
1444 this was suspended, and only in 1586 the Banco di San Giorgio resumed 
its banking activities on behalf of private individuals issuing, in exchange for 
deposits, special transferable bonds considered precursors of banknotes. The 
Banco was suppressed in 1816.246 
The name of the institution became Casa delle compere e dei banchi di San 
Giorgio. The term Compere, with which the Casa di San Giorgio was often 
referred to, indicated a particular type of public debt widespread in Genoa: a 
company of private investors lent the State a certain sum of money for an 
agreed period and, on the basis of the capital sold, obtained the right to collect 
for its own benefit and until the loan was repaid, a tax already in force or 
specially instituted. The profits collected each year on the taxes temporarily 
granted by the state represented the interest on the debt: the uncertain nature 
of tax revenues made the interest variable and thus allowed to escape the 
condemnations of the Church against fixed interest rates.247 The creation of the 
Casa di San Giorgio represented an operation of debt consolidation through the 
reunification of the different pre-existing Compere into a single institution.248 The 
seat of the Casa was located in the building once known as Palazzo a Mare 
since 1408: ancient residence of the Capitano del Popolo, it was later briefly 
used as a customs house.249 
The administrative direction of the Casa followed strict requirements: protect 
the creditors, minimize conflict of interests, and maintain independence from 
government.250 The state granted the Casa non-interference in the 
management of its accounts, a commitment sanctioned annually through a 
                                                          
245 The only exception was the period between 1445 and 1530, when banking was restricted to 
the state, shareholders, tax collectors, and taxpayers, see G. Felloni, Inventario dell’archivio del 
Banco di San Giorgio (1407-1805), III/1, Rome, 1990, 77-82. 
246 See Il Banco di San Giorgio: fonti e cimeli. Mostra a cura del Banco di Roma, Genova, 
Palazzo S. Giorgio, 16-28 maggio 1970, Genoa, 1970. 
247 Only in 1569 did Pius V approve the censo constitutivo, a type of loan that recalled the 
functioning of the Genoese compere. See P. Vismara, Oltre l’usura. La chiesa moderna e il 
prestito a interesse, Soveria Mannelli, 2004. 
248 In Genoa, the processes of consolidation and unification of debts began in 1274 and were 
renewed in 1303, 1332, 1340 and, finally, 1407. G. Felloni's studies have long focused on the 
functioning of this powerful institution. In particolare, see G. Felloni, ‘I primi banchi pubblici della 
Casa di San Giorgio’, in G. Felloni ed., Scritti di storia economica, 1, Genoa, 1998, 603-622. On 
this theme, see 
http://www.lacasadisangiorgio.eu/main.php?do=bibliografia, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
249 This building is currently known as Palazzo San Giorgio and it is the siege of the Port 
Authority. See D. Cabona, Palazzo San Giorgio, Genoa, 1991. 
250 G. Giacchero, ‘Il contributo della Casa di San Giorgio alla difesa della repubblica’, in La 
storia dei genovesi, III, Genoa, 1983, 173. 
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mutual oath: San Giorgio swore to protect the state financially, while the latter 
guaranteed the autonomy of the institution. Many observers have differentiated, 
when not opposed, the management of San Giorgio from that of the Republic. 
Niccolò Machiavelli himself was among the first authors to compare the chaos 
and factional conflicts that characterized the Republic political life with the order 
and efficiency of San Giorgio.251 This contrast is however misleading, as shown 
also by the observations of some Genoese politicians of the time such as 
Matteo Senarega or Andrea Spinola.252 Although formally separated, the same 
elites governed San Giorgio and the Republic, and it would be unthinkable to 
believe that their political agendas diverged significantly. However, scholars 
often refer to two ‘separate states’ in reference to the two entities.253 This is, 
however, an exaggeration. Even after the declaration of incompatibility between 
the charges of San Giorgio and those in the government of the Republic, which 
took place in 1528, the Casa di San Giorgio was continually called upon by the 
Magnifici of the Ducal Palace to provide the economic means necessary for the 
Senate, the Camera and the magistrates in their institutional duties. A further 
example of the correlation between San Giorgio and the state, as mentioned 
above, can also be observed in the entrusting to the first of the free port 
policies. 
In line with developments with the main institutions of the Republic, all the 
supreme positions of the Casa di San Giorgio were reserved for patricians listed 
in the Liber Nobilitatis. Not infrequently, among the offices of government and of 
San Giorgio there were people linked by close kinship or successive 
generations of the same family branch. Also in this case, moreover, the criterion 
of the alternation between Vecchi and Nuovi Nobili, applied since the formation 
of the Casa, was preserved.254 In 1568, a general statute was promulgated in 
order to create an organic structure, harmonizing all the decrees and orders 
issued in previous years.255 Leading the management of Casa di San Giorgio 
                                                          
251 C. Vivanti ed., N. Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, VIII, Turin, 2005 (1 ed. 1532), 28. 
252 BCB, m.r. XIV, 1, 4, A. Spinola, Ricordi, 129-131. BUG, Manoscritto B-III-8, M. Senarega, 
Relatione compitissima della Repubblica di Genova, 1597. On Senarega see Cattaneo Mallone, 
I “politici” del Medioevo genovese, 205, 251, 321, 328, 360. On the internal debates on San 
Giorgio during the sixteenth century see Savelli, ‘Tra Machiavelli e San Giorgio’, 249-322. 
253 Cama, ‘Banco di San Giorgio’, 110. 
254 In particular, we can find recurrent names of some of the families of the Old Nobles such as 
De Franchi, Sauli, Invrea, while among the New ones the most frequent were Balbi, Brignole 
and Durazzo. See Bitossi, ‘Il governo della Repubblica’, 97-100. 
255 The patricians Simone Spinola quondam Gio. Battista (protettore in 1529), Nicolò Doria 
quondam Giacomo (protettore in 1556), Nicolò Cibo quondam Giuliano (protettore in 1560) and 
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was a select committee of eight individuals (Protettori).256 The charge lasted two 
years with a renewal of two members per semester, as a result centralizing 
almost all the decision-making power. The elder among the Protettori was the 
Priore, who presided over the meetings and kept the keys of the palace. At the 
end of their term of office, the outgoing Protettori would enter the office of the 
Precedenti, where they would hold a one-year term charge to complete any 
remaining task.257 In the case of relevant issues, the Protettori had to obtain the 
approval of the general assembly, the Gran Consiglio delle Compere. The Gran 
Consiglio, which had representative and consultative functions, initially 
consisted of fifty-two councillors, but their number increased to 480 following the 
1568 statute.258 It also appointed four Sindacatori to review the activities of the 
Casa during the previous year.259 The Gran Consiglio would meet at least once 
a year to deliberate on major issues and internal rules.  
Since individuals belonging to the same families and the same social class 
as those who ran the Republic lead the Casa, it is likely that the formal 
separation served to minimize the side effects of the continuous struggle for 
power that characterized Genoa between the fifteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. The privacy of its public accounts sheltered San Giorgio from the 
constant shocks that occurred at the political-administrative level.260 Some 
scholars such as Giampiero Cama refer to it as a kind of: 
 
A sui generis Senate, a clearinghouse that cushioned the bitterness of city 
rivalries that risked, without the presence of this brake, to drag the Republic 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Ottaviano Sauli quondam Antonio (protettore in 1565-1566) formed the deputation in charge of 
drafting the new rules of the Casa delle Compere. On this process see Felloni ed., 
Amministrazione ed etica, 9-10. 
256 Giacchero, ‘Il contributo della Casa’, 167. The protettori, in turn, formed sub-commissions for 
ordinary administration, one of which was responsible for the affari del mattino, the taxes, and 
the other for the cura della scrittura, the accounting. To these permanent commissions were 
added others for criminal authority, the franchises of the clergy, unsold taxes, salt contracts, 
free port, etc. 
257 After the year had passed, the precedenti handed over to the protettori the writings for which 
they were responsible, and the protettori had another five years and one month to complete any 
outstanding issue. Beyond this term every writing was transferred to a special office in charge of 
the liquidation of the residuals, called Ufficio del 1444 to commemorate the year of its 
foundation. See G. Felloni, 1407. La fondazione del Banco di San Giorgio, Bari, 2011, ebook. 
258 Of these 480 individuals, 460 were chosen from among the owners of at least 10 luoghi, 
chosen half by random draw and half by vote, and the remaining 20 were the protettori, 
precedenti and sindacatori. The Council met formally with the presence of at least 300 
members. See Felloni ed., Amministrazione ed etica, 11. 
259 Cama, ‘Banco di San Giorgio’, 111. 
260 Giacchero, ‘Il contributo della Casa’, 170. 
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towards a destiny of disorder and turbulence detrimental to its very 
survival.261 
 
San Giorgio represented an economic and political security mechanism at the 
service of the city's oligarchy.262 Initially, the Protettori alone decided the 
granting of credit to the state. Because of the increasingly pressing financial 
demands of the Republic, however, the statute of 1568 introduced the need to 
obtain the approval of the Gran Consiglio delle Compere.263 
The institutional function of the Casa was to administer the taxes that the 
state had transferred to creditors. It collected tax revenues at variable interest 
until the state repaid the loan. The sum loaned constituted the capital of the 
Compera and, to facilitate the collection and counting of subscriptions, it was 
divided into shares called luoghi. The luoghi had a nominal value of 100 lire 
each, were seizable by the tax authorities in case of insolvency, were 
mortgageable and could be transferred: all these elements favoured the birth of 
a dynamic market. The luoghi yielded a variable interest each year, called paga, 
to their owners, called luogatari. Investments in luoghi were not highly 
remunerative. However, they were safe investments guaranteed by the state.264 
The paghe were proportional to the active balance of San Giorgio, that is, to the 
difference between the sale of the tax revenues managed under contract and 
the expenses for ordinary administration and ordinary and extraordinary 
contributions to the Republic.265 Initially, the interest on the luoghi was fixed at 
7% and was paid regularly every year. In the course of the fifteenth century and, 
in particular, as a result of the large expenses for the administration of those 
eastern colonies that the Republic had granted to the Casa di San Giorgio since 
                                                          
261 “Senato sui generis, una camera di compensazione che attutiva le asprezze di quelle rivalità 
cittadine che rischiavano, senza la presenza di questo freno, di trascinare la repubblica verso 
un destino di disordini e turbolenze nefaste per la sua stessa sopravvivenza”, in Cama, ‘Banco 
di San Giorgio’, 116. C. Bitossi also suggests an approach to the study of San Giorgio that 
considers this institution as a fundamental component of Genoese politics, see Bitossi, ‘Il 
governo della Repubblica’, 107. 
262 From 1539 the state debt and the taxes entrusted to San Giorgio were declared perpetual. 
263 BCB, B.S.XVI.C.55-88, Leggi delle compere di San Giorgio, 1568, 30. 
264 This type of public debt guaranteed the creditors from risk, also giving them greater 
bargaining power with the government. The public debt in the Kingdom of Naples, for example, 
offered a much higher interest rate on average during the sixteenth century, but this difference 
was also the result of the different risk rate, see A. Calabria, The cost of empire: the finances of 
the kingdom of Naples in the time of the spanish rule, Cambridge, 1991. This same mechanism 
was still applied in 1980s Europe by entities such as the British central bank or some European 
central banks, see D. North, B. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of 
institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England’, Journal of Economic 
History 49, 1989, 803-832. 
265 Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale’, 347. 
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1446, it was necessary to opt for a variable and usually lower profit margin.266 
After 1440, paghe collection became variable, and luogatari waited from a few 
months to several years, depending on the economic situation, for payments.267 
The Casa di San Giorgio had full authority over the administration of its taxes 
and revenues.268 This institution managed the taxes that the Republic entrusted 
to it, in return for its loans, through contract sales to private operators who 
offered the highest price, for periods ranging from one to five years.269 The 
taxes were auctioned off in the first months of the year, so that between May 
and June the Casa could calculate the income from the contracts and the 
related expenses. After deducting the expenses from the profits, it established 
how much interest would be left for the luogatari.270  
Overall, the budget of the Casa far exceeded the revenues and expenditures 
pertaining to the state: a body managed by the main creditor families of the 
government administered more resources than were managed by the 
government itself. This element corroborates the hypothesis of a system of 
mutual collaboration with the Republic. With the accumulated capital, the Casa 
made public investments and financed activities of public utility, for example 
through fixed or extraordinary contributions and occasional debt 
cancellations.271 Ordinary contributions amounted to 33,000 lire in 1490 and 
they increased to 50,000 in 1539. In the same year, a debt worth 350,000 
Genoese lire was also forgiven.272 The contributions, as noted above, also 
allowed for the maintenance of low taxation in the port area. 
                                                          
266 From 1420 the bond became variable. In 1457, for example, it was of 3.45% per year, see M. 
Balard, ‘Il Banco di San Giorgio e le colonie d’Oltremare’, in G. Felloni ed., La Casa di San 
Giorgio: il potere del credito, Genoa, 2006, 63-73, 73. 
267 San Giorgio required the purchasers of the tax collection rights to pay the price in paghe of 
the same year, contributing to the liveliness of the securities market through the purchase and 
sale of credits collectible forward and exchanged for cash at a rate below the nominal value. In 
1631 it also instituted an office with a monopoly in the trade of paghe, but this office was 
suppressed in 1662 because of the impossibility of regulating the market. See G. Felloni, ‘Il 
credito all’erario e ai privati: forme ed evoluzione’, in G. Felloni ed., La Casa di San Giorgio: il 
potere del credito, Genoa, 2006, 155-163, 156-157. 
268 It also dealt with tax evasion, see Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, 129-130. 
269 Felloni, ‘Il credito all’erario’, 155. 
270 The income provided by the luoghi seems to double, going from 250 lire in 1450 to 500 lire 
annually during the first half of the sixteenth century. See Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici ed economici’, 
132. The quotation of the luoghi of San Giorgio on the market went from 64.10 Genoese lire in 
1575 to 130.15 lire in 1600 to 278 lire in 1621. Their value dropped again to 151.5 lire in 1632. 
See C. Cuneo, Memorie sopra l’antico debito pubblico, mutui, compere e banca di S. Giorgio in 
Genova, Genoa, 1842, 309. 
271 Giacchero, Il Seicento, 131. 
272 Giacchero, Il Seicento, 54. 
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The establishment of new taxes by the government was subject to approval 
by the Casa di San Giorgio, whose duty it was to protect the interests of 
creditors.273 Since the majority of goods and commodities arrived by sea, 
moreover, the Casa di San Giorgio was interested in the port administration. 
Throughout the early modern period, 40% of Genoa's tax revenue came from 
trade impositions. Of this amount, about 33% came from the taxation of 
fundamental supplies (wine, wheat, meat, oil and salt).274 About 75% of San 
Giorgio’s revenues came from goods transiting through the port, mainly 
foodstuffs.275 The maritime policy of the Genoese state, which for centuries had 
centralized trade in the capital, guaranteed San Giorgio control over commercial 
flows and the corresponding revenues.276 It is no coincidence that at the palace 
of San Giorgio were declared also the Average reports relating to the ships that 
arrived in Genoa with loads of salt or oil, whose taxes were due to San 
Giorgio.277 
San Giorgio often replaced the state, or reinforced its action, in the port 
investments. The carati maris tax initially linked San Giorgio with maritime trade 
and determined its interest in the port area. It unified this tax from 1445 and 
regularly contracted it out. It affected goods landed in Genoa or in the Riviera 
coming from abroad or from the Republic, as well as those leaving, with a levy 
of between 5 and 7%.278 The 1576-1637 period, the most prosperous in 
investments in infrastructure, coincided with the phase in which the port of 
Genoa was most protected by the Casa. Between the mid-sixteenth century and 
the seventeenth century, the financial contribution of San Giorgio for the port 
represented 49.6% of the total invested in this sector.279 It provided funds that, 
                                                          
273 For these reasons, scholars’ opinions on the activity of this institution are often divergent. 
Admirers of this institution, in later centuries, were for example Cuneo, Memorie sopra l’antico 
debito; A. Wiszniewski, Histoire de la banque de Saint-George de Gênes, la plus ancienne 
banque de l’Europe, Paris, 1865; E. Marengo, ‘L’antico debito pubblico genovese e la Casa di 
San Giorgio’, in E. Marengo, C. Manfroni, G. Pessagno eds., Il Banco di San Giorgio, Genoa, 
1911; Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle. 
274 Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale’, 340. G. Felloni, basing his analysis on the sums collected 
by San Giorgio, suggested a number of hypotheses regarding the flow of goods which will be 
examined in chap. 4. 
275 Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale’, 347. 
276 Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale’, 349. 
277 These reports are found occasionally, but with a certain regularity, throughout the early 
modern period. See some examples in ASG, SG, Affari Generali 2796, 1501-1506; ASG, SG, 
Altro, 39578, 19/08/1678-27/98/1680. San Giorgio, as will be seen in the next Chapter, was also 
involved in the collection of administrative fees related to Average procedures.  
278 See A. Pacini, Desde Rosas a Gaeta. La costruzione della rotta spagnola nel Mediterraneo 
occidentale nel secolo XVI, Milan, 2013, 319.  
279 San Giorgio contributed for the 18,7% in the realization of the warehouses and for the 30,9% 
in the construction of the Molo Nuovo, vedi Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 159. 
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depending on the year, could exceed seven or eight times the total amount of 
ordinary port revenues.280 As early as 1545 the Padri del Comune, who 
benefited from a fixed contribution from San Giorgio, were forced to ask for a 
loan of 28,000 lire in 310 luoghi, to be repaid in ten years.281 They used this 
money, among other things, for seabed excavation.282 In exchange, San Giorgio 
obtained the collection of a tax of 4 denari for every mezzarola (158.04 lt.) of 
wine discharged in the Darsena.283 
San Giorgio was directly interested in an increase of port traffic and 
infrastructures. The construction of new warehouses, for example, allowed to 
increase customs revenues through warehousing costs and to attract more 
businessmen to use the Genoese port facilities. Following the already observed 
increase in taxes on vessels in 1638 San Giorgio’s financial aid to the port 
decreased.284 The annual contribution dropped from 16,000 lire per year in the 
period 1623-1644 to an average of 8937.10 lire in the years 1645-1656 and to a 
complete cessation in the period 1657-1661.285 
The end of its financial involvement did not mean the end of San Giorgio’s 
complex relationship with the port space and the goods in transit, nor the end of 
the port’s primary role in the Republic’s economy. On the contrary, this 
relationship intensified with the growth of the free port and the building of new 
warehouses. The contribution of a financial and banking institution proved to be 
decisive in the evolution and functioning of the complex apparatus analysed in 
the preceding paragraphs. San Giorgio lived in a symbiotic relationship with the 
state’s institutions, a symbiosis that belies the alterity or divergence of interests 
with respect to the government, who actually needed San Giorgio’s financial 
power and authority. 
  
                                                          
280 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 173, 175. 
281 In addition to this, they received a fixed contribution from San Giorgio in lire di paghe. 
Extraordinary contributions for the excavation of the seabed were also frequent, vedi Piccinno, 
Economia marittima, 97.  
282 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 97. 
283 Massa, ‘Fattori tecnici’, 110-111. 
284 Grendi, ‘I nordici e il traffico’, 48-49. 
285 The plague epidemic that struck the city between 1656 and 1657 must be taken into account, 
see Giacchero, Il Seicento, 430-434. The final suspension of tributes, as already noted, did not 
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3. Maritime Trade: Business Strategies and Risks 
 
 
3.1 Financing Maritime Business in Genoa between the Medieval and Early 
Modern Period
 
The information flow, the voyage organization, the voyage’s financing, and the 
option of either reducing or shifting the voyage’s business risk to third parties all 
played a crucial role in the development of maritime trade. The efficiency in 
managing the port of Genoa and the tax system applied by the Republic, 
together with the free port policy previously examined, are not enough to 
explain the volume of maritime trade that, whether as a final destination or as a 
port of call, concerned Genoa. Genoa has been a privileged observation point 
due to both its importance as a port and the resourcefulness of the 
businessmen who resided there. The latter used cutting-edge financial 
instruments, which were popular in the main European market squares.1 The 
businessmen could rely either on institutions with ancient roots, such as the GA, 
or on more modern financial instruments, such as maritime exchange loans or 
premium insurance.2 
Even before shipowners faced the risk factors linked to ship management, 
shipowning and trading activities, their very first endeavour was the raising of 
capital to finance travel. Maritime expeditions only pay off upon arrival at their 
destination, providing earnings through freights or by selling their cargo. Before 
the voyage, however, the shipowners or the shipmasters had to bear preventive 
costs to supply the onboard provisions, to buy goods or to hire the crew.3 The 
capital could be obtained by using funds from previous profits, using the 
accumulated stocks following previous earnings or by entering into debt.4 This 
                                                          
1 See G. Felloni, Genova e la storia della finanza: una serie di primati, Genoa, 2005. 
2 While maritime loans, commenda and all the tools examined in these pages were typical 
market instruments, GA was not; see M. Fusaro, ‘Introduction: sharing risks, on averages and 
why they matter’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., Sharing risk, forthcoming. On the 
development of risk management, see M. Billings, ‘A historical perspective on risk 
management’, in M. Woods, P. Linsley ed., The Routledge Companion to Accounting and Risk, 
Abingdon-New York, 2017, 5-14. 
3 A shipowner, for example, would acquire some shares in a vessel in order to pay only part of 
the construction costs and spread the risk of shipwreck over several vessels. This practice was 
used in Genoa since the fifteenth century, see Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, 288-291. 
4 Excessive debt, however, could undermine the stability of the business or wipe out its profit 
margins. See B. Supple, ‘The Nature of Enterprise’, in E.E. Rich, C.H. Wilson eds., The 
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last strategy was more often common practice, as it allowed the shipowners to 
shift part of the business risk onto the creditor. 
As in the main Italian marketplaces, in Genoa, the credit instruments that 
developed between the Middles Ages and the modern age to meet the needs of 
shipowners or merchants belonged to two main categories: contracts of 
association and credit agreements.5 Contracts of association allowed splitting 
the profits and risks between the investors of the capital and the 
shipmasters/shipowner; even GA made the relationship between shipowners 
and merchants similar to a society. Credit agreements, on the other hand, 
according to local customs and the debtors’ needs, provided funds on terms 
different from those available under the market conjuncture. 
Contracts of association complied with the principle of finance equity: since 
the return to equity investors was a pro rata share of the profits, they also bore 
a pro rata share of all the risks to which the business was exposed.6 The most 
common contracts of this kind were the sea commenda — also known as 
accomendatio in Genoa and collegantia in Venice — and the implicita.7 Such 
contracts were temporary arrangements, limited in time or for a single 
investment.8 The commenda was a contract of association for capital and work 
and allowed the contract partner to buy goods to sell elsewhere, usually 
overseas, and then to split the earnings amongst the business partners.9 These 
contracts in Genoa usually stated the route and the first port of call. Other than 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 5, The Economic Organization of Early Modern 
Europe, Cambridge, 1977, 393-461. 
5 See A. Zanini, ‘Financing and risk sharing in Genoa’s maritime trade: strategies and practices 
(Eighteenth Century)’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., Sharing risk, forthcoming. 
6 M. Kohn, ‘Risk instruments in the medieval and early modern economy’, Darthmouth College, 
Department of Economics working paper, 99/07, 1999, 1, 2, available on 
 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=151871, accessed on 29/06/2021. A 
similar principle, as mentioned, underlies the very concept of GA. 
7 The origin of this institution is uncertain. According to some theories it derives from the Roman 
societas or from medieval legal doctrines, see J.H. Pryor, ‘The origins of the commenda 
contract’, Speculum 51/1, 1977, 5-37. Jewish and Arabic origins have also been suggested. 
See A. Udovitch, ‘At the origins of the western commenda’, Speculum 37/2, 1962, 198-207; A. 
Sacerdoti, ‘Le colleganze nella pratica degli affari e nella legislazione veneta’, in Atti del R. 
Istituto di Scienze, Letteratura ed Arti VIII, II/2, 1899-1900, 1-45. 
8 Jurists have pointed out that the commenda and the implicita were not partnership contracts, 
see Targa, Ponderationi, 150. 
9 The commenda appeared for the first time in Islamic Arabia. Islamic jurists in the eighth and 
ninth centuries called it qirad or mudarabah. Commenda contracts arrived in Italy only between 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see R. Harris, ‘General average and all the rest: the law and 
economics of early modern maritime risk mitigation’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., 
Sharing risk, forthcoming. See also G. Astuti, Origine e svolgimento storico della Commenda 
fino al sec. XII, Turin, 1933. 
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that, the shipmaster was given much leeway.10 The most common practice was 
for the partner who remained ashore (socius stans, or commendante) to handle 
the full sum of the capital and to in turn receive ¾ of the revenues, whereas the 
partner who did the voyage (socius tractans, commendatario) received the 
remaining ¼. In Genoa, to better safeguard the tractans, the allocation of profits 
deriving from the commenda was given priority over other types of contracts 
and credit obligations.11 In the impietta, also known as the implicita, the tractans 
received a fixed percentage of the profits rather than a proportional share.12 The 
statutes of the Republic, as it can be seen, displayed both the commenda and 
the impietta:13 
 
We declare that the accomenda is to be understood as the money to be sent 
for the purchase of goods and the goods to be sent for the sale and that all 
the proceeds are to be used for other goods and not for those things in which 
the person who brings them or administers them has a share. However, we 
declare that the impietta is a purchase of goods ordered by the 
commissioners, in which the person who administers or executes the goods 
has no part but only takes his commission, provided that no company or 
other reason has been imposed in the aforesaid accomende and impiette. 
The accomendatario is the one who takes care of the execution of the 
accomende or impiette, but the accomendatore is the one who orders to 
anyone who participates in the accomende or impiette.14 
 
The societas maris, also called bilateral commenda, particularly common during 
the twelfth century, was similar to the abovementioned contracts. The capital in 
the societas maris was provided by both parties, who then split ¾ of the profits 
for the stans shareholder in proportion to the given values. The tractans 
                                                          
10 F. Ciccaglione, ‘Il contratto di commenda nella storia del Diritto italiano’, Il Filangieri, XI/1, 
1886, 322-338, 383-406, 389-390. 
11 As the most ‘vulnerable’ party, he would receive his share of the profits first in order to face 
any unforeseen expenses related to commercial shipping. 
12 Targa, Ponderationi, 151. When it came to practice, however, such distinction was not as 
clear-cut. See Targa, Ponderationi, 150-158. M.S. Rollandi, ‘Mimetismo di bandiera nel 
Mediterraneo del secondo Settecento. Il caso del Giorgio inglese’, Società e Storia 130, 
2010, 721-742. 
13 ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1613, IV, 
chap. XIII, ‘Delle accomende et impiette’, 128. 
14 “Dichiariamo che l’accomenda s’intenda de denari da mandarsi per compra de merci e di 
merci da mandarsi, accioché siano vendute; tutto il proceduto s’impieghi in altre merci o non 
s’impieghi in quelle cose nelle quali colui che le porta, o ne ha l’amministratione, è partecipe. 
Ma dichiariamo l’impietta compra de merci ordinata per i committenti, nelle quali colui che 
amministra o essequisce non ha parte, ma solamente piglia la sua provigione, pur che nelle 
predette accomende et impiette non sia stata imposta alcuna compagnia o ragione. 
L’accomendatario è quello che ha cura di essequire l’accomende, o impiette; ma 
l’accomendatore è quello che ordina a qualsivoglia che è partecipe nell’accomende o impiette”. 
See ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1613, 
IV, chap. XIII, ‘Delle accomende et impiette’, 130. 
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shareholder kept the remaining ¼ of the profits as compensation for their 
work.15 In the event of shipwreck, jettison, robbery, etc., these bilateral contracts 
also specified how the payment for these damages was to be shared based on 
the capital invested in the enterprise.16 Last, there was the colonna contract, 
namely, the societas navis, which is probably less common in the early modern 
period but of which it is still possible to find occasional traces in Average 
documentation presented in Genoa until the middle of the seventeenth 
century.17 This contract included the financier, who put in the capital, the 
shipmaster or shipowners, who contributed the ship, and the sailors, who 
provided the work.18 All of the profits were divided by three, while any possible 
damage was shared only between the financiers and the 
shipmaster/shipowners. The sailors did not contribute ever, not even in the case 
of jettisons or shipwrecks.19 
The main issue with finance equity and the use of such instruments was that 
they exposed the investors to all maritime risks.20 For this reason, investors 
often needed to employ more money, thus increasing transaction costs. 
According to Douglass North’s definition, transaction costs are the costs of 
specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie exchange and therefore 
                                                          
15 The limited capitals and financial resources of commercial operators led to the initial success 
of the bilateral commenda, which offered more guarantees to the stans partner. From the 
thirteenth century onwards, greater security on the seas and greater financial availability led to a 
preference for the unilateral commenda, which was more favourable to both investors and 
merchants, who were better protected against risks. See Astuti, Origin and Development, 38. 
The increase in capital was also facilitated by the statutory rules that permitted the investment 
of minor assets in the commenda contracts. For Genoa see V. Promis ed., Statuti della colonia 
genovese di Pera, Genoa, 1870, ch. CVIII, ‘de pecunia minorum collocanda’, 663; ch. CXX, ‘de 
tutore et curatore potestatem non habentibus mittendi per mare pecuniam minorum’, 669. In the 
medieval period the main Genoese families, such as the Spinola, frequently invested their 
capital in commenda and societas maris contracts. See M. Weber, The history of commercial 
partnership in the Middle Ages, Lanham, 2002 (1st ed. 1889), 74. This contract, unlike a 
traditional partnership contract, hindered the contribution of shares of different amounts which 
had to be separated in further unilateral commenda contracts, see D. Puncuh, ‘Il documento 
commerciale in area mediterranea’, in D. Puncuh ed. Cinquant'anni tra archivi e biblioteche: 
1956-2006, Genoa, 2006, 785-882, 834-835. 
16 Astuti, Origine e svolgimento, 31. 
17 An example is the voyage of shipmaster Geronimo Trani’s vessel of Sestri Ponente, bound 
from Naples to Genoa in 1640 with a cargo of raw materials for making paper and wine. The 
wine was intended for “coloro che li avevano dato li denari per comprarlo in colonna”, see ASG, 
NG 2084/136, 09/04/1640. 
18 Weber, The history, 74-77. See also A. Carrino, B. Salvemini, ‘Come si costruisce uno spazio 
mercantile: il Tirreno nel Settecento’, Studi storici 1, 2012, 47-73. 
19 This was both in compliance with chap. 245 of the Consolat de Mar, and because sailors lost 
their wages in case of damages, see Targa, Ponderationi, 160-161. 
20 Such contracts, for instance, were not very attractive to investors who had liquidity but were 
unfamiliar with the maritime sector. On this aspect see G. Rossi, ‘Barratry of the shipmaster in 
early modern law: polysemy and mos italicum’, The Legal History Review 87, 2019, 65-85. 
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comprise all the costs of political and economic organization.21 For example, the 
contracts could require the sending of a trusted subordinate on board or at the 
port of loading to verify the shipmaster’s behaviour and competence. 
However, operators involved in the maritime trade could still rely on other 
tools that could protect them at least partially from maritime risks. Cambio and 
mutuo developed in Genoa from the middle of the twelfth century and 
represented important innovations from which new types of contracts, such as 
letters of credit and sea loans, would derive.22 One of the first new instruments 
to allow access to credit was the stipulation of mutui, known in Genoa by the 
formula habuisse et recepisse mutuo.23 These loans could be unconditional, 
i.e., intended for use in the purchase of goods through a deferred payment, or 
aleatory, that is, the payment is contingent upon the safe arrival of what had 
been exposed to the risk. Except for Venice, where a customary interest of 20% 
was applied, in other marketplaces, commercial operators masked the interest 
with the formula gratis et amore Dei.24 At the urging of a Genoese archbishop—
Siro II or maybe Ugo dalla Volta—between 1159 and 1181, Pope Alexander III 
vouched against this type of contract, pointing out that “venditores peccatum 
incurrunt”. However, merchants continued using them in the following 
centuries.25 The other most widely used loan in medieval times was the 
maritime loan, derived by the Roman foenus nauticum and regulated in the 
Justinian Digesto.26 Expressed in money or goods, the maritime loan was 
specifically intended for maritime traffic, which travelled at the risk of the lender 
to whom the trafficked goods had been pledged.27 Maritime loan agreements 
became more sophisticated in time by specifying the type of vessel, the 
itinerary, the length of the journey and the expected port of calls, as well as the 
                                                          
21 See D. North, ‘Transaction costs, institutions and economic history’, Journal of institutional 
and theoretical economics 140, 1984, 7-17, 7. 
22 Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 850. 
23 Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 801. 
24 Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 802. 
25 Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 803. 
26 Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 791. The sea loan was known to the Byzantine Empire, 
it was not accepted by Islamic law and remerged in the Latin West with the revival of trade in 
Italy, see R. Harris, Going the Distance: Eurasian Trade and the Rise of the Business 
Corporation, 1400-1700, Princeton, 2020. 
27 Unless specific conditions were met, the debtor was entitled to the profits of the expedition 
and had to repay the creditor and keep the rest. In the event of losses, the creditor could claim 
against the entire assets of the debtor. See G. Bonolis, Il diritto marittimo medievale 
dell'Adriatico, Pisa, 1921, 456. 
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interest, which was usually higher than that of ordinary loans.28 These loans 
were always linked to the safe outcome of the expeditions.29 
The most common loan instrument in modern age was the cambium 
maritimum, namely, the sea loan.30 It was the direct evolution of maritime loans 
and a variant of the well-known bill of exchange.31 Known simply as cambio in 
Italy during the early modern period, this was a high-risk and high profit loan, 
which became one of the cornerstones of European maritime commerce.32 The 
investor lent the capital to the operator involved in maritime trade for a specific 
journey or amount of time. At the end of the contract, the investor obtained, 
exclusively at the investor’s own risk, both the return of the initial capital and the 
interests accrued. At the time of drafting of the document, the latter was 
specified in a different currency.33 The recipient of the loan could mortgage as 
warranty the vessel and freights and/or the potential goods that had been 
loaded. As happened with maritime loans, the contracts specified the main 
elements related to the voyage. In this contract, the debtor was free from any 
obligation in the event that the mortgaged goods were lost.34 
According to the Genoese jurist Carlo Targa, the maritime carrier would 
rather resort to the sea loans, as this allowed him to immediately have at his 
disposal an amount of money that he could use to resolve any possible 
                                                          
28 Interest was also referred to as pretium periculi, see J.M. Pardessus, Collection des lois 
maritimes antérieures au XVIIIe siècle, I, Paris, 1828, 47. It was usually also followed by the 
opt-out of the privilegium fori, see Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 809. 
29 G. Astuti, ‘recensione a U.E. Paoli, Studi sul processo attico’, Rivista di filologia e d’istruzione 
classica XI, 1933, 261. Zanini, ‘Financing and risk sharing’. 
30 On the application of this contract in Genoa see Lo Basso, ‘Il finanziamento dell´armamento 
marittimo’, 81-106; L. Lo Basso, ‘The Maritime Loan as a Form of Small Shipping Credit (17th-
18th centuries): The Case of Liguria’, in A. Giuffrida, R. Rossi, G. Sabatini eds., Informal Credit 
in the Mediterranean Area (XVI-XIX Centuries), Palermo, 2016, 145-173. In France it was called 
prêt à la grosse aventure, while in the Anglo-Saxon area a distinction was made between 
‘bottomry loan’, guaranteed by the ship, and ‘respondentia loan’, guaranteed by the goods on 
board. See A. Baldasseroni, Dizionario ragionato di giurisprudenza marittima, e di commercio, 
2, 1810, 357-358; A. Annesley, A Compendium of the Law of Marine Insurance, Bottomry, 
Insurance on Lives and Insurance against Fire in which the Mode of Calculating Averages is 
Defined and Illustrated by Examples, New York, 1808, 173-174. 
31 See Hoover, ‘The Sea Loan’, 495-529. This credit instrument was derived from the maritime 
loan or foenus nauticum, a contract of Roman origin which was abandoned following Pope 
Gregory IX’s condemnation of usury in 1236. See L. Piccinno, ‘Genoa 1340-1620: early 
development of marine insurance’, in A. Leonard ed., Marine insurance. Origins and institutions, 
1300-1850, London, 2016, 25-46, 29. 
32 A.M. Bernal, La financiación de la Carrera de Indias (1492-1824). Dinero y credito en el 
comercio colonial español con America, Madrid, 1993, 27. 
33 Targa, Ponderationi, 73; Lo Basso, ‘Il finanziamento dell’armamento’, 82. 
34 This practice was also used, from about the middle of the seventeenth century, in the 




inconvenience and to take care of the voyage expenses.35 The insurance 
practice, the most common alternative in the early modern period, would have 
allowed him to obtain the money only after the damage was done and following 
irregular timing.36 Moreover, the shipowner, or the shipmaster, was not required 
to return the capital invested in case of accident; therefore, the entire casualty 
risk fell onto the lender. To legitimize this contract and to avoid incurring the 
accusation of usury, it was drawn up as a summary of three separate and 
artificial contracts, all of which were morally lawful and well familiar to the 
jurists.37 
The first contract was a loan for a sum of money in return for a share in the 
profits that would have been yielded by a certain capital. For example, a loan 
with a warranty on goods was negotiated based on the profits expected to be 
gained by selling those goods in the port of destination. The second contract 
was an implicit sale, drawn up between the seller and the buyer through the 
assignment of capital of which the seller required a percentage of the profits, 
quite like the maritime loans already examined. Finally, the third contract was a 
promise, made by the lender, to be accountable for risks maris, piratarum et 
ignis, as if it were an insurance contract.38 
In early modern period, interest in this type of loan was highly variable and 
depended on routes, seasons, vessels, and market conjuncture. The interest 
would range from 6% to 50%. The interest was hidden by using two different 
currencies, namely, the one used in the port of departure and the one in the port 
of arrival, for the return of the capital.39 From the seventeenth century onward, 
Genoese businessman abandoned the practice of using different currencies, 
explicitly stating in the contract the compensation to the creditor, calculated as a 
percentage of the lent sum.40 The lender could add specific clauses to limit his 
liability and reduce the interest rate. These included the possibility of excluding 
GA contributions, whose specific operation will be discussed in the next pages. 
In the ordinary drafting, the subject interested in the preservation of the 
                                                          
35 On Targa's life and works see M.G. Merello Altea, Carlo Targa giurista genovese del secolo 
XVII, I, La Vita e le opere, Milan, 1967. 
36 Targa, Ponderationi, 72. 
37 Targa, Ponderationi, 74; Casaregi, Discursos, I, LXI, 220. 
38 Casaregi, Discursos, I, LXI, 224. 
39 Lo Basso, ‘Il Finanziamento dell’armamento’, 84. See also L. Freire Costa, ‘Privateering and 
Insurance: Transaction Costs in Seventeenth-Century European Colonial Flows’, in S. 
Cavaciocchi ed., Ricchezza del mare, ricchezza dal mare. Secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti della 
“Trentasettesima Settimana di Studi”, 11-15 aprile 2005, II, Florence, 2006, 703-726. 
40 Targa, Ponderationi, 136-137; Lo Basso, ‘Il finanziamento dell’armamento’, 88. 
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mortgaged assets was the creditor — also called the cambista — upon whom 
would fall any potential obligation linked to damage repartition or 
compensation.41 The contracting parties could agree to exclude this situation, 
leaving the borrower to repay the loan in full with — lower — interest.42 
Sea loans were exposed to different risks or fraud: the debtor could ask for 
multiple loans by continuing to mortgage the same assets; the value of the 
mortgaged assets could be overestimated and not be sufficient enough to repay 
the creditor in the event of insolvency; and with the help of the crew, the 
shipmaster could deliberately cause a shipwreck, avoiding thus the repayment 
of the credit.43 Various measures were adopted in Genoa to limit frauds. First, 
the legislation imposed that it would not be possible to request sea loans for 
sums that exceeded two-thirds of the mortgaged assets;44 sea loan debts would 
expire after thirty years.45 Furthermore, according to a decree issued on 20 May 
1644, all sea loans and commenda contracts had to be entered in a register 
kept by the chancellor of the Conservatori del Mare, which was also the court in 
charge in case of fraud.46 In 1654, however, the Conservatori were still asking 
the Collegi for authorization to compile the register, a clear sign of the difficulty 
in applying this measure.47 The Senato granted a new special law in 1668 
ordering the register’s redaction. Between 1698 and 1707, to identify contracts 
and contractors, the Conservatori still recalled the need for the correct 
compilation of the register with all the relevant annotations, and they asked to 
register contracts that had been drawn up abroad.48 Note that the Conservatori 
del Mare, which was responsible for both Average proceures and the register of 
                                                          
41 Casaregi, Discursos, I, LXI, 229. 
42 Targa, Ponderationi, 137, 140. 
43 See ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicatione 444, 20/05/1644; Casaregi, Discursos, I, LXI, 
222. The creditor in these cases could claim against the assets of the shipmaster/receiver, see 
Puncuh, ‘The Commercial Document’, 806. Other frauds could take place in the currency used 
for the exchange, as in the fraud perpetrated by the Genoese against the Ottoman Empire in 
the 1660s. They passed off a French coin, the luigino, by adulterating it with less silver than its 
nominal value. The system involved making sea loans in Genoa or in Livorno in luigini, to be 
repaid on return in pieces of eight. The profit derived both from the sea loan and from the 
different intrinsic value between bad and good money, see Cipolla, C.M., Tre storie extra 
vaganti, Bologna, 1994. 
44 Targa, Ponderationi, 148. 
45 Gatti, Navi e Cantieri, 108. 
46 Documentation on the legislative process of this decree is in ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e 
pubblicazione 444, 20/05/1644. The documents concerning the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the only systematically preserved records for the early modern period, are in ASG, 
CdM, Cambi 378-386, 1782-1798. 
47 “[…] Primieramente, che si debba formare quel libro che sin l’anno 1644 a 20 di maggio fu 
ordinato da serenissimi collegi in tutto come si contiene nella relatione che fece in quel tempo il 
prestantissimo magistrato […]”, in ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 21/10/1654. 
48 ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 24/11/1707. 
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sea loans and criminal proceedings involving both of these institutes, drafted 
legislations in conjunction with the two issues during the seventeenth century, 
as I will show in the following pages. 
Scholars have defined the sea loan as the imperfect ancestor of insurance 
due to its obvious similarities with this type of contract.49 It is significant, 
however, that in the eighteenth century, Genoese merchants still resorted to 
sea loan rather than the newer consolidated insurance contract.50 In fact, in the 
event of an accident, it could take a long time before insurers settled claims, 
and this would entail an expense for shipmasters, shipowners or merchants, 
who in the meantime had to resort to invest more capital, reduce their capital 
investments, or even temporarily suspend their activity. With sea loans, without 
further consequences for the debtor, the occurrence of damage immediately 
nullified the obligation to repay the loan.51 In Genoa, there was also a fiscal 
motivation: while sea loan contracts were exempt from taxes, insurance 
contracts were charged a half percent on the insured capital, therefore 
increasing the obligations borne by the contractor.52 Sea loans and insurance 
contracts were not mutually exclusive. A mortgaged asset in a sea loan contract 
could be insured:53 for example, in the event of a shipwreck, the exchange 
agent/debtor could ask the creditor for an insurance premium or for a sum for 
the insurance established within the sea loan.54 In the event of shipwreck, 
depending on what was specified in the contract, either the exchange agent, the 
insurer, or the owner of the asset him- or herself could pitch in. The profound 
interconnection amongst the instruments analysed in these pages is therefore 
undeniable. 
 
                                                          
49 Zanini, ‘Financing and risk sharing’; C. Kingston, ‘Governance and Institutional Change in 
Marine Insurance, 1350–1850’, European Review of Economic History 18/1, 2014, 1-18, 2. 
50 Zanini, ‘Financing and risk sharing. 
51 Procrastination in payment was a frequent occurrence, despite repeated regulations aimed at 
preventing it. According to the Barcelona Ordenanzas, for example, the maximum time limit 
before proceeding to payment was 2 months for voyages to Spain or the Balearics, 3 months for 
those to southern Italy or North Africa, 4 months for voyages beyond these limits and 6 months 
if there was no more news of the vessel. See Corrieri, Il consolato del mare, 551. 
52 G. Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. L’esperienza genovese dal Medioevo 
all’Età contemporanea, Genoa, 1984, 119-128. 
53 However, limitations could be applied to avoid fraud. In the Ordenanzas of Barcelona, for 
example, the mortgage for maritime exchange could not exceed the value of the sum insured, 
see Pardessus, Collection des lois, 5, 496. 
54 Casaregi, Discursos, I, LXVI, 229. 
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3.2 Managing Risk: Insurance Between Law and Practice55 
 
Alongside the practices for obtaining credit, the ability to share and transfer 
maritime risks is a key element of commercial activities.56 The risks are divided 
into two main categories: casualty risks and market risks.57 Casualty risks are 
accidents, such as the jettison of goods or equipment, shipwrecks, encountering 
pirates, and unexpected delays, that occur during navigation. Market risk, on 
the other hand, refers to the possible losses due to adverse conditions of the 
money market or the commercial market, and that might occur upon the arrival 
of the cargo at its destination. As a matter of fact, the high costs of 
transportation and transaction resulted in national and international markets 
becoming fragmented and vulnerable; this meant that prices could undergo 
sudden and significant changes even during a single journey. The main 
strategies for dealing with casualty risk consisted of finding new routes, 
travelling in convoys, improving the fitting out of ships, or dividing the load on 
several different vessels. Market risk, on the other hand, could be addressed by 
improving intelligence gathering and by diversifying activities across multiple 
assets and markets.58 
According to Douglass North, the development of insurance practices and 
the diversification of profitable investments were important institutional 
innovations that facilitated risk management and by doing so, reduced 
transaction costs.59 Insurance practice separated casualty risks from credit 
risks. Casualty risk was a variable influenced by the chosen route, the period of 
the year or the political situation. All these elements were evaluated and 
analysed by the insurer. The latter, based on the information available to him, 
established the premium that the insured had to pay and could share insurance 
coverage with other policyholders. In a competitive insurance market, the 
insurer had to be able to price a risk premium that was sufficiently accurate and 
                                                          
55 This paragraph is partly the re-elaboration of the section I wrote for an article written with 
Luisa Piccinno: ‘Shifting and sharing risk: average and insurance between law and practice’, in 
P. Hellwege, G. Rossi eds., Maritime risk management. Essays on the history of marine 
insurance, general average and sea loan, Berlin, 2021, 83-110. 
56 Piccinno, ‘Genoa, 1340-1620’, 27. 
57 Kohn, ‘Risk instruments’, 1. 
58 See Doria, ‘Conoscenza del mercato’, 91-156. On the English scenario, see R. Davis, The 
Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, New York, 
1962. 




competitive.60 The insurance contract, an original creation by medieval Italian 
merchants and developed between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, largely 
derived its structure from that of other contracts that have been previously 
examined, such as the mutuo.61 Policies in the late medieval period usually had 
to be registered in front of a notary and took the form of a ‘contingent loan’, the 
opposite of a sea loan.62 The insurer promised to pay a specific sum unless the 
ship or cargo arrived safely in port. This sum also included the return of the 
premium paid before the voyage.63 To avoid accusations of usury, the 
distinction between investment and speculation was fundamental. Within the 
community, concepts, such as credibility and trust, were essential in the 
insurance practice, whose proceeds were usually modest.64 Between the 
fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, although still often accused of being 
culpabilis and execrabilis, some jurists, such as Saint Bernardino of Siena, 
justified the practice because of the social utility elicited in the commercial 
field.65 
In medieval Genoese documents, insurance was hidden in the form of a 
mortgage, in which the insurer appeared as the borrower and was required to 
reimburse a fictitiously paid sum only if the ship had not arrived safely at its 
destination.66 Gradually, jurists recognized that the risk could be remunerated 
according to the potential loss of earnings with respect to the direct 
                                                          
60 G. Ceccarelli, ‘The price for risk-taking: marine insurance and probability calculus in the late 
Middle Ages’, Journal Électronique d'Histoire des Probabilités et de la Statistique 3/1, 2007, 1-
26. 
61 G. Cassandro, ‘Note storiche sul contratto di assicurazione’, Assicurazioni XXVI/1, 1959, 16-
57. See also Piccinno, ‘Genoa, 1340-1620’. 
62 For a distinction between maritime loan, foenus nauticum, sea loan and insurance loan see 
F.E. De Roover, ‘Early examples of marine insurance’, The journal of Economic History 5/2, 
1945, 172-200; E. Spagnesi, ‘Aspetti dell'assicurazione medievale’, in E. Spagnesi, G.S. Pene 
Vidari, B. Caizzi eds. L'Assicurazione in Italia fino all'unità: saggi storici in onore di Eugenio 
Artom, Milan, 1975, 1-187, 38. 
63 The premium consisted of the difference between the sum borrowed and the sum declared. 
See Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 868. In the late medieval period the contract became 
a conditional purchase. The insurer agreed to buy the vessel or the cargo from the insured only 
if it did not arrive in port. Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, came the principle of 
emptio-venditio periculi, recognised by jurists Pietro Santerna, Benvenuto Stracca, Sigismondo 
Scaccia and Carlo Targa. See E.C. Pia, ‘"From heaven to earth": developments in insurance’, 
Reti Medievali Rivista 19/1, 2018, 177-187, 185. 
64 Pia, ‘«Dal cielo alla terra»’, 177-187. 
65 Spagnesi, ‘Aspetti dell’assicurazione’, 82. On the concept of ‘social utility’, better theorised in 
the eighteenth century, see K. Stapelbroek, ‘La libertà del commercio. Problemi politici, 
istituzionali e costituzionali dello stato commerciale del ’700’, in D. Andreozzi ed., Attraverso i 
conflitti. Neutralità e commercio fra età moderna ed età contemporanea, Trieste, 2017, 13-27; 
G. Ceccarelli, ‘Quando rischiare è lecito. Il credito finalizzato al commercio marittimo nella 
riflessione scolastica tardomedievale’, in Cavaciocchi ed., Ricchezza del mare, 1187-1199. 
66 Puncuh, ‘Il documento commerciale’, 872-873. 
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management of the borrowed money.67 The lawfulness of the operation was 
accompanied by a rise in resorting to intermediaries connecting 
shipmasters/shipowners with private investors: sensali.68 Community networks, 
in which operators often shared risks by acting at the same time as insurers for 
the operations of others and as the insured for their own operation, partially 
responded to the uncertainty in shipping.69 In Genoa, it was common practice 
for patrician families who had sufficient financial liquidity to participate in 
multiple insurance contracts. Repeated voyages to the same destinations, a 
higher frequency of voyages, thicker trade networks, and larger commercial and 
financial family firms gradually lead to the accumulation of sufficient information 
about the a priori probabilities.70 
From a regulatory point of view, Genoa was one of the most active and 
avant-garde actors in this sector.71 The first insurance policy known to date was 
stipulated in the city on 18 March 1343 by the notary Tommaso Casanova, 
although it included a prior agreement drawn up in Pisa previously on 20 
February.72 Dating back to 1369, the first rule aimed at regulating the sector 
was a decree of doge Gabriele Adorno, who tried to limit disputes in the context 
                                                          
67 M. Bukala, Risk and medieval negotium. Studies of the Attitude towards Entrepreneurship: 
from Peter the Chanter to Clarus Florentinus, Spoleto, 2014, 119. 
68 Policy underwriting was not a sector for specialists. The operators were often merchants, 
shipowners, bankers, see Kohn, ‘Risk instruments’, 6. 
69 G. Ceccarelli, ‘Tra solvibilità economica e status politico: mercato delle assicurazioni 
marittime a Firenze (secc. XIV-XV)’, in B. Molina, G. Scarcia eds., Politiche del credito. 
Investimento consumo solidarietà, Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Asti, 20-22 marzo 2003), 
Asti, 2004, 191-221; see also G. Ceccarelli, Un mercato del rischio. Assicurare e farsi 
assicurare nella Firenze rinascimentale, Venice, 2012. 
70 Scholars do not agree on the role of insurance in the shipping business. According to Frank 
Knight, insurance was the outcome of the conversion of uncertainty into risk. Douglass North 
further specified this, taking a position that is not mutually exclusive with Knight’s theories: he 
wrote that insurance was a solution reached through a gradual and continuous institutional 
development. See F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Boston, 1921; North, Institutions, 
institutional change. 
71 See V. Piergiovanni, ‘Le assicurazioni marittime’, in Piergiovanni ed., Norme, scienza e 
pratica, II, 869-882; V. Piergiovanni, ‘L’Italia e le assicurazioni nel secolo XIX’, in Piergiovanni 
ed., Norme, scienza e pratica, 827-868. See also E. Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione nel 
medioevo, Genoa, 1884; L.A. Boiteux, La fortune de mer, le besoin de sécurité et les débuts de 
l’assurance maritime, Paris, 1968. On the economic evaluation of the insurance contract see F. 
Melis, Origini e sviluppo dell’assicurazione in Italia (secoli XIV-XVI), I, Le fonti, Rome, 1975. 
72 Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni, 23, 215. The insurance practice is also mentioned in a 
provision of the Breve portus Kallaritani of 1318, although opinions differ on the term segurare. 
See Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione, 49-50; Lattes A., ‘L'assicurazione e la voce "securare" 
in documenti genovesi del 1191 e 1192’, Rivista del Diritto commerciale e del Diritto generale 
delle obbligazioni XXV, 1927, 64-73. Other historians attributed a more ancient tradition to 
Florentine rules. See F. Melis, L'economia fiorentina del Rinascimento, Florence, 1984, 121-
126; J. Heers, Genova nel Quattrocento, Milan, 1983, 141; G. Valeri, ‘I primordi 
dell'assicurazione attraverso il documento del 1329’, Rivista del Diritto commerciale e del Diritto 
generale delle obbligazioni XXVI, 1928, 601-641. 
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of sea loans, mutui and insurance contracts.73 These disputes were generally 
caused by those who exploited the lack of clarity of the clauses necessary to 
avoid the canonical prescriptions of usury, to evade payment obligations or to 
implement fraudulent or speculative practices. For example, this provision 
forbade the policies stipulated after the accident and those relating to foreign 
ships, on which it was more difficult to collect information quickly.74 
At the regulatory level, this institution developed along two axes.75 On the 
one hand, the sector was progressively regulated because of the transposition 
of rules from the Ordenanzas de seguros marítimos de Barcelona, issued 
between 1435 and 1484, and inserted as an appendix to the Libro del Consolat 
de Mar.76 The Ordenanzas governed the contract, focusing on the merits of its 
practical drafting and also establishing precise procedures for resolving 
disputes.77 According to the Genoese jurist Casaregi, the Ordenanzas were not 
universally recognized ‘laws’ but general ‘rules’, which were more or less 
applicable according to local customs.78 However, in an effort to prevent 
abusive practices, the Ordenanzas of 1484 imposed constraints and controls 
                                                          
73 ‘Contra allegantes quod cambia et assecuramenta facta quovicumque coum scriptura, vel 
sine, sint illicita et usuraia’, issued on the 22 October 1369. This document is reproduced in 
Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione, 149-151. This rule was draft to legitimise insurance and 
speed up contracts. It was, however, a special law that did not represent an attempt at 
comprehensive codification, as happened with the Barcelona Ordenanzas in the following 
century. See F. Mansutti, ‘La più antica disciplina del contratto di assicurazione: le Ordinanze 
sulle sicurtà marittime’, Assicurazioni, rivista di diritto, economia e finanza delle assicurazioni 
private LXXIV/4, 2008, 683-693. According to Melis, the first real Italian legislation was made in 
Florence in 1523. See Melis, Origini e sviluppo, 166. According to others, the first one was the 
Codice per la veneta mercantile marina of 1786. See G. Cassandro, Saggi di storia del diritto 
commerciale, Naples, 1982, 251. 
74 Piccinno, ‘Genoa, 1340-1620’, 33-34. 
75 D. Gioffré, Mostra storica del documento assicurativo del XIV-XVI secolo: Palazzo S. Giorgio, 
29 aprile-10 maggio 1969, Genoa, 1969, 19-20. Between the last decades of the sixteenth 
century and the 1620s, Genoa was one of the most active centres in the insurance market. Its 
slow decline began only after the military aggression of the Savoy in 1626-1627. It continued in 
the following decades due to both the slowdown in merchant activities resulting from the general 
crisis in the Italian economy and the increasing competition from Livorno. This decline can also 
be seen in the lower income of the gabella di sicurtà, which dropped from more than 88,000 lire 
in 1627 to around 52,000 lire in 1629. It then settled at a lower level, between 20 and 30,000 
lire, in the following years. See Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni, 125. On the rise of Livorno 
as a thriving commercial and insurance business centre, see A. Addobbati, 'Italy 1500-1800: 
cooperation and competition', in Leonard ed., Marine insurance, 46-77, 63. 
76 The Ordenanzas are published in Catalan and French in Pardessus, Collection des lois 
maritimes, vol. 5, 493-543. 
77 These include, for example, the possibility of insuring foreign vessels and goods, unless they 
were departing from beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, the insured's ownership of the interest 
covered, the advance payment of the premium. See Addobbati, ‘Italy 1500-1800’, 49. 
78 “[…] leges particulares civitatis Barchinoniensis non sunt attendendae in aliis mundi emporiis, 
nis eas de consuetudine receptas fuisse probatum fuerit […]”, in Casaregi, Discursos, I, 27. Of 
Genoese origin, Casaregi practised law in his city before moving to Tuscany as a judge of the 
Rota in Siena and then in Florence. See V. Piergiovanni, ‘Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi’, in 
Piergiovanni ed., Norme, scienza e pratica, I, 57-63. 
160 
 
that were often considered excessive.79 Perhaps for these reasons, to cope with 
the expansion of traffic and the growth in demand for insurance coverage, 
Genoese rulers chose to liberalize the sector, responding to the requests of 
shipowners, merchants and brokers. For example, on January 1408, more than 
thirty years earlier than in Florence, the Magnifici abolished the ban on insuring 
foreign boats and merchandise, while the ban on vessels bound for the Strait of 
Gibraltar and beyond remained in force.80 The latter fell only a few years later, 
presumably around approximately 1420.81 Towards the middle of the fifteenth 
century, and later with respect to Florence, notaries began to redact policies in 
an explicit form in Genoa, and the recourse to brokers and apodisie increased. 
The latter was a private agreement by private or verbal writing, although the 
employment of notaries persisted.82 A law enacted in 1434 specified that 
brokers were directly responsible for the registration of the contracts in the 
public register, and for the payment of the 0.5% tax on the insured values 
required by the beneficiary of the policy. This tax increased over time, reaching 
1.5% in 1490. From the sixteenth century, tax collectors began to calculate it 
based on the premium paid.83 
As far as the risks covered by the policies are concerned, it was common 
practice to insert the ad florentinam clause to indicate the maximum possible 
extension of coverage, including risicum maris, such as storms or shipwrecks, 
and risicum gentium, such as the capture by pirates or privateers.84 The clauses 
often also included the risks derived from the unseaworthiness of the ship 
following harmful events during the voyage.85 In this period, however, the rules 
                                                          
79 For example, all insurance policies had to be stipulated by public deed; the whole regulation 
was mandatory and had to be mentioned in the policy; in case of a dispute, the parties had to 
address themselves compulsorily to the Consolat de Mar of Barcelona with renunciation of 
recourse to other magistracies; insurers had to swear an oath on the truthfulness of the 
agreements made; transgressors had to pay heavy fines. See Mansutti, ‘La più antica 
disciplina’, 5-6. 
80 Bonolis contested the Genoese precedence over Florence. He stated that the amendments to 
the Florentine Statutes of Mercanzia in 1405 and 1407 laid down exceptions that allowed the 
prohibition to be circumvented. See G. Bonolis, ‘Contributo alla storia delle assicurazioni in 
Firenze’, Archivio Storico Italiano V/22, 1898, 312-321, 315-316. 
81 However, this ban did not seem to have a protectionist aim as it protected Genoese 
businessmen from the risks linked to information asymmetries with the Mediterranean basin, 
see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, I., 166; Giacchero, Storia dell’assicurazione, 33-34, 218-219. 
82 D. Gioffré, ‘Note sull’assicurazione e sugli assicuratori genovesi tra Medioevo ed età 
moderna’, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 9/1, 1969, 27-51, 32. 
83 Giacchero, Storia dell’assicurazione, 119-120. 
84 Giacchero, Storia dell’assicurazione, 33-34. 
85 To invalidate the policy, the insured had to be aware of a damage or loss to the insured asset 
prior to the conclusion of the contract, while it was irrelevant that the contract was drawn up 
after the loss if the loss was still unknown. In such cases the policy included the clause “a 
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did not mention coverage for damage caused by GA acts, and the 
documentation found to date does not allow us to shed full light on the matter.86 
If we consider the legislative production of the following century, it is reasonable 
to assume that policyholders could choose whether to include GA damages in 
the list of risks excluded from the policy. 
The wide discretion left to the contractors and the lack of precise discipline 
led to some disputes in the middle of the sixteenth century. The De Mercatura 
treaty, published in 1553,87 report some judgements of the Rota Civile of 
Genoa, the competent court in all civil cases worth more than one hundred lire. 
One of the judgements concerned the acceptance of the appeal filed by the 
insurers Agostino Lomellino and Stefano Pinelli and associates against the 
shipmaster Lorenzo Riccio and concerning throwing into the sea some insured 
goods, a harmful event that fell within the GA cases (Decisio CXXIX). The 
judges expressly stated that in the event of a jettison, the insurers were not held 
responsible for damage to the ship's equipment, the crew's property or the 
goods loaded. They were required to pay for any type of damage except iactu & 
avaria. This ruling was not aligned with those issued by the Rota in previous 
years, which it clearly overturned. This tribunal was more concerned with good 
faith and merchant customs than with the technical or legal aspects of the 
cases.88 
It is obvious that because of ambiguous regulations on this issue, judges 
were allowed a wide margin of discretion.89 During the sixteenth century, legal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
buona o cattivo nuova”. See A. Brunetti, ‘Svolgimento storico del diritto marittimo e le fonti’, 
Diritto marittimo privato italiano 3/1, Turin, 1935, 218. This principle took into account the 
difficulty of the circulation of information at the time, so much so that an arbitrary travel speed 
was established which was judged sufficient to get the news across: according to the 
Ordenanzas this travel speed was one lega per hour, while according to the Genoese statutes it 
was two miles per hour, see Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione, 107; BUG, ms. C. III. 13, 
Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589, 159. 
86 Even the Ordenanzas do not mention this subject, see Pardesuss, Collection des lois 
maritimes, 5, 493-543. On the links between Average and insurance practice see also par. 5.3. 
87 De mercatura decisiones et tractatus varii, Colonia, 1622. 
88 Piccinno, ‘Genoa 1340-1620’, 43. 
89 The first point in this judgement’s argumentation declares that “Ad remotionem antecedentis 
sequitur remotio subsequentu”, in De mercatura, 245. This judgement is also included in the 
collection of decisions of the Rota published in 1582, Decisio CXXVIIII. Assecurator non 
obligatus ad iactum teneturramen ad naula rerum iactarum, in Decisiones Rotae Genuae De 
Mercatura et Pertinentibus ad eam, Venice, 1582, 104r-104v. On the decisive role played by the 
judgements of the courts of the states of Ancien Régime as a primary source of regulation of 
legal disputes, see G. Gorla, Civilian judicial decisions: an historical account of Italian style, 
New Orleans, 1970; M. Sbriccoli, A. Bettoni eds., Grandi tribunali e rote nell’Italia dell’Antico 
Regime, Milan, 1993; C.M. Moschetti, Caso fortuito, trasporto marittimo e assicurazione nella 
giurisprudenza napoletana del Seicento, Naples, 1994; I. Birocchi, Alla ricerca dell’ordine: fonti 
e cultura giuridica nell’età moderna, Turin, 2002; A. Monti, Iudicare tamquam deus: I modi della 
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doctrine played a relevant role, providing opinions and interpretations, helping 
to outline a unitary vision of the principles and rules on insurance. For example, 
the practice of limiting the insurance of an asset to only a fraction of its 
estimated value became widespread to reduce risky capital.90 
Genoese rules regarding insurance were for the most part an organic 
collection of laws previously enacted. They adopted a structure similar to that of 
the Florentine Statutes of Sigurtà of 1524,91 with which they also shared some 
fundamental principles.92 The latter, although they did not introduce any 
particular innovation, represented the first organic corpus of laws enacted on 
the subject. For this reason, they became a model upon which the normative 
productions of the main European commercial centres were based. Policy 
holders were bound to adopt a legal policy standard, which included specific 
sections for the variable elements of the contract, namely: the name of the 
insured, the indications for the identification and estimate of the value of the 
property exposed to danger, the journey to be made, and the name of the ship 
and shipmaster. Insurers could insert the clause in quovis,93 which allowed the 
name of the ship or the exact composition of the insured cargo to be not 
specified.94 Regarding the extension of insurance coverage, the 1524 Florentine 
Statutes asserted that the list of events provided the right to compensation, 
abandoning the use of the aforementioned permissive ad florentinam clause; 
the cover was valid until the completion of the unloading of the goods on land.95 
In the event of an accident, the insurer was required to pay within two months of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
giustizia senatoria nel ducato di Milano tra Cinque e Seicento, Milan, 2003; A. Wijffels, R. van 
Rhee eds., European supreme courts: a portrait through history, Tempe, 2013. 
90 This practice was taken up by the Barcelona Ordenanzas, which stipulated that an ‘overdraft’ 
of 12.5% on the value of the insured goods was compulsory. This figure was doubled in the 
case of goods of an enemy nationality voyaging to and from Barcelona. See Pardessus, 
Collection des lois maritimes, 5, 525. This prohibition, however, does not appear in the Consolat 
Italian editions. See Mansutti, ‘La più antica disciplina’, 7. 
91 In 1515, the Florentine Rota referred to the rules in the Ordenanzas for the resolution of 
disputes: “dove non n’è statuto, né leggie, che s’à a richorrere im quelli luoghi dove sono: che 
ssono quelli di Barzalona; e all’uso mercantile, che è questo statuto di Barzalona”, in Melis, 
Origine e sviluppi, 168-170. 
92 The text of the Florentine Statutes are partially published in A. Baldasseroni, Trattato delle 
assicurazioni marittime, III, Florence, 1786, 500-515. See also A. Baldasseroni, Collezione delle 
leggi costituzioni ed usi delle principali piazze di commercio d’Europa per il regolamento delle 
assicurazioni cambi ed avarie raccolte dal cavaliere Ascanio Baldasseroni per servire di 
supplemento al Trattato delle assicurazioni marittime, V, Livorno, 1804, 238-248. 
93 On this clause, in use from the beginning of the sixteenth century, see G.S. Pene Vidari, Il 
contratto d'assicurazione nell’età moderna, Milan, 1975, 255-257. 
94 However, not reporting particularly risky goods as perishable or of high unit value was a 
sufficient reason to invalidate the contract. See Pardessus, Collection des lois 
maritimes, IV, 602-603; Addobbati, ‘Italy 1500-1800’, 54. 
95 Baldasseroni, Trattato delle assicurazioni, IV, 240. 
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receiving a notification of the event, or after six months had passed without 
having received any news on the outcome of the voyage. This was, in fact, the 
principle of the provisional enforceability of the contract, a concept developed 
according to the solve et repete formula and introduced to avoid the delays and 
obstacles posed by insurers to avoid payments.96 
In Genoa, following the administrative and institutional reorganization 
culminated in the Reformationes novae of 1528 and the Leges novae of 1576, 
the long preparatory phase of the new Statuti Civili began. This phase started in 
1551 and ended only in December 1588, with the promulgation decree and its 
subsequent publication and implementation in June of the following year.97 The 
new statutes, as well as their subsequent editions translated into the vernacular 
and published without significant changes in the following two centuries, 
focused also on Average and insurance.98 Although they make multiple 
references to the sixteenth century reforms that had preceded them, on 
maritime and commercial topics, the new Statuti evoked much older rules still 
dating back to the Statuti of 1413.99 Perhaps the Magnifici wanted to guarantee 
the long-term continuity of a subject traditionally at the centre of the economic 
interests of the Genoese ruling class. 
Chapter XVII of volume IV focuses exclusively on insurance. This Chapter 
follows the one on jettisons and GA, confirming the close relationship that 
existed and that still exists today between these two institutes.100 Chapter XVII 
specified first how policies should always report the name of the insured and the 
insured object, whether it was “in goods, or in ships, or in all other things 
insured with or without mediation, mainly or indirectly”.101 The activity of brokers 
was freely permitted. The insurance premium corresponded to the cost of the 
                                                          
96 Addobbati, ‘Italy 1500-1800’: 52; Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione, 80. 
97 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589. 
98 As Rodolfo Savelli pointed out, “a Genova si stampavano e si ristampavano gli Statuti mentre 
sembra esservi stata una minore attenzione per le leggi”. Except for minor changes, the Statuti 
Civili remained substantially unchanged until the end of the 18th century. The last edition was 
published in 1787; see Savelli ed., Repertorio degli statuti, 145, 150. 
99 Attached to these statutes were also the Liber Gazariae, one of the few collections of laws 
preceding the 16th century statutes; see R. Savelli, ‘Statuti e amministrazione della giustizia a 
Genova nel Cinquecento’, Quaderni Storici, 37/110, 2002, 347-377, 362-363. 
100 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589, IV, 
chap. XVII. De Securitatibus, 158-160. 
101 “Il risico, o in merci, o né navigli, ovvero in tutte le altre cose assicurate mediatamente o 
immediatamente, principalmente o indirettamente”, in ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili della 
serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 141. 
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sigurtà.102 If the policy did not specify the value of the goods, and the damage 
had occurred in the first half of the voyage, then it would have been valued at 
the purchase price; if the accident had occurred in the second half of the 
voyage, it would have been considered the sales price inclusive of freight 
charges and taxes.103 In the event of fraud involving multiple insurances on the 
same property, all policies after the first one would be null. The insurance 
stipulated after the caso sinistro (the accident) was not valid. This expression 
was also linked to the concept of Average and is defined in the Chapter itself: 
 
It is not a caso sinistro unless the insured vessel, on which the goods or 
other things have been insured, has been reduced by accident to such a 
state that it cannot be repaired by human providence.104 
 
After the accident, the insured party had two options: he could terminate the 
contract of sigurtà and leave the impietta up to the insurers, making them 
become owners of the insured assets, or he could request the calculation of 
damages and compensation, as often happened after a GA.105 In the same 
way, if the damage to the insured property exceeded 50% of its value, the 
insurer could choose to pay the compensation and acquire the object of the 
policy.106 
As previously stated, the practice of using predefined forms for the stipulation 
of insurance contracts was in use in Genoa. However, neither the Statuti Civili 
of 1589, nor the subsequent edition of 1613, included this model.107 The 
                                                          
102 “Escluso il costo delle sigortà, il quale non s’intenda compreso in essa sigortà”, in ASG, 
84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 
1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142. 
103 ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1613, IV, 
chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142. 
104 “Non s’intenda caso sinistro, salvo se il naviglio assicurato, sopra il quale le merci o le altre 
cose saranno state assicurate, sarà stato ridotto per caso fortuito in tale stato che dalla 
provvidenza humana non possa esser riparato”. In these cases the shipmaster had to obtain 
within one month a declaration of the Genoese consul or, in his absence, of a local magistrate. 
105 “L’assicurato, in qualsivoglia caso sinistro, possa scodere le sigortà in tutto se vorrà, e le 
cose assicurate, o come si dice volgarmente lascia l’impietta agli assicuratori, a quali in tal caso 
spettino. O possa se vorrà far fare il calcolo sopra il danno secondo la forma de capitoli”, in 
ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 
1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142. 
106 “E quando fosse stato dichiarato ascender il danno a cinquanta per cento, sia lecito a gli 
assicuratori pagare la somma intera assicurata e tener per se le cose assicurate, o pagar il 
danno dichiarato e lasciar la cosa assicurata all’assicurato”, in ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti 
civili della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1613, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142. 
107 In his commented edition of the Statuti Civili of the Republic of 1610, Baldasseroni reported a 
model of a Polizza di Sicurtà marittima in Genova. This model, however, refers to rules of 1780, 
which therefore excludes a previous chronological origin. See Baldasseroni, Trattato delle 
assicurazioni, IV, 309. 
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Genoese statutes, moreover, did not specify the list of risks covered, but they 
focused on other items, for example, the specific case of damages deriving from 
the GA. In this regard, Chapter XVII decreed the following: 
 
If the insurers and the insured have not made any legal agreement with each 
other regarding the above, they shall be held to pay for the jettison which has 
been made and proved in accordance with the statutes, and they shall also 
be held to pay for the average [GA], which is all the damage which results 
from an accidental event, whether it occurs to the ship, to the inventory, or to 
the insured goods, as well as the expenses which may be incurred even if 
the damage does not occur; so far that one can say that the accident 
involves everything; and this is true for the apportionment of the jettison, or of 
the average which is due by the insured thing.108 
 
Therefore, insurers were formally required to pay for Average damages. Entirely 
similar in content but more detailed in form is the statutory Chapter reported by 
Baldasseroni, who probably erroneously linked it back to a 1610 edition: 
 
If the insurers do not come to an agreement with the insured, in accordance 
with the agreed practice, they will be obliged to pay, according to the 
Statutes, for the jettison which has been made, and which can be proved, as 
well as the average [GA] (in which are included all the damages deriving from 
any accident to the ship, its belongings, or to the insured merchandise), in 
addition to the expenses, which will be caused by such accident, if it can be 
proved that they concerned the whole vessel, in proportion to the insured 
goods, whether of jettison, or average.109 
 
For the first time in Genoa, the rules explicitly established that unless otherwise 
agreed, the insurance covered damages and expenses deriving from Average 
events, and the insurer was required to indemnify the insured for the share 
pertaining to him. The Conservatori del Mare ordered the execution of the 
                                                          
108 “Se gli assicuratori con l’assicurato, sopra l’infrascritte cose, non havranno fatto alcun patto 
lecito, siano tenuti del getto fatto, e provato secondo la forma degli statuti, ancora siano tenuti 
per l’avaria, la qual è tutto il danno, il quale segue per caso fortuito, ò accade nel naviglio, con 
l’inventario, ò nelle cose assicurate, oltre le spese, che possono occorrere ancorché egli non 
segua; talmente, che si possa dire di caso sinistro esser seguito sopra il tutto; e ciò per la rata, 
ò del getto, o dell’avaria che spetta alla cosa assicurata”. ASG, 84.L.IX. 2, Degli statuti civili 
della serenissima repubblica di Genova, Genoa, IV, chap. XVII, ‘Delle segortà’, 142-143. 
109 “Se gli assicuratori non vengono ad un accomodamento con gli assicurati, conforme alla 
pratica accordata, saranno obbligati a bonificare a seconda degli Statuti, il getto che è stato 
fatto, e che può provarsi, come anche l’avaria (nella quale sono inclusi tutti i danni provenienti 
da qualunque sinistro, che accada al bastimento, sue appartenenze, o alle mercanzie 
assicurate) oltre le spese, che appariranno cagionate da tale sinistro, se può dimostrarsi che le 
medesime furono sopra l’intiero in generale, qual proporzione che cade sulla parte delle robe 
assicurate, sia di getto di mare, o di avaria”. Baldasseroni, Trattato delle assicurazioni, IV, 307. 
No trace of this edition of the Statuti Civili actually appears in the repertoires, perhaps because 
of a dating error made by Baldasseroni or because it has been lost in the course of time. See 
Savelli, Repertorio degli statuti, 304-305. 
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calculation of damages only in the event that the jettison followed current 
regulations.110 The same was true for any other damage or expense arising 
from the shipmaster's actions aimed at pursuing the salvation of the shipment. 
This mixture between insurance and Average perhaps explains the high number 
of complaints filed in Genoa that certified damages without the practice leading 
to a calculation: it was probably an expedient tolerated by the authorities and 
that enabled the obtaining of a certificate to be enforced by the insurer to 
receive compensation for the losses suffered.111 
The Statuti Civili of the Republic therefore sanctioned the definitive 
integration between insurance institution and Average procedures as 
complementary business risk management tools in maritime trade.112 
For example, consider again the journey of the ship the Mercante di Dover 
and its English shipmaster William Segent.113 The vessel carried a cargo of 
sugar, wool, and soda from Cartagena to Genoa in 1640. A storm near Mallorca 
damaged the cargo, especially the sugar, which partially melted when it came in 
contact with sea water, prompting the crew to perform emergency repair at sea. 
Following the declaration of GA, the calculation, whose detailed operation will 
be explained in the next pages, declared the contributory amount for each batch 
of cargo on board. However, as noted by the statutes and as recalled in the 
ruling of the Rota Civile at the bottom of the calculation, the owners of the 
assets could retaliate against their insurers: 
 
Having made the due apportionment, we find that there is damage to the amount of 
1.4.0.1/12 lire for every 100 lire, and we say that this amount should be accepted, 
reasoned, calculated, and paid among the merchandise, that is the merchants, and 
their insurers, and others who have, and may have, an interest in this calculation, 
freeing, as we do, the said captain William from the said damage suffered as a 
result of the said fortune […].114 
                                                          
110 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589, 159. 
111 Some documents only report the values of the vessel and its equipment, which was not 
sufficient information for a GA calculation, but may have been sufficient for shipmasters and 
shipowners to address their insurers. As an example, see the calculation in ASG, NG 636, 
24/01/1601. Numerous other examples are in the AveTransRisk database, available on 
http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/AveTransRisk, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
112 Also in some Average procedures drawn up in Genoa, Genoese shipmasters and merchants 
specified how they wanted to submit to Genoese legislation. Perhaps this was for the benefit of 
insurers, who were thus obliged to pay for the GA contribution, see ASG, NG 636, 13/04/1600. 
113 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50272. 
114 “Fatto il dovuto ripartimento troviamo esservi di danno a ragione di lire 1.4.0.1/12 per ogni 
lire 100, e tanto alla detta ragione diciamo doversi accettare, ragionare, calcolare, e pagare tra 
le mercanzie, ossia mercanti, e suoi assicuratori, e altri che nel presente calcolo habbino, e 
possino avere interesse, liberando, come liberiamo, il detto capitano Guglielmo dal detto danno 




For example, the merchant Francesco Spinola had to contribute by paying 
approximately 1.25% of the value of his sugar. The notary who performed the 
calculation, Gio. Benedetto Gritta, drew up another copy of Segent's 
testimoniale at Spinola's request. Spinola asked for the document so he could 
deliver it to his insurers to avoid complications in the payment of the 
compensation: 
 
[...] in the sugars received from the ship named the Mercante di Dover, some broken 
and wet bags have been found, which have been taken to the warehouse. One of 
the keys is with the sindico of the Most Serene Lords of the Commerce of San 
Giorgio and the other with the magnifico Francesco [Spinola], as he will testify. 
Therefore, he asks that they [the sugars] be visited and assessed for the damage 
they may have received so that they may be paid for by the insurers or others to 
whom it may pertain.115 
 
Further protection in the event of an accident was provided by the fact that 
Genoese legislation, unlike what was established in other port cities, such as 
Livorno, authorized the stipulation of policies that included coverage for 
damages deriving from Average events.116 It was also because of the great 
dynamism of the local insurance sector, the relative elasticity of the rules that 
governed its functioning, and the use of Average institution that the port of 
Genoa maintained a primary role in Mediterranean trade, even in an era 





                                                          
115 “[…] nelli zuccari ricevuti dalla nave nominata il Mercante di Dover se ne ha trovate alquante 
sporte di rotto e bagnate, quali sono deportati nel magazzeno con una delle chiavi del quali è 
appresso il Sindico de Serenissimi Signori del Commercio di San Giorgio e l'altra appresso di 
essi magnifico Francesco come farà constare per testimonii. Perció richiede che siano visitati, et 
taggiato il danno che possono haver ricevuto acciò se ne possa imbursare dalli assicuratori, o 
altri a quali spetti”. ASG, NG 2084, 02/05/1640. 
116 For example, the PA calculation drawn up in Genoa for the shipment of grain to the brothers 
Raffaele, Andrea and Gio Batta Ferrari in 1640 also shows the bill of lading and the insurance 
contract drawn up in Naples. It is likely that the calculation and the report were drawn up in 
order to be sent to Naples where the insurers would then have been asked to reimburse their 
share in the damages following the GA act. See ASG, NG 2084, 12/08/1640. According to Jake 
Dyble the functions of GA damages’ repartition and premium insurance in Livorno were 




3.3 The Evolution of Average Rules in the Mediterranean117 
 
Unlike insurance, a GA procedure did not separate the risks by transferring 
them to a third party but rather created a temporary ‘society’ among all 
participants in the maritime voyage. The participants suffered an arguably 
precise or justifiable expense equally shared, as Casaregi reports: 
 
It is well known that the avaria grossa [GA] is the proportional contribution of 
the things saved to restore the damage done by someone voluntarily on the 
sacrificed things of another, so that the saved things escaped an imminent 
danger.118 
 
The GA standards recalled the Justinian Corpus Iuris Civilis and the so-called 
Basilika, legislative collections that acted as coagulating factors within the 
various regulations that had developed in the Mediterranean area between the 
medieval and early modern period.119 The concept of GA derived directly from 
the Digest, an anthology of 50 books that is part of the Justinian’s Corpus Iuris 
Civilis, and in particular from book 4.2, significantly named De Lege Rhodia de 
Jactu.120 The genesis and formulation of this rule has been defined as the 
“greatest problem in the history of maritime trade”.121 
At the core of this procedure was the idea that to ensure the safety of the 
vessel and its cargo, all participants in the expedition should equally share the 
damages that had voluntarily occurred to someone's property during a sea 
shipment.122 This strategy also resolved a priori any disputes related to the 
stowage of goods and the greater risks incurred by goods placed on the upper 
decks or the different weight/value ratios. Only upon arrival in port, merchants 
                                                          
117 This paragraph is partly a reworking of A. Iodice, ‘General average in Genoa: rules and 
practices’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., Sharing risk, forthcoming. 
118 “Sciendum est itaque Avaria grossam esse contributionem pro portione rerum servatarum 
reficiendi causa damni voluntario alicujus facto alterius rebus illati, ut ab imminenti periculo 
caetera evaderent”. Casaregi, Discursos, II, 1. 
119 On the evolution of Roman law in the Byzantine Empire, see D. Penna, ‘General average in 
Byzantium’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., Sharing risk, forthcoming. On the adoption of 
Rhodian law, see G. Tedeschi, Il diritto marittimo dei romani comparato al diritto italiano, 
Montefiascone, 1899; G.A. Palazzo, La lex Rhodia de jactu nel diritto romano, Parma, 1919. 
120 The jurists’ texts collected in the corpus date as far back as the second and third centuries. 
Some scholars believe that a customary Rhodian maritime law existed as early as the seventh 
century BCE. Jettison is also mentioned in the Book of Jonah, see D. Bolanča, V. Pezelj, P. 
Amižić, ‘General average an ancient institution of maritime law’, Ius Romanum 2, 2017, 390-
401; Remie Constable, ‘The Problem of Jettison’, 207-220. 
121 J. Rougé, Recherches sur l’organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous 
l’empire romain, Paris, 1966, 398. 




and shipowners, in proportion to the economic interests of each, shared the 
damages suffered by the cargo, the ship itself and its crew.123 
The text of the Lex Rhodia is quite old and presents a few interpolations. It is 
interesting to observe that it does not include the term ‘average’ but only that of 
‘contribution’.124 According to Andrea Addobbati, despite the linguistic 
confusions, the theoretical distinction between GA, understood as voluntary 
damage, and PA, understood as fortuitous damage due to reasons of force 
majeure, remains fundamental. The latter only burdened the owner of the 
damaged property. The main legal figure in both cases was the Magister, that 
is, the shipmaster, who was often also the owner of the ship. In a GA event, he 
acted for the common good by addressing the acutal event, but he was also the 
mediator in the subsequent apportionment of damages: he collected the money 
from those who had to contribute and offered it as partial compensation for 
those who had suffered damage. He also had the authority to seize the 
properties of those who refused to pay their share. On the other hand, the 
Magister was held solely responsible for any damage caused by inexperience 
or the erroneous assessment of the danger.125 
The Nòmos Rhodìon Nautikòs introduced some changes. Scholars believe 
this work is a private collection of maritime principles applied in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in the eighth century. Aimed at forensic practice, it is a text in 
which for the first time the damages suffered in an attempt to escape from 
enemies or pirates, including shipwrecks, were admitted to the sharing.126 The 
text is known as Pseudo-Rhodian Law to distinguish it from the original Lege 
Rhodia de iactu, inserted in the Corpus Juris.127 The maritime matter is in Book 
53, and in theory, it referred directly to the maritime custom reported in the 
Corpus Juris. The main difference with respect to the Corpus was the need for a 
favourable resolution by the majority of the merchants, before claiming 
voluntary damage. This novelty was perhaps due to the growing piracy in the 
                                                          
123 Corrieri, Il consolato del mare, 267. 
124 See Addobbati, ‘Principles and rules’. 
125 A. Lefebvre d’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, Rivista di Diritto della 
Navigazione I, 1935, 36-140, 39-40. 
126 In the event of a shipwreck, the contribution rate was fixed and was only paid by any 
surviving property and if the vessel could be partially salvaged. 
127 The recall to the Rhodian law was just a way to give it a pretended authority and a legislative 
validity, Bogojevic-Gluscevic, ‘The Law and Practice of Average’, 28. See also W. Ashburner, 
The Rhodian Sea Law, Oxford, 1909. On the Pseudo-Rhodian law see also M. Pal ed., Plenitudi 




Mediterranean and to the practice of the owners of goods to travel on board 
with the goods. The new collection of rules survived until the twelfth century in 
Adriatic cities, especially those that were involved the most in trade with the 
Byzantine Empire. The first legal systems of Trani, Venice and Ancona partially 
adopted them.128 
Based on the adoption of the Pseudo-Rhodian Law or the Digest, which 
maintained its influence in the Western Mediterranean, two distinct legal 
traditions developed. However, there was no lack of mutual influences. For 
instance, the rules of Pisa, Genoa and Amalfi, as well as the Usatges de la 
Ribera de Barcelona, traditionally linked to the Digest, gradually accepted the 
Pseudo-Rhodian Law, which was more widespread in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.129 The reference to slightly different norms amongst the various 
states led to a multitude of customs and usages that made it necessary to 
formulate codes and compendia of law or to resort to the opinions of jurists to 
provide practical indications for merchants, shipmasters, and institutions.130 As 
in the Genoese case, to have a shared starting point and to be able to claim the 
necessary authority for their own indigenous rules, which often differed from 
those of neighbouring states, codes and statutes of various maritime realities 
explicitly referred to the authority of Roman law or to the generally accepted 
general customs .131 No social or institutional player was able to impose its own 
rules. This increased the transaction costs associated with risk management, as 
there were different administrative structures with which the agents of the sector 
had to deal.132 
                                                          
128 R. Di Tucci, ‘Consuetudini marittime del Medio Evo italiano nella redazione del Libro del 
Consolato del Mare’, in L.A. Senigallia ed., Atti della mostra bibliografica e convegno 
internazionale di studi storici del Diritto marittimo medioevale, Naples, 1934, 129-138, 130-131. 
According to Lefevbre D'Ovidio, the statutory provisions of these cities were simply more or less 
extensive derogations from the customary law of the Nòmos, see Lefevbre D'Ovidio, ‘La 
contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 70. 
129 Corrieri, Il consolato del mare, 24-25. See also Benvenuti, Le repubbliche marinare. 
130 One of the recurring themes in today’s quest for uniformity in maritime law is the argument 
that different states applied uniform rules in the past. The most enthusiastic supporters contend 
that the lex mercatoria is a universal and autonomous a-national legal system developed 
spontaneously by merchants, without regard to and independently of states. Opponents of the 
lex mercatoria, however, reject these claims by maintaining that detaching law from the state is 
little more than wishful thinking. The scholars’ discussions regarding a hypothetical lex 
mercatoria are partially stimulated by the idea of ‘international rules’ such as those governing 
GAs. See V. Piergiovanni ed., From lex mercatoria to commercial law, Berlin, 2005; O. Toth, 
The Lex Mercatoria in Theory and Practice, Oxford, 2017. 
131 This was the case in the Genoese statutes, according to Pardessus. See J.M. Pardessus, 
Collection des lois maritimes antérieures au XVIII siècle, IV, Paris, 1837, 521. 




Between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, frequent exchanges 
between the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Western Mediterranean favoured Genoa 
and Barcelona as ports of trading. This allowed Genoese and Catalan maritime 
law to play an aggregating role in the Western Mediterranean area.133 At the 
same time, the slow increase in the volume of trade determined a broadening of 
the GA principles. For instance, in Barcelona and Genoa, the concept of GA, 
which according to the Digesto was closely linked to the act of jettison, 
expanded irregularly until it included administrative costs and many damages 
due to unforeseeable circumstances or force majeure.134 Even a maritime 
exchange loan requested by the shipmaster to make emergency repairs and 
purchase supplies could be included in GA.135 There was no lack of attempts to 
standardize and rearrange the rules. For example, this was the purpose of the 
Costumbres de Valencia.136 According to this collection of rules, promulgated in 
1250, damage apportionment would only take place in the case of a jettison, 
whereas to emphasize the voluntary nature of the act, the merchants had to 
throw their own goods overboard. To protect shipowners, who assumed the risk 
of the sea voyage, the ship contributed to the compensation of damages for half 
of its value.137 In 1258, however, Barcelona responded to the legal systems of 
Valencia with the drafting of a new maritime code and with the establishment of 
a magistracy formed by local merchants for the resolution of disputes, namely, 
the Consolat de Mar.138 Under the authority of the Crown of Aragon, this 
magistracy established itself as the defender and supporter of international 
trade, thus becoming a legislative model far beyond the Aragonese borders.139 
                                                          
133 Corrieri, Il consolato del mare, 14. The Ordonnance touchant la Marine issued in France in 
1681 had the same aggregating function, but between Nordic and Mediterranean law. See O. 
Chaline, La mer et la France: Quand les Bourbons voulaient dominer les océans, Paris, 2016. 
The original document is digitally available on Gallica. See 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k95955s, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
134 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 266. 
135 An example is the loan of 1,184 Genoese lire requested by the Catalan patrone Giovanni Pol 
in 1600 to make a new lifeboat and buy food supplies. Only 10% of its value, however, was 
included in GA calculation. See ASG, NG 637, 04/04/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk db 
with the id 50433. 
136 See D.S.H. Abulafia, D. Bates, The Western Mediterranean kingdoms: the struggle for 
Dominion, 1200-1500, London, 2014. 
137 Costumbres de Valencia, IX, chap. XVII, par. VII. Transcribed in Pardessus, Collection des 
lois maritimes, 5, 336. 
138 R.C. Cave, H.H. Coulson eds., A Source Book for Medieval Economic History, New York, 
1965, 160-168. Following the development of maritime law and trade, Peter IV granted further 
legislative privileges in 1340, see Lefebvre d’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 104-
105. 
139 See E. Maccioni, Il Consolato del Mare di Barcellona. Tribunale e corporazione di mercanti 
(1394-1462), Rome, 2019. An important role is played also by arbitrators, required in 
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The volume of the judgements of the Consolat de Mar, resulting from its judicial 
activity, became the reference point for maritime laws and rules in the 
Mediterranean. It remained an essential model for Genoese jurists during the 
early modern period.140 According to Raffaele di Tucci, the Consolat partially 
reflected the legal systems of the states of the Western Mediterranean in a 
‘practical’ synthesis for resolving disputes.141 Perhaps the initial weakness of 
the normative and customary tradition facilitated the Barcelonian legislators in 
the editing of the Consolat, which was largely the outcome of the elaboration of 
different sources.142 
Tracing the events related to this text and analysing the rules therein allows 
us to reveal the circulation of the principles of maritime legislation in the 
Mediterranean. This is a necessary task to better understand the regulatory 
evolution of Average within the legal system of the Republic of Genoa. For 
instance, it is significant that scholars believed for a long time that the Consolat 
was an Italian work. At the beginning of the twentieth century, its authorship 
was still the subject of numerous debates and clashes amongst legal 
historians.143 The succession of the Consolat’s editions gave rise to this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
commercial and maritime disputes by different legislations, especially in case of ‘international 
accidents’. See M.E. Soldani, I mercanti catalani e la corona d’Aragona in Sardegna: profitti e 
potere negli anni della conquista, Rome, 2017. 
140 Although the oldest Italian printed edition dates back to 1519 (Capitulj et ordinatione di mare 
et di mercantie, Antonio de Bladi, Rome, 1519), the editio princeps was the second edition by 
G.B. Pedrezzano ed., Libro di consolato novamente stampato et ricorretto, nel quale sono scritti 
capitoli & statuti & buone ordinationi, che li antichi ordinarono per li casi di mercantia & di mare 
& mercanti & marinari, & patroni di nauilii, Venice, 1539. In 1549 a new edition was printed, in 
which the editor made direct reference to the Catalan edition by including all the original parts, 
like the Chapters on the customs of the consuls of Valencia and other Chapters omitted by the 
previous editions. See C. De Deo, ‘Il consolato del mare: storia di un successo editoriale’, in L. 
Guatri, C. De Deo, G. Guerzoni eds., Il Consolato e il portolano del Mare, Milan, 2007, XI-
XXVIII, XXI-XXII. The reprints of the latter edition, published in 1564 and 1584, were the most 
widely known in Europe. The work of the Genoese jurist Casaregi, Il Consolato del Mare, was 
based on these editions. 
141 Di Tucci, ‘Consuetudini marittime’, 133. A direct influence had, for example, the customs of 
Tortosa (1271), of Valencia (1272), the ordinances of the Ribera of Barcelona (1258), the Curia 
Fumada of Vic (1231), the consulate of Majorca (1336), the consulate of Barcelona (1348), see 
Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 43-45. On the influences for the redaction of the book of the 
Consolat, see G. Colon, A. Garcia, Llibre del Consolat de Mar, Barcelona, 2001; A. Iglesia-
Ferreiros, ‘La formacion de los libros de consulado de mar’, Initium, 2, 1997, 1-372. 
142 For example, some collections of Genoese laws such as the statutes of Pera and Gazaria, 
already mentioned, directly influenced the redaction of the Consolat. See Di Tucci, 
‘Consuetudini marittime’, 134-136. 
143 See, for example, the debates around the publication of O. Sciolla ed., Il Consolato del Mare, 
Turin, 1911. Guillermo M. de Brocà, member of the Real Academias de Buenas Letras of 
Barcelona, replied to this book accusing the editor of wanting to “fight, through a primacy of 
editions, the Barcelona authorship to assign the Italian authorship to the consular collections”, 
see O. Sciolla, ‘Dell’edizione principe del Consolato del mare’, in L.A. Senigallia ed., Atti della 
mostra bibliografica e convegno internazionale di studi storici del Diritto marittimo medioevale, 
Naples, 1934, 329-334. 
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misinterpretation. In fact, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, 25 
editions of the Consolat were published in Italian, while only 7 editions were 
printed in Castilian, English, Dutch, French, and German.144 Most of the printed 
versions also enclosed a list that displayed the presumed date of the 
implementation of the book’s rules in the various Mediterranean ports, the so-
called cronica de les promulgacions.145 This list backdated the writing of the 
book to the period immediately subsequent to the Basilika, that is, at the dawn 
of the eleventh century: in this way and by citing Rome as the first city that 
adopted it in 1075, a direct continuity with Roman law was communicated, 
giving strength and formal authority to the book. Some seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century jurists, such as Carlo Targa and Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria 
Casaregi, reported this list presumably in good faith.146 According to the 
cronica, Genoa adopted the Consolat in 1186. As Olivia Remie Constable 
proved, however, the rules which constitute the book of the Consolat mostly 
date back to the thirteenth century.147 
The Catalan princeps edition dates between 1482 and 1484.148 The Italian 
editions consulted the most by Genoese magistrates and jurists until the 
eighteenth century were those of 1564 and 1584.149 Casaregi, for instance, 
used a reprint of the 1564 edition for his Spiegazione.150 All the Italian first 
                                                          
144 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 1. Among the earliest printed editions is the one in Barcelona, 
dating from around 1484. The second, revised by Francesch Celells, dates back to 1494. The 
immediately following editions, all printed in Barcelona, date from 1502 (by Johan Luschner), 
1518 (by Johan Rosembach) and again 1518 (by Carles Amoros). The first Italian editions, all 
printed in Venice except the Roman edition of 1519, date from 1539, 1544, 1549, 1556, 1558, 
1564, 1566, 1567, 1576 and 1584. See J.M. Edelstein, ‘Some Early Editions of the “Consulate 
of the Sea”’, The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 51/2, 1957, 119-125, 120-
122. The first French edition is F. Mayssoni ed., Le livre du Consolat, Aix-en-Provence, 1577. 
One of the best known and most faithful edition to the original text is the Spanish edition with 
Catalan text on the front, edited by Capmany, Codigo de las costumbres. 
145 The studies citing this list, however, do not specifically mention which editions contain it and 
which do not, with the exception of the edition commented on by Casaregi. See L. Tanzini, ‘Le 
prime edizioni a stampa in italiano del Libro del Consolato del Mare’, in R. Martorelli ed., 
Itinerando. Senza confini dalla preistoria ad oggi. Studi in onore di Roberto Coroneo, Perugia, 
2015, 965-978, 967. Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 45-46. 
146 Targa, Ponderationi, 395. G.M. Casaregi, ‘Il Consolato del Mare colla spiegazione di 
Giuseppe Maria Casaregi’, in Casaregi, Discursos, III, 59. See also V. Piergiovanni, ‘La 
Spiegazione del Consolato del mare di Giuseppe Lorenzo Maria Casaregi’, in Piergiovanni ed., 
Norme, scienza e pratica, II, 1257-1271. 
147 Remie Constable, ‘The problem of jettison’, 215. On the dating of the Consolat, see also A. 
Garcia Sanz, ‘El derecho maritimo preconsular', Boletin de la Sociedad Castellonense de 
Cultura, 36, 1960, 47-74; J.J. Chiner Gimeno, J.P. Galiana Cachón, ‘Del «Consolat de mar» al 
«Libro llamado Consulado de mar»: aproximación histórica’, in Libro llamado Consulado de mar 
(Valencia, 1539), Valencia, 2003, 7-42. 
148 On the diffusion of the different editions, see Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 966. 
149 Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 975-976. 
150 Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 975. 
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editions, with the exception of the Roman edition of 1519, were printed in 
Venice, one of the most important printing centres in Europe.151 
The book had a section on the establishment and jurisdiction of the Consoli 
del Mare di Valencia, a corpus of customary norms known as “the good 
manners of the sea”, and a final section taken from normative definitions of the 
kings of Aragon or the city authorities of Barcelona.152 The rules resembled 
codes of conduct that became executive legal rules at the very moment of 
navigation. According to Roman law, law and customs have equal normative 
forces.153 Therefore, in the laws of maritime navigation, as in the rest of 
commercial laws, the behaviours declared as ‘good rules’ were indeed 
mandatory in those given circumstances, in that environment and in those 
activities, as these rules met the established criteria of adequacy, fairness and 
justice.154 
The Consolat did not deal with questions of a technical-seafaring nature, 
except for a few exemplary cases.155 The Chapters relating to jettison were very 
detailed and met the Roman law and Mediterranean customs’ guidelines at the 
time, such as the Genoese statutes of Pera, which will be discussed in the next 
pages.156 
An essential requirement for the validity of a GA act was the manifestation of 
the will of the weakest subjects, the ones most exposed to the prejudices that it 
involved, that is, the merchants. All responsibility for the prediction and 
assessment of the danger, as well as the actions necessary for the elimination 
or reduction of risks, converged on the Dominus/Magister. In the absence of 
                                                          
151 Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 974; In the 1539 edition, the dedication by Giovan 
Battista Pedrezzano to the imperial consul of Venice Martino Zornoza suggests that the 
Consulat was also well known in Venice as a normative source, although its first mention in 
Venetian documents dates back to 1705. M. Fusaro, ‘Migrating Seamen, Migrating Laws? An 
Historiographical Genealogy of Seamen’s Employment and States’ Jurisdiction in the Early 
Modern Mediterranean’, in S. Gialdroni, A. Cordes, S. Dauchy, D. De ruysscher, H. Pihlajamäki 
eds., Migrating Words, Migrating Merchants, Migrating Law, Leiden, 2019, 54-83, 71-72. 
152 Tanzini, ‘Le prime edizioni a stampa’, 966. 
153 According to the classical conception, the populus is the holder of all normative power and 
the emperor also took his power from it. The customary source had the same value as the 
written source, since both were essentially expressions of the same subject holding the power 
to legislate, see F. Gallo, Interpretazione e formazione consuetudinaria del diritto: lezioni di 
diritto romano, Turin, 1993, 55-56. 
154 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 23. 
155 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 195-196. 
156 The Chapter on jettison in the Consulate reflects the major influence of the Corpus Juris. The 
institute of germinamento on the other hand, of uncertain origin and analysed in Addobbati, 
‘Principle and rules’, is influenced by the Pseudo-Rodhian law but is a contractual obligation, 
see Lefebvre d'Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 113-115. For an analysis of the 
Chapters of the Consolat relating to the GA, see Iodice, ‘General average in Genoa’. 
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merchants, the shipmaster needed the consent of the officers and the nocchiero 
(boatswain).157 
The jettison procedure played a key role. It began with the shipmaster 
correctly assessing the threatening danger that he would have to report to the 
merchants in a speech. In this speech, partially transcribed in the Consolat, he 
would formally suggest the jettison as the only way to save the expedition.158 
Once the merchants had expressed their approval, the shipmaster could start 
the operation by letting one of the merchants ‘symbolically’ begin the jettison.159 
The ship's scrivano (purser)160 wrote down the agreement. The shipmaster 
could jettison with the help of the boatswain and the pennese,161 keeping in 
mind that he had to achieve the maximum benefit with the minimum sacrifice. 
The shipmaster also had to have no scruples in sacrificing the goods, because 
“[…] it is worth more to throw a large amount of goods than to lose the people, 
the ship and all the goods […]”.162 
The ship, the freights and the cargo contributed to the damage partition. 
Crew’s properties did not contribute as long as these were worth less than half 
the wage of each sailor and officer for the current voyage.163 In the case of a 
“plain jettison”, in which the quantity of goods thrown was less than half of the 
total load, the ship contributed half of its value. In the event of an “irregular 
jettison”, also defined as “almost similar to shipwreck”, which occurred when 
there was no time to observe the necessary formalities and half the load or 
                                                          
157 The ‘boatswain’ was in charge of the crew during navigation, see 
https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity
/roles/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
158 On this ceremony and the reception of the Consolat, see also Addobbati, ‘Principle and 
rules’. 
159 This custom was abandoned over the following centuries, see Casaregi, Il Consolato del 
Mare, 87. 
160 In Genoa and Venice the ‘purser’ was in charge of the administrative and financial running of 
the ship. He took care of the books, and this is the only role that was given only to properly 
literate individuals. On Italian ships he acted as public notary on board. On English ships, there 
was no directly comparable office. See 
https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity
/roles/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
161 The pennese was in charge of the correct and safe loading of the cargo on board, see 
https://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/history/research/centres/maritime/resources/sailingintomodernity
/roles/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
162 “[…] vale più gettar una quantità di robba che se perdessino le persone, la nave et tutta la 
robba […]”. This practice was also confirmed by the jurist Casaregi in the eighteenth century, 
see Casaregi, Discursos, I, 162. According to Casaregi, for example, even the wounding of a 
sailor in case of successful defence against a pirate or enemy attack could give rise to a GA 
damage repartition, see Casaregi, Discursos, I, 163. 
163 These goods constituted the so-called canterata of the sailors. It was not even subject to the 
payment of freight, but the canterata had to be purchased with the money of the salary itself, 
see ch. 128 and 129. See also Lefebvre D’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle avarie comuni’, 110. 
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more was involved, the ship contributed two-thirds of its value.164 The freights 
contributed in their entirety, but only if the accident happened in the second half 
of the voyage. The Consolat extended the concept of GA damages to include 
any extraordinary and voluntary expenses necessary for the completion of the 
journey. An example was the application of the GA procedure for damages or 
loss of the schifo [the skiff],165 the small boat used for the loading and unloading 
of goods and, if necessary, as a lifeboat, a frequent type of damage.166 
Following the approval of the judges, the procedure ended with the settlement 
phase. 
The Consolat, unlike the Venetian and Ancona statutes, did not clearly 
regulate the assessment of damage and settlement. It also did not require the 
reconstruction of the events, but rather, it relied on the shipmaster/shipowner for 
the definition of the attribution criteria of the incurred expenses. The calculation 
took place in the port of loading of the goods if the shipmaster could go back on 
his route. The calculation of the value of the assets followed a procedure that 
Corrieri defines as “archaic and simple”, in which the shipmaster himself 
assumed the function of calcolatore, drawing up a list with the value of the 
goods involved.167 The goods contributed according to either the purchase 
value if the Average had occurred in the first half of the journey, or the sales 
value in the port of destination if the damage had occurred in the second half of 
the journey.168 As per Roman law, the shipmaster had the possibility of 
confiscating the goods while waiting for payment from the merchants: the 
shipmaster assumed a prominent role in the procedure.169 Despite the rethoric 
of fairness and trust, there could always be the suspicion that the shipmasters 
acted in their own interest, as shipmasters lacked real counterparts beyond their 
own crew. For these reasons, merchants could resort to the judgement of the 
arbitrators, who were chosen as “[…] two good seamen […]”.170 
                                                          
164 In the event of sinking or abandonment, the loss was accounted over the cargo alone. See 
Casaregi, Il Consolato del Mare, 100. 
165 F. Corazzini, Vocabolario Nautico Italiano, VI, Bologna, 1906, 160. The term derives from the 
Longobard Skiff and is still used today to refer to vessels less than 10 metres long, see 
https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/schifo2/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
166 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 295-296. 
167 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 300-301. As revealed by the Livorno documentation uploaded 
to the AveTransRisk database by Jake Dyble, it seems that this procedure was also followed in 
Tuscany. 
168 Casaregi, Il Consolato del Mare, 88-89. 
169 Casaregi, Il Consolato del Mare, 87-88. 
170“[…] due buoni huomini di mare […]”. Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 300-301. 
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Regarding the responsibility of the shipmaster and the criteria for attributing 
risk, the Libro del Consolat partly followed the same rules as those applied in 
the Genoese Republic at that time.171 In Catalonia, in fact, the need for written 
and shared maritime rules arose later than in Genoa, which by the late medieval 
period ruled over a territorial and maritime domain that extended from the Black 
Sea to North Africa.172 
 
3.4 The Genoese Statutes from Pera to the 1589 Statuti Civili 
 
The overseas territorial expansion of the Republic and the general increase in 
maritime traffic in the late medieval period propelled the development of trade 
and determined the need for rules for the protection of the most distant routes. 
During this period, the Republic of Genoa sent copies of its statutes to the 
territories under its control for ordinary administration.173 The statutes 
constituted the formal affirmation of its own legal system and allowed the 
preservation of the privileged and direct relationship of the distant territories with 
the motherland.174 The statutes of the colony of Pera responded to these 
considerations. Pera (Galata) was a Genoese settlement on the Corno d'Oro, 
obtained in 1261 together with the free transit through the Dardanelles Strait 
and the Black Sea, following a treaty between the Capitano del Popolo 
Guglielmo Boccanegra and the Byzantine emperor Michele Paleologo.175 
The statutes of Pera (1316) ruled on various topics, including maritime trade. 
Based on the type of formulation, the regulations are assumed to date back to 
the years prior to the abolition of the podestà, which occurred in 1265, and 
thought to be a copy of the regulations promulgated in the capital.176 
                                                          
171 Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 36. 
172 See Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza’, 26-38. The Castile-Genoa axis also remained a 
determining factor for the economic development of Catalonia during the sixteenth century, 
when relations between these two regions were further favoured by the political alliance 
between Genoa and the Spanish Empire. See P. Vilar, La Catalogne dans l’Espagne moderne, 
2 voll., Paris, 1962. 
173 These territories were considered part of the Republic and not colonies, a term never used in 
the sources. See Taviani, ‘The Genoese Casa di San Giorgio’, 185. 
174 See V. Piergiovanni, ‘Lo statuto: lo specchio normativo delle identità cittadine’, in 
Piergiovanni ed., Norme, scienza e pratica, I, 317-328, 327. 
175 Polonio, ‘Dalla marginalità alla potenza sul mare’, 33. 
176 Raffaele Di Tucci also hypothesised a reciprocal influence with respect to the Constitutum 




These norms included the first known Genoese rules concerning Average 
and jettison.177 A Chapter forbade loading goods on the upper deck of the ship, 
as this was the most dangerous area on board, while another one ordered the 
voyage to proceed with the throwing (iactu) of goods only in case of real danger 
and with the approval of the merchants on board.178 The statutes regulated 
jettison, Average (the word ‘Average’ appears in the Chapter as a synonym for 
‘damage’) and any further expense under the concept of risk sharing, hinting at 
the influence of these traditions pertaining to Roman law, the Digesto law and 
the Pseudo-Rhodian law. According to Pardessus, the Chapters were resumed 
and were influenced by the Roles d'Oleron, a well-known compilation of 
maritime law written in France in the twelfth century.179 
The Genoese judges of the Officium Gazariae applied these rules in Genoa 
in the following century. The Officium Gazariae was a maritime court based in 
Genoa and established in the fourteenth century, although the name refers to 
the lost colony inhabited by the Gazari in Crimea. The court dealt in maritime 
legislation, with specific reference to super factis et negotiis navigandi.180 Its 
statutes were redrafted from time to time based on the need to update the rules 
or distribute new copies of the current laws such that their formulation became 
stratified throughout different editions. The volumes were intended to provide a 
manual for consultation; they did not, however, help clarify the genesis of the 
individual norms. In contrast, the new rules overruled the previous ones, and for 
this reason, the older, obsolete versions were discarded.181 The Chapters 
concerning jettison and Average copied the statutes of Pera without additions, 
both in the edition of 1403 and in that of 1441.182 The Chapter on jettison was 
                                                          
177 This is the oldest normative text on this subject found to date, as far as the Genoese 
Republic is concerned. See Promis ed., ‘Statuti della colonia genovese’, 588-595. On these 
statutes, which contain the rules adopted in Genoa and Pera at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, but which actually cover a period of time from 1195 to 1316, see Piergiovanni, Gli 
statuti civili e criminali; Piergiovanni, Lezioni di storia giuridica. 
178 See chap. CCXV De Rebus Positis in Navi Super Cohpertam Emendandis;chap. CCXXXI De 
iactu emendando facto de voluntate maioris partis mercatorum, in Promis, ‘Statuti della 
Colonia’, 752. 
179 The Roles d’Oleron, however, mention more specific cases such as, for example, the cutting 
of the mast. See Pardessus, Collection des lois, I, 328. 
180 Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, XLV; Calegari, ‘Patroni di nave’, 60. The 
fourteenth-century book of the Imposicio Officii Gazariae, consisting of 11 treatises and 153 
paragraphs, does not mention the Chapter on jettison, which appeared in the fifteenth century 
editions, see ‘Imposicio Officii Gazariae’, in Monumenta Historiae Patriae, Leges Municipales, I, 
Turin, 1838, 303-430. 
181 This is perhaps a Genoese peculiarity compared to other cities of the time, such as Venice. 
See Pardessus, Collection des lois, IV, 425. 
182 Chap. VIII. De non carrigando in deck, nisi ut supra. According to Pardessus, the same 
Chapter was also in the statutes of Pera of 14 October 1317, thus confirming the origin of this 
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almost the same as the Chapter in the statutes of Pera, as was the content: 
however, the Chapter’s title displayed the word avariis, intended as a synonym 
for damage, whereas the terms avarias, expensas and jactum were used in the 
text. The Chapter referred to the need for the approval of those on board, the 
proportional division of damages and the possibility of including into the 
repartition all the expenses incurred.183 
The Average legislative production in Genoa seems to stop after the statutes 
of Gazaria. Most likely, in the years until the promulgation of the Statuti Civili of 
1589, the Republic followed the rules in the book of the Consolat de Mar. 
Despite the probable circulation and adoption of the Consolat, the presence of 
an anti-Spanish faction within the Republic, the vagueness of some customary 
rules, and the conflicts of jurisdiction in the stretch of sea between Liguria and 
Corsica were perhaps the basis of the subsequent will to affirm an autonomous 
jurisdiction.184 
The Republic reformed its statutes during the sixteenth century, and the long 
preparatory phase of the Statuti Civili began in 1551.185 These statutes 
remained unchanged at least until the first decades of the eighteenth century. 
They represented an essential moment in the consolidation of the Genoese 
legal system. Although the new body of laws had multiple references to the 
Dorian 1528 reforms, in the maritime and commercial spheres it resumed 
regulations dating back to the Liber Gazariae.186 The desire to convey an idea 
of long-term continuity is perfectly normal, as already observed about the book 
of the Consolat itself.187 The latter, despite being informally integrated into 
                                                                                                                                                                          
rule. See Pardessus, Collection des lois, IV, 463; chap. XCVIII. De jactis et avariis factis de 
voluntate majoris partis mercatorum. This Chapter appears in the 1403 edition, see Pardesuss, 
Collection des lois, IV, Officium Gazarie (1441), chap. XCVIII, 521. 
183 Pardesuss, Collection des lois, IV, Officium Gazarie (1441), chap. XCVIII, 521. 
184 According to the jurist Giulio Pace, the Genoese Republic, as weaker of the Spanish Empire, 
did not have legal control over the Ligurian Sea, see G. Pace, De dominio maris Hadriatici, 
Lyon, 1619, 70-71, in Calafat, Une mer jalousée, 155. In the Additiones to the capitulations with 
Spain in 1519 the Genoese were subject “ordinibus constitutionibus et decretis dicotrum 
locorum, tam mari quam terra” to Iberian legislation, while the Spanish had to submit to 
Genoese regulations in the territories of the Republic. See Pacini, I presupposti politici, 102. 
185 The consultations began in 1551 with the appointment of a first experts’ committee and 
ended in December 1588 with the promulgation decree in June 1589. See BUG, ms. C. III. 13, 
Statutorum civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589. BCB, F.Ant.Gen.C.110, Degli Statuti 
civili della Serenissima Repubblica di Genova, Genoa, 1613. The draft of these statutes is in 
ASG, ms. 197, Statuti Civili, 1588. 
186 Savelli, ‘Statuti e amministrazione’, 362-363. 
187 The political-institutional context, the policies of neutrality and the coincidence between the 
subjects governing the state and those involved in the main commercial networks determined a 
partial coincidence between public power and private interests in the economic policies. See L. 
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Genoese customs, was never explicitly mentioned in the Statuti Civili.188 
According to the authoritative opinion of Casaregi, who wrote in the eighteenth 
century, the Consolat prevailed over Roman law, yet the Statuti Civili did not 
mention the Corpus nor the Consolat. Plus, the Statuti introduced important 
innovations and clarifications at an institutional and procedural level.189 
Genoese legislators inserted Average rules into a rigid and apparently 
autonomous institutional framework. In their plans, the division of competences 
within different magistracies was assumed to ensure the reliability of the 
procedure and to discourage litigations, thus leading to a reduction of costs and 
timing. The rules involved a new office created ad hoc: the calcolatori. The 
Statutes, as well as the subsequent editions translated into vernacular and 
published in the following centuries, dedicated two Chapters to GA.190 Genoese 
legislators chose to focus only on some crucial aspects: the jettison procedure, 
the contribution criteria, and the operations of the calcolatori. Their role was the 
main element of divergence from coevals and previous European rules. Jurists 
in the following centuries criticized the way in which the statutes described 
Average procedure: for example, according to Ascanio Baldasseroni, author of 
a well-known treatise on insurance written at the end of the eighteenth century, 
Genoese statutes included too many procedural details and too few rules.191 
As far as jettison is concerned, procedure resembled the one described in 
the Consolat, although it differed from it in several respects and required a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Piccinno, ‘Grandi porti e scali minori del Mediterraneo in età moderna: fattori competitivi e reti 
commerciali’, in Ianuensis non nascitur, sed fit, 3, 1045-1059, 1053. 
188 Still in 1592 it is possible to find shipmasters arriving in port and promising to respect the 
Average procedure according to the “customs of the sea”: “[…] pagandomi […] l’avaria secondo 
il Costume del mare […]”, in ASG, NG 630, 10/04/1592. Towards the end of the decade the 
promise to respect the Genoese Statuti Civili or, even, “juxta formam statuti de Calcolatoribus et 
eorum officio”. See, for example, ASG, NG 636, 16/11/1599. The promise to respect the 
statutes of the calcolatori is also in ASG, NG 636, 07/01/1600. It is also quoted in Felloni, ‘Una 
fonte inesplorata’, 848. It is not easy to interpret it: it could refer to the Chapter on the calcolatori 
in the Statuti Civili or to other specific statutes of this magistracy, whose traces have been lost 
so far. 
189 Casaregi, Discursos, II, 2. The lack of clarity of the normative text on the hierarchy of legal 
sources and the desire to emphasise the authority of the statutes is reminiscent in some 
respects of the Venetian case illustrated in Fusaro, ‘Migrating Seamen’, 54-83. 
190 Vol. I, chap. XI. De calculatoribus et eorum officio, IV, chap. XVI. De jactu, et forma in eo 
tenenda. Except for minor changes, the Statuti Civili remained substantially unchanged until the 
end of the eighteenth century. The last edition was published in 1787, see Savelli ed., 
Repertorio degli statuti, 145, 150. 
191 In his trieatise, however, the Average rules are hazily depicted. Come accennato, 
Baldasseroni reports a model of the ‘Polizza di Sicurtà marittima in Genova’ sbagliando la data, 
See Baldasseroni, Collezione, 5 (n. 27), 309. This is not the only mistake reported in good faith 
by Baldasseroni. In the Chapter on jettison, for example, he attributed a quote from Targa to 
Casaregi, see Baldasseroni, Trattato delle assicurazioni marittime, 4, 60. 
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greater bureaucratic effort from the parties involved.192 According to Andrea 
Addobbati, the introduction of further formal requirements in Genoa, often 
impossible to carry out in practice and almost “ridiculous”, should be interpreted 
as a formal act against parties, who would eventually refuse jettison.193 For 
example, the Statutes required merchants’ approval, although they did not 
travel anymore with their goods and according to Targa, GA reports that 
continued to mention this element were usually suspicious.194 
Similarly to the Consolat, even in the Genoese Statutes, the shipmaster 
assessed the danger, which could be represented by a storm or “any other 
reason”, and proposed the jettison. The statutes described a rather complex 
and articulated procedure, following the shipmaster’s speech, in which he 
explained the inevitability of imminent danger, crew and merchants had to vote 
for the GA act. In case of approval with a two-thirds majority, they appointed 
three consuls: two among the crews’ officers and one among the merchants.195 
It is not clear whether the criterion for establishing the two-thirds majority was 
based on a vote per head or by the “parties involved”, where the shipmaster, the 
crew and the merchants each made one party. In the absence of merchants on 
board, the shipmaster had still to seek the consent of his crew. The newly 
elected consuls held a temporary position of great responsibility: they chose 
what to throw into the sea; common salvation depended on them. The 
shipmaster was the one who proposed a solution to avert imminent danger. 
However, he did not direct the operations. The purser kept track of all the 
jettisoned goods, while the consuls signed his list after the danger.196 The 
                                                          
192 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo 
tenenda, 154-157. The scale and variety of the trade headed to Genoa, as well as legal 
reasons, according to Steven Epstein, led to a different conception of time and to the unusual 
mania of the Genoese mercantile and notarial class for the written documents. This behaviour 
lead them to record and preserve a mass of documents rarely equalled in other ports, see S. 
Epstein, ‘Business cycles and the sense of Time in Medieval Genova’, Business History Review 
62, 1988, 238-260, 244. 
193 See Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’. 
194 Targa, Ponderationi, 253. 
195 “[…] facere consultam cum omnibus officialibus navigii et mercatoribus in eo existentibus, et 
si duae tertiae partes praedictorum concurrerint in faciendo iactu pro dicta salvatione, eligantur 
eo casu tres consules, quorum duo sint ex dictis officialibus et unus ex dictis mercatoribus […]”, 
in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo 
tenenda, 154-155. In the event of the absence of merchants on board, the Statuti require the 
election of two consuls from among the “officers of the bow” and one from among the “officers 
of the stern”. 
196 “[…] quicquid de ordine dictorum consulum iactum fuerit, scribi et annotari debeat per 
scribam navigii in suo libro in praesentia dictorum consulum cum eorum subscriptionibus, si 
scribere scirent”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et 
forma in eo tenenda, 155. 
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jettison had to have a positive outcome; otherwise, it would have resulted in a 
shipwreck, defined by Targa as a “total loss”.197 
Due to the jettison’s complexity, it is safe to assume that the procedure was 
largely theoretical. Taking into account that it was a response operation to 
sudden events, and that the speed of the measures adopted could make the 
difference between either the safety or the ruin of the expedition, all of these 
formalities could hardly all be implemented.198 However, in a study on the 
Mediterranean between the medieval and early modern period, Wilma Borghesi 
reports a practical example of the application of this procedure dating back to 
1504, well before the publication of the Statuti Civili. This is a testimony relating 
to the election of 3 consuls for a jettison carried out on 16 February 1504 on the 
Genoese ship of the patrone Agostino de Gropallo off the coast of Tortosa.199 
This document implies, prior to the 1589 Statuti Civili, a specific Genoese 
legislation on GA. This is not the only case of GA reported in Genoa before 
1589 and cited by Genoese scholars in their researches on other topics.200 
According to the 1589 Statuti, damages caused by jettison were distributed 
proportionally over the value of the ship, freights and everything else on 
board.201 The Chapter on jettison was full of operational details. It specified how 
certain types of goods, for example gold, silver, jewels but also horses, other 
animals, and slaves, contributed to the repartition.202 These goods, in return, 
                                                          
197 Targa, Ponderationi, 256. This rule is also confirmed in Casaregi, Discursos, II, 2. According 
to Targa’s definition, the shipwreck is caused by the wrath of the sea, “procede da ira di mare”, 
and leads to the breaking of the ship. See Targa, Ponderationi, chap. 57, 247. On the concept 
of shipwreck in later Genoese legal doctrine see V. Piergiovanni, ‘Brevi note dottrinali e 
giurisprudenziali in tema di naufragio’, in Piergiovanni ed., Norma, Scienza e pratica, 1277-
1282. 
198 No mention of the list drawn up during the storm or of the consuls’ election was found in the 
documentation consulted so far. Consultation certainly took place, in a more informal manner. 
Depending on the presence or absence of merchants on board, expressions like this were used: 
“fatto il debito consiglio [with the merchants and his crew]” or “d’accordo con li suoi ufficiali [with 
his crew only]”. See ASG, NG 2084, 18/04/1640; ASG, CdM, Esibite in avaria 377, 28/02/1696. 
199 The testimony of officers and passengers reported the appointment of two consuls chosen 
from among the passengers, Lodisio de Odone and Geronimo Grimaldi quondam Giorgio, and 
two councillors chosen from among the crew, the sub-boatswain Enrico de Ceva and the master 
calafato Jacopo de Columnis. See Borghesi, Il Mediterraneo, 74-77. Borghesi did not recognise 
the connection with the GA procedure, which is however evident by cross-referencing this 
source with the practice described in the Statuti Civili. 
200 Edoardo Grendi found two GA calculations drawn up in 1552 and 1558, although he believed 
them to be insurance documents, see Grendi, ‘Genova alla metà del Cinquecento’, 136. 
201 “[…] dividi debeat secundum aes et libram inter navigium, naula, merces et omnes alia res 
existentes in dicto navigio tempore iactus […]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, 
vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 155. 
202 “[…] compraehensis pecuniis, auro, argento, iocalibus, servis maribus et foeminus, quis et 
aliis animalibus existentibus in navigio de transitu”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, 
vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 155. These same goods, according to the 
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could not be thrown overboard, even though they could obviously suffer 
damage in the event of a storm or any other situation.203 There are, however, a 
few rare examples that contradict this rule, such as the jettison of a horse made 
by the ship Sant’Antonio Buonaventura during a storm in the Ligurian Sea in 
1601.204 
Although the Statutes did not specify it, the calculation of the value of the 
goods and their freights appears to follow the custom of the Consolat de Mar.205 
Each merchandise, both saved and thrown, was valued for the contribution 
based on the moment in which the jettison took place. If it took place in the first 
half of the voyage, the price was assessed according to the port of departure; if 
it took place in the second half, the price was assessed according to the port of 
destination, and the expressions “here at sea” or “here on land” were usually 
used to indicate this distinction.206 In case of doubt, as reported by both Targa 
and Casaregi, the value of the asset was calculated in the port of departure, it 
was added to by its value in the port of arrival, and the resulting average was 
the final sum to be considered.207 No mention of this procedure, however, was 
ever found in the sources. Freights, on the other hand, only contributed if the 
damage occurred in the second half of the trip, as only in this case were they 
considered “earned”.208 This principle was also depicted within individual cases: 
 
We do not place in the present risk the freights of the aforementioned goods, 
because the accident [...] is occurred in the port of loading, and so they are not 
earned for not having made not only half of the journey, but [...] any part of it.209 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
legislations of other ports, such as Venice or Leghorn, were otherwise excluded from the 
repartition procedure. 
203 Targa, Ponderationi, 324. This prohibition goes back to the Digest, see Constable, ‘The 
problem of jettison’, 211. 
204 The horse was listed both as a contributing item and as jettisoned good, its value in both 
cases being 97.11 Genoese lire. See ASG, NG 637, 30/08/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk 
db with the id 50473. 
205 Also in the Genoese documentation, damage to goods loaded above deck is excluded from 
repartition. From some statements, it seems that the shipmasters tried to get repartitions on 
these goods anyway, see ASG, NG 2085, 19/10/1641, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with 
the id 50341. 
206 Casaregi, Il Consolato del Mare, 88-89. In case of incidents in different parts of the route it 
could also happen to find the same goods valued in different ways, as in the case of the sugar 
cargo in ASG, NG 637, 16/12/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50500. 
207 Targa, Ponderationi, 323, Casaregi, Discursos, I, 164. 
208 According to Targa, on the other hand, freights are registered into the calculation only at their 
net value, as per Consolat chap. 96. See Targa, Ponderationi, 326. 
209 “Non ponendosi nel presente risico li noli delle soprascritte merci, perché il sinistro […] è 
seguito nel caricatore, e così non per anche guadagnati per non aver fatto, non solo la metà del 
viaggio, ma […] parte alcuna del medesimo”. ASG, CdM, Esibite in avaria 377, 20/08/1705. 
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However, the application of this principle seems to vary over time: in certain 
years, freights contributed to all GA calculations, regardless of where the 
accident took place, while in other years, they followed these customary rules, 
and there was usually an expression similar to the abovementioned 
quotation.210 
According to the Statuti Civili, the vessel contributed for the entirety of its 
value.211 This element favoured the merchants and their insurers against the 
shipowners: a high value of the vessel would have increased the “passive 
mass”, i.e. all those assets that survived the fortouitous event, reducing the 
relative individual rate to be paid by the cargo.212 According to Targa, however, 
the value of a vessel consisted of both its hull and its equipment: the latter 
accounted for approximately half of total value. For example, Average 
calculations drawn up between 1639 and 1641 report both values confirming 
this theory.213 Each calculation reports the value of the body of the vessel and a 
list of the value of all its equipment (sails, ropes, etc.). The equipment almost 
exactly matches the value of the vessel itself. Targa explains that although the 
Statutes did not explicitly mention the Consolat de Mar, they did refer to it where 
they wrote “vessel” and not “vessel and accessories”, which would have 
indicated the total value. Targa considered this reasoning essential to avoid a 
procedural difference that could hinder international trade: “it is not possible, in 
one part of the world, to operate in one way with regard to maritime commerce 
and in another in a different way, because of the common interest that so many 
different people may have in the same fact”.214 Calculations redacted at least 
                                                          
210 Routes could vary significantly. See, for example, the voyage of the shipmaster Simone 
Sverze. He set sail from Amsterdam to Genoa. However, probably because of bad weather, he 
took the Northern route passing through the strait between Scotland and Ireland. See ASG, NG 
630, 17/02/1592. 
211 “[…] dividi debeat secundum aes et libram inter navigium, naula, merces et omnes alia res 
existentes in dicto navigio tempore iactus […]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, 
vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 155. 
212 Furthermore, in the cases of Average calculations presumably drawn up for the sole purpose 
of insurance on the body of the vessel, it would not have made sense to report only half of its 
value, as the insurance was calculated as a percentage of the total value. See for example, the 
value of the orca named San Giovanni Battista, mastered by Antonio Maria Germano of Sestri 
Ponente, in 1601, ASG, NG 636, 04/04/1601. Recorded in AveTransRisk db with the id 50275. 
213 ASG, NG 2084, 1639-1640, NG 2085, 1641. 
214 “Non potendosi, in una parte del mondo, circa la contrattatione maritima operare in un modo 
e in altra in diverso, per l’interesse comune che tanta gente diversa puonno haver in un istesso 
fatto”. Targa, Ponderationi, 323-324. Legal doctrine regulates the diversity factor introduced by 
the Statuti Civili by placing it in a Mediterranean, if not European, context, see V. Piergiovanni, 
‘Il valore del documento alle origini della scienza del diritto commerciale: Sigismondo Scaccia 
giudice a Genova nel XVII secolo’, in Ianuensis non nascitur, sed fit. Studi in onore di Dino 
Puncuh, Genoa, 2019, 1061-1068. In Venice, for example, local statutes and, only later, 
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until the 1640s, however, did not explicitly report both the value of the vessel 
and of its equipment in every calculation; they considered them both for the 
repartition of the damages. This clearly contradicts Targa’s interpretation.215 
According to his opinion, moreover, the vessel contributed two-thirds of its value 
in the event of an “irregular jettison”, that is, when due to the need to act 
promptly and the necessary procedural formalities had been neglected. Based 
on the documentation examined thus far, however, I have not found any 
indication of an “irregular jettison”.216 Perhaps this was purely a theoretical 
distinction.217 The sources do not allow for clarity in this area. However, it is 
reasonable to speculate that Targa's theory is applicable only to the ship 
damages drawn up in the second half of the seventeenth century, which were 
the years in which he worked as a causidico in Average trials at the 
Conservatori del Mare.218 Targa was not a legal historian. He conceived his 
treatise to be a practical guide for merchants and shipowners. Seeing that the 
Statuti Civili explained a criterion that contradicted the daily practice of the 
courts of his time, he gave a plausible explanation without further research. This 
explanation, however, was taken up by later jurists and historians, leading to a 
‘flattening’ of the development of a legislation that at least in Genoa was not as 
linear as had been imagined.219 Average rules in the Statuti Civili are evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                          
international conventions were given preeminence in the procedure to be followed during 
maritime trials. See Fusaro, ‘Migrating seamen’, 69. The need for the parties to agree on shared 
procedures and contractual forms is also the reason for the existence of the contemporary York-
Antwerp Rules, see J. Kruit, General average, legal basis and applicable law: the overrated 
significance of the York-Antwerp Rules, Zurphen, 2017, 32-35. 
215 See, as an example, ASG, NG 2084, 20/03/1640. 
216 Targa, Ponderationi, 325. 
217 Targa also referred to other theoretical elements, such as the subdivision of Averages into 
the following categories: Avaria Ordinaria, i.e. for customary and foreseeable payments; Avaria 
Straordinaria, similar to shipwreck and due to accidents for which “human providence could not 
repair”; Avaria Mista, when there was an unforeseeable accident from which one could save 
oneself with a voluntary expenditure; Avaria Straordinaria-Volontaria, when two or more 
shipmasters met in a port of loading and agreed to share the cargo, freight and related maritime 
risks. Half the profit went to the shipmasters and his officers, half “to the people for their good 
service”; Avaria Indiana or Portoghese, which was added to the surplus on the freight to make a 
voluntary gift to the officers and the crew; Avaria Inglese or Olandese, which consisted of a gift 
of one Spanish real to the shipmaster for each lot of high-value goods; Avaria Grossa, when a 
vessel stayed in port voluntarily to avoid privateers or pirates. The expenses were distributed 
over the freight, the cargo and the vessel. See Targa, Ponderationi, 252. No trace of all these 
categories has been found in the documentation. Also Venetian laws, for example, 
contemplated such variants (except for the Avaria Inglese or Olandese), although they do not 
appear in the actual documentation. 
218 According to Targa, the main difference between a causidico and a lawyer lay in the fact that 
the causidico was interested and participated in the court case, while the lawyer was only 
interested in the final judgement. See Targa, Ponderationi, 418-419. 
219 Even Felloni did not notice this important procedural difference for calculations made 
between 1590s and the 1640s. 
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of how each country could rule independently even on a topic well known 
across Europe, such as GA. Calculations drawn up at the end of the 
seventeenth century, on the other hand, show the value of the vessel as a 
contributing element, specifying that it was half of the total value.220 Following 
the shifting of the procedure from the calcolatori’s to the Conservatori del 
Mare’s jurisdiction, a convergence probably occurred. 
The Statuti Civili also described the conditions needed to continue the 
journey following the jettison. Loading a new cargo or modifying the route would 
have resulted in the request for new documents, casting doubt on the legality of 
those documents and on the legitimacy of the GA act. This meant that the 
shipmaster was forbidden to load goods other than the provisions necessary for 
the journey, passenger baggage or merci sottili, that is, goods with a high unit 
value, which for the most part were excluded from jettison.221 The shipmaster 
had to unload the remaining cargo on board only at ports agreed upon and had 
to present the relevant bills of lading. For this reason, many bills of lading are 
included in Average documentation in Genoa. The unloading of the cargo had 
to take place during the day, and the shipmaster had to request a certificate 
from local customs officers; otherwise, the shipmaster would have had to pay 
the damages deriving from the jettison. Average calculations in Genoa often 
mention a payment due to the assistant and one to the sindaco of the 
calcolatori, who were responsible for assisting the unloading of goods.222 
If at the behest of the owning merchant or due to other exceptional 
conditions, part of the cargo had been unloaded in any other port than the one 
envisaged, the so-called “consuls of the jettison”, in addition to the local 
Genoese consul or another magistrate, had to witness the unloading 
                                                          
220 See for example the explanation of this criterion in ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 03/03/1699, 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50590: “E prima si pone in risico detta tartana stata 
tutta dal Francesco Maria Burna sudetto perito eletto, estimata in pezzi sei cento cinquanta reali 
da otto, e così per metà pezzi trecento venticinque simili”. 
221 “[…] victualia pro usu et necessitate navigii, merce subtiles et capsias passageriorum […]”, in 
BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo 
tenenda, 155. The merci sottili, in the mercantile practice of the time, consisted of finished 
products, usually woollen cloths and linens, see A. Fiorentino, Il commercio delle pelli lavorate 
nel Basso Medioevo. Risultati dall’Archivio Datini di Prato, Florence, 2015, 38. 
222 The ‘assistant’ was also called “giovane dei calcolatori”, “assistente dei calcolatori”. Only 
sometimes was the name of the official given. From 1639 to 1641, for example, we know that 
Giacomo Varese was in charge of assisting the unloading of goods on behalf of the calcolatori. 




operations.223 At the time of this unexpected unloading, the shipmaster had to 
demand the contribution from the owner of the unloaded goods. The 
contribution rate was calculated based on the economic interests involved and 
according to the per soldo et per lira formula.224 Since the calculation had not 
been done previously, however, the shipmaster could only make an estimate of 
the contribution rate: if, after the calculation, the rate turned out to be greater 
than what he had already collected, the difference would have had to be paid by 
the shipmaster himself.225 This rule was obviously a further incentive to make 
the calculation as soon as possible to avoid inaccuracies and quarrels with 
merchants.226 Only if the jettison had occurred in the loading port, it was 
possible to load on board again as many goods as those previously 
jettisoned.227 If the shipmaster had taken on a new load elsewhere, and another 
jettison had then occurred, the latter's damage would have been exclusively 
borne by the shipmaster.228 In this case, the shipowners would have had to pay 
one-third of the freight charges on the new cargo to the insurers of the 
jettisoned goods and two-thirds to the Conservatori del Mare.229 
In the first port reached after the jettison, with the help of the purser and the 
consuls of the jettison, the shipmaster had to declare the accident and all the 
lost or damaged goods. The report — in the sources called indifferently 
consolato, testimoniale, or manifesto — had to be followed by the officers’, 
merchants’ or any passengers’ testimonies, which were a necessary 
prerequisite to free the shipmaster from liability for all damages.230 The incipit of 
                                                          
223 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo 
tenenda, 157. 
224 This expression also appears in the statutes of Pera and Gazaria, and in the editio princeps 
of the Consolat: “per sou et per liura et per besant”, where the latter term refers to the currency 
of Byzantium. See Corrieri, Il Consolato del Mare, 298. 
225 “[…] contributionem iuxta calculum fiendum cum damnis et interesse”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, 
Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 156. 
226 The inaccuracies seem to have been very rare. Although we do not know exactly where 
appeals were filed with the Rota Civile, if any, we do have some rare examples of appeals in the 
examined files. See for example the request for amendment in the shipmaster’s report wanted 
by the merchant Francesco Spinola in 1640 for a miscalculated consignment of wheat. See 
ASG, NG 2084, 16/06/1640, recorded in the AveTranskRisk db with the id 50272. 
227 This was the case, for example, with the galeone named San Giorgio, mastered by Delfino 
Vassallo in 1601. An accident in the port of Girgenti forced it to leave the port and to lose part of 
its cargo. Later, however, the galeone returned to port and loaded new cargo, see ASG, NG 
637, 05/01/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50417. 
228 “[…] patronus […] teneatur ad satisfaciendum omne damnum in casu novi iactus […]”, BUG, 
ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 155. 
229 For the links between these two institutions in Genoa see the essay by Iodice, Piccinno, 
‘Shifting and sharing risk’. 
230 BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo 
tenenda, 156-157. According to Targa, the three terms responded to a precise logic, not always 
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the reports followed a common pattern: first, the date was recorded, and then, 
the office of the authority in which the declaration was made; finally, the 
elements aimed at identifying the shipmaster and the vessel were recorded. 
Although the statutes did not require it, documents drawn up in Genoa in the 
first years following the promulgation of the new rules also frequently indicated 
the tonnage of the vessel.231 The shipmaster usually arrived with the oldest 
members of the crew, the most important crew officers in navigation, or those 
best able to understand the followed route and to confirm the alleged 
‘inevitability’ of the Average act, namely, the pilot or the boatswain.232 
Testimonies are usually attached to the reports. 
The report often served other purposes as well. For example, it could be 
used to meet the requirements of the formulas consolato di sigurtà,233 which 
refers to the need of the shipmaster to obtain an official document to request 
reimbursement of damages to the insurers, also referred to as consolato o 
germinamento.234 The latter refers to the sharing of all damages between the 
vessel and goods by agreement between the shipmaster and the merchants. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
followed in the documents examined: the manifesto referred to the shipmaster who ‘manifested’ 
his accident; the consolato to the fact that the document was drawn up in front of a Genoese 
consul; finally, the testimoniale referred to the presence of at least three supporting testimonies. 
See Targa, Ponderationi, 309. It is also possible to find other formulas such as attestato 
pubblico, present in ASG, CdM, Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero 285, 26/09/1698, recorded 
in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50411. The Genoese economist and senator Girolamo 
Boccardo, in his nineteenth-century dictionary of economics and commerce, provided a broad 
interpretation of the term, which perhaps better suited the complexity of the Genoese case. 
According to him, the word Consolato referred generically to the shipmaster’s report, an act 
containing the judicial deposition of maritime events, in particular the accident, suffered by the 
vessel. See G. Boccardo, Dizionario universale di economia politica e di commercio, I, Milan, 
1875, 559. On Boccardo see G. Pavanelli, ‘L'attività scientifica e le vicende politico-professionali 
di Gerolamo Boccardo’, in M.M. Augello, G. Pavanelli eds., Tra economia, politica e impegno 
civile, Genoa, 2005, 20-71. 
231 Following the change in the taxation system in 1638, discussed above, this indication seems 
to disappear almost completely from the shipmaster’s reports. Not being a detail specifically 
required by the legislation, shipmasters probably preferred to keep silent about an element that 
could lead to higher taxation. See L. Piccinno, ‘The economic structure of maritime trade calling 
at the port of Genoa through the analysis of general average data (Sixteenth-Seventeenth 
Centuries)’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno, Sharing risk, forthcoming. 
232 It could happen that, following the accident or for any other reason, the shipmaster was 
unable to file a report and to ask for the calculation to be drawn up. In these cases, the 
shipmaster could delegate this task to one of his officers. This was the case of the shipmaster 
Antonio de Andrea of Frontignano, in 1600. Honorato Cavo, his boatswain, requested the 
calculation. See ASG, NG 636, 26/02/1600, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50182. 
233 ASG, NG 637, 05/01/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50422. 
234 ASG, CdM, Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero 285, 17/11/1698, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db with the id 50407. 
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This agreement could be taken on before the voyage as well as at the time of 
facing an impending danger, as stated in the Consolat de Mar.235 
Either the consul of the Genoese nation or the local magistrate approved the 
report and delivered an authentic and sealed copy of it to the shipmaster for the 
continuation of the voyage to the port of destination. Here, the calculation 
procedure would start. In the rare cases where there was no public authority 
present at the place where the accident was reported, the shipmaster could 
walk to another larger settlement, or could be given a sworn statement by a 
notary or a local officer before continuing the journey.236 
Once in Genoa, the vessel that had suffered an Average event had the right 
of way to unload its cargo.237 Perhaps this was meant to prevent any damaged 
goods from suffering even more damage while waiting. For example, a load of 
wet wheat had to be unloaded immediately, put in the air and ‘paddled’ to 
remove moisture.238 The offloading precedence also helped to prevent the 
parties involved from making private and (potentially fraudulent) agreements, 
thus avoiding pleas to the institutions in charge. Furthermore, this could have 
been a way to favour the rapid circulation of information on the presence of 
pirates or temporarily dangerous routes, as well as making sure that different 
testimonies relating to the same event would strengthen and confirm one 
                                                          
235 Although not a GA procedure, the affinity was evident. On the relationship between 
germinamento and jettison see Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’; D’Ovidio, ‘La contribuzione alle 
avarie comuni’, 110-111. 
236 The vessel Maria Buonaventura, mastered by the patrone Marco de Thomatis, is a clear 
example. Following a storm near Ansedonia, the vessel took refuge in Porto Ercole where the 
patrone asked for a consolato, but no notary was present. He therefore decided to set sail again 
by having a certificate issued by the local harbour master. This certificate was called consolato 
e fede, see ASG, NG 636, 08/04/1600, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50233. 
Another example is the behaviour of the patrone Joseph Rigliomaiore. He arrived in Portofino in 
1640 but was told that it would take some time to get a notary from Santa Margherita Ligure. He 
therefore walked to Genoa and filed his report in front of the Abbondanza magistrates. See 
ASG, NG 2084, 19/03/1640, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50326. 
237 The Conservatori del Mare, perhaps also for this reason and in order to avoid delays, could 
accept the shipmaster’s reports even on traditional holidays. It is also significant that sometimes 
the reports drawn up in Genoa were drawn up “in domus mei”, in the residence of the notary 
himself. See, for example, the report drawn up in the home of the notary of the calcolatori Gio. 
Benedetto Gritta in Piazza delle Erbe, ASG, NG 2084, 17/06/1640, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db with the id 50375. Notaries in Genoa could draw up documents in their own 
homes or in one of the involved parties’ home or in some conventional public space such as 
squares or markets, see Epstein, ‘Business cycles’, 238-260. 
238 For example, see the cargo of wheat transported from Campomarino to Genoa on the vessel 
of the Flemish shipmaster Martino Boccehlins in 1640. Once landed, the rotten wheat was sold 
for a very low price, while the recovered wheat was paleggiato, i.e. shaken and turned to 
ventilate it, 8 times and sold at 5% of its value. See ASG, NG 2084, 05/10/1640, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk database with the id 50403. 
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another.239 The shipmaster and his purser had to go either to the port 
magistrate responsible for unloading the vessel or to an ordinary judge and 
state the month, day, and time of the jettison, along with a list of damages. If the 
officers or the sailors broke these rules in any way, for example, by unloading 
their belongings or other goods sooner than permitted, they would lose their 
jobs and their possessions on board.240 The goods unloaded illegally in Genoa 
were seizable by the Padri del Comune or by the Conservatori del Mare.241 If 
there was an accuser reporting the fraud, the latter was rewarded with a third of 
the involved assets and the promise of anonymity. 
The Chapter on jettison ended with a significant clarification: the regulations 
were addressed to all patroni and shipmasters but also to any other legal figure 
managing the vessel.242 
What emerges from this legislation is the attempt to delimit as much as 
possible the operational margins left to the shipmasters. If, on the one hand, in 
the event of irregularities, shipmasters were personally responsible for any 
damage with their personal belongings; on the other hand, they still had great 
decision-making power. The voluntary act of jettison presupposed a choice and 
a resolution that morally qualified that action. Because of this, the shipmaster 
stated how the damage had occurred “after due consultation with his people” or 
with other expressions aimed at stressing the collegiality of the decision.243 
However, a ‘choice’ was and still is an inner act that at most can be deduced by 
way of circumstantial evidence, therefore leaving the shipmaster as the only 
                                                          
239 See a few significant examples: the vessels Salamandra, Tobia il Giovane and Ettore 
Troiano sailed from Sciacca to Genoa with a cargo of grain in 1639. All three encountered the 
same storm near Sardinia which caused damage to ships and cargoes. The fact that the 
testimoniali were written two days apart reinforced each other’s credibility, see ASG, NG 2084, 
22/01/1639, 24/01/1639, 24/01/1639, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50186, id 
50187, id 50188. In the event of a pirate attack, moreover, it was useful to know as soon as 
possible the sea area in which the pirates had been sighted. For example, the patrone 
Cristophorus Raynerius, whose galeone was plundered by pirates, reported a testimoniale 
privato in which he identified the assailant as Henrico Puppel from London on board of the 
English vessel Le Charlé. The patrone drew up a list of looted goods which, if recovered, would 
rightfully belong to the owner, the merchant Pompeo Vassallo of Genoa, see ASG, NG 637, 
08/05/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as id 50458. 
240 “[…] amitta exonerata et privati remaneant officiis”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum 
civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 157. 
241 “Si bona fuerint reperta exonerata contra formam praesentis statuti sint effecta patrum 
communis et conservatorum maris civitatuis Genuae […]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum 
civilium, vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 157. 
242 “[…] prefectus, magister seu praepositus navigii”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, 
vol. IV, chap. XVI, De iactu, et forma in eo tenenda, 157. 




depositary of the truth.244 In a period in which merchants rarely travelled with 
their goods, the shipmaster was almost the exclusive arbiter and ‘narrator’ of 
any event that took place during navigation.245 In this regard, the opinion of 
Targa on the presumed voluntariness of jettison, which he defined as a wilful 
act “violated” by danger, is significant: “the cause from which it [the jettison] 
originates is not free, but violent, and so it is a will violated by the accident of 
danger”.246 
The complexity of these rules, although aimed at avoiding fraud and 
irregularities, made it difficult to effectively enforce their content.247 Targa 
himself confirmed this impression. He believed that those cases in which all the 
rules and complex theoretical indications provided by the Statutes were 
complied with were probably linked to the shipmasters' decision making or to 
other subjects involved in concealing much larger irregularities: 
 
[…] when a great danger arises, little is remembered of the juridical actions; 
and in sixty years in which I have seen a great number of maritime practices I 
do not remember having seen more than four in five consolati, made for a 
jettison, legally noted in the prearranged form; and in every one of these 
there was some criticism for having seemed too premeditated.248 
 
                                                          
244 On this see Addobbati, ‘Principle and rules’, and par. 5.4, 5.5. 
245 Even in this cases, although rare, there is no lack of requests for amendments to the 
shipmaster’s reports. For example, the ship Santa Maria Bonaventura, mastered by the patrone 
Battista Insula quondam Bernardi, sailed into a storm in front of Portovenere and the Insula 
ordered a jettison. An unspecified number of baggages were thrown overboard, whose cargo 
was unknown. On arrival in port, the merchant owners asked and obtained an amendment to 
have the contents of their baggages recorded, see ASG, NG 2084, 05/05/1640, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db with the id 50376. 
246 “La causa da cui ha origine non è libera, ma violenta, e così è una volontà violentata 
dall’accidente del pericolo”. Targa, Ponderationi, 249. 
247 However, the Genoese rules became internationally known and were also reported by jurists 
such as Sigismondo Scaccia: “Avaria secundum statuta Genua, et apud mercatores quid 
significet”, chap. 2 gloss. 5 n. 57-58-60, in S. Scaccia, Tractatus de Commerciis et Cambio, 
Rome, 1620, 340-341. 
248 “[…] sopraggiungendo un grande pericolo, poco vengono a memoria li atti giuridici, et io in 
anni sessanta di pratiche maritime che n’havrò veduto gran quantità non mi ricordo haver 
veduto Consolati á pena quattro in cinque fatti per gettito notato giuridicamente alla forma 
prenarrata, et in ogn’un di questi vi è stato da criticare per esser parsi troppo premeditate”. 
Targa, Ponderationi, 253. The work was published in 1692, but Targa’s name was among the 
causidici present when the calculations were drawn up as early as 1640, see ASG, NG 2084, 
21/05/1640. The same opinion can be found in Baldasseroni, Trattato delle assicurazioni, 
IV, 60. Even in the nineteenth century, Gerolamo Boccardo used almost the same expression to 
refer to the legislation on jettison of his time, a sign of the difficulty of ruling in this area and of 
the continuity of certain problems of the GA institution that are affect it today, see Boccardo, 
Dizionario, I, 221. 
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To date, the adjustment to an ever-changing reality is still a necessary 
prerogative of maritime law. Although rich in provisions and indications, formal 
rules will never be capable of contemplating every variable of a sea voyage. 
 
3.5 The Calcolatori and the Standardization of Average Procedure 
 
The estimates and calculations of the damages are still to date a reason for 
frequent disputes, in which the parties rely on external ‘experts’, trusting them in 
their competence and impartiality. From the end of the sixteenth century, 
through the legitimation of a new professional magistracy, Genovese 
rulemakers made a significant effort at an institutional level to limit arbitrariness. 
The establishment of the calcolatori represented an important innovation in the 
management of Average practices. According to the current extant research, 
such magistracy seems to have been a Genoese peculiarity. 
Book I of the new Statuti Civili sanctioned the creation of the Ufficio dei 
calcolatori, exclusively intended to deal with Average (GA and PA).249 Before 
the Statuti Civili of 1589, the Rota Civile chose the judges and the calcolatori of 
each Average case in the presence of all interested parties. This process 
followed common practice, and those legal treatises which mentioned the Lex 
Rhodia de jactu.250 The calcolatori were transitory figures, appointed on the spot 
as experts ad id specialiter deputata per habentem ad id autoritate.251 The faith 
in their role was based on custom. Between the involved parties, there was a 
type of fiduciary relationship that clearly distinguished the mutualistic nature of 
Average practice as external to the market logic. The calcolatori magistracy was 
composed of three calcolatori who remained in office for 18 months, signed all 
the calculations, and had their own specialized notary/chancellor with a 
renewable five-year mandate.252 As previously mentioned, they also had a 
traglietta, an assistant whose position probably corresponded to that of the 
                                                          
249 See BUG, 716.C.V.15, Magistrati antichi e moderni, Consegli, Presidenze dal principio della 
repubblica, manuscript of the eighteenth century, 12r. 
250 See, for example, the lawsuit by Niccolò Spinola against Vincenzo Giustiniani, transferee of 
a jettisoned cargo previously belonging to Cristoforo Giustiniani. Niccolò Spinola, probably a 
merchant involved in the sea venture, demanded that Vincenzo, the new owner of the cargo, 
pay his share of the GA contribution. See De Mercatura, 254 (decisio CXLI). 
251 See De Mercatura, 254 (decisio CXLI). 
252 The mandate was renewable, but with a 3-year break between one term and the next. There 
could be exceptions, including the extension of Gio Benedetto Gritta’s mandate for two 
consecutive five-year terms, see ASG, Bibl. Rari 8, Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae 
Reipublicae Ianuensis, I, chap. XI, ‘De calculatoribus, et eorum officio’, 1688, 29. 
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giovane dei calcolatori mentioned in the sources, and a sindaco who was in 
charge of attending disembarkations.253 Therefore, the calcolatori were no 
longer experts appointed on the spot, and thus theoretically susceptible to 
creating conflicts between the parties, but were individuals formally selected by 
the Senato.254 The parties, however, could ask the Conservatori del Mare to 
appoint ‘private’ calcolatori. For example, in a 1667 case involving the merchant 
Antonio Grimaldi and the patrone Benedetto de Moro, this type of appointment 
occurred with the election of external calcolatori.255 This practice, however, 
does not appear in the Statutes and was probably linked only to exceptional 
situations. In a few cases, experts appointed by the parties could support the 
ordinary calcolatori. For example, in 1640 Francesco Spinola, Nicolao Scaglie 
and Ambrogio Digherio agreed with numerous other English and Genoese 
merchants for the appointment of Carolus Vulstatuis, Michael Belhomus and 
Hieronimus Pallavicinus as calcolatori. Michele Bonomo and Geronimo 
Pallavicino were two calcolatori whose names were present in almost all the 
calculations of those years. The appointment of a third one, probably Dutch, 
perhaps responded to a need for protection - maybe also for a translator - 
expressed by the Northern merchants involved. The notary of the Conservatori 
del Mare, Filippo Camere, approved their calculation.256 
The Statutes also specified the remuneration due to this new office. The 
calcolatori’s salary varied between a minimum of ten and a maximum of one 
hundred and fifty lire per calculation, probably depending on its complexity.257 
                                                          
253 These roles do not appear in the statutes, but are recorded in the documentation examined. 
See, for example, the calculation in ASG, NG 2084, 12/08/1640, recorded in the AveTransRisk 
db with the id 50382. 
254 As an example, see the appointing of the calcolatore Joannes Baptista Zerbinus in 1594, 
ASG, NG 631, Atti dei calcolatori, 11/07/1594. See the document transcribed in Appendix IV. 
Such specialisation can be observed as well in the notarial folders of Orazio Fazio, Gio Agostino 
Gritta and Gio Benedetto Gritta, significantly marked on the back as ‘Atti dei Calcolatori’, see 
ASG, NG 629-637, 1643-1646, 2083-2088. For example, for 1640 the three calcolatori Carlo 
Ottaggio, Michele Bonomo and Geronimo Pallavicino always appear, see ASG, NG 2084, 1640. 
255 However, if this agreement had not been reached quickly, the judges of the Rota Civile 
reassigned the case to the calcolatori ‘ordinary’. More precisely, the foreign judges of the Rota 
Civile entrusted the practice to the Senato of the Republic, which transferred it under the 
jurisdiction of the calcolatori. The example, reported in Appendix V, took place by private notary 
in the house of Antonio Grimaldi himself and in the presence of witnesses, see ASG, NA 8478, 
UGG 10, 11/05/1667. See also See BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. I, chap. XI, De 
calculatoribus, et eorum officio, 20. 
256 ASG, NG 2084, 16/04/1640. 
257 If there was unforeseen income, it was due to the Padri del Comune for the manteinance of 
the port: “[…] et alia dimidia solvatur conservatoribus maris eroganda in usus dicti offici et pro 
eo, quod dictis usibus supererit, dando patribus communis in impensas portus et moduli 
erogando”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. I, chap. XI, De calculatoribus, et 
eorum officio, 19-20. 
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For example, the payment for a ‘standard’ calculation in the period between 
1590 and 1641 was 10 lire for the calcolatori and 1.13.04 lire for their notary.258 
The Conservatori del Mare seized half of the fee, as specified in the 
calculations: 
 
[…] 5 lire half of 10 lire in which the said calculation has been taxed for the 
magnificent magistrate of the Conservatori del Mare [...]. The half of which, due to 
the said magnificent magistrate, has been paid credit by means of 5 lire.259 
 
The sindaco of the calcolatori received 30 denari a day for supervising the 
unloading of vessels and the storage of the cargo.260 The payment of the 
traglietta was usually 2 lire in total, to which a variable amount could be 
added.261 
The Statutes did not just entrust to the calcolatori the drafting of the 
calculation. The calcolatori listened to parties (shipmaster, merchants, and any 
insurers) and their witnesses and then proceeded to validate or nullify the report 
presented.262 At this stage, the parties could propose any claim regarding the 
report.263 
Following the report approval, the calcolatori could order the unloading of the 
goods and impose the presence of guardians on the ship to prevent any 
                                                          
258 The sum of 11.13.04 lire was very frequent in the Average administrative costs reported in 
the calculations drawn up in these years. In case of complicated cases, however, the costs 
could rise to an exceptional calculation where the parties paid 175 lire for the salary of notary 
and calcolatori, see ASG, NG 636, 27/01/1600, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 
50164. 
259 “[…] lire 5 metà de lire 10 in quali è stato tassato il detto calcolo per il magnifico magistrato 
de signori Conservatori del Mare […]. La metà de quali spettante al detto magnifico 
magistrato è stata pagata in lo credito per mezzo che sono lire 5”. ASG, NG 2084, 04/05/1640, 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50376. 
260 This criterion is explicitly illustrated in ASG, NG 2084, 30/01/1640, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db with the id 50584: “[…] che ha assistito al sbarco di detti grani per riponerli in 
magazeno, per farsi paleggiare, e farli consignare dopo la vendita che si sono consumati giorni 
ventotto a denari 30 il giorno”. 
261 In the period 1639-1641 the payment of a fee for the notary of calcolatori is also frequent, 
see for example the fee of 20 lire paid in ASG, NG 2084, 12/08/1640, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as id 50382. 
262 “Quotiescumque patronus, magister seu prefectus navigii, aut alius ad quem de iure spectet, 
petierit fieri calculum de iacut seu avaria […] Magistratus calculatorum intelligat partes, 
examinari faciat testes […]”, in BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum civilium, vol. I, chap. XI, De 
calculatoribus, et eorum officio, 19. 
263 One example is the case of the patrone Antonino Risso from Messina. He filed a report 
promising to comply with the Genoese Average laws in order to discharge any liability for 
damage to the cargo of grain he had brought to Genoa. The grain had not only become wet but 
also deteriorated. Following the calculation of GA, a supplementary consolato was drawn up 
and two calculations were produced for two PAs, see ASG, NG 636, 01/03/1600, recorded in 
the AveTransRisk db with the id 50215. 
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fraud.264 Furthermore, the shipmaster had to swear that he had not unloaded 
anything in violation of the statutory rules and to be ready otherwise to pay a 
fine of twelve scudi. The calcolatori collected one-third of the fine, and the Padri 
del Comune collected the remaining two-thirds.265 A guilty shipmaster was fined 
one hundred scudi or the value of the Average itself. If an accuser had revealed 
the fraud, he would receive the third part of the fine as a reward. 
Each calculation began with a brief summary of the report, including the 
information on the case and the events leading up to the GA. The calculation 
listed the values of the contributing elements, that is: vessel, freights, and 
cargo.266 The contributing assets referred to the situation prior to the jettison. All 
these elements were called risico (risk) in the document. The calcolatori also 
indicated the quantity, quality, and value of each loaded batch of cargo, often 
expressed in the units of measurement and in the currency of the place of 
loading, along with the relative equivalent values in Genoese measures. In 
addition, they often recorded the names of the seller and buyer merchants and 
those of any other intermediaries. If the goods were packed, they relied on the 
bill of lading without opening the crates.267 
After the risk section, the calculation of the damage admitted during the 
partition followed, with a list developed of the value of the deteriorated and/or 
lost assets and of the administrative and unforeseen expenses incurred up to 
that moment.268 The contribution rate, which had to be borne by the individual 
merchants and by the shipowners or by their insurers, was formulated through 
the division of the total damages by the total risk. These calculations were quite 
complex at times, as reported by the notary in the notes attached to the 
                                                          
264 Documents often mention the presence of a “young man of the calcolatori” who attended the 
disembarkation of the ships and handed over a note listing the disembarked cargo, see ASG, 
NG 2084, 1640. 
265 Forcheri, Doge, governatori, procuratori, 90. 
266 Often, when referring to the ship's equipment, the quality of the lost objects was also 
specified. This was expressed in carats for keels, sails and anchors. For other parts such as a 
mast or a schifo, adjectives such as ‘new’, for example, were used to obtain the highest 
valuation. This system could lead to fraud. Evidence of this can be found in the lawsuits brought 
by insurers against shipmasters accused of making upward valuations of the ship’s equipment 
in order to amortise the costs of renewal and maintenance by taking advantage of the GA event, 
see Casaregi, Discursos, I, 58. 
267 ASG, NG 2084, n. 143, 27/04/1640. 
268 The value of GA damages was generally low. For the period 1598-1600, for example, the 
average damage was 1,109 Genoese lire. It constituted only 4% of the average value of the 
contributing elements, see my elaboration based on the dataset of the AveTransRisk database, 
http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/avetransrisk, accessed on 29/06/2021. This was the 
subject of a paper presented at the EBHA international conference held in Ancona on 9 
September 2018, The firm and the sea: chains, flows and connections. 
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procedure.269 The calculation was the most important and detailed document of 
the entire process, and was an essential knowledge source because of the 
wealth of information it provided on the loading of vessels arriving in the port of 
Genoa, the routes they followed and the dangers they faced. After this process, 
the calcolatori read the calculation in the presence of all the involved parties. 
The calculation was then passed to the Rota Civile of Genoa, which sanctioned 
its validity with a judgement.270 
The approval of the Rota Civile appeared to be a mere bureaucratic formality, 
and required a variable period of time linked to the presence of disagreements. 
The approval usually took place on the same day or in the days immediately 
ensuing. This magistracy had full jurisdiction on any potential appeal against the 
calculation. According to what has emerged from the practices examined, these 
instances seem rather rare. The priority of the procedure was rapidity, and the 
few appeals in the sources are mainly concerned with an erroneous estimate of 
the cargo value, rather than with a refusal to pay for a share in a GA 
repartition.271 A motto of the time, shared in European trading circles, 
recommended the merchant to “never go to justice” to avoid further raising his 
expenses.272 The resolution of the case, from the presentation of the scriptura to 
the approval of the Rota, could end in a few days as well as in many months, 
and, in rare cases, after several years. The shipmasters presented their 
declarations asking for a generic damage repartition and a discharge from any 
responsibility, but it was up to the competent judiciary to assess whether the 
                                                          
269 ASG, NG 2084, n. 143, 27/04/1640. 
270 This last operation is not specified in the Statuti Civili, but emerges with regularity in daily 
practice. The calculations regularly concluded with formulas such as “Diciamo doversi accettare, 
ragionare, e calcolare tra il mercanzie, o sia mercanti, e suoi assicuratori et altri che nel 
presente calcolo abbino o possano avere interesse, liberano come liberiamo il patrone […] dal 
detto gettito seguito per colpa di detta fortuna patita, riservando siccome riserviamo le ragioni e 
azioni a cuiusvoglia contro qualunque persona che prima o poi del presente calcolo avesse o 
fossero obbligati tali quali li competano, o possono competere in giudizio ordinario e così in fero 
a magnifici Auditori della Rota Civile della serenissima repubblica doversi accettare, ragionare, 
calcolare e pagare”. See, for example, ASG, NG 2084, 19/02/1640. On the Rota Civile see V. 
Piergiovanni, ‘Genoese Civil Rota and mercantile customary law’, in Piergiovanni ed., Norme 
scienza e pratica, II, 1211-1229. 
271 Again, see the report declared by the patrone Antonino Risso in ASG, NG 636, 10/04/1600, 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50215. A further problem with the valuation of 
cargoes arose from the jettison of a suitcase valued at 400 Genoese lire. Paolo Sommovigo, its 
owner, asked and obtained to suspend the GA procedure promising to bring new witnesses to 
prove that his suitcase was actually worth 800 lire. See ASG, NG 2084, 05/05/1640, voyage 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50376. 
272 This advice was included in a petition by the dragoman Giovanni Antonio Grillo who 
attributed it to the bailio Giorgio Giustiniani during his embassy to Constantinople, see 
Maréchaux, ‘«Non andare mai alla giustizia»: conflictividad maritima, mediacion y normas 
juridicas comunes entre Venecia y el imperio otomano (1600-1630)’, in M.H. Sanchez ed., 
Republica y Republicanismo en la Europa moderna (siglos XVI-XVIII), Madrid, 2017, 205-228. 
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conditions for GA existed.273 The practices of GA and PA from the moment of 
approval of the report to that of the calculation required on average 46 days for 
the former and 72 days for the latter, a relatively short time considering the 
multiplicity of interests and the courts involved.274 
During the seventeenth century, Average procedures in Genoa underwent 
only slight changes, largely translatable into an increase in responsibilities, 
skills, and controls by the Conservatori del Mare. Although the 1589 statutes did 
not indicate a relationship between the calcolatori and the Conservatori, and 
indeed the former appeared as an independent office, with the passing of time 
the Conservatori gradually absorbed the calcolatori’s functions. The calculation 
procedure followed a progressive standardization, which limited the functions of 
the calcolatori.275 For example, the value of the ship and its equipment was 
increasingly provided by the sindaco of the Conservatori del Mare. The sindaco, 
as previously mentioned, was the officer in charge of the visit to the vessels 
arriving in the port.276 The authority of the sindaco probably allowed resolving or 
preventing any issues that could arise between the merchants and 
shipowners.277 The calcolatori simply copied the estimate into their 
calculation.278 Furthermore, the calcolatori lost their responsibility over the 
reception of the shipmasters who presented a report in Genoa. This formally 
                                                          
273 Felloni, ‘I calcoli di avaria’, 844. 
274 Elaboration based on all Genoese archival sources uploaded in the AveTransRisk online 
database. The average value for GA procedures was calculated on 110 voyages. Seven 
voyages were excluded due to the number of days being significantly higher than the other 110 
voyages (number of days > 250 days). The average value for PA procedures was calculated on 
100 voyages. Two voyages were excluded due to the number of days being significantly higher 
than the other 100 voyages (number of days > 300 days). The difference between the average 
values is perhaps due to litigations of merchants with their insurers or to the fact that Genoese 
institutions considered the PA procedures less ‘urgent’ than those involving many merchants 
and shipowners. 
275 For an example of the standardisation of consulates, see the form in Targa, 
Ponderationi, 326-328 and transcribed in par. 3.5. 
276 See for example the estimate for the ship San Giacomo of the English shipmaster Andrea 
Rend, arrived in Genoa from London in March 1640: “Estimo fatto da me Gio. Batta Casanova 
Sindico delli m. Ill. Conservatori del Mare, e con mio giuramento della nave nominata Santo 
Giacomo di portata di salme 2500 incirca, capitano Andrea Rend inglese, venuta d’Inghilterra 
con carrico di merci diverse […]”, in ASG, NG 2084, 09/03/1640, recorded in the AveTransRisk 
db as id 50229. 
277 A mercede to the sindaco of the Conservatori, usually 6 lire, generally appear in the 
calculations. See, for example, ASG, NG 2084, n. 143, 26/03/1640. 
278 The person in charge of providing this assessment was the sindaco of the Conservatori. This 
role, already mentioned in par. 2.4.2, lasted three years. The sindaco was also entrusted with 
the inspection of vessels leaving the port, together with another ordinary member of the 
Conservatori, as well as the collection of a tax of six soldi for every hundred Genoese salme 
(1.9 tons) of departing ships, see Forcheri, Doge, governatori, procuratori, 150. 
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passed to the Conservatori del Mare from 1602 onwards.279 For example, 
consider the report of the patrone Giacomo S. Michele di Lavagna, the patron of 
the liuto called San Antonio Bonaventura.280 He brought his report, initially 
drawn up in Piombino, to Genoa, and he delivered it to the Conservatori del 
Mare on 25 October 1638. The Conservatori read it in the presence of the 
patrone and Stefano Marengo, the principal merchant interested. Marengo and 
the patrone asked the Conservatori del Mare Pantaleo Balbi, Geronimo de 
Marini and Alessandro Gentili, to proceed with the calculation on 29 October. 
The Conservatori approved the request but requested further witnesses. The 
declaration was then rewritten, followed by the testimony of three of the five 
crew members of the vessel. Finally, the Conservatori asked the calcolatori to 
proceed with the calculation. Only from this moment on did the calcolatori 
intervene in the procedure. 
At the same time, the informal practice in which shipmasters declared an 
Average report in front of other city authorities became common practice.281 In 
such cases, the report differed from those drawn up abroad due to its brevity. It 
was usually a single sheet divided into two columns. It had a small introduction 
with standard expressions aimed at declaring the proper loading of the cargo 
and the safety of the vessel.282 It ended with formulas that released the vessel, 
the sailors, and the shipmaster from any responsibility.283 Perhaps, shipmasters 
asked to have these declarations written down simply so that the notary of the 
calcolatori could keep them to prove the shipmasters’ innocence in case of 
possible litigation or claims by the merchants. The percentage can vary 
                                                          
279 As early as 1598 an isolated case of a declared consulate can be found at the chancellery of 
the Conservatori del Mare, see ASG, NG 635, Atti dei calcolatori, 31/12/1598. This practice, 
however, only became established during the first years of the following century. 
280 ASG, NG 2084, 09/10/1638, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50512. Report 
partially transcribed in Appendix VI. 
281 This happened in particular in front of the Ufficio dell’Abbondanza and the Pammatone 
hospital, near the gate of Acquasola. It is not clear what motivated this change in the daily 
practice of dealing with Average cases. Perhaps the large number of vessels arriving in the port 
led captains to declare the damage they faced en route to other magistracies so as to set sail 
again as soon as possible. For example, the consolato declared by the Flemish shipmaster Gio 
Giacomo Pellegrino in 1641 was drafted in the “cancelleria dei protettori dell'ospedale di 
Pammatone”. See ASG, NG 2085, 04/04/1641; the shipmaster Jacob Passanus declared his 
consolato in 1640, on the other hand, in the “ufficio dell’Annona”, see ASG, NG 2084, 
03/02/1640. 
282 “Il detto carico era bene in ordine stagno fasciato e amainato et atto a venir qua con detto 
carico havendo per tutte le parti del mondo”, see ASG, NG 636, n.14, 04/02/1600. Voyage 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50184. 
283 “Il che tutto quelle che è seguito non è stato ne è per colpa di detto patrone, o sua marinari e 
gente ma per causa di detta fortuna però fa instanza essaminati li seguenti testimoni per 
valersene poi dove si faccia il bisogno et tutto in ogni miglior modo […]”, in ASG, NG 2084, 
01/01/1640. Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50201. 
199 
 
significantly depending on the period examined, but in general, more than 50% 
of the total reports in the calcolatori’s archival folders, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk database, do not have an attached calculation. 
Moreover, the 1602 reforms granted to the Conservatori all criminal 
jurisdiction for control and safety of navigation. This jurisdiction had been theirs 
initially, but it had been entrusted to the Rota Criminale in 1576. A further reform 
in 1605 authorised the Conservatori to proceed at any time, ignoring for 
example public holidays or Sunday rest, in order to ensure the speedy 
execution of maritime cases as any delay could lead to further expense and 
financial damage.284 Part of the jurisdictional tasks, however, also seemed to 
belong to the calcolatori, as demonstrated in a complex overlapping of duties: a 
judgement of 23 March 1625, signed by the Conservatore del Mare Ottaviano 
Canevari, officially established that the calcolatori could not be judges in civil 
cases: all judicial authority belonged to the Conservatori alone.285 This 
judgement allows us to speculate an institutional conflict of which, unfortunately, 
no other evidence remains to date. Only following the potential approval of the 
report and the request for calculation by decree of the Conservatori would the 
procedure reach the calcolatori.286 
At the end of the seventeenth century, the calcolatori seem to disappear from 
the sources, although the Statuti Civili were unchanged. The calculations began 
to be drawn up and signed by the notary of the Conservatori. For example, all 
the calculations found to date for the year 1699 display the name of the notary 
of the Conservatori del Mare Alessandro Alfonso, who functioned as both the 
chancellor and the designated calcolatore. The calculation also took place 
under the direction and guidance of one of the Conservatori del Mare, who in 
these cases was Filippo Spinola.287 Starting in 1720, the new magistracy of the 
Magistrato di Avaria replaced the notary of the Conservatori. This magistracy 
operated from 1720 to 1817.288 
                                                          
284 See ASG, ms. 41, Leggi perpetue, 1576-1639, 27/05/1605, 104r. 
285 ASG, Bibl. Rari 8, Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae Ianuensis, 1688, 29. 
286 ASG, Bibl. 9, Legum 1590-1608, 18/03/1602, 263. 
287 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 19/05/1699. These documents were drawn up following legal 
disputes, in fact they are part of the folders of the Atti Civili. One of the values in the calculation 
was the payment of the lawyer who carried out the litigation. Further analyses on other sources 
could perhaps shed more light on these events. 
288 ASG, CdM 451-453, Sessioni diverse del magistrato d’avaria ed altro, 1720-1817. A short 
review shows that these documents are essentially made up of drafts of sessions in which the 
date and names of the shipmasters involved are recorded. Since the end of the seventeenth 
century, all the Genoese documents on Average procedures are kept in the files of the 
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The strengthening and centralization of the procedure perhaps responded to 
a specific request from merchants and insurers or from shipowners. The 
complete management by the Conservatori would have possibly favoured a 
streamlining of the procedure and a greater standardization of practices, 
allowing merchants to save time and money by not having to pay administrative 
costs to the various judiciaries involved. For shipowners, the jurisdiction shift 
from the calcolatori to the Conservatori seems to have carried a change in the 
contributing criteria: the vessel started contributing for only half of its value. As 
stated by Douglass North, a significant part of the institutional changes in 
history were carried out by the same social actors who sought to interpret the 
world around them through ideologies, regulations, and values.289 This was 
even truer in Genoa, where the main merchants and businessmen were closely 
linked by business and family relations and belonged to the class of patricians 
ruling the state.290 From the management of Average practices, an effort of 
bureaucratic-administrative uniformization emerges in line with other Italian and 
European realities, considered by historians as more advancements toward the 
“creation of the modern state”.291 
Most likely due to the continuous standardization of the procedure and the 
variety of types of damage accepted as GA, during the second half of the 
seventeenth century, the Conservatori del Mare faced the growing problem of 
the unscrupulous use of reports by some shipmasters. The latter obtained 
counterfeit accident reports or exaggerated the extent of the damages to 
receive illicit repartitions, without the port authorities being able to do much to 
stop them. For this reason, in 1654, the Conservatori asked the Senato for 
authorization to issue new surveillance and punishment regulations.292 The 
Senato, having heard the positive opinion of a deputation specially created to 
evaluate the matter, gave its authorization.293 On 27 November 1654, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Conservatori del Mare. Future research will shed light on the functioning of Average practice in 
Genoa in the eighteenth century. 
289 North, Institutions, institutional change, 36-45; see also J. Knight, D. North, ‘Explaining 
Economic Change: The Interplay Between Cognition and Institutions’, Legal Theory 3(3), 
1997, 211-226. 
290 Bitossi, ‘Il governo della Repubblica’, 91-107; Felloni, ‘Il ceto dirigente’, 1323-1340; Bitossi, Il 
governo dei magnifici. 
291 Lo Basso, ‘Il finanziamento dell’armamento’, 101. 
292 The Conservatori sent a request to draft new rules following the trial for the barratry of the 
shipmaster Franciscus Rubeum of Sestri Ponente, see ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e 
pubblicazione 444, 27/11/1654. 
293 The deputation included the magnifici Andrea De Mari, Agostino Raggio and Gio. Batta 
Raggio quondam Francesco, see ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/03/1655. 
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Conservatori del Mare obtained the authority to take all necessary measures to 
limit the phenomenon of the false consolati, i.e., the false reports made by 
shipmasters, usually in collusion with their crews. According to the Senato, 
those countermeasures should above all protect foreign merchants who arrived 
in Genoa: 
 
[…] we have esteemed that it is in the public interest to find and establish a 
way by which they can be deprived of the opportunity to commit so frequently 
fraud, theft, barratry [shipmaster’s fraud] and similar crimes outside the 
dominion of the Most Serene Republic, to the detriment, not so much of the 
vassals and subjects of the Most Serene Republic, but of the foreign 
merchants […].294 
 
The common indebtedness of the shipmasters was considered the first reason 
behind the frauds. For this reason, the regularization of Average reports went 
hand in hand with the regularization of sea loans, one of the most commonly 
used tools for the rapid retrieval of credit. However, the establishment of a 
univocal method that limited the shipmasters’ false reports remained 
problematic. The solutions adopted were limited to reinstituting the need for 
witnesses to be present at the time of the drafting of the report and the 
presentation of the bill of lading. Documents that did not comply with these 
formal requirements would be considered null, and the Conservatori would have 
had the authority to proceed ex officio in suspicious cases. There would also be 
a reward for those who denounced fraud. This reward ranged from 50 to 500 
scudi, depending on the crime. To avoid weighing on the Conservatori's budget, 
the reward was paid by the owners of the vessel whose shipmaster had been 
found guilty of barratry.295 
These measures do not appear to have brought significant improvements, as 
the matter remained at the centre of the memoirs that the Conservatori sent to 
                                                          
294 “[…] habbiamo stimato che convenga al pubblico servigio di trovare, e stabilire forma per 
mezzo de cui si tolga in qualche maniera li occasione di poter commettere così frequentemente 
le frodi, furti, baratterie e delitti simili anche fuori di dominio della Serenissima Repubblica in 
pregiudizio non tanto de vassalli e sudditi della Serenissima Repubblica quanto de mercanti 
forastieri […]”. ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/03/1655. 
295 On the definition of ‘barratry’ see Boccardo, Dizionario, I, 290-292. On this topic see G. 
Rossi, ‘Early modern maritime insurance between mercantile customs and ius commune: some 
remarks on the liability of the shipmaster’, in L. Brunori, S. Dauchy, O. Descamps and X. 
Prévost eds., Le droit face à l'économie sans travail. Finance, investissement et spéculation de 
l'Antiquité à nos jours, II, L'approche internationale, Paris, 2020, 241-263; G. Rossi, ‘The 
Barratry of the Shipmaster in Early Modern Law: The Approach of Italian and English Law 
Courts’, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, 87(2), 2019, 504-574; M. Berti, ‘La “baratteria di 
padrone” nella circolazione marittima commerciale mediterranea’, in S.P.P. Scalfati, A. 
Veronese eds., Studi di storia offerti a Michele Luzzati, Pisa, 2008, 39-52. 
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the Senato throughout the second half of the seventeenth century. In Genoa, as 
deducible from the documentation examined, there was a rapid and almost 
standard drafting of the reports, which as previously specified, could also be 
declared before different magistracies of the Republic. This obviously increased 
the difficulty in recognizing mendacious statements.296 However, these factors 
could have contributed to pushing more shipmasters to declare their GA or PA 
report in Genoa; that is, the ease of declaring a report for a shipmaster was a 
congenital but “necessary” inconvenience to maritime trade. These problems 
were still present in the following centuries and are still a source of contrast 
today.297 The culmination of automatism in the drafting of the reports was the 
template reported by Targa in 1692. This is a summary of all the characteristics 
and requirements that the shipmaster’s reports had to observe and even 
included the usual references to the inevitability of damage and to the external 
danger: 
 
1690. In … at … appeared before the… the patrone … of nation … patrone 
of the vessel named … he with his oath registered from me, notary, and from 
himself taken, having touched the writings, denounces in all as hereinafter; 
that is, that coming with his said vessel, and men … of his crew from … from 
where he left …. with a cargo of … to be taken to … as per the freight 
contract made to … on behalf of … to go to … and, being this night, or … on 
high sea above this port miles … and having been overtaken by a fierce 
storm of … which caused him a very heavy damage, which he was unable to 
resist, after various attempts, in order not to get lost; he was forced to land in 
this port where he arrived at … and he has moored, that for other things he 
did not have here to do anything, but it was mere violence, and he has not 
done, nor does he intend to do any landing, nor any embarkation, and he 
asks that of this report a public act is made, and that it is approved, when it is 
needed, by whoever is responsible for it, so that it may always be a record of 
the truth, and for his own indemnity, and that of all concerned in the said 
vessel, and in its cargo, and he requests that in confirmation of what has 
been said above, the examinations of the passengers and seamen be 
received in the usual form.298 
                                                          
296 ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/03/1655. 
297 Baldasseroni, for example, wrote that “[…] vi è sommo abuso, permettendo che i capitani 
facciano solamente una denunzia generica, che talvolta è fatta dai loro raccomandatarj senza 
loro saputa […]”. See Baldasseroni, Trattato sulle assicurazioni, IV, 96. 
298 “1690. À ... in … à hore ... comparve dinanzi al ... il Patron ... di Nation ... patroneggiante 
come dice la Barca intitolata ... di portata di ... il quale con suo giuramento defertoli da me 
Nottaro, e da esso stato preso, toccate le scritture, denoncia in tutto come in appresso; cioè che 
venendo con detta sua Barca, & huomini ... di Marinaria da ... di dove si è partito ... con carico 
di ... da condursi a ... come per contratto di noleggio fatto à … per conto di ... per andar a ... & 
essendo questa notte, ó ... in altura sopra questo porto miglia ... ó circa è stato sopragionto da 
una fierissima borasca di ... che gli hà causato una gravissima tormenta, alla quale non 
hauendo, doppo vari tentativi potuto resistere, per non perdersi; gli è stato forza di approdar in 




The countermeasures enacted against the false reports resulted in an edict 
drawn up in 1698, approved and published in 1703, to prevent “large averages 
based on inconsistent calculations”.299 This edict, however, only reported the 
solutions discussed by the commission of 1654 and did not add any further 
restrictions. It was renewed without changes in the following years.  
The standardisation of the procedure increased the simplicity with which a 
shipmaster could declare his Average report, thus leading to favouring a stop in 
the port of Genoa. In this sense, it is possible to assume that the lack of a more 
organic intervention on the drafting of the reports was part of the competition 
policy with nearby ports, especially Livorno but also Villefranche and 
Marseille.300 The letters written in 1671 by the English consul residing in 
Livorno, John Finch, seem to confirm this hypothesis.301 For this reason, 
perhaps in the Genoese archives, there are numerous reports of shipmasters 
with cargoes destined for Livorno, especially wheat: they stopped in Genoa to 
declare their report and to request the calculation.302 The standardisation of the 
procedure may also have reduced transaction costs compared to those applied 
in rival ports.303 Genoese authorities, moreover, constantly kept under 
surveillance the reports drafted in Livorno. They requested their consul in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cosa alcuna, ma è stata mera violenza, & non hà fatto, né intende fare sbarco, né imbarco 
alcuno, e domanda che di questa sua dinoncia, ne sia fatto atto publico, e che sia approvato, 
quando sia di bisogno, da chi spetta, quale sia, acciò sempre consti della verità, e per indennità 
sua, e d'ogni interessato in detta Barca, e nel carico di essa, e fa instanza che in confermatione 
di quanto ha detto sopra, sieno ricevuti li esami de passagieri, e Marinari in forma solita”. Targa, 
Ponderationi, 300-301. The sources, however, did not follow this model and shows a significant 
syntactic variety even at the end of the seventeenth century. See, for example, the documents 
in ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 125, 1700. 
299 ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 15/09/1698. The drafting process of the edict 
began on 20 November 1698 and ended on 26 September 1703. 
300 Also the free port institution was a tool used in the commercial rivalry with Livorno. See Kirk, 
‘Genoa and Livorno’. 
301 J. Dyble, ‘Foreign shipping and the Tuscan authorities’, in Fusaro, Addobbati, Piccinno eds., 
Sharing risk, forthcoming. 
302 An interesting example is the voyage of two Flemish shipmasters who set out from 
Malamocco, near Venice, with a cargo of grain for Livorno. Both vessels, Giovanni d'Armano's 
San Giorgio and Gherardo Shut's Profeta Elia, declared an Average due to bad weather en 
route. However, following the unloading of the goods in Livorno and the reports drawn up with 
the city governor, the two shipmasters took their declarations to Genoa. See ASG, NG 2084, 
29/12/1639 e 29/12/1639, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50195 and id 50196. 
303 This observation can only be tested following specific research on nearby ports. Following 
the analysis of two sample cases for GA calculations made in 1640 in Genoa and Livorno, for 
example, the administrative costs in Livorno are more than double those paid in Genoa. 
Administrative expenses in two GA calculations in Genoa in 1640: 114 lire; 93.5 lire. 
Administrative expenses in two GA calculations in Livorno in 1640: 280.5 lire; 218 lire. See the 
voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50229, 50272, 10036 and 10042. The 
currency in Calculations drafted in Livorno in 1640 were the scudo. I followed the conversion 
rate of 1 florentine scudo = 7.5 lire, as indicated in Dyble, ‘General average’, 137. 
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Livorno to keep them informed about what was happening in Tuscany. The 
consul sent to Genoa a copy of the reports declared by Genoese shipmasters in 
front of the local governor.304 
In Genoa and elsewhere, Average procedure responded to the primary 
function of mercantile justice: to provide judgements quickly and without 
excessive formalities and without wasting time in the economic cycle. These 
were the guidelines followed by Genoese businessmen and legislators in 
drafting the legislation, and these requirements precisely determined the 
continuous and detailed normative development in Genoa. The entrustment of 
the appeal function first to the Rota Civile and then to the Conservatori, the 
presence of the merchants at the time of approval of the report and of the 
calculation, and the speed in the procedure, as has emerged from the cases 
analysed thus far, were functional aspects in the mercantile environment and in 
the customary practices that prevailed in the field of maritime law.305 Vito 
Piergiovanni stated: 
 
If the world of commerce moves in increasingly wide international spaces, it 
is unthinkable that law could become a brake, at least in realities, such as the 
Genoese one, which based its survival and then its fortunes on commerce.306 
 
These are probably some of the reasons why the GA institution, in some ways 
based on empiricism and ‘trust’ between the parties, still survives today, albeit 
with mixed fortunes. 
                                                          
304 The reports drawn up in Livorno in front of the governor and sent to Genoa by the Genoese 
ambassador are numerous, see for instance the dispatches made by Consul Gio. Stefano 
Boccalandro during 1640 in ASG, NG 2084, 1640. 
305 Other jurists of the time reported the Genoese rules on credit and insurance as exemplary 
measures, see Scaccia, Tractatus de commercii, 340-341. 
306 “Se il mondo del commercio si muove su spazi internazionali sempre più ampi, non è 
pensabile che il diritto possa diventare un freno, almeno in realtà, come quella genovese, che 
sulla mercatura ha basato prima la propria sopravvivenza e poi le sue fortune”. V. Piergiovanni, 
‘Il diritto del commercio internazionale e la tradizione genovese’, in Piergiovanni ed., Norme, 
scienza e pratica, I, 417-425, 424. 
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4. Ships Calling at the Port of Genoa Based on the Avetransrisk Db 
 
 
Average reports are precious sources that can also be used to investigate the 
structure of maritime trade calling at Genoa. This analysis aims at proving how 
the economy of the Genoese Republic relied heavily on maritime trade, even in 
a period, such as the seventeenth century, in which historians mainly study the 
financial activities of Genoese businessmen.1 The routes to and from the port of 
Genoa formed the heart of the Republic’s economic system. The Republic, for 
example, depended yearly on the arrival of vessels loaded with grain to ensure 
the necessary food supplies.2 Almost the entire manufacturing sector also 
depended on maritime trade for both the import of raw materials and the export 
of finished products.3 Even today, the region still revolves mainly around the 
port of Genoa.4  
Genoa survived or prospered, therefore, thanks to the control of an area that 
transcended its territorial boundaries.5 The routes linking the capital and its 
territory guaranteed connections to Western- and Northern-European, or to 
more remote, markets. Genoa also acted as a redistributive emporium towards 
the coastal centres, according to a precise policy of centralisation.6 The smaller 
ports often lacked the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the stopover of 
vessels engaged in long-distance trade. 
Genoa, therefore, was involved in trade exchanges extending from the 
Mediterranean to Northern Europe, with connections also to non-European 
regions such as the Russian Empire or the island of Newfoundland. The 
documentation examined in the following pages makes it possible to reconstruct 
the main characteristics of Genoese trade, particularly intra-Mediterranean, and 
provides some paradigmatic examples of an elusive and dynamic cabotage 
trade.7 
                                                          
1 The urban economy, according to Edoardo Grendi, escaped from the ‘continental’ model to fit 
fully into a ‘maritime-international’ model. See Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 115. 
2 See par. 2.2. 
3 Massa, Lineamenti di organizzazione, 90. 
4 The port of Genoa is today the second largest Italian port for cargo handled. The cargo 
terminal has a maximum annual capacity of 550,000 TEU (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit). See 
 https://www.portsofgenoa.com/it/porto-di-genova.html, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
5 Grendi, 'Traffico portuale’, 593-638. 
6 See par. 2.2. 
7 On the definition of cabotage trade, see the Terminology. 
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Short-distance trade, often carried out by patroni from the Riviera, acting on 
their own behalf with crews of fellow countrymen, has long escaped the scrutiny 
of historians due to a lack of sources. Although the patroni of small vessels 
often did not ask for the calculation of Average damages compared to the 
shipmasters of large vessels in which the interests of several merchants were 
involved, they still presented reports before the Genoese magistracies, perhaps 
for different purposes.8 The AveTransRisk database, although it does not report 
information on the total number of voyages per year involving the port of Genoa, 
collects a significant amount of information on different types of voyage and 
provides a representative picture of general trends. Moreover, Average reports 
and calculations constitute a reliable and relatively consistent source that does 
not change significantly during the early modern period, thereby allowing a long-
term analysis. 
The history of maritime trade in the Republic of Genoa for the seventeenth 
century is significantly incomplete, and there are no comprehensive 
reconstructions. Felloni, in an essay devoted to maritime historiography on 
Genoa, observed how the reconstruction of Genoese maritime trade was still a 
work in progress.9 Grendi attempted to fill this relative historiographical and 
documentary gap through a series of essays that are still an indispensable 
reference point today. Edoardo Grendi systematically examined the proceeds of 
the jactus navium, the tax of 20 soldi per 1,000 cantari (47.64 tons) levied by 
the Padri del Comune on vessels over 1,500 cantari (71.46 tons).10 The 
registers of the collection of the jactum between 1590 and 1666 provided him 
with information on the destination of the vessels, without indicating their 
names; on the shipmasters, whose nationality is rarely specified; and on the 
tonnage, with the possibility of making subdivisions of vessels according to their 
tonnages.11 The tonnages, as well as the number of arriving vessels, are 
significantly variable.12 The data analysed by Grendi are useful in providing 
overall indications of trade, but do not specify the economic relations underlying 
individual voyages. Grendi himself, in fact, recalled the need to make in-depth 
studies to reconstruct the voyage records of individual vessels entering the port 
                                                          
8 Examples of possible alternative uses of shipmasters’ Average reports are described in chap. 
3. 
9 G. Felloni, ‘La storiografia marittima su Genova in età moderna’, in Felloni ed., Scritti di 
storia, 861-880, 865. 
10 See par. 2.2. 
11 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 602. 
12 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 607. 
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of Genoa, in order to correct any errors in the general trends assumed so far.13 
His analysis shows, for example, the importance of the Sicilian market and the 
fundamental role of the routes involving the territories formally under the control 
of the Spanish crown.14 However, for example, the jactum excluded vessels 
with a capacity of less than 1,500 cantari (71.46 tons), which instead paid the 
schifato, a duty regularly contracted.15 In spite of the lack of precise 
measurements, Grendi hypothesised a direct correlation between major and 
minor traffic trends. 
Also Giorgio Doria hypothesised the existence of this relationship. He used a 
different approach to attempt an analysis of the Genoese port movement in 
general terms. Doria analysed the annual revenue from bollo and anchorage 
duties collected by the Padri del Comune between 1550 and 1797. This 
analysis enabled him to identify the general trend of port traffic and to identify 
specific phases of growth, crisis or stagnation. These phases or cycles (1550-
1575; 1576-1637; 1638-1681; 1682-1751; 1752-1797), will be considered in the 
analysis of the sample periods examined below through the use of data 
recorded in the AveTransRisk database.16 The main traffic trends indicated by 
Doria, as well as Grendi's data, are reflected, at least in part, in the number of 
vessels and the cargoes of the vessels whose shipmasters started Average 
procedures in Genoa. Being able to consider the sources for all types of vessels 
arriving in Genoa, as Average's documentation allows, makes it possible to 
verify the complementarity of trends or the presence of divergences between 
bigger and smaller vessels. Grendi’s and Doria’s analyses are inevitably 
Genoa-centric. Both scholars based their work on the analysis of certain taxes 
collected by the Padri del Comune, linked to the functioning of the port. Despite 
the exclusivity of the capital city for the management of Average practices and 
the role of the Conservatori del Mare, reports came from all the ports of the 
Republic and beyond, as the documents revolved around the ships, not a 
specific institution or port area. Although it is almost impossible to disregard the 
role of Genoa, this allows at least a partial observation of the activity of different 
Ligurian ports and patroni. 
                                                          
13 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 23. 
14 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 603. 
15 Galleys, vessels wrecked in the port area, those loaded with grain and those carrying ballast 
out of the port were also excluded, see Desimoni, Statuto dei Padri del Comune, 93-97. 
16 See Doria, 'La gestione del porto’, 135-198, 173-183. 
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The objective of the following analysis is to examine the structure and 
changes of maritime traffic in Genoa through the employment of Average data. 
It is based primarily on what emerges from the documents found in several 
archival series of the Genoa State Archives and registered in the AveTransRisk 
database to facilitate statistical and synthesis operations. The documentation 
presents bills of lading, estimates with values of vessels and damages, 
interrogations and statements of the witnesses involved and a whole series of 
judicial documents related to litigations, some of which come from abroad. 
These documents refer to the private initiative of the shipmasters and 
merchants involved in the maritime trade and help to build a complex and 
comprehensive idea of the trade headed to Genoa. 
Regardless of Average rules and the purpose for which the reports are used 
by shipmasters or patroni, Average documents provide information relevant to 
the history of trade and navigation without excessive administrative 
manipulation. Within the reports, the identification of the vessel and shipmaster, 
the course of the vessel and its cargo, and the causes of the event leading to 
the alleged damage are regularly found. The calculations also include the value 
of the vessel, the description and amount of expenses and damages, the 
composition and specific value of the cargo, the amount of freight, the names of 
the merchants and/or insurers involved. The reports, as well as the calculations, 
were read in the presence of the parties involved and cases of dispute seem 
rare and mainly related to errors of assessment and exceptional circumstances, 
rather than to problems in the procedure itself.17 
The most difficult task is to determine the exact degree of representativeness 
of the Average reports per year in relation to the total maritime traffic. Felloni, in 
his article on Average procedures between 1599 and 1601, considered that 
these data accounted for about 60% of the total voyages operated by large 
vessels (over 1,500 cantari, 71.46 tons).18 As regards the total value of goods 
reported in the calculations in this same interval, it would amount to about one 
fifth of all Genoese maritime imports: 5,804,078 Genoese lire in three years, 
compared to about 8-10 million lire per year in total.19 Piccinno found similar 
                                                          
17 On these aspects see Felloni, ‘Una fonte inesplorata’, 846. 
18 Felloni, ‘Una fonte inesplorata’, 851. Felloni grounds this statement on the number of vessels 
above 1,500 cantari (71,460 kg.) that enter the port of Genoa annually paying the anchorage 
tax. The total number of vessels per year is analysed in Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’ and is 
continuously available until 1666. 
19 Felloni, ‘Una fonte inesplorata’, 854-855. 
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percentages for Average calculations drawn up in the years 1640-1641.20 It is 
worth remembering that most of the cargoes of the vessels whose shipmasters 
declared an Average report were foodstuff cargoes and that valuable goods 
were excluded from the GA damage apportionment.21 On the basis of the 
documentation in the archives and the paper cards catalogued by Felloni, it is 
assumed that the sources maintained a sufficient level of representativeness in 
the following decades. This could be confirmed by further research on the 
eighteenth-century sources. 
The available sources are abundant and unpublished. In the Genoese 
archives there are dozens, in some periods hundreds, of Average procedures 
per year. These may consist of only the report with the narration of the 
shipmaster and his witnesses, or they may have attached documents, forming 
‘dossiers’ within the archival units. The inclusion of these documents in the 
AveTransRisk database aims to provide scholars with all the information that 
emerge from the original source. This is why, in addition to fields relating to the 
Average procedure itself, such as one for the report and the harmful event and 
one for the GA or PA, there are tables relating to the ports of call, the cargo on 
board, the vessel, the freight and the shipmaster. There is also a generic 
documents section to summarise the data related to other documents, not 
necessarily related to an Average procedure. Each piece of information in the 
database is often fully transcribed. Each record also contains the archival 
references for further verification. Due to the large number of procedures and 
the information they report, it has not been possible to date to include all the 
documents extants in the archive, which on the basis of some verifications go 
back at least as far as the eighteenth century. The documents come from 
multiple archival series: Notai Giudiziari (Atti dei calcolatori), and Conservatori 
del Mare (Atti Civili; Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero; Esibite in avarie). 
Three-year sample intervals were chosen from the documents recorded in 
the database, based on the availability of cases and their relevance. With the 
aim of covering the seventeenth century, the chosen intervals are 1599-1601, 
1639-1641, 1668-1670, 1698-1700. These three-year samples are analysed in 
relation to their contemporary political-economic situation. This selection also 
makes it possible to compare the data with those available for Livorno, which 
                                                          
20 L. Piccinno, ‘The economic structure’. 
21 See par. 3.4. 
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are also present in the database for the same years.22 The processed data 
allow a macroeconomic survey that, depending on the chosen time period, 
reveal new information or corroborate the hypotheses put forward so far by 
Grendi and Doria. 
The first interval, 1599-1601, benefits from a significant homogeneity and 
abundance of documents, perhaps due to the recent establishment of the 
magistrate of the calcolatori, before the progressive loss of power of this office 
to the Conservatori del Mare.23 It is situated after the most acute phase of the 
so-called ‘Northern Invasion’, which occurred in the early 1590s, but before the 
second wave identified by Grendi, which began around 1602.24 It records the 
partial readjustment of Genoese trade with a return to traditional routes, 
alongside the inclusion of new players and routes. For this interval I have relied 
on the paper cards recorded and used by Felloni, which I have included in the 
database. 
The second interval, relating to the years 1639-1641, is still based on the Atti 
dei Calcolatori, with the presence of estimates and documents drawn up by the 
Conservatori del Mare.25 Since, for these cases, Felloni’s paper cards did not 
capture all the data from these cases, I integrated them with direct recourse to 
the sources. This interval is situated at the height of the Thirty Years' War, 
following France's entry into the conflict. The Republic, as already noted, tried to 
maintain a position of neutrality to ensure the survival of its trade. 
The third interval covers the years 1668-1670.26 The trade in these years 
have been reconstructed relying exclusively on the documents preserved or 
drawn up by the Conservatori del Mare and kept in the archival series of the Atti 
Civili. For this reason, it is possible to find several litigations and explicit 
requests for repartition of GA damages, while the number of calculations seem 
to be proportionally lower than in the other chosen periods. This period, 
                                                          
22 These data were entered into the db by Jake Dyble, Ph.D. student within the AveTransRisk 
project. 
23 On this, see par. 3.5. 
24 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 31. ASG, NG 635, Atti dei Calcolatori, 1599; NG 636, Atti dei Calcolatori, 
1600, NG 637, Atti dei Calcolatori, 1601. The paper cards are in ADG, Felloni 1, 1589-1608. On 
the impact of the ‘Northern Invasion’ in Genoa, see par. 2.2. 
25 ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei Calcolatori, 1639-1640; NG 2085, Atti dei Calcolatori, 1641-1642. The 
paper cards are in ADG, Felloni 6, 1639-1640; ASG, Felloni 7, 1641-1642. 
26 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 84, 1667-1668; CdM, Atti Civili 85, 1668-1669; CdM, Atti Civili 86, 1669-
1670; CdM, Atti Civili 87, 1670-1671. 
213 
 
according to Doria, was one of stagnation of traffic, which only began to recover 
in 1670.27 
The fourth interval, finally, considers the last three years of the seventeenth 
century, 1698-1700.28 This is perhaps the darkest period in Genoese maritime 
historiography, for which there are no hypotheses regarding the systematic 
arrival of vessels in port. Here too I have relied on the documents in the Atti 
Civili, which are more numerous and richer in calculations than in the previous 
interval, although there are gaps in the documentation, which I have tried to fill 
by using documents from different but homogeneous archival folders.29 These 
are the years following the French bombardment of 1684 and were 
characterised by the definitive adoption of neutrality policies by the Republic. 
Frequent commercial interactions with France and the subsequent ‘liberal’ free 
port edict of 1708 are evidence of this policy.30 
Despite the fact that the documents come from different series, they follow 
the same structure. Terminology, units of measurement, currencies and dates 
are standardised and a report drawn up in 1590 is essentially identical to one 
produced a century later. The same applies to calculations. Although the 
calculations, for example, changed from using Genoese lire to using Spanish 
pieces of eight, they always show the conversion rates followed in Genoa in that 
particular year.31 Grendi himself points out the importance of referring directly to 
Genoese documents for conversion rates between different measures and 
currencies, beyond the usefulness of manuals such as that of Rocca.32 
A further example of continuity in the sources concerns the use of the term 
patrone.33 The sources regularly employ it to refer to Ligurian and sometimes 
Provençal or Neapolitan shipmasters, while the term ‘capitano’ recurs in all 
other cases. When he was not the sole owner, the Ligurian patrone was usually 
                                                          
27 Felloni, 'Port Organisation', 345. 
28 ASG, CdM, Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero 285, 1693-1698; CdM, Atti Civili 124, 1699; 
CdM, Atti Civili 125, 1699-1700. 
29 See par. 4.4. 
30 This edict allowed goods from Livorno into the free port warehouses, lowered tariffs for 
imports from the Levant and renewed the invitation to foreigners and Jews, see ASG, AS, 
Portofranco 1011, 1708. See also par. 1.4. 
31 For an average of the year-by-year conversion rates calculated on the basis of the GA 
calculation, see the table of currencies. 
32 Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 123. See P. Rocca, Pesi e misure antiche di Genova e del 
genovesato, Genoa, 1871; A. Martini, Manuale di metrologia, ossia misure, pesi e monete in 
uso attualmente e anticamente presso tutti i popoli, Turin, 1883. 
33 On the term patrone see the introduction. 
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part of a shipowning group, in which he held a minority position.34 The objective 
of this group was chartering. It is possible to assume, for the purposes of this 
analysis, that the nationalities of the patroni coincided with those of their 
vessels, a circumstance which occurred in most cases, but which is not 
specified in the documentation.35 Generally speaking, Genoese merchants 
preferred to use foreign vessels which guaranteed better armament, lower 
freight rates and fewer stops in ports.36 Although the nationality of the 
shipmaster was not always explicitly stated, it is possible to rely on their names 
and those of their vessels to observe the role of, for example, Northern vessels 
in the Mediterranean Sea.37 From the voyages examined in each of the sample 
periods, it is possible to derive both a quantitative and a commodity analysis of 
the imports made by merchants in Genoa, both in general terms and for 
comparative purposes. There are also sporadic voyages from Genoa that allow 
observations on exports from the capital’s port. Unfortunately, only a fraction of 
the total reports have an attached bill of lading, and often the sources use the 
expression ‘merci diverse’ (General Cargo) to describe cargoes.38 As far as 
vessel types are concerned, the sources specify them only with regard to the 
most common ones in the Mediterranean (tartana, polacca, felucca, barca, 
etc.). However, they do not distinguish between the different vessels from 
Northern Europe and, above all, between the use of the generic term ‘nave’ 
(ship) and that of ‘nave’ as a specific vessel type.39 For this reason, there are a 
large number of ‘vessels’ registered in the database, within which the ‘nave’ 
category also falls. The ‘nave’ type has been specified only where the sources 
specified the tonnage. 
In order to maintain a uniform structure and to facilitate comparisons, the 
statistical analysis of the sources for each period has a similar structure. 
Following the presentation of the political-economic context, the number of 
cases and the amount of calculations available per year, the main reference 
                                                          
34 The election of the patrone was annual and the same patrone could be reconfirmed for 
several years. The charge could be passed on from father to son, see Grendi, ‘Traffico 
portuale’, 608 -609. 
35 Piccinno, ‘The economic structure’; Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 598; Polonio, 'Devozioni 
marinare’, 305. 
36 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 608. 
37 This approach is also adopted, for example, in Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 34. 
38 The same problem affects Grendi’s sources. See Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 42. Merci diverse literally 
means ‘miscellaneous goods’. This expression has been translated, across the text, with the 
current formula of General Cargo. 
39 See Gatti, Navi e Cantieri, 145-154. 
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factor is the port of departure of the vessels. Through a classification of the 
origin’s regions of the arriving vessels, it will be possible to identify the main 
traffic flows that emerge. I will present the main areas involved in trade with 
Genoa starting from Northern Europe and the Atlantic side of the Iberian 
Peninsula, before focusing on the Mediterranean by presenting the various 
areas from west to east. To this end, reference can be made to the order in 
which the different regions will be listed within the graphs in each paragraph. All 
places cited in this Chapter appear in the Appendix XI maps. 
Average sources indicate ports of departure, possible scheduled stops, and 
ports of destination. Italian ports were the most involved in trade with Genoa, 
both for political-economic and geographical reasons. In order to escape the 
boundaries’ changes between the various Old Regime states, as well as their 
different names, a hybrid localisation method has been chosen: reference has 
been made both to the political-administrative subdivisions of Europe in the 
seventeenth century and, for Italy in particular, to the contemporary 
administrative division into regions. The Kingdom of Naples, for example, can 
be treated as such or classified according to the current administrative division, 
i.e. Campania, Calabria, Apulia, Molise and Abruzzo.40 The sources sometimes 
resort to a subdivision into geographical regions, albeit uncertain, which partly 
coincide with the current administrative boundaries. It is sufficient to refer to 
Map 4.1 and Map 4.2 below to contextualise the references within the text.  
As noted by Paola Massa, although the economic and organisational 
resources deployed by the Genoese were not negligible, their ability to 
formulate precise strategic choices based on analyses of individual sectors, 
competition, the economic and social environment and other data was equally 
essential.41 Within each section, information related to the areas of origin, the 
various types of vessels, the cargoes, the nationalities of the shipmasters and 
the possible presence of merchants’ names will be considered. 
                                                          
40 There are no reports of vessels coming from the coasts of the current coastal region of 
Basilicata. 
41 Massa, Lineamenti di organizzazione, 92. On the organizational skills of Genoese merchants 
and the circulation of information see Doria, ‘Conoscenza del mercato’, 91-156. 
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Map 4.1 Italian early modern states, seventeenth century
Source: my elaboration based on the maps in C. Grataloup, Atlante storico mondiale. La storia 
dell'umanità in 500 mappe, Milan, 2020 
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Map 4.2 Contemporary Italian regions
Source: my elaboration based on ‘Regioni d’Italia’ Wikipedia page, in 
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regioni_d%27Italia, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
 
For each sample period, differences and continuities will be highlighted. In 
contrast to Northern Europe, Mediterranean maritime traffic took place 
throughout the year without major seasonal differences, which at most 
influenced the availability of specific products.42 All analyses were conducted 
                                                          
42 A. Aragón Ruano, 'The Mediterranean connections of Basque ports (1700-1841): trade, trust 
and networks', The Journal of European Economic History 3, 2015, 51-90, 79. 
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using the ‘advanced search’ function of the AveTransRisk database. The 
common elements for each search were as follows: 
 
Table 4.1 Advanced search fields used in the AveTransRisk database
Source: screenshot from the AveTransRisk db ‘advanced search 
 
To these three main fields, in which the sample years of the various reference 
periods have been entered, further fields have been added from time to time to 
refine the search. These will be indicated in a footnote following each piece of 
data in the text from paragraph 4.1 to 4.4. In the absence of specific indications, 
the results presented in the text were obtained through a search using only 
these three fields. 
 
4.1 1599-1601, the Traditional Routes in the Aftermath of the Northern Invasion 
 
As mentioned, the analysis begins in the years following the so-called ‘first 
Northern Invasion’, which took place between 1591 and 1594.43 During the 
following years, traditional routes reconsolidated before the second wave in 
1602. The three years from 1599 to 1601 were part of the second phase of the 
port movement identified by Doria on the basis of the account books kept by the 
Padri del Comune.44 It began in 1576, the year of the Leggi di Casale and the 
end of the Republic's internal conflicts, and ended in 1637.45 During this 
interval, as noted above, the Padri del Comune carried out the most important 
work of extension and maintenance of the port area. Between 1599 and 1601, 
according to Grendi, an average of 89 ships of more than 1,500 cantari (71.46 
tons) entered the port of Genoa each year, plus 1,500-2,500 vessels of lesser 
                                                          
43 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 24. 
44 See par. 2.4.1. 
45 The Leggi di Casale of 1576 put an end to the last civil war within the Genoese oligarchic 




capacity, which escaped the measurements.46 During most of the sixteenth 
century, vessels came from Spain, Sicily and, until 1560, from the Levant. 
Genoese and the Ragusan vessels (present day Dubrovnik) were the main 
carriers. Northern ships replaced them in the 1590s.47 Most of the goods 
handled on the docks were cargoes of food supplies and wood.48 
The total number of voyages entered in the database from the Atti dei 
calcolatori between 1599 and 1601 is 171, respectively 50 cases for 1599, 60 
for 1600 and 61 for 1601.49 This period is homogeneous in terms of number and 
distribution of reports per month within each year. Perhaps it was this 
homogeneity that led Felloni to choose these years for his study. Similarly, there 
are no significant changes in the characteristics of voyages from one year to 
another. This makes it possible to bring the sample together for an overall 
analysis. Eighty-five voyages, about half of the total, have one or more GA or 
PA calculation attached.50 The total value of cargoes in this three-year period 
amounts to 6,130,127.38 Genoese lire.51 This total value results in an annual 
average cargo value per vessel of 72,204 Genoese lire. The average annual 
value of vessels involved in the 48 GA amounts to 10,104 Genoese lire, 
approximately 14% of their average cargo.52 Finally, between GA and PA, the 
total damage suffered by cargoes and vessels in this three-year period amounts 
to 321,822.03 Genoese lire, for which the annual average per vessel is 3,790 
lire, an amount equal to approximately 5% with respect to the capital involved 




                                                          
46 My elaboration, based on data in Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 65. Arrivals of the largest ships could 
range from 27 in 1580 to 263 in 1592, the year of the higher arrivals of the Northern vessels 
loaded with cereals. 
47 Felloni, ‘Organizzazione portuale’, 346. 
48 Wood could serve as construction material in shipyards but also as simple firewood. Other 
frequent goods were salt, wine, oil and some raw materials (iron, building materials, wool and 
silk). See Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 139-140. The quantity of goods in parcels increased 
progressively, especially during the eighteenth century. Parcels could contain textiles, metals, 
spices, manufactured goods, hides, foodstuffs, lye, pitch, saltpetre, alum and others.  
49 This is achieved by entering 1599 and 1601 in the second and third text fields of the 
‘advanced search’ function above. 
50 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Average type’ ‘is not empty’. 
51 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Total amount of risk for the cargo’ ‘>1’. 
52 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Total amount of risk for the vessel’ ‘>1’. 
53 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Damages/expanses - total awarded’ ‘>1’. 
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Table 4.2 Statistical values 1599-160154 
n. of 
voyages 
























85 10,104 - 72,204 - 3,790 - 
 
Using the AveTransRisk database it was possible to separate each voyage 
according to its port of origin. Graph 4.1 below refers to the departure regions of 
vessels bound for Genoa between 1599 and 1601. 
My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the ‘advanced search’ function. The 
graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (4) and those with 
Genoa as port of origin (5). 
 
                                                          
54 I put empty Deltas in this tab to keep the same structure as the following Table 4.3, Table 4.4, 












































Origins concentrated between the Western Mediterranean and the Italian 
coasts. These data also highlight the focus of Genoese maritime import trade in 
this period on two specific routes: Sicily-Genoa and Mediterranean Spain-
Genoa. These two areas accounted for more than 60% of the total voyages 
reported (104). Three main types of goods travelled on such routes: cereals, 
wool and money. The ports most involved in trade with Genoa emerge in Map 
4.3, realised through the mapping function of the AveTransRisk database. Each 
port, except Genoa, has its frequency cluster. 
Each port is marked with different colours according to its function. Purple 
markers indicate ports of origin, blue markers indicate scheduled stops to load 
supplies or other goods, and yellow markers indicate ports of destination.55 The 
same port could have multiple colours according to the different functions it had 
from one voyage to another. For example, Livorno could be a port of origin as 
well as a scheduled stop or an additional destination. The number of markers 
and the width of certain clusters make it possible to quickly identify the main 
areas of concentration of origins, confirming the observations made earlier and 
based on Doria’s research. It is also interesting to observe the presence of a 
significant cluster around the port of Livorno. Livorno was a competing port of 
call which figures in many voyages as an additional or substitute destination to 
Genoa: often the goods on board were addressed to “Livorno and Genoa”, or to 
“Livorno or Genoa”.56 Usually the shipmasters stated that their vessels were 
suitable to make any voyage, so it was not binding for them to indicate a 
specific destination. 
                                                          
55 Markers in the centre of a country indicate that the shipmaster did not specify the specific port 
in his report. See, for example, in this sample period, the marker in the centre of 'Spain'. 
56 As shown by Dyble's Ph.D. thesis and by data from the State Archives of Pisa recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db, Livorno also kept numerous Average reports mentioning Genoa as an 
additional or substitute destination. See Dyble, General Average. 
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The map was constructed on the AveTransRisk db by selecting the sources in ASG in the 
interval 1599-1601 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I 
removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages. 
 
The absence of a univocal port of destination is also indicative of the absence of 
a specific buyer for the goods, a sign that shipmasters moved easily from one 
port to another in search of buyers for their cargoes, perhaps on the instructions 
of the merchants who loaded the goods. 
 
4.1.1 1599-1601, Extra Mediterranean Routes 
 
Routes with Northern Europe, as already mentioned, had a limited weight in 
these years. They accounted for 4.6% of the total voyages (8).110 The 
shipmasters were mainly of Dutch origin (4), while only one of them was 
certainly English, Giacobo Leill from London.111 According to Grendi, there were 
misunderstandings, excessive taxes and the problem of return freight for those 
Northern shipmasters who stopped in Genoa.112 The cargoes from Northern 
Europe consisted of wheat and rye from Danzig and Amsterdam; wood and iron 
from Texel;113 wheat, lead and General Cargo from London; and cod from an 
unidentified location, possibly in Normandy.114 
As mentioned above, the reports in these years frequently show the 
tonnages of vessels arriving in the port of Genoa.115 This information is 
particularly useful with regard to Northern vessels. The difficulty in obtaining the 
tonnages of these vessels from traditional sources, in fact, led Grendi to 
                                                          
110 This information is also confirmed by Grendi’s data. From 196 arrivals of vessels in 1592 and 
105 in 1593 the average was about 18 arrivals between 1599 and 1601. My elaboration based 
on the data in Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 67. 
111 Numerous Flemish shipmasters arrived in Genoa, while the English preferred the port of 
Livorno. It was a Flemish merchant, Gio Buchentorp, who spread the news that he was the first 
to bring cargoes of Northern grain to Genoa. See Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 25. A sharp increase in 
English shipmasters only occurred from the 1660s onwards, see Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 343. 
112 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 26. 
113 Texel was the Dutch port where the largest vessels passed through to fill their holds with 
products for Genoa and the Mediterranean. Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 37. 
114 The port of loading was “Habelegroscia di Ormandie”, see the voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db with the id 50137. 
115 See par. 3.4. 
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formulate hypotheses which can now be tested thanks to Average data.116 
Grendi found unusually low tonnages for Northern vessels, based on those 
occasionally recorded in other sources, and questioned the criteria by which 
they were calculated. He ascribed these measurement problems to the large 
number of vessels, mostly of unknown types, that crowded into the port of 
Genoa within a few years at the end of the sixteenth century. There is also the 
fiscal element to consider, as the higher the tonnages, the higher the taxes 
which Northern shipmasters had to pay. The average value in the capacities of 
Northern vessels arriving in these years, based on Grendi’s sources, was about 
82 lasti (185,52 tons).117 The shipmasters' Average reports, recorded in the 
AveTransRisk database, allow to test this value’s reliability. Northern 
shipmasters regularly reported their vessels’ tonnages from 1590 until the 
1630s.118 Reports from the late 1500s to the early 1600s show a stable value, 
which is probably closer to the actual vessels’ tonnage.119 This value is 117.5 
lasti (267.26 tons), i.e. about 30% more than the value found by Grendi.120 In 
the early modern period, however, tonnage is an elusive concept.121 As already 
specified, I use this term in the meaning of the maximum net load that can be 
stowed below deck, which is the meaning used in the Genoese sources of the 
time; it therefore corresponds to the freight tonnage or tonneau d'affrètement.122 
Let us now resume the data analysis, following the order set by Graph 4.1. 
Firstly, the Iberian Peninsula. Genoa was the main port of call for vessels 
departing from Spain, at least until the increasing role of Marseille during the 
seventeenth century.123 Voyages from this area appear to be very regular in 
terms of cargo types and stops. The few vessels from the west coast of Spain 
                                                          
116 Here too, according to Grendi, the use of specific voyage dataset would have resolved the 
issue of underestimate vessels’ tonnages. See Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 51. 
117 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 28. 
118 This, as also assumed by Piccinno and stated in par. 3.4, was probably due to the 
introduction of a new tax from 1638 onwards. 
119 The tonnages were identified using the advanced search function of the AveTransRisk db 
indicating ‘Archivio di Stato di Genova’ as the ‘Archival Source’. The ‘vessel tonnage’ had to be 
‘IS NOT EMPTY’ and the ‘reports: written date’ was ‘<= 1601’. 
120 The equivalence between Genoese mine and lasti in the sources varies between 25 and 27 
mine per lasto, as can be seen in the conversion section. 
121 See Lane, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, 213-233; U. Di Tucci, ‘Architettura navale 
veneziana: misure di vascelli della metà del Cinquecento’, Bollettino dell'atlante linguistico 
mediterraneo, 5/6, 1963, 277-293. 
122 Lane, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, 216.  
123 M. Deyà, ‘L'èvolució del comerç exterior’, in E. Belenguer ed., Història de les Illes Balears, 
Vol II, L'época foral i la seva evolució (1230-1715), Barcelona, 2004, 440-447. 
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(4) carried hides and wool cargoes from Cadiz, including “Indian” hides.124 
Other colonial products came from Seville, such as ginger.125 
 
4.1.2 1599-1601, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes 
 
Thirty-four vessels arrived in Genoa from the Mediterranean Spain, i.e. 21% of 
the total. They departed from Cartagena and Alicante or from the Balearic 
archipelago. These routes, together with those from Sicily, constituted the main 
connections with the Spanish dominions in the Mediterranean, allowing Genoa 
to play a linking role which, according to Pacini, was one of the reasons for its 
alliance with Spain.126 
Voyages from Cartagena and Alicante (18) were the most frequent in the 
reports examined. They represent about 53% of the total number of voyages 
from Mediterranean Spain. These two ports were both ports of loading. Again, 
this was a traditional market, although the importance of these ports had grown 
in the later years of the sixteenth century. Wool was the main product traded by 
the Genoese in Spain from medieval times,127 and Alicante was the first port for 
the export of Castilian wool during the early modern period.128 This city took 
over Valencia’s role in Spanish trade during the second half of the sixteenth 
century, due to privileges obtained from the kings of Spain, such as the 
authorisation by Philip II to Alicante to have a commercial court independent of 
the Consulado of Valencia.129 Even trade routes from Cadiz stopped in Alicante 
before proceeding to Genoa or Livorno. Cartagena, usually the first scheduled 
stop on the Alicante-Genoa route for vessels from beyond Gibraltar, 
                                                          
124 On leather working in the early modern period and the functioning of a tannery see S. 
Tognetti, ‘La conceria Serristori di Figline Valdarno nel primo Cinquecento’, in P. Pirillo, A. Zorzi 
eds., Il castello, il borgo e la piazza, Florence, 2012, 195-219. 
125 Seville housed the main institutions for governing overseas territories and was one of the 
most active Spanish ports during the early modern period. F. Morales Padrón, ‘The commercial 
world of Seville in early modern times’, Journal of European Economic History 2/2, 1973, 294-
319. 
126 See Pacini, ‘Poichè gli stati’, 413-457. 
127 The wool was ‘washed’ and prepared mainly in inland towns and transported to the 
Mediterranean ports of Cartagena and Alicante for export. See C. Rahn Phillips, W.D. Phillips, 
El toisón de oro español. Producción y comercio de lana en las épocas medieval y moderna, 
Valladolid, 2005. Genoese companies, such as those of B. Spinola, B. Veneroso, B. Spinola, B. 
Veneroso and B. Veneroso, were also active in the internal movement and processing of wool 
(unfortunately the author does not specify the names of the members of these companies). See 
R.M. Girón Pascual, Las indias de Génova. Mercaderes genoveses en el reino de Granada 
durante la edad moderna, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Granada, 2012, 153. 
128 Aragón Ruano, ‘The Mediterranean connections’, 67. 
129 F. Figueras Pacheco, El Consulado maritimo y terrestre de Alicante y pueblos del Obispado 
de Orihuela, Alicante, 1957, 51-57. 
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experienced its period of greatest splendour between 1540 and 1640, thanks to 
the settlement of many Genoese merchants attracted by the advantages of its 
fiscal policy, guaranteed by the sovereigns to encourage the colonisation of its 
territory.130 The raw wool exported from Alicante and Cartagena, depending on 
the year, varied between 10 and 20% of the total value of goods imported 
annually to Genoa.131 There were also cargoes of raw silk, leather, sugar, linen, 
money and other goods.132 Occasional cargoes of wool or wheat were also sent 
from Catalonia or Valencia (3). Only galleys escape detection based on 
Average reports, and thus the data in the database, probably for two reasons: 
this type of vessel in the seventeenth century was often used as a warship, so 
galleys usually did not carry goods on board; plus, their holds had a limited 
capacity, this is why they carried high unit-value cargoes such as silver 
currency, thus excluded from GA contribution. An example are the galleys used 
for the transport of silver and money on the Barcelona-Genoa route.133 
Many cargoes from Spain departed from or stopped at the Balearic 
archipelago, particularly the island of Ibiza. These islands were both a frequent 
port of call and loading ports for specific goods. The Balearic Islands were 
known for the salt trade and the presence of large vessels.134 It is also possible 
to find vessels loaded with oil or hides, the latter probably coming from 
mainland Spain. 
As regards the shipmasters’ nationality from this area in the three years 
examined, on the basis of the Average sources there were Genoese (10) and 
Ragusans (6), against a marginal presence of Provençals (3).135 
The data analysed in Figure 4.1 also reveals what can be defined as the 
minor routes headed to Genoa, some of which experienced significant 
developments during the sixteenth century. Small vessels carried most of the 
traffic on these routes and their shipmasters seldom declared an Average 
                                                          
130 Franch Benavent, ‘El comercio en Mediterráneo’, 89. 
131 Piccinno, ‘Il commercio marittimo’, 8. 
132 On the cash and silver trade see C. Marsilio, ‘"Which way to turn?" The destinations of the 
Spanish silver (1621-1650). London, Lisbon, or Genoa?’, Gabinete de história económica e 
social WP 54, 2015, 4-28. 
133 Franch Benavent, ‘El comercio en Mediterráneo’, 80. 
134 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 605. The Raynolt, for example, a family of German merchants 
living in Genoa, also had a correspondent in Ibiza for salt purchases. See Lamberti, ‘Mercanti 
tedeschi a Genova’, 84. 
135 In the following years French shipping would establish itself on these routes. As reported, for 
example, by Franch Benavent, between 1603 and 1617 the total traffic from Cartagena carried 




report. Nevertheless, although the voyages from the routes listed below, like 
Corsica and Sardinia, may have been sporadic, they are representative of the 
reality of daily traffic and are in line with what is already known from other 
studies.136 Eight vessels arrived from the Genoese Corsica, from Ajaccio (6) 
and Calvi (2) in particular. They brought wood, wine, wheat and other food 
supplies, or even passengers, to Genoa. Genoese considered Corsica as a 
poor suburb, they exploited mostly the north and north-east area of the 
island.137 Forests were the main island resource. Agriculture and sheep-farming 
were the main human activities, with the exception of Cap Corse, a densely 
populated peninsula with small harbours from which the Genoese imported 
local wines.138 The reports in the database, all declared by Ligurian patroni 
sailing on small vessels, reflect the structure of Genoese trade with this region. 
Other foodstuffs were imported from Sardinia (4), including cheese and salt. 
The presence on the island of a grain market system facilitated the 
concentration of goods for export in the ports of Cagliari, Sassari, Alghero and 
Oristano. In fact, three of the four voyages in this three-year period came from 
Cagliari, although the goods on board were mainly salt and cheese. Despite the 
fact that tax records show grain as the most important export product from 
Sardinia, this does not reflect the demographic and social weight of the sector 
linked to sheep farming activities and it is reflected in the cargoes of this three-
year period.139 Another cargo, consisting of tonnine (a low-value cured tuna 
meat), came from Porto Paglia, on the south-western side of the island. The 
voyages were operated by shipmasters of different nationalities including one 
from Catalonia, one from Saint-Tropez and one from Danzig. 
Even Liguria would be a secondary region in terms of volume of trade if we 
look only at the cases in the database. On the contrary, it is known, as already 
mentioned, that most of the exchanges between the ports of the Republic and 
between them and the capital took place by sea. The two patroni in this interval, 
                                                          
136 Grendi does not have data for this three-year period. However, looking at the data for the 
decade 1580-1589 it appears that arrivals of vessels over 71.5 tons from Corsica and Sardinia 
averaged 3.9 units per year. My elaboration based on data in Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 637. 
137 This was the most fertile and populous area, where the Genoese governor was also based. 
See P. Massa, ‘Lo sviluppo economico della Corsica tra età moderna e contemporanea’, in 
A.M. Macías Hernández ed., Economia e insularidad (siglos XIV-XX), vol. II, La Laguna, 2007, 
533-576, 12, 22. 
138 Massa, ‘Lo sviluppo economico’, 16-17. 
139 In the early seventeenth century in Sardinia, about 60% of the population was engaged in 
sheep farming, 30% in agriculture and the remaining 10% in other activities, such as 
handicrafts. See M. Brigaglia, A. Mastino, G.G. Ortu eds., Storia della Sardegna, vol. 1, Dalle 
origini al Settecento, Bari, 2006, 175-176. 
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one from Lerici on a tartana and one of unknown origin on a fregata, sailed from 
the ports of Portovenere and the estuary of the Magra River, near La Spezia. 
They carried an unspecified cargo and a cargo of grapes to Genoa. 
Continuing with the Italian peninsula, from Tuscany (4) came Sicilian grain 
loaded in Livorno, Tuscan grain loaded in Montalto, and wood from the Torre di 
San Vincenzo. Ligurian patroni on small vessels, one from Arenzano, operated 
on this route (2).140 Also the only voyage from Civitavecchia (1) (Lazio) 
concerns a patrone from Arenzano on his barca, a small Mediterranean vessel 
mainly used in cabotage trade. He carried a cargo of alum to Genoa. This cargo 
reflects the monopoly of this precious resource on the mines of the nearby Tolfa 
by some Genoese families.141 
Vessels arriving from the Kingdom of Naples follow. There were two main 
areas of origin: the city of Naples (8), on the Tyrrhenian side of the Kingdom 
(Campania), and the ports of Apulia, on the Adriatic side (5). Vessels from 
Naples transported wine, raw materials for making paper, pitch, pasta and other 
goods. In some cases the vessels stopped at Livorno to unload part of their 
cargo.142 The privileged relations between the Genoese and the Spanish crown 
had favoured the establishment and growth of a flourishing diasporic Genoese 
community in Naples, which maintained contacts and trade with the 
homeland.143 Ligurian patroni, from Sestri Ponente (3) or Lavagna (1), 
Neapolitan from Sorrento (1) or unspecified (1), and Tuscan from the Elba 
Island (1) sailed from Naples. 
As far as trade with Apulia is concerned, from the cases in which the Average 
reports specified the cargo, it consisted only in wheat from the ports of Barletta 
and Manfredonia straight to Genoa.144 Merchants in Apulia commonly hired 
Ragusan vessels (3), perhaps because of the proximity to the city of Ragusa 
and their vessels’ large tonnage.145 Two Ragusan vessels loaded with grain 
                                                          
140 The only case involving a larger vessel, a galeone, concerns a voyage where an accident 
during loading in the port of Livorno caused an explosion on board. See the voyage in the 
AveTransRisk db recorded with the id 50129. 
141 See Delumeau, L'alun de Rome, 92-100, 106-118, 169, 208-241. 
142 Paper mills were located close to the minor centres of Ligurian maritime trade, and generally 
according to the availability of local rivers. These were concentrated around Pegli, Voltri, 
Cogoleto, Arenzano and Varazze, see Massa, Lineamenti di organizzazione, 48. 
143 See G. Brancaccio, “Nazione genovese”. Consoli e colonia nella Napoli moderna, Naples, 
2001. 
144 See G. Poli, Città contadine. La Puglia dell'olio e del grano in età moderna, Bari, 2004. 
145 Sergio Anselmi described Ragusa as a sort of Hong Kong of the Adriatic because of its lively 
trade and its role as a bridge between the Ottoman and European worlds. See S. Anselmi, ‘Le 
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also arrived in Genoa from the Marche region, and in particular from Ancona, on 
the Adriatic side of the Papal States. The vessels of the Republic of Ragusa, 
after an initial shock due to the arrival of Northern vessels and the free port of 
Livorno’s edict in the early 1590s, re-established their role on the main 
Mediterranean routes by the end of the century.146 Ragusa experienced a 
period of relative stability even during the Austro-Turkish War (1593-1606).147 
The real decline came from the 1620s onwards, as the importance of the 
Adriatic and the role of the Dubrovnik shipmasters as intermediaries declined.148 
Over the next few years, however, the Apulian grain market established itself as 
a viable alternative to the Sicilian market, and Northern shipmasters took over 
from Ragusan shipmasters. 
Trade with Venice (1) (Veneto) based on Average reports is almost non-
existent. There was only one voyage from Venice to Livorno and Genoa with a 
cargo of vallonea, a type of leather, transported on the vessel of a Rotterdam 
shipmaster. 
Voyages from Sicily were the most frequent. According to Orazio Cancila, 
Sicilian trade with Genoa during the sixteenth century ranked first both in terms 
of number of vessels and volume of goods.149 The tonnage of ships from Sicily 
in favourable years between the sixteenth and mid-seventeenth century, 
according to Grendi’s estimates, accounted for 42% of the total tonnage of 
vessels arriving in Genoa.150 This phenomenon is easily understandable for a 
city, like Genoa, that survived thanks to the constant arrival of foodstuffs. The 
number of shipmasters reporting Average damages in Genoa, which accounted 
for more than 45% of all voyages, confirms Grendi’s estimate. Trade between 
these regions dated back to medieval times, as does the presence of a strong 
Genoese minority established in the island's main cities and with ramifications in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
relazioni economiche tra Ragusa e lo stato pontificio’, Nuova Rivista Storica V-VI, 1976, 521-
534. 
146 On the role of Livorno for the Ragusan merchant shipping see M. Berti, ‘Navi e capitani 
ragusei sulle rotte per Livorno (fine secolo XVI- inizio secolo XVII)’, in A. Di Vittorio ed., Ragusa 
e il Mediterraneo. Ruolo e funzioni di una Repubblica marinara tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna, 
Bari, 1990, 197-227. On Ragusan trade see D. Dell'Osa, ‘Tra commercio e finanza: profitti 
commerciali e investimenti finanziari dei mercanti ragusei nella seconda metà del XVI secolo’, 
Storia Economica XV/2, 2012, 343-375. Despite the partial recovery, the reduced size of the 
Ragusan fleet started as early as 1599, see A. Di Vittorio, Tra mare e terra. Aspetti economici e 
finanziari della repubblica di Ragusa in età moderna, Bari, 2001, 93. 
147 G. Castellan, Storia del Balcani, XIV-XX secolo, Lecce, 1996, 207. 
148 M. Moroni, L'impero di san Biagio. Ragusa e i commerciali balcanici dopo la conquista turca 
(1521-1620), Bologna, 2011, 229-234. 
149 O. Cancila, Impresa, redditi, mercato nella Sicilia moderna, Rome-Bari, 1980, 249. 
150 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 603. 
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the local government. The merchants in Genoa exploited their links with the 
Genoese community in Sicily.151 The habitual recourse to certain routes and the 
need to guarantee regular grain supplies, as noted, had been among the 
motivations for the alliance with Spain, endorsed by Andrea Doria in 1528, and 
the free port policies inaugurated at the end of the sixteenth century. Genoese 
financiers also entered the grain trade in exchange for loans granted to the 
Spanish crown.152 The economic ties favoured, at least in part, the 
specialisation of trade and commercial operators on this and other routes.153 
Regarding the shipmasters’ nationalities on the Sicily-Genoa routes, no 
particular trend emerges, apart from the generic origin from Western 
Mediterranean, in particular from France. Probably, given the importance and 
frequency of trade with the island, Genoese merchants needed to find 
amenable freight rates quickly throughout the year, so there is no clear 
specialisation. The years between 1530 and 1596 marked, theoretically, a long 
process of crisis for the Genoese merchant fleet.154 However, this crisis does 
not seem to have affected the Sicilian route, at least as far as Average reports 
are concerned: the authorities could not afford to lose provisions. If, during 
1590s, based on Average reports examined by Piccinno (1589-1592, 1597-
1599), Ligurian merchant marine accounted for between 31.75 and 20.54%, in 
the current sample period they still accounted for 21.73% of the total.155 In 
particular, there were Ligurian shipmasters (15) from Genoa, Cogoleto, 
Arenzano, Sestri Levante and Savona; Provençal shipmasters (15), from 
Marseille, Six-Fours-Les-Plages, Toulon, Saint-Tropez, Frontignan, La Ciotat 
and Antibes; Catalan shipmasters (5); Sicilian shipmasters (8) from Messina 
and Catania; and Ragusan shipmasters (3).156 Northern European shipping 
                                                          
151 On the structure of Genoese trade in Sicily in this period, see L. Piccinno, A. Iodice, 
‘Whatever the cost. Grain Trade and the Genoese dominating minority in Sicily and Tabarka’, 
Business History, special issue paper in minorities and grain trade in early modern Europe, 
2021, 1-19. 
152 Consider, for example, the concession of exports licenses from the warehouses of Sciacca 
and Girgenti which in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries yielded 25,000 ducati 
annually each, see M. Aymard, ‘Bilancio di una lunga crisi financiaria’, Rivista Storica Italiana 
LXXXIV/1, 1972, 988-1021, 996. 
153 It is no coincidence that many Genoese consulates scattered throughout Europe came into 
being precisely to protect Ligurian patroni abroad. According to Grendi it is possible to 
distinguish between merchant consulates, patroni consulates and mixed consulates, see 
Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 616. 
154 Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 606. 
155 Piccinno, ‘The economic structure’. 
156 Ragusan shipmasters constituted about 17% of the arriving shipmasters between the 
intervals 1589-1592 and 1597-1599, see Piccinno, ‘The economic structure’. The Ragusan 
shipping had reached its peak in the Genoese port traffic around 1567, when it accounted for 
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seems to have been completely absent. Northern shipmasters were probably 
still linked to routes connecting Genoa with their home countries. 
The cargoes from Sicily belong to two macro categories: foodstuffs and 
silk/textiles. 
Wheat, in a city characterised by the need to import grain from abroad like 
Genoa, was the great protagonist of the exchanges, with no less than 56 
voyages out of 70 with, at least in part, a load of grain (80%).157 Among the 
most frequented Sicilian locations were Sciacca, Girgenti (present-day 
Agrigento), Castellammare del Golfo, Trapani, Termini Imerese, Siculiana and 
Terranova (present-day Gela). Other products such as sugar or legumes could 
accompany cereals.158 In 16 out of 56 cases, wheat was unloaded also in the 
port of Livorno.159 Wheat is a bulky product with a low unit value, the transport 
of which in freight contracts was paid for on the basis of weight in the port of 
loading.160 It was convenient for shipmasters to fill their holds as much as 
possible in order to obtain higher freight rates. 
In Sicily, there was a complex system of managing the export of grain, 
through the granting of special licenses called tratte managed as a monopoly by 
a Maestro Portolano, appointed by the king and resident in Palermo.161 The 
Genoese often requested the concession of these tratte as a guarantee for 
money loans made to the Spanish government in the Sicilian or European 
markets.162 Another strategy was to obtain the Maestro Portolano office, which 
was managed in almost monopoly by the Spinola family from the 1550s until 
1608.163 Average calculations related to voyages from Sicily often reported the 
names of the merchants involved. This allows us to observe how traffic was 
carried out by different branches of the same Genoese families active between 
                                                                                                                                                                          
about 40% of the total tonnage, see Grendi, Introduzione alla storia, 110; Piccinno, ‘Il 
Commercio marittimo’, 3-4. 
157 See Grendi, ‘Genova alla metà del Cinquecento’,106-160. 
158 In Palermo, for example, shipmasters from Genoa brought manufactured and luxury goods 
which were sorted into the inland. In the port, in return, they loaded sugar or made contracts to 
go and load grain in other ports of the island. See M. Aymard, ‘Palermo and Messina’, in M. 
Ganci, R. Romano eds. L'impero spagnolo dal XV al XIX secolo, Palermo, 1991, 143-164, 146. 
159 On grain trade in Livorno see Braudel, Romano, Navires et marchandises. 
160 A widespread fraudulent practice, for example, was to pour water on the grain in the hold to 
make it heavier and cover any shortcomings, see Targa, Ponderationi, 175-177. 
161 On this export system see S. Laudani, ‘Dai "magazzinieri" ai "contrascrittori": il sistema dei 
"caricatori" nella Sicilia d'età moderna tra mutamenti e continuità’, Mélanges de l'École française 
de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 120/2, 2008, 477-490. 
162 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 257. 
163 The Spinola family took over as Maestri Portolani as early as the 1550s, see Soprintendenza 
Archivistica della Sicilia, Archivio di Stato di Palermo, L'archivio del Maestro Portulano del 
Regno di Sicilia, 8. 
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Genoa and Sicily and often based in Palermo: examples are the Spinola, 
Cigala, De Ferrari, Di Negro, Rogali, Roccatagliata, De Franchi, Interiano, 
Groppo, Squarciafico, Fieschi, Pallavicino, Mainardo, Cavanna or Brignone.164 
Another product imported from Sicily, the most important in terms of cargo 
value, was silk.165 Silk, unlike wheat, was a high value product. It was an 
essential raw material for the manufactures of the Republic of Genoa, which 
imported significant quantities of it. It could be loaded together with wheat and 
was present in 8.5% of the cases examined in this period. This percentage, 
however, should be revised upwards, as part of the silk trade took place on 
board of Genoese galleys, vessels considered safer from pirate attacks than 
merchant vessels.166 Galley shipmasters, however, did not use the Average 
procedure. The database can therefore only capture the percentage of traffic 
that occurred on other types of vessel. 
Genoese silk manufacturing in the sixteenth century was probably the most 
important in Europe.167 In 1565, for example, it has been calculated that about 
250 merchant-entrepreneurs were active in Genoa, employing about 38,000 
artisans and workers.168 Sicilian exports were concentrated in the city of 
Messina, where all the cargoes identified so far came from and which was the 
main export port for this product until 1674.169 In Messina itself, numerous 
maestri setaiuoli of Genoese origin were active.170 Here too, Genoese 
merchants dominated the market in a quasi-monopoly regime: they often 
purchased raw silk from producers in advance, based on reliable estimates, 
thus managing to seize around 90% of the annual island production.171 
Other products from Sicily were sugar and tonnina, produced mainly in 
Trapani, the city of tuna fisheries.172 Sugar had been traditionally produced 
since at least the fifteenth century, but the market slowly declined during the 
                                                          
164 Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Whatever the cost’, 8. 
165 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 261-262; Massa, Lineamenti di organizzazione, 49-50 
166 This common perception was also reflected in insurance policies, where galleys paid lower 
premiums compared to other vessels. See Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Managing shipping risk’, 103. 
167 S. Tognetti, ‘I drappi di seta’, in F. Franceschi, R.A. Goldthwaite, R.C. Mueller eds., 
Commercio e cultura mercantile, Vicenza, 2007, 86-170, 86. On silk industry in Genoa see P. 
Massa, ‘Conseguenze socioeconomiche dei mutamenti di struttura nella tessitura serica ligure 
(secoli XVI-XIX)’, in R. Allio ed., Studi in memoria di Mario Abrate, Turin, 1986, 601-620; P. 
Massa, L'arte genovese della seta nella normativa del XV e del XVI secolo, Genoa, 1970. 
168 G. Sivori, ‘Il tramonto dell'industria serica genovese’, Rivista Storica Italiana LXXXIV, 1972, 
893-942, 895-897. 
169 M. Aymard, ‘Commerce et production de la soie sicilienne’, Mélanges de l'école française de 
Rome 77/2, 1965, 609-640, 622-631. 
170 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 253. 
171 G. Galasso, Economia e società della Calabria del Cinquecento, Naples, 1992, 209. 
172 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 274. 
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sixteenth century.173 Venetian merchants largely handled the Sicilian sugar 
trade, but there was also a strong Livornese component, so the Genoese were 
unable to secure a monopoly in this sector.174 The Sicilian sugar imports would 
disappear from Genoa during the seventeenth century, as did the Sicilian tuna 
imports, gradually replaced by Northern European and Newfoundland’s herrings 
and stockfish.175 
 
4.1.3 1599-1601, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes 
 
Finally, the Levantine routes are quite rare. Two cargoes of grain arrived from 
Greece, from the region generically called “the Archipelago”, corresponding to 
the Aegean Islands. The voyages were made by a shipmaster's orca of 
unspecified origin and by a vessel of a patrone from Messina. The voyages 
from Alexandria (2) were also made by a shipmaster of unknown origin and a 
patrone. The latter was a Marseillaise living in Savona, travelling on his 
galeone. These voyages testify to the survival of a small Levantine market for 
spices, silk and luxury goods. The vessels followed a route via Messina and 
Genoa or via Messina, Livorno and Genoa. Finally, voyages from Tabarka, an 
estate run by the Lomellini family in North Africa along the Tunisian coast, still 
involved cargoes of grain. As early as the second half of the sixteenth century, 
the island of Tabarka began to establish itself as a purchasing and redistribution 
market for Maghreb wheat, a trade that complemented the lucrative red coral 
trade that had initially been the raison d'être of the settlement itself.176 
 
4.2 1639-1641, Trade in Troubled Times and the Hegemony of Northern 
Shipping 
 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the second sample period, consisting of the 
documents in the Atti dei calcolatori from 1639 to 1641. Between the two 
periods analysed here, it is worth remembering the expansive phase of the 
city's economy in the years 1615-1620, observable in the influx of financial 
income from abroad, in the stability of silk production and in the constant 
                                                          
173 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 262. 
174 Braudel, Romano, Navires et marchandises, 32. 
175 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 274. 
176 Piccinno, ‘Alleanze, conflittualità’, 29-30; Piccinno, Un'impresa fra terra e mare. 
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immigration from the periphery to the capital of the Republic. From the 1620s 
onwards there was a general decline in trade, probably because of the Thirty 
Years’ War, which involved the main European states between 1618 and 1648. 
The decline phase is reflected in the increase in rentiers, the abandonment of 
productive investments in favour of private housing, the collapse of the silk 
industry, the halting of urban growth, and the transfer of industrial activities to 
the suburbs.177 The collapse of business in the foreign exchange fairs, the war 
with the Savoy and the Spanish bankruptcy of 1627 further exacerbated the 
economic malaise.178 
In this three-year period, the average number of vessels with a capacity of 
over 1,500 cantari (71.46 tons) arriving in Genoa, as determined by Grendi’s 
analyses, was of 298 units, while there were approximately 1,740 smaller 
vessels per year.179 Urban supplies and the growing activity of the free port 
were the main port movement growth factors. Traffic grew almost separately 
from urban development, benefiting those engaged in international trade and 
those working on behalf of foreign correspondents.180 
The AveTransRisk database contains a total of 243 voyages recorded 
between 1639 and 1641. These cases are distributed as follows: 96 for 1639, 
88 for 1640 and 59 for 1641.181 The decrease in the number of reports from one 
year to the next was probably influenced by the contraction of trade brought 
about by the escalation of the conflict and the entry of France into the conflict. 
The period 1629-1643 represented the crucial phase of the conflict, when war 
efforts on Spain’s possessions in Italy (Sicily, Milan, Naples) were heaviest.182 
In confirmation of this, Grendi identifies, on the basis of the traffic curve 
constructed from the income from the jactum tax, a regular downturn from 1625 
until 1641, the point of maximum stagnation. The curve only began to rise again 
in 1642, reaching a short-lived peak in 1643 and then undergoing a new phase 
of decline.183 
                                                          
177 On the decline of the silk industry see Sivori, 'Il tramonto dell'industria’, 893-943. 
178 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 173-174. 
179 My elaboration of the data in Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 66. 
180 Compared to the first sample period, for example, voyages from/to Livorno appeared more 
and more frequently in these years, with Genoa acting as a transit port for the Tuscan free port. 
See Grendi, ‘I nordici’, tab. V, 70. 
181 This is achieved by entering 1639 and 1641 in the second and third text fields of the 
‘advanced search’ function. 
182 Aymard, ‘Bilancio di una lunga crisi’, 988. 
183 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 53. 
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Voyages took place regularly over the three years period and there is no 
particular change in the structure of the trades, other than a general contraction. 
Only 20 cases present a GA or PA calculation, confirming the increasing 
standardisation in reports, often done for precautionary purposes only.184 The 
total value of the goods involved amounts to 1,617,421.48 Genoese lire.185 The 
average annual value per voyage is 80,468.7 lire, a figure similar to that 
observed in the previous three-year period, and about 11% higher. The total 
value of the vessels involved in the 10 GA recorded is 162,676.5 Genoese 
lire.186 The average annual value per vessel is approximately 16,432 lire, an 
increase of approximately 62% compared to the previous period due to the 
presence of Northern vessels whose hulls had a much higher value than that of 
liuti, cimbe and fregate usually employed in the Mediterranean Sea.187 The total 
damages suffered by goods and vessels in the three-year period 1639-1641 
amounted to 71,211.13 Genoese lire, resulting in an annual average of 
approximately 3,542.8 Genoese lire.188 
 
Table 4.3 Statistical values 1639-1641 
n. of 
voyages 
























20 16,432 +62.63% 80,468.7 +11.45% 3,542.8 -6.98% 
 
These data show that, although the number of calculations is lower than in the 
previous period and the value of vessels is higher due to the presence of 
vessels from Northern Europe, the values of the goods transported and the 
damages suffered do not vary significantly. 
Tonnages, which, as has already been pointed out in recent years, are no 
longer recorded in the reports, emerge with irregularity from other types of 
sources, although they are probably methodically underestimated in order to 
                                                          
184 Probably the parties involved made private arrangements for the drawing up of the 
calculations, using other notaries. See par. 3.5. 
185 Result obtained by adding the functions ‘Total amount of risk for the cargo’ ‘>1’. 
186 Result obtained by adding the functions ‘Total amount of risk for the vessel’ ‘>1’. 
187 In addition to eight vessels whose hulls alone are valued between 250 and 10,000 lire, there 
are two Northern vessels, Il mercante di Dover and Juppiter, each valued at 32,000 Genoese 
lire. See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as id 50572 and 50245. 
188 Result obtained by adding the functions ‘Damages/expanses - total awarded’ ‘>1’. 
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pay less on the custom duties.189 On the contrary, the voyage records obtained 
from the reports increasingly allow us to observe the nationality of the 
shipmasters and their city of origin. Starting from this period it is also possible to 
find often the names of Genoese and foreign merchants involved together in GA 
cases or in court litigations. Although the Republic did not follow a policy of 
opening up to foreigners similar to the Livorno model, a mercantile pragmatism 
dominated, allowing trade and investment to take place wherever conditions 
were advantageous.190 Compared to the early seventeenth century, for 
example, when English merchants sent agents to Genoa temporarily to deal 
with their businesses, it is possible to observe from 1630 the stable presence of 
a slowly consolidating community.191 
Names that sporadically emerge from Average sources can be cross-
referenced with other studies on foreign merchant activities in Genoa in the 
same period. In a 1639 GA procedure, concerning a General Cargo from Isle of 
Wight to Alicante, Genoa and other destinations, for example, Genoese 
merchants such as Raffaele Ferrari, Carlo Odescalchi and Gio. Agostino Mussi 
had goods loaded on board together with English merchants such as Guglielmo 
Elam or Enrico Mulman.192 Grendi observed these English merchants’ activities 
thanks to the analysis of the drictus armamenti.193 Crosschecking sources 
shows that Mulman established in Genoa before 1591-1592, where he was 
active in grain trade. Guglielmo Elam, on the other hand, had been resident in 
Genoa since at least 1637, the year in which he was involved with a group of 
other English merchants in a dispute concerning an English shipmaster. 
Seventeenth-century Mediterranean had the same attraction, for the English, 
that India or North America would later have in the eighteenth century.194 The 
second sample period (1639-1641), as it will be seen, allows observing the 
growing weight of Northern vessels in the trade circuits traditionally pertaining to 
Mediterranean shipping. 
                                                          
189 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 52. 
190 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 45. 
191 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 46-47. 
192 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50354. 
193 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 45-46. 
194 See Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire; L. Colley, Captives Britain, Empire and the 
World, 1600-1850, London, 2003; R. Rapp, 'The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade 
Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution', Journal of Economic 
History 35/3, 1975, 499-525. 
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From the second decade of the seventeenth century, there was also an 
increase in the number of small vessels from the Republic's Riviera. At first, 
Grendi noted a prevalence of patroni from Arenzano and Cogoleto, also 
observed in the first three years period examined.195 In these years, the origin of 
Ligurian patroni, when specified, is more diversified.196 
As regards the types of goods transported, wheat remained the primary 
product. Grendi cites two registers, one for the years 1629-1630 and one for the 
years 1644-1645, to note the proportions in the commodity compositions of 
vessels arriving above 300 salms.197 He identified 145 and 243 vessels with 
grain on board in these two intervals. The prevalence of cereal cargoes over 
other categories is highest in the period between 1629 and 1631, when it 
reached 43% of the total number of vessels entering Genoa.198 In the twenty-
year period 1630-1650, based on Grendi's data, the average value of wheat 
landings in the port was 25-30% of the total arrivals. In the three-year period 
examined on the basis of the Average sources (1639-1641), there were 87 
vessels with the hold at least partly loaded with grain, equal to 35% of the total. 
The Genoese, according to Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, who quotes the English 
consul in Livorno, were forced, due to the dependence of the Ligurian region on 
food supplies imports, to maintain a certain commercial movement in order to 
provide the incoming vessels with return cargoes.199 In these same years, 
General Cargo shipments also increased, which passed, on the basis of 
Grendi's data, from 19% in 1629-1631 to 56% in 1640-1643.200 This 
phenomenon emerge, to a slightly lesser extent, in the Average reports as well: 
61 vessels (25%), almost all from beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, declared only a 
General Cargo, compared to only four vessels in the previous three years. 
Below you can see the distribution by region of the origin of the vessels 
arriving in Genoa and reporting an Average between 1639 and 1641. 
 
                                                          
195 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 36.  
196 They came from Genoa (5), Cogoleto (3), Sturla (3), Albissola (2), Chiavari (2), Lavagna (2), 
Sestri Levante (2), Sestri Ponente (2), Prà (2), Savona (2), Arenzano (1), Alassio (1), 
Sampierdarena (1), Voltri (1), Moneglia (1) and a generic “riviera di Genova” (1). 
197 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 31. 
198 Piccinno, ‘Il commercio marittimo’, 8. 
199 G. Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale inglese e l'Italia', Studi Storici 27/1, 1986, 
109-148, 123. 
200 Piccinno, ‘Il commercio marittimo’, 8. 
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My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The 
graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (15) and those with 
Genoa as port of origin (4). 
 
Compared to Graph 4.1, for the years 1599-1601, the greater fragmentation of 
origins immediately stands out. This was the effect of a diversification of 
markets perhaps due to greater insecurity of the routes or the search for regular 
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Map 4.4 Ports of departure and scheduled stops of vessels arriving in Genoa, 1639-1641
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The map was constructed on the AveTransRisk db by selecting the sources in ASG in the 
interval 1639-1641 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I 
removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages. 
 
4.2.1 1639-1641, Extra Mediterranean Routes 
 
From the sample examined in this three-year period, we can also see a marked 
increase in arrivals from Northern Europe. This region, with 43 arrivals, is the 
first area of import of cargoes arriving in Genoa. 
The massive arrival of Northern ships into Genoa had already resumed 
vigorously in 1602, creating new types of traffic alongside the ordinary grain 
cargoes.148 However, it is necessary to clarify this. The Northern market was 
divided into two distinct areas: the Dutch and the English area. The number of 
ports involved in the trade is very limited, but the polarisation is clear. From the 
reports it seems that navigation was direct or with undeclared stops.149 
As can be seen from the first three years examined, a large part of the traffic 
with Northern Europe between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
consisted of Dutch vessels which made their way between Amsterdam, Texel, 
Danzig and Lübeck to bring mainly grain to Genoa: the interception of this type 
of traffic was also the first spur for the creation of the free port. England was an 
almost obligatory passage area for vessels coming from the North Sea, and 
Genoese diplomats agreed to obtain free transit for cargoes destined for 
Genoa. Trade from this area, however, was much lower.150 The situation 
changed dramatically in the following years. The use of General Cargo category 
in the three-year period under consideration makes it difficult to identify the 
precise currents of North European trade. However, where possible, 
hypotheses will be ventured. With the consolidation of relations within the 
Mediterranean, Northern shipmasters sought to transport, in addition to cereals, 
other products such as salted fish, metals, hides, and others. 
                                                          
148 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 31. 
149 In most cases the report was made in Genoa. According to the regulations, the shipmaster 
had to make his report in the first port he touched following the accident. Avoiding reporting 
other stops could help to prevent disputes when arriving at the landing destination. 
150 Nevertheless, the activity of some Genoese merchants on the English market in the 
preceding decades, such as the Pallavicino family, is significant. See Stone, An Elizabethan. 
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Eighteen out of forty-three voyages, or about 41% of the total, were General 
Cargo shipments from Amsterdam, Texel or Antwerp to Genoa (11), Genoa and 
Livorno (5), Genoa and Naples (1) or Genoa, Livorno and Venice (1). The 
shipmasters all seem to have come from the Flemish area, although 
nationalities were never specified and can at best be deduced from their names 
or those of their vessels. 
Seventeen vessels left England, accounting for 39% of the total arrivals from 
Northern Europe. The main embarkation areas were Dunes (7), an unspecified 
location at the mouth of the Thames,151 London (6), Plymouth (2), the Isle of 
Wight (1) and Dover (1). From the mid-sixteenth century the connection 
between the Flemish area, particularly Antwerp, and London had given the 
capital a significant competitive advantage over other English ports.152 From the 
rare instances where the goods shipped are specified, it seems that cargoes of 
cloth and 'other goods' left London and the mouth of the Thames, while cargoes 
of salacca, salted fish, arrived mainly from Plymouth. Fernand Braudel and 
Ruggiero Romano stated that typical cargoes arriving from England consisted of 
tin, cloth, barrels of salted fish, leather or other goods loaded along the route. 
The shipmasters involved appear to be exclusively English, as confirmed in the 
cases where their origin was specified (5).153 
Alongside the main flows from Holland and England, there are other trade 
flows, notably from Hamburg (5), Arkhangelsk, Russia (3) and Newfoundland 
(2). Hamburg rose as a hub for international trade following Antwerp's sack in 
1576 and Lübeck's century-long stagnation.154 However, although its port was 
suitable for Northern trade, it proved unsuitable for handling the distribution of 
incoming goods from southern Europe.155 From Hamburg cargoes departed for 
Genoa and Venice (3), Genoa (1) or Marseille and Genoa (1): the Livorno 
                                                          
151 In sources it is also called “caricatore di Londra” or “spiaggia di Londra”. Such designations 
are frequent in the Mediterranean. 
152 Pagano de Divitiis, ‘L'espansione commerciale’, 111. An example is also the decline of the 
colony of Italian merchants in Southampton, who moved to London and were absorbed into the 
English community in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, see G.D. Ramsay, 
‘The undoing of the Italian mercantile colony in sixteenth century London’, in N. B. Harte, K. G. 
Ponting eds., Textiles history and economic history: essays in honour of Miss Julia de Lacy 
Mann, Manchester, 1973, 22-49. 
153 Braudel, Romano, Navires et marchandises, 49-50. 
154 In face of increasing competition from Dutch and English shipping, Lübeck chose to defend 
its home market by enforcing rules against foreigners. See R. Fagel, L. Alvarez Frances, B. 
Santiago Belmonte eds., Early modern war narratives and the revolt in the Low Countries, 
Manchester, 2020; E. Lindberg, ‘The rise of Hamburg as a global marketplace in the 
seventeenth century: a comparative study of the rise of the city’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 50/3, 2008, 641-662. 
155 Pagano de Divitiis, 'L'espansione commerciale', 113. 
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emporium seems curiously absent, as the Tuscan sources examined so far also 
show for comparison. From the two voyages in which the goods on board are 
specified, we know that Hamburg merchants sent lead, tin, wax and leather to 
the Mediterranean market.156 Despite the importance of the English 'nation' in 
this city, the voyages seem to have been made by local shipmasters.157 Little is 
known of the voyages from Arkhangelsk to Genoa (1) or Genoa and Livorno (2): 
shipmasters declared only General Cargoes and, on the basis of one of the 
three cases examined, it seems that they shipmasters followed a route north of 
Scotland, thus avoiding the English Channel and probably stopping at other 
ports in the area.158 Typical imports from this area, which can also be seen from 
GA data recorded in Livorno, were caviar and hides.159 On the Hamburg route 
there are local or unspecified shipmasters, while all voyages from Arkhangelsk 
are made by English shipmasters, probably employed by the Muscovy 
Company, on whose behalf regular shipments departed throughout the year.160 
The cod trade from Newfoundland also seems to have involved only English 
shipmasters.161 Two shipmasters departed from this area, probably travelling 
together, with cargoes of cod on their way to Genoa.162 
Trade to Genoa from the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula also seems to 
be dominated by the Northerners and, in particular, the English. In this interval 
                                                          
156 The only voyage examined to date with departure from Hamburg to Genoa and Livorno 
dates back to 1704, see ASLi, Governor Auditore Vicario, Atti Civili 478, 1220, 22/11/1704, 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 13095. 
157 According to Michael North, Hamburg was “the continent's most English city”, see M. North, 
From the North Sea to the Baltic: Essays in Commercial, Monetary and Agrarian History, 
London, 1996. 
158 Vessels from Amsterdam and Texel also chose to use this route when headwinds (mainly 
south-westerly) made it impossible to pass through the Channel. See, for example, the voyages 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50030 and 50031. Such a change of route could 
also be specified in freight contracts, see Berti, ‘Il "rischio" nella navigazione’, 292. 
159 Advanced search carried out by selecting ‘Arkhangelsk’ as ‘port visited’. The records in the 
AveTransRisk db do not show any other specific type of goods being loaded in Arkhangelsk. 
Also Pagano de Divitiis' research shows that caviar was the main object of trade. See Pagano 
de Divitiis, ‘The Commercial Expansion’, 122. 
160 On the development of English trade in Russia see F.J. Stout, Exploring Russia in the 
Elizabethan commonwealth: the Muscovy Company and Giles Fletcher, the Elder (1546-1611), 
Manchester, 2015. 
161 It is possible that the English shipmasters came from the Devon area, see D. J. Starkey, 
‘Devonians and the Newfoundland Trade’, in M. Duffy, S. Fisher, B. Greenhill, D.J. Starkey, J. 
Youings eds., The New Maritime History of Devon, I, From Early Times to the Late Eighteenth 
Century, London, 1992, 163-171, 164. On Newfoundland fish trade see C. Heywood, ‘Beyond 
Braudel's 'Northern Invasion'? Aspects of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean fish trade in the 
early seventeenth century’, The International Journal of Maritime History 26/2, 2014, 193-209; 
D. Abreu-Ferreira, ‘The English mercantile community in seventeenth-century Porto: a case 
study of the early Newfoundland trade’, Newfoundland Studies 19/1, 2003, 132-152. 
162 The two reports were declared one day apart. This suggests that the voyage took place in 
convoy. See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50577 and 50581. 
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there are 6 voyages from Portugal and 6 from western Spain. The vessels from 
Portugal all departed from Lisbon with 'colonial' products such as ginger, 
cinnamon, sugar or General Cargoes.163 Amongst the damage reports from this 
period is a return cargo, a consignment of wheat from Livorno to Lisbon which 
stopped in Genoa due to bad weather. Shipmasters from Western Spain only 
reported General Cargo from Cadiz to Genoa (1), or Genoa and Venice (3). On 
one of the voyages from Cadiz, the shipmaster stopped to load other General 
Cargoes also in Motril and Cartagena.164 The role of Cadiz will emerge more 
clearly in the analysis of the next three years. This city had an active Genoese 
colony with its own consul and institutions.165 Cadiz, alongside Portuguese 
ports, specialised in the redistribution trade of colonial or Northern European 
products. This role had belonged in the sixteenth century to the city of Seville, 
where the largest community of Genoese merchants on the Iberian Peninsula 
initially resided.166 In the course of the sixteenth century, however, Genoese 
merchants in Seville swlowly moved their interests towards insurance business, 
trade with North America - in slaves but also in goods - and lending to the local 
nobility or crown.167 Perhaps these reasons explain the low number of 
shipmasters coming from Seville in the Average reports. Only one cargo for 
Genoa arrived from Seville (1). 
 
4.2.2 1639-1641, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes 
 
The area whose trade changed perhaps less in this three-year period than in 
the previous sample is Mediterranean Spain. In the database there are 30 
voyages from this area, representing about 13% of the total. From 1630 
onwards, trade in the area was characterised by a greater instability in the 
                                                          
163 Although Lisbon was the main port of the Kingdom, in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries other ports, such as Porto, specialised in particular sectors such as the Swedish steel 
trade. See M.C. Moreira, J. Eloranta, J. Ojala, L. Karvonen, ‘Early modern trade flows between 
smaller states. The Portuguese-Swedish trade in the eighteenth century as an example’, Revue 
de l'OFCE 4/140, 2015, 87-109, 101. 
164 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50520. 
165 The first special privileges for Genoese date back to the fifteenth century, see F. Morand, ‘La 
nación nómada: los genoveses en Cádiz desde finales del XV hasta mediados del siglo XVII’, in 
J.I. Ruiz Rodriguez, I. Sosa Mayor eds., Construyendo indentidades: del protonacionalismo a la 
nación, Madrid, 2003, 9-37. 
166 R. Pike, ‘The Genoese in Seville and the opening of the New World’, The Journal of 
Economic History 22/3, 1962, 348-378, 349. 
167 Pike, ‘The Genoese in Seville’, 376-377. 
244 
 
number of vessels.168 In addition, the Genoese settled on the Mediterranean 
coast of Spain had to cope with the growing weight of French merchants who 
were mainly based in the region of Valencia and Andalusia.169 The voyages 
within the three years examined are concentrated in the area between 
Cartagena and Alicante or between Menorca and Majorca. The origins are as 
follows: Alicante (3), Cartagena (6), Alicante and Cartagena (6), Balearic 
Islands (11), Barcelona (2), Motril and Cartagena (1), and the salt flats of La 
Mata (1), a coastal location between Cartagena and Alicante. Compared to the 
previous period, Cartagena and Alicante began to be referred to separately. 
Cartagena had in fact entered a long phase of decline since the increase in 
taxation in 1630, which would slowly make Alicante the main export port in the 
area in the second half of the seventeenth century.170 Wool, timber, sugar, soda 
ash and barley, a plant used to make soda, were sent from mainland Spain.171 
Some of the sugar probably came from the Cadiz area, where it arrived from 
overseas waiting to be reloaded.172 Production was also widespread in the 
Granada area, where many Genoese companies operated.173 According to 
Edoardo Grendi and Luisa Piccinno, between 10 and 20% of the raw silk 
shipped to Genoa came from Spain.174 This merchandise, as mentioned, was 
transported mainly on board galleys and, for this reason, partly escapes 
analysis based on damage documents. The Spanish market, in return, bought 
paper produced in Liguria, iron and about two thirds of the textiles which arrived 
in Genoa.175 From Menorca and Majorca, in addition to the products already 
listed, there were frequent shipments of oil and cheese.  
An important new element in this three-year period is the increasing role of 
Northern shipping on specific routes, such as those from Sicily or the Adriatic 
area. Chartering was a way of obtaining valuable currency in pieces of eight 
reales in the Mediterranean, a market where the arrival of Spanish silver 
                                                          
168 Franch Benavent, ‘El comercio en Mediterráneo’, 87. 
169 A. Alloza, Europa en el mercado español. Mercaderes, represalias y contrabando en el siglo 
XVII, Salamanca, 2006, 90. 
170 Franch Benavent, ‘El comercio en Mediterráneo’, 111. 
171 W. Bowles, Introduction to the Natural History and Physical Geography of Spain, I, Parma, 
1783, 139. 
172 Franch Benavent, ‘El comercio en Mediterráneo’, 111. 
173 See A. Fábregas García, Producción y comercio del azúcar en el Mediterráneo medieval. El 
ejemplo del reino de Granada, Granada, 2000. 
174 Piccinno, ‘Il commercio marittimo’, 8; Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale’, 324-330. On the silk trade 
in Spain see M. Garzón Pareja, El industria sedera en España: el arte de la seda de Granada, 
Granada, 1972. In the Sicilian market too, silk, at least between 1620 and 1670, replaced wheat 
as the first export product. See Aymard, 'Palermo and Messina', 158.  
175 Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale’, 324-330. 
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allowed a wide circulation of money.176 The appearance of the Northern 
shipmasters is evident: in addition to five Genoese shipmasters and one 
Majorcan, there are five Northerners, probably Flemish, and four English. The 
nationalities of the remaining shipmasters are not specified, but on the basis of 
their names it can be assumed that most of them came from the territories of 
the Republic. 
On the basis of the data analysed, there are very few journeys coming from 
Provence (2) and Liguria (2), mostly operated by local shipmasters. Perhaps 
this is due to the small amount of capital involved in the individual voyages, 
which rarely led to a report or calculation, or perhaps the route connecting these 
two regions was generally safer.177 Genoa's trade with the Riviera and the 
French Mediterranean coasts was mainly based on small-scale coastal 
shipping. From Provence there is information on two voyages, both made by 
Provençal patroni on small boats: in one case it is a Marseille patron leaving the 
islands of Marseille with his cimba and an unknown cargo for Genoa and 
Livorno; the second case, instead, concerns the events of a French patron 
carrying bales of fabric from Marseille to Genoa on his tartana. The 
correspondence of Genoese diplomats in Paris confirms this type of traffic: it 
shows that Genoese vessels, calling at Marseille and other ports or plundered 
by French pirates on the coasts of Provence, were mainly boats (cimbe), 
feluccas, tartanes, for which the coasts of western Liguria and Provence offered 
excellent landing places.178 Another area of activity of the Ligurian patroni, as 
one would expect, was Corsica (7). Loads of grain, wine, timber and 'forks' 
destined for Genoa left from Ajaccio (3), Cap Corse (1) or other unspecified 
locations. The voyages were operated by patroni of the Ligurian Riviera, coming 
from Arenzano (1), Sturla (1) or Sampierdarena (1). From the Kingdom of 
Sardinia (9), on the other hand, Flemish (3), Ligurian (1), Tuscan (1) or other 
nationalities shipmasters arrived with probably larger vessels. The region 
continued to be an exporter of foodstuffs, especially cheese, but here too there 
is evidence of a vessel loaded with General Cargo. 
The sources examined for this three-year period report only two voyages 
from Liguria, both carried out by Ligurian patroni on small vessels: one is a 
                                                          
176 Pagano de Divitiis, ‘L'espansione commerciale’, 137. 
177 On the landings between Genoa and Marseille see A. Agosto, ‘Portulans et Cartes nautiques 
génoises’, in Marseille au XVII siècle, numero spécial 122, 1980, 30-32. 
178 P. Schiappacasse, ‘Genova e Marsiglia nella seconda metà del XVII secolo’, Atti della 
Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie, XXII, 1982, 197-224, 203. 
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patrone from Albissola, a small town on the Western Riviera, transporting 
General Cargoes from Albissola to Genoa on his fregata; the second voyage 
involves a patrone transporting wine from La Spezia, on the Eastern Riviera, to 
the capital of the Republic on a cimba. 
There are 14 voyages from Tuscany. Again, these are often made by 
Ligurian patroni, whose origin is specified in the sources: San Cipriano (1), 
Cogoleto (1), Sturla (1), Prà (1) Genoa (1), “riviera di Genova” (1), or even one 
from Corsica but living in Livorno (1). They travelled on small vessels such as 
cimbe (3), barche (3), polacche (3), liuti (2), tartane (1), fregate (1) or others not 
specified (1). From the nearby port of Livorno came wheat, wax, Roman 
saltpetre and General Cargoes. The trade with Tuscany also reveals the activity 
of minor ports specialised in specific exports such as Elba and Piombino, from 
which iron was exported, or Montalto and Corneto, from where cargoes of grain 
departed for Genoa. The cargoes of the two remaining voyages from Tuscany, 
which set sailed from Follonica and Cecina, are not specified. 
The vessels departing from Lazio (8), the Tyrrhenian side of the Papal 
States, carried goods such as wheat, General Cargo, saltpetre, oil, wine, raw 
materials for paper or wood. The ports of loading were Rome (3), Civitavecchia 
(2), Rome and Civitavecchia (1), Foce Verde (1) or Porto Badino (1). Given 
perhaps the geographical proximity to Liguria, it seems that also in this case the 
trade was carried out mainly by patroni on Mediterranean vessels such as liuti 
(2), lembi (1), tartane (2), or polacche (2). The shipmasters are Genoese, e.g. 
from Savona (2), or of unspecified nationalities, plus a Provençal shipmaster 
from Martigues (1). 
The routes linked to the Kingdom of Naples are in significant growth 
compared to the previous period. Heterogeneous cargoes departed from 
Naples and it is possible to find also luxury goods: besides products such as 
pitch, wine, raw materials for paper, almonds and General Cargoes, in fact, 
there are two porcelain shipments, one from Sorrento and one from Naples, 
both bound directly for Genoa. Grain and foodstuffs arrived from Calabria (8) 
and, in particular, from the port of Crotone, on the Ionian coast.179 Trade with 
the Adriatic area - Apulia (21), Abruzzo (1) and Molise (1), constituting the 
Adriatic side of the Kingdom of Naples - also increased, as shown in Graph 4.2. 
                                                          
179 One of these vessels also stopped in Messina to load “altre merci”, see the voyage recorded 
in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50371. 
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About 9.4% of the total vessels registered in this three years sample period 
arrived from these latter regions, all loaded with grain for Genoa. Apulia, as 
already mentioned, was an alternative market to Sicily. In purchasing Apulian 
grain, Genoese merchants theoretically faced competition from the Republic of 
Venice, which concentrated its food trade in this area.180 However, the 
increasing number of voyages, the indication of Genoa as the only destination 
and the relative specialisation of some ports such as Barletta (6) and Fortore (6) 
suggest an increasing weight of Genoese merchants.181 
As far as the nationality of the shipmasters is concerned, despite the few 
cases where this data was specified, it is possible to observe or hypothesise the 
presence of some trends.182 Trade from Naples seem to be managed by 
Genoese shipmasters where the nationality is indicated (3) or where it can be 
deduced (1). From Calabria, on the other hand, Flemish shipmasters (5) and 
one Genoese arrived in Genoa. On the Adriatic side, two thirds of the 
shipmasters (14) came from the Flemish area, while the others are not specified 
(7). 
The Adriatic side of the Papal State, roughly comprising the present-day 
regions of Marche and Emilia-Romagna, also specialised in sending grain 
cargoes: these departed from Goro (2), Ravenna (1), and Ancona (3).183 The 
shipmasters headed straight to Genoa. They were Flemish (5) or of unspecified 
nationality (1). A Flemish shipmaster travelling with a cargo of wheat, rice etc. 
from Venice and Ancona declared instead to be generically heading 
“westward”.184 
Northern shipmasters clearly established themselves in the cereal sector, 
also thanks to the competitive advantage of the larger average holds of their 
vessels. This specialisation is also confirmed by the voyages arriving from the 
                                                          
180 M. Aymard, ‘Commerce et consommation des draps en Sicile et en Italie méridionale (XVe-
XVIIIe siècles)’, Settimana di Prato 1970, 1970, 127-132, 130. 
181 Unfortunately it is not possible to make a comparison with the vessels heading for Venice in 
the same period. It is safe to assume, however, that their presence in the area remained stable 
during the seventeenth century. 
182 This data is also absent from Grendi's studies, which report vessel origins only for a limited 
sample of years (1558-1565). See Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 70. 
183 In the period 1630-1639, according to Grendi, 21% of the cargoes of grain purchased by the 
Ufficio dell’Abbondanza came from central Italy, while arrivals from Sicily remained stable 
between 45 and 49%, see Grendi, ‘Traffico portuale’, 324. On the commercial development of 
Ancona during the early modern period see P. Earle, ‘The Commercial Development of Ancona, 
1479-1551’, The Economic History Review 22/1, 1969, 28-44; M. Moroni, ‘Reti commerciali e 
spazi costieri: il caso di Ancona tra XVII e XVIII secolo’, in D. Andreozzi, L. Panariti, C. Zaccaria 
eds., Acque, terre e spazi dei mercanti, Trieste, 2009, 85-112. 
184 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50353. 
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territories of the Venetian Republic. The 9 cases recorded all concern cargoes 
of grain, in one case accompanied by a consignment of uva passa bound for 
Genoa (5) or Livorno (3). There is also a voyage with wheat and rice from 
Venice and Ancona destined generically “westward”.185 With the exception of a 
French shipmaster living in Venice, all voyages are carried out by Flemish 
shipmasters (8). 
Moving from the Italian peninsula to Sicily, it is evident that this region 
remained one of the main areas of origin for vessels bound for Genoa and 
involved in Average reports. Nevertheless, these were years of crisis for Sicilian 
exports. Cereal shipments in these years were mainly destined for Catalonia, to 
support the war effort: from 1642 to 1646, for example, 30,000 Sicilian salme 
(6,441.6 tons) of wheat and 20,000 Sicilian salme (4,294.4 tons) of barley were 
required each year for Tarragona.186 After 1620, the volume of cereal sales from 
Sicily abroad had steadily decreased.187 This can also be observed in the lower 
yield of the revenue from the sales of the tratte, the grain export permits 
abovementioned: they decreased from 8,000 scudi per grain in 1560 to 2,250 
scudi per grain in 1640.188 In 1640 in particular, according to Cancila, the long 
sixteenth century ended and a long seventeenth century of relative decline in 
Sicily began, lasting until the advent of the Bourbon dynasty (1734).189 
Within the cargoes arriving in Genoa from Sicily in the three-year period 
1639-1640, wheat figured in 21 voyages. It was often the only commodity on 
board. The variety of ports of loading decreased considerably compared to the 
previous sample period and arrivals were concentrated in the island's main 
caricatori: Girgenti (11) and Sciacca (9). One voyage with a cargo of wheat also 
departed from Messina (1). Silk shipments are completely absent in Average 
reports and silk manufacturing experienced a period of decline in Genoa. Other 
goods such as oil from Milazzo (3), or pitch and wine (1), hemp (1), tonnine (1), 
zibibbo wine with raw materials for making paper (1) from Messina, Palermo or 
Lipari are also present to a lesser extent. 
As many as 20 of the 30 total voyages from Sicily were carried out by 
shipmasters from the Flemish area, to which must be added the presence of an 
                                                          
185 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50353. 
186 Aymard, ‘Bilancio di una lunga crisi’, 990. 
187 Aymard, ‘Palermo and Messina’, 158. 
188 Aymard, ‘Bilancio di una lunga crisi’, 992. O. Cancila, ‘I dazi sull'esportazione dei cereali e il 
commercio dei grani nel regno di Sicilia’, Nuovi Quaderni del Meridione 28, 1962, 12-17. 
189 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 264. 
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English shipmaster, Thomas Spenser. There are only 3 shipmasters of 
Genoese origin and 5 of unknown origin: on the basis of their names and their 
status of patrone, however, it is possible to assume that most of them were 
Genoese. Compared to the previous period, therefore, the so-called ‘Northern 
Invasion’ was fully established, which led Northern European merchant navies 
to impose themselves on the Mediterranean routes, eroding the market shares 
of local navies thanks to their lower freight rates.190 According to Gigliola 
Pagano de Divitiis, this substitution had begun, painlessly, as early as the 
1570s: only gradually it evolved into greater involvement of English and Dutch 
merchants who began to establish themselves directly in the main 
Mediterranean ports.191 The cargoes bounded for Genoa in this period, 
however, are mostly bought and sold by Genoese merchants: an example is the 
consignment of wheat loaded at Girgenti by order of Gio Batta Semino, resident 
in Palermo, and received in Genoa by Giulio Semino and Paolo Morinello in 
1639, transported on the vessel of the Flemish shipmaster Antonio Jacopo 
Coes.192 
 
4.2.3 1639-1641, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes 
 
Moving eastward, there are two voyages from Greece, one of which was made 
by a patrone, probably from Genoa, on board of his tartana with General Cargo 
from Zakynthos and Kefalonia to Genoa and Marseille. The second voyage, 
about which unfortunately we do not have many details, concerns the sending 
of a cargo on board a galeone from Corfu to Messina and Genoa.193 Corfu, 
Zakynthos and Kefalonia were all part of the Venetian domains in the Ionian 
Sea. The galeone carried uva passa, oil, dyeing material, millet and stones 
used to polish mirrors.194 The document was drawn up in front of the Annona 
office. The shipmaster feared that storms along the route had soaked the millet 
                                                          
190 According to the research of F. Rigamonti, for example, the freight for a bale of cloth from 
Genoa to Palermo in 1619 on a large Dutch vessel was less than half that paid to a 
Mediterranean fregata or felucca. See F. Rigamonti, ‘Dutch navigation in Sicily in the first half of 
the Seventeenth century’, in Ö. Çaykent, L. Zavagno eds., People and goods on the move. 
Merchants, networks and communication routes in the medieval and early modern 
Mediterranean, Fisciano, 2016, 143-161, 146. 
191 Pagano de Divitiis, ‘L'espansione commerciale’, 142. 
192 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50509. 
193 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50384. 
194 On the Venetian trade of uva passa and the presence of English and Dutch shipmasters in 
the Ionian Sea, see M. Fusaro, Uva passa. Una Guerra commerciale tra Venezia e l'Inghilterra 
(1540-1640), Venice, 1996. 
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on board. The shipmaster appears to be Armenian or Persian, while the only 
sailor called to testify was a Ragusan.195 Similarly to what has already been 
pointed out for the first sample period, the Levantine market remained 
secondary within the panorama of trade to Genoa. As the Direttori per il 
commercio con il Levante in Livorno in 1627 explained in a report, for example, 
eight times more Levantine vessels arrived yearly in Livorno than in Genoa.196 
There was no lack of plans to increase trade in the Levant, as shown by a 
report written by the Giunta Marittima in Genoa in 1638, which referred to a 
Collegi’s decree of the previous year.197 However, international opposition, 
particularly from France, to the entry of new competitors into the Levantine 
market made it difficult to implement these projects. Only one voyage from Acre 
on a Flemish shipmaster's vessel in 1639 with a cargo of grain, silk and other 
goods is recorded in the current three years sample.198 Moreover, this cargo 
was bound for Livorno and only a copy of the report drawn up in Tuscany was 
sent to Genoa. This is perhaps an indication of the interest of unknown 
Genoese merchants in some of the goods carried to Livorno. 
Finally, there are five vessels from Tabarka. All voyages are operated by 
Flemish shipmasters.199 They carried to Genoa two cargoes of wheat and other 
goods, one of wheat, coral and other goods and one of unknown goods. 
 
4.3 1668-1670, New Balance between Local and Foreign Players 
 
The third three-year sample period is situated within a phase of relative decline 
in traffic. The years of the plague of 1656-1657 must be taken into account, for 
which about 45-55,000 people died in Genoa alone, equal to nearly half of its 
                                                          
195 Following the promulgation of the Livornine between 1591 and 1592, a stable community of 
Armenian merchants established in Livorno, some of whom moved to Marseille following the 
free port edict of 1669. On the other hand, the presence of Armenian shipmasters, which was 
growing in Venice and the Eastern Mediterranean at the time, seems unusual for the Tyrrhenian 
area. On the Livornine see P. Castignoli, L. Frattarelli Fischer, Bandi per il popolamento di 
Livorno. 1590-1603, Livorno, 1988. On the Armenian community that moved to Marseille see S. 
Boghossian, La communauté arménienne de Marseille, Paris, 2009. For an example of the 
Armenian presence in Livorno in the AveTransRisk database see voyage id 10031. 
196 M.C. Engels, Merchants, interlopers, seamen and corsairs: the Flemish community in 
Livorno and Genoa, 1615-1635, Hilversum, 1997, 107. 
197 Pastine, Genova e l'Impero Ottomano, 8. 
198 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50194. 
199 The nationalities of the shipmasters are explicitly mentioned in two cases. They can be 
deduced from the names of their vessels (La Speranza, La Barca Longa, Rosa di Fortuna) in 
the remaining three cases. 
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inhabitants.200 The plague marked a collapse, preceded and followed by years 
of decline and stagnation.201 Thereafter, trade recovered very slowly and this 
led to the gradual end of the policy of state support for port maintenance during 
the 1670s. It almost seems, according to Giorgio Doria, that the city's oligarchy 
between the 1640s and 1660s tried to swim against the tide through a vast 
programme of public works to revive activity and employment in the port area, 
but without achieving the aimed objectives.202 Edoardo Grendi, too, confirmed 
the decline in traffic from the 1640s onwards and even more markedly in the 
1660s.203 For the five-year period 1661-1665, among the last years considered 
in his research, he identifies 67 vessels with a capacity of over 300 Genoese 
salme (57.17 tons) arriving in the port of Genoa on average every year. 
Compared to the previous period, there is an important change in the archival 
location of the Average procedures. As mentioned above, between the 1640s 
and the 1660s the drafting of the procedures progressively passed to the notary 
of the Conservatori del Mare.204 This led to an increasing number of cases 
being declared and registered at the Conservatori’s chancellery. It was then the 
notary of the latter, also acting as a calculator, who drew up the calculation of 
the apportionment of damages. The total voyages in the Atti Civili of the 
Conservatori del Mare for the three-year period 1668-1670 are 168, respectively 
38 for 1668, 58 for 1669 and 72 for 1670.205 The increasing quantity reflects 
both the progressive recovery of traffic compared to the previous years, and the 
growing importance of the notary of the Conservatori. However, it is still a 
consolidation phase from an administrative point of view and this is also 
reflected in the low number of calculations made in these years.206 Only seven 
voyages present one or more calculation, for five GA and four PA 
respectively.207 For some voyages, in fact, more than one calculation was 
                                                          
200 Plague epidemics broke out regularly in Genoa during the early modern period (1499-1506, 
1527-1530, 1579-1580, 1598-1599, 1625-1626), but the plague of 1656-1657 was the most 
serious in terms of death toll. Costantini, La repubblica di Genova, 355-357. 
201 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 53. 
202 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 177. As early as 1645 the Casa di San Giorgio began to 
reduce its ordinary contribution, leading the Padri del Comune to rely increasingly on income 
from port traffic alone. See par. 2.4. 
203 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 55. 
204 See par. 3.5. 
205 This is achieved by entering ‘1668’ and ‘1670’ in the second and third text fields of the 
‘advanced search’ function above. 
206 It is probable that in the transition period of the procedure’s jurisdiction from the calcolatori to 
the Conservatori the shipmasters and, above all, the merchants involved preferred to use 
private agreements for the GA calculations, see par. 3.5. 
207 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Average type’ ‘is not empty’. 
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made. For example, there could be more than one GA calculation in the case of 
multiple accidents on the same voyage because of more than one harmful 
event. PA calculations, on the other hand, resulted when part of the cargo was 
damaged as a result of an accident and not as a result of an act of GA.208 The 
goods’ average value per voyage in this period is 9,571 lire.209 The average 
value per vessel is approximately of 4,790 Genoese lire.210 This figure 
represents approximately half or one third of the value of the vessels in the 
Average calculations examined in the first or second three-year period 
respectively. Finally, the average damage per voyage amounts to 3,597 
Genoese lire.211 Although the average value of vessels and cargoes on board 
has declined significantly, the average amount of damage during the first three 
quarters of the seventeenth century remains substantially stable. 
 
Table 4.4 Statistical values 1668-1670 
n. of voyages 























7 4,790 -243% 9,571 -740.7% 3,597 +1.5% 
 
In spite of the small number of calculations, it was possible to trace the names 
of the merchants involved in 27 different voyages thanks to the information in 
the reports and the accompanying documentation, such as bills of lading or 
calling of the parties involved before the Conservatori’s court. Compared to the 
previous sample period, there are not many names of foreign merchants and, in 
general, patroni or their sailors are often found among the owners of the goods 
loaded in the holds. The only exception is the presence in 1670 of the English 
merchant Guglielmo Elam, already mentioned in the calculations of 1639 and 
1640. He was probably part of the small community of English merchants 
                                                          
208 This was the case when different incidents gave rise to multiple Averages or when, within the 
same event, the vessel and the goods suffered both GA and PA damages. 
209 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Total amount of risk for the cargo’ ‘>1’. The total 
value is 201,948 Genoese lire. 
210 Result obtained by adding the functions ‘Total amount of risk for the vessel’ ‘>1’. The total 
value of the 5 vessels involved in GA procedures is about 35,923 Genoese lire. This figure has 
to be doubled as the value of the vessels in the GA contributes only half in this three-year 
period. On the different criteria followed for the calculation of the vessel's contributing value, see 
par. 3.3. 
211 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Damages/expanses - total awarded’ ‘>1’. The total 




permanently settled in Genoa. He was involved in a GA concerning a General 
Cargo from England to Genoa in 1670.212 On the other hand, there is no 
shortage of names from the Genoese aristocracy such as Spinola, Pallavicino, 
Assereto, Tagliafico, Rezzonico and others. 
Graph 4.3 shows the distribution by region of the origin of vessels arriving in 
Genoa and declaring an Average report between 1668 and 1670. 
Once again, wheat confirms its centrality among the types of cargo arriving in 
the port. It appears as the only product on board or, in rare cases, together with 
other goods, in 62 voyages, 36% of the total. This percentage is significantly 
almost identical to the one found in the previous sample period. There was a 
slight decrease in the number of vessels carrying a General Cargo: 36 vessels, 
or about 21% of the total, compared to the previous 25%. Although this 
expression refers mainly to cargoes coming from Northern Europe, it was 
sometimes also used to indicate goods coming from Mediterranean ports such 
as Naples and Marseille, or from Genoa itself.213 On the other hand, fifteen 
voyages did not provide any indication of the region of origin and/or on the 
loaded goods.214 
The three main areas of origin are Northern Europe (21), Apulia (22) and 
Sicily (16). These three areas accounted for 59 cases, or 43% of the total. They 
are followed, at a short distance, by Mediterranean Spain with 11 voyages. This 
last route saw its importance reduced compared to the other flows and to the 
previous sample periods, decreasing from 19 to 12 to 8% of the total traffic. 
Apulia, on the other hand, seems to have acquired a leading importance in this 
interval, following a positive trend already observable in the previous sample 
periods. The absence of a clear predominance of a specific area in this interval 
is reflected in Map 4.5, where there is a great dispersion of ports of departure 
and scheduled stops along the Mediterranean coast. 
                                                          
212 All the voyages involving Guglielmo Elam are recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the ids 
50354 (1639), 50272 (1640) and 50736 (1670). 
213 See, for example, a General Cargo from Genoa to Athens in ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 86, 
27/09/1669, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50706. 
214 These cases also include 3 voyages where the region of origin could not be identified 
(“spiaggia di Lissinati”; “Gonda”), see the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 
50695, and 50733. 
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My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The 
graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (19) and those with 




















































Map 4.5 Ports of departure and scheduled stops of vessels arriving in Genoa, 1668-1670
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The map was constructed on the AveTransRisk db by selecting the sources in ASG in the 
interval 1668-1670 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I 
removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages. 
 
4.3.1 1668-1670, Extra Mediterranean Routes 
 
Northern Europe is one of the main areas of origin of shipmasters. This region, 
as shown above, has a clear bipolarity between England and the Flemish area. 
There are no more arrivals from Arkhangelsk. The disappearance of 
Arkhangelsk with its English shipmasters from this area is also reflected in the 
Livorno sources. Only Flemish shipmasters sailed from Russia to Livorno in 
these years.215  
Fifteen vessels departed from Holland, accounting for 71% of the arrivals 
from Northern Europe and about 9% of the total voyages. The shipmasters, 
when specified, were Dutch (6). There is also one shipmaster specifically from 
Texel and one from Scotland. Texel appears to be the most used port, whereas 
in the previous sample period it was a port of call to complete the cargo after 
departure from nearby Amsterdam.216 The origins are distributed as follows: 
Texel (11), Rotterdam (1), Amsterdam (1), unspecified (2). Two of these 
voyages are bounded to unspecified locations, probably Genoa. In one other 
case, the vessel, besides Genoa, was bounded also to Livorno, Naples and 
Messina.217 In all cases, unfortunately, the composition of the cargo is not 
indicated or the sources report a General Cargo. Cadiz appears to be a 
common leg in these voyages (13), although shipmasters did not always 
specified whether they loaded a new cargo in Cadiz or they simply replenished 
food supplies and equipment necessary for the vessel and crew. Based on the 
two only cases where this information is given, we know that General Cargo 
                                                          
215 Voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the ids 10020 and 10027. 
216 Considering that Texel is a small island in the delta where Amsterdam is located, it is likely 
that cargoes were brought there to save time. On Dutch maritime trade in these years see J. De 
Vrie, A. van der Woude, The first modern economy. Success, failure and perseverance of the 
Dutch Republic, 1500-1815, Cambridge, 1997. 
217 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50679. 
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and “money” were loaded. In Cadiz, Atlantic and Mediterranean trade routes 
and products converged.218 Cadiz was also a port of call for Dutch convoys to 
regroup and form up before entering the Mediterranean. The Dutch vessels on 
this route, in fact, sometimes travelled in convoy and under the escort of 
warships, so it is frequent that on arrival in Genoa, in the event of accidents 
during the voyage, the Dutch shipmasters went together on the same day to 
declare their report at the chancellery of the Conservatori del Mare.219 Other 
possible legs were the ports on the Mediterranean coast of Spain. There is, for 
example, a shipmaster coming from Amsterdam with a General Cargo who 
stopped in Alicante to load salt for Genoa.220 
Six vessels set sailed from England, all with English shipmasters, when 
specified (4). From 1651, the Navigation Acts, which declared that only English 
ships would be allowed to bring goods into England, were in force. London 
maintained its centrality with respect to the other ports of the Kingdom, 
establishing itself even more clearly than in the previous sample periods. Apart 
from two cases where the port of origin is not indicated, the alternative to the 
English capital in these years was the port of Yarmouth, in Norfolk.221 
Unfortunately, General Cargo expression makes it difficult to get an idea of the 
types of cargo leaving England. The only voyage where this is specified is for a 
cargo of herring leaving Yarmouth for Genoa, with a scheduled stop at Cadiz.222 
On the basis of what emerges from Tuscan GA sources, it is possible to state 
that cargoes of woollen cloth, lead, tin, leather and spices such as pepper 
arrived mainly from England.223 All voyages are declared as headed directly to 
Genoa, which suggests that relations with England were being strengthened. In 
the previous sample periods Genoa had frequently been a destination in 
addition to or instead of the port of Livorno.  
There was only one voyage from Newfoundland in this three-year period. 
This was a cargo of cod loaded onto an English vessel and bound for Genoa 
and Livorno. 
                                                          
218 A. Bustos Rodríguez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico. La ciudad, sus comerciantes y la 
actividad mercantil (1650-1830), Madrid, 2005, 60-70, 364-372. 
219 See, for example, ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 84, doc. 306, 24/08/1668 and ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 
84, doc. 307, 24/08/1668. 
220 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50776. 
221 On the rise of Yarmouth as a trading centre see P. Gauci, Politics and society in Great 
Yarmouth 1660-1722, Oxford, 1996. 
222 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50714. 
223 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 10033. 
258 
 
Moving on to the western coasts of the Iberian Peninsula, we find the vessels 
departing from Portugal. The structure of the routes from Portugal to the 
Mediterranean Sea is very simple. The main port of loading was Lisbon (7) but 
some voyages also departed from Oporto (1) and Vila Nova de Milfontes (1). 
The goods were bound for Genoa (5), Genoa and Livorno (1) or, in 1 case, 
Livorno alone.224 In contrast to the Dutch dominance on the Cadiz-Genoa route, 
the vessels from Portugal are of different nationalities. When specified, French 
(2), English (1) and Genoese (1) shipmasters are found. What is striking is the 
regularity of the composition of the cargoes. Sugar is the main product of 
Portuguese exports, sometimes loaded with tobacco cargoes. Cargoes are 
distributed as follows: sugar and General Cargoes (5), sugar and tobacco (2) or 
just sugar (1). It is likely that the sugar came from Portuguese Brazil, which 
specialised in this type of export. Between 1650 and 1710, the production of 
Brazilian plantations increased from 4,000 to 25,000 tonnes of sugar per 
year.225 Much of the sugar arrived in Lisbon.226 From Lisbon, loads were re-
exported to the Mediterranean or to Northern Europe. As can be seen from the 
documentation, and has been theorised by other scholars, the port of Genoa 
played an important redistribution function, thanks also to the contacts between 
Genoese merchants living in Lisbon and their partners in the homeland.227 
Stephen Fisher, for example, has brought out how the importance of Lisbon as 
an emporium should not be underestimated by concentrating entirely on the 
                                                          
224 The vessel headed to Livorno stopped in Genoa only because of bad weather suffered along 
the route. See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50772. 
225 The reduced importance of the Lisbon sugar circuit in the previous sample period was 
probably due to the temporary loss of Pernambuco (1630-1654) by Portugal in its wars with 
Holland. See N. Alessandrini, A. Viola, ‘Genovesi e fiorentini in Portogallo: reti commerciali e 
strategie politico-diplomatiche(1650-1700)’, in Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche 28, 2013, 295-
322, 300. On Portugal in these years see L. Freire Costa, P. Lains, S. Munch Miranda, An 
economic history of Portugal, 1143-2010, Cambridge, 2016; D. Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation 
upon the Ocean Sea: Portugal's Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492-
1640, Oxford, 2007; C.A. Hanson, Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal: 1668-1703, 
Minneapolis, 1981. 
226 P. Calcagno, ‘Attraverso la porta di Lisbona: i generi coloniali volano del commercio luso-
genovese tra XVII e XVIII secolo’, in Nigro ed., Reti marittime, 519-532, 521. The increase in 
Brazilian sugar production averaged 2.4% per year in the two centuries between 1580 and 
1780, see M. Fusaro, Reti commerciali e traffici globali in età moderna, Rome-Bari, 2008, 64. 
227 The Genoese colony was the most important in Lisbon's socio-economic sector, see N. 
Alessandrini, ‘La presenza genovese a Lisbona negli anni dell'unione delle Corone (1580-
1640)’, in Herrero Sánchez, Ben Yessef Garfia, Bitossi, Puncuh eds, Génova y la Monarquía, 
73-98; Alessandrini, Viola, ‘Genovesi e fiorentini’; L. Lo Basso, ‘"La porte d'Italie". Marchandises 
coloniales et transculturation dans le port de Gênes au XVIIIe siècle: l'exemple du tabac’, in M. 
Figeac, C. Bouneau eds., Circulation, métissage et culture matérielle (XVIe-XXe siècles), Paris, 
2017, 145-160. A similar role in the re-export of sugar from Lisbon to Northern Europe was 
played by the French port of Nantes, see M. Villeret, Le goût de l'or blanc. Le sucre en France 
au XVIII siècle, Rennes, 2017. 
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fortunes of Livorno.228 This function became more evident in the following years. 
Re-exporting was also carried out from Livorno, often by Genoese and 
Livornese merchants together, with bills of lading specifying both ports as 
possible destinations.229  
The growing role of Cadiz as a transit port for vessels from Northern Europe 
to the Mediterranean has already been mentioned. The western side of the 
Iberian Peninsula acted not only as a port of call for supplies and regrouping for 
Northern vessels before entering into the Mediterranean Sea, but also as a 
centre for the redistribution of colonial products arriving from overseas. Cadiz, in 
this sample period, is a port of loading for five vessels bound for Genoa. As in 
the case of the voyages previously examined, the shipmasters were Dutch (4) 
or from Hamburg (1). They used to travel in convoy (3). There is also evidence 
of a French vessel travelling from the Canary Islands to Alicante and Genoa 
with a General Cargo including, most probably, sugar.230 In these same years 
there were also convoys operating on the Cadiz-Genoa route loaded with 
precious metals.231 
 
4.3.2 1668-1670, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes 
 
As regards the Mediterranean side of the Iberian Peninsula, the situation shows 
little changes. For this sample period, information is available on eleven 
voyages, i.e. 6.5% of the total. The ports of departure were Alicante (4), 
Cartagena (3), the Balearic Islands (2), Mazarròn and Barcelona (1) or 
generally Spain (1). Apart from one journey to Genoa and Palermo (1), all 
cargoes were directed to Genoa (10). The cargoes loaded on board are the 
same of the previous periods, confirming the continuity of trading along the 
                                                          
228 S. Fisher, ‘Lisbon, its English merchant community and the Mediterranean in the eighteenth 
century’, in P.L. Cottrell, D.H. Aldcroft eds., Shipping, Trade and Commerce: essays in memory 
of Ralph Davis, Leicester, 1981, 23-44. 
229 Calcagno, ‘Attraverso la porta’, 531. See also, for example, the voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id 10048. On this trade see Braudel, Romano, Navires et 
marchandises; J.P. Filippini, Il porto di Livorno e la Toscana (1676-1814), I, Naples, 1998, I, 55-
56. 
230 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50715. Genoese merchants 
stimulated the establishment of a plantation society in the Canary Islands, see S. Greenfield, 
‘Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery’, Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 6/1, 1979, 
85-119. On the role of these islands for international trade see G. Santana Pérez, ‘Los 
holandeses y la utilización de Canarias como puerta atlántica durante los siglos XVI-XVIII’, in R. 
Vermeir, M. Ebben, R. Fagel eds., Agentes e identidades en movimiento. España y los Países 
Bajos siglos XVI-XVIII, Madrid, 2011, 329-349. 
231 Kirk, Genoa and the sea, 194. 
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‘traditional’ routes of the Republic which, apart from variations in quantitative 
terms, do not undergo significant changes. Soda, salt and libani ropes were 
exported from Alicante.232 Soda was also exported from Cartagena alongside, 
occasionally, wool and pieces of eight.233 From Balearic Islands came money, 
hides, blankets, cheese and salt. Finally, a cargo of wheat left Mazzaròn, in 
Catalonia, to which the shipmaster added a General Cargo loaded in Barcelona. 
Grendi identifies, at least until 1666, the presence of an almost constant 
predominance of Flemish and Dutch shipmasters on the routes from 
Mediterranean Spain.234 On the basis of the data examined, however, there 
appear to be Genoese shipmasters from Sturla and Monterosso (2), on the 
Genoese Riviera, a Majorcan patrone (1) and only one shipmaster, probably 
English, in command of the vessel La Fregata di Zante.235 The proximity of 
Catalonia allowed the Ligurian patroni to trade in different goods, perhaps 
loaded along the route, according to what Arnaud Bartolomei has defined as the 
“great European coastal trade route”.236 One example is the voyage of the 
patrone Sebastiano Bigetto from Voltri.237 In 1670 he transported a cargo of oil, 
rice, soap and candied fruit jam from Genoa to Mazzaròn, in Catalonia, on his 
barca. When he arrived in Mazzaròn, Bigetto decided to keep the soap and jam 
on board to sell them in Barcelona. During the stop in Barcelona and after the 
selling of his goods, the local merchant Hieronime Sivaro gave him some 
cordelatti - a type of woollen cloth - to take to Augustin Martin, possibly a 
French merchant living in Genoa. His consolato includes other goods loaded in 
Barcelona as, for example, 50 Spanish gold pistole, addressed to several 
merchants living in Genoa. Francois Turdant, another merchant in Barcelona, 
gave Bigetto some cloths to take to Alexis, a merchant in Finale. Finally, Bigetto 
returned to Mazzaròn from where he sailed to Genoa and Finale. Bad weather 
and a storm in the Gulf of Lion forced him to make several stops and he arrived 
in Genoa in roughly a month. 
                                                          
232 Liban was a vegetable rope made of braided fibres, not twisted, used for various purposes in 
merchant marine or by fishermen. This rope is also used in mussel farming. See the definition of 
‘Liban’, in G. Casaccia, Vocabolario genovese-italiano, Genoa, 1883, 273. 
233 There is also an unidentified type of good, “strase di late”, see the voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id 50774. 
234 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 55. 
235 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the voyage id 50816. 
236 A. Bartolomei, ‘Cadix et la Méditerranée à la fin du XVIIIe siècle’, Revue d'Histoire Maritime 
13, 2011, 173-210, 192. 
237 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50745. 
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Voyages of this kind, which hardly emerges with such richness of detail in the 
archival sources, probably also characterised exchanges with southern France. 
In this period only 4 voyages are recorded. Two of them concern cargoes of 
different goods from Marseille to Genoa, while the other two are a transport of 
wine from Frontignan to Genoa and one of oats from an unidentified port known 
only as “Golfo Bianco” to Sestri Ponente. There is also a cargo of lemons, 
citrons and wheat from Bordighera to Marseille, where wine was to be loaded to 
take to Bordighera or “in other places in Italy”.238 The two voyages from 
Marseille, which took place in March 1669 by a patrone probably from Genoa 
and a shipmaster from Hamburg, took place between the end of the rebellion 
against King Louis XIV and the promulgation of the free port on 26 March 
1669.239 We will therefore have to wait until the last sample period of the 
present analysis to assess the long-term effects of the opening of the free port 
in Marseille and the reinforced Genoese policy of neutrality on the exchanges 
between these two ports.240 
Five vessels set sail from nearby Corsica, one headed to Bocca di Magra - 
and therefore not considered for this analysis - and the others directly to Genoa. 
The cargoes, as in the previous periods, were mainly wood (4), but also fish (1), 
tuna (1), cheese (1) or other goods. The ports of loading were mainly Saint-
Florent (2) and Cap Corse (1). All voyages were carried out by, in the only two 
cases where it is specified, Corsican patroni. On the other hand, according to 
the Average reports, there are no voyages from Sardinia. The only two voyages 
recorded in this period concern cargoes of grain and foodstuffs bound from 
Sardinia to Spain, in which Genoese merchants or shipowners were probably 
involved. The sources, however, reveal some information on the routes from 
Liguria to Sardinia.241 One patrone left from Sestri Levante with an empty hold 
to go to Sardinia to load goods to bring, later, to Genoa.242 Another patrone left 
with a load of building materials such as planks of fir, “chiappelle per lastricar 
case” (floor tiles) made in Savona and glasses, but also other goods, to Cagliari 
                                                          
238 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50819. 
239 See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50669 and 50674. On Marseille 
in these years see J.T. Takeda, Marseille between Crown and Commerce, Baltimore, 2011, 20-
49. G. Rambert ed., Histoire du commerce de Marseille, IV, de 1599 à 1660, and V, de 1660 a 
1789: Le Levant, Paris, 1954, 1957. 
240 On taxes and relations between Genoa and Marseille in the second half of the seventeenth 
century see Schiappacasse, ‘Genoa and Marseille’, 197-224. 
241 See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50766 and 50801. 
242 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50768. 
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and Alghero.243 Perhaps this voyage also would have continued with a cargo of 
Sardinian products back to the capital of the Republic, if the patrone had not 
suffered a shipwreck near Liguria. 
In spite of the often complementary role of Livorno, contacts with Tuscany 
are scarce in the examined sources. In this interval there is only one cargo of 
wheat and two cargoes of “merci varie” bound for Genoa on board the vessels 
of three patroni, probably Ligurian. This does not mean that traffic between the 
two regions was absent, it was probably operated by small vessels of patroni 
from the Riviera which, as such, largely escape recording in archival sources. 
The sources allow the partial observation of some patroni operating between 
Ligurian and Tuscan ports. One example is the voyage of the patrone 
Bartolomeo Mucci from Lerici to Livorno on his fregata.244 He carried some bags 
of coins, white wine, a fagotto of towels, a fagotto of documents and books, and 
a ferraiuolo [?]. The coins were addressed to different groups of merchants, as 
stated in the bill of lading. Some of the merchants to whom they were 
addressed, such as Cornelius Loct, were probably of Flemish origin and lived in 
Livorno. The patrone also travelled with 40 pieces of eight, divided between 
“moneta minuta” and silver scudi. The boat sank off the coast of Viareggio, 
despite the fact that the schifo had been abandoned in order to increase 
manoeuvrability. Mucci managed to save himself by swimming ashore. These 
isolated examples are indicative of traffic networks, as already mentioned, that 
escape ‘traditional’ sources and show the operational autonomy of the 
Republic's merchant marine, whose vessels were always on the lookout for 
profitable opportunities without necessarily touching Ligurian ports. For 
example, the reports following a heavy storm in September 1670 reveal a series 
of connections between Livorno and Villefranche operated by Genoese patroni 
from Prà and Voltri. Between 18 and 23 September, three Genoese patroni 
sailing from the Elba Island with a cargo of iron presented a report at the 
chancellery of the Conservatori del Mare in Genoa.245 The Duke of Savoy 
Emmanuel I had granted Villefranche the benefit of the free port since 1612. 
Over the years, his successors tried to encourage the formation of a local 
                                                          
243 On the loading of this vessel see the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 
50756. On the definition of chiappella see ‘ciappa’ in Casaccia, Vocabolario genovese-
italiano, 166. 
244 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50641. 
245 See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the ids 50791, 50792 and 50793. 
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merchant marine that could compete with the neighbouring Ligurian ports.246 
Witnessing the activity of the patroni of the Republic of Genoa operating 
undisturbed on the Livorno-Villefranche route is indicative of the flexibility of 
Mediterranean trade, even though it was operated by modest-sized vessels.247 
Part of the trade from overseas also arrived in Livorno without stopping in 
Genoa. One example, as Grendi states, was the activity of English shipmasters, 
in command of large vessels.248 
The activity of the Ligurian patroni is observable even in the exchanges with 
the Tyrrhenian side of the Papal States, roughly corresponding to present-day 
Lazio. In this three-year period there are two voyages to Genoa, one with wheat 
from Civitavecchia and one with “ferraccio” (low-quality iron) from Nettuno. 
Another vessel with a load of wheat sailed from Porto Badino to Villefranche. 
Small boats made these three voyages: a tartana, a barca and a navicello. Also 
the small boats of the Ligurian patroni were probably entrusted with part of the 
re-export trade from Genoa to Lazio. An example is the voyage from Genoa to 
Civitavecchia by the frigate called San Giovanni Bonaventura in 1668 with a 
cargo of sugar.249 The sugar presumably arrived in Genoa from Lisbon on one 
of the previously mentioned voyages. 
From Campania, in particular from Mondragone and Castellammare di 
Stabia, departed two vessels with a cargo of wheat bound for Genoa: one 
cimba and one tartana of Mediterranean patroni, one of which from nearby 
Sorrento. Calabria, on the other hand, was the area of origin of eight voyages, 
seven of which with loads of wheat and one of zibibbo wine. The voyages were 
bound to Genoa (6) or to Livorno and Genoa (2). The departures were from 
Crotone (3), Colleggiano [?] (1), Corigliano (1), Melissa (1), Belvedere Marittimo 
(1) and from Calabria in general (1). Only shipmasters from the Mediterranean 
area and, more specifically, from the Tyrrhenian area are found. There are in 
fact three shipmasters from Liguria, one from Sestri Ponente, and two from the 
Kingdom of Naples, both from the town of Vico Equense. The vessels used, 
when specified, were cimbe (3) and tartane (1). 
In this third interval, as mentioned above, the importance of the Apulian 
cereal market grew significantly, bringing this region to the first place as an area 
                                                          
246 F. Hildesheimer, ‘Entre la Méditerranée et les Alpes: Nice et son port franc au XVIIe siècle’, 
Provence Historique 27/108, 1977, 197-212. 
247 Fusaro, Addobbati, ‘The Grand Tour of Mercantilism’. See also bibliography therein quoted. 
248 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 55. 
249 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50789. 
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of origin of the vessels arriving in Genoa: there are twenty-two voyages, equal 
to 16% of the total. The years 1640-1660 were characterised by a general 
contraction of voyages from Sicily and Apulia. The decline phase was overcome 
after 1661 in favour of Apulia.250 In the period 1658-1665, as Cancila reports, an 
average of about forty-seven vessels arrived in Genoa yearly from Apulia and 
Sicily.251 The specialisation in wheat cargoes is very clear: twenty cargoes of 
wheat were bound to Genoa (17), Livorno or Genoa (1), Messina and Genoa 
(1), Genoa or Spain (1). Among the charterer merchants in Apulia there are also 
local public authorities, such as the Prince of San Nicandro.252 The loading 
ports are Taranto (8), Barletta (5), Manfredonia (3), Brindisi (2), Gallipoli (1), 
Fortore (1), or Manfredonia and Otranto (1). In addition to wheat, there are one 
load of broad beans from Taranto and one load of oil from Ostuni. Compared to 
the previous three years there is a marked evolution in the nationality of the 
shipmasters and in the type of vessels used. There are no shipmasters from 
Northern Europe in the documentation examined. The employ of patroni in 
charge of vessels with a smaller tonnage than those from the Northern Europe 
is common. The vessels used are typical of the Mediterranean area: cimba (7), 
tartana (4), petacchio (1), polacca (1). The nationalities of the shipmasters are 
not specified, except for two patroni of the Kingdom of Naples, one from 
Positano and one from Castellammare di Stabia. It would therefore seem that 
the Mediterranean and, in particular, the Kingdom of Naples’ merchant marine 
controlled these routes following a period of fierce competition with Northern 
European shipmasters. This rebalancing was perhaps also possible because of 
the reduced circulation of capital in the analysed period. 
The North-Central Adriatic is one of the few areas where traces of Northern 
shipmasters involved in the grain trade can still be found. There are two 
shipmasters from Holland and possibly one from Northern France. It is also 
interesting to note the presence of three Ligurian patroni from Cogoleto, 
Arenzano and Finale. Cogoleto and Arenzano, in particular, are villages on the 
Ligurian Riviera which provided the Republic with shipmasters engaged on the 
grain routes through all the sample periods analysed so far. 
In particular, vessels arrived from the ports of Ancona (3) and Senigallia (2) 
in the Marche region, to which can be added the ports of Rimini (3), Ravenna 
                                                          
250 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 266. 
251 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 266. 
252 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50775. 
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(2) and Rimini (1) from the present Emilia-Romagna. The goods travelled 
almost exclusively straight to Genoa (8) with the exceptions of a cargo of wheat 
to Livorno or Genoa (1) and a voyage with wheat to Genoa and unspecified 
goods to Messina (1). Also another voyage to Genoa included a stop in 
Messina, to load a consignment of silk. Apart from these exceptions related to 
the stop in Messina, on all voyages from the Adriatic region wheat was the only 
cargo item on board. From the few reports in which Genoa is mentioned as a 
port of departure, it is also possible to know how the voyages to the Adriatic 
were carried out. The barca of the patrone Benedetto Moro, for example, left 
Genoa in the winter of 1668 with a cargo of codfish to be unloaded in Senigallia 
and Ancona.253 When he arrived in Senigallia, he took a new load of grain to 
Genoa for his return journey. The cargo was sent to Genoa by the same 
merchant who had received the codfish in Senigallia, Carlo Vianelli. 
Exchanges with Venice in this three-year period are completely absent from 
the documentation examined. The only exception is a voyage from the Bocche 
di Cattaro (present-day Boka Kotorska), a Venetian possession in the eastern 
Adriatic, present-day Croatia.254 The shipmaster was a Venetian who departed 
from the Boka Kotorska Bay in 1670 with several bags of money obtained from 
sea loans guaranteed on the vessel, to go and load grain in Albania.255 After 
loading the grain and returning to the Boka Kotorska Bay to settle the sea loan 
contracts, the vessel continued its journey to unload the grain in Livorno or 
Genoa. Although this is an isolated example, this voyage illustrates the multiple 
tools available to shipmasters to find the capital for maritime trade. 
From Sicily there are 16 voyages to Genoa, which is about 9.5% of the total. 
The database also contains data for 4 other voyages that did not have Genoa 
as destination port, but Livorno (2), Naples (1) or Ancona (1). In particular, the 
two voyages to Livorno regarded oil shipments, while those to Naples and 
Ancona were salt shipments. The presence of these Average reports in Genoa, 
a port not touched during these voyages, is perhaps linked to the nationality of 
the shipmasters, who were Genoese in three out of four cases, and/or to the 
presence of insurers or merchants in Genoa involved in such cargoes. With 
regard to the cargoes bound for Genoa, despite the presence of rare cargoes of 
salt (2), oil (1) or zibibbo wine (1), wheat continued to monopolise the trade from 
                                                          
253 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50691. 
254 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50742. 
255 For the function of sea loans, see par. 3.1. 
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Sicily (12). The destinations were Genoa alone (16), Genoa and Livorno (1) or 
Genoa and the coast of Spain (1). With the exception of Girgenti and Trapani 
for grain cargo, among the most used ports of loading also in the previous 
sample periods, there are no particular preferences among the Sicilian ports: 
Girgenti (5), Trapani (3), Milazzo (1), Termini (1), Siracusa (1), Palermo (1), 
Pozzallo (1), Lipari (1), Messina (1), and Sicily in general (1). The merchants 
involved are mainly Genoese. As expected, these routes also confirm the 
predominance of Mediterranean shipping, with the presence of shipmasters 
from Liguria (7), Provence (2) and Sicily (1). There seems to be no shipmaster 
from Northern Europe. Even for Sicily, in the few cases where the type of vessel 
used is indicated, small Mediterranean vessels prevail: petacchio (2), barca (1), 
tartana (1), pinco (1) and polacca (1). The reduced use of the Northern marine 
and the use of smaller vessels was one of the symptoms of the stagnation of 
trade, which led to less investment, so that the large Northern vessels could not 
be chartered to load heavy and low-value wheat cargoes.256 
 
4.3.3 1668-1670, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes 
 
The routes with the eastern and southern Mediterranean are still a clear 
minority among the routes headed to Genoa. In this interval there are only two 
voyages from Greece, two from Turkey and one from Algiers. From Greece, in 
particular from Athens and Porto Vitolo - today's Karavostasi in the 
Peloponnese - a cargo of wool and other goods left for Genoa and a cargo of 
pieces of eight, silk, vallonia257 and other goods left for Livorno. The first voyage 
was made by a French patrone from La Ciotat on board of his polacca, the 
second one by an unknown shipmaster on his tartana. There is also a 
shipmaster sailing from Genoa to Greece, Antonio Pavia. He sailed on 12 
September 1669 with a cargo of pottery, salted fish and money to load vallonia 
and other goods in Athens, but his vessel sank off Cape Matapan in the 
Peloponnese.258 He was rescued by a French tartan carrying wine to Candia, 
                                                          
256According to Cancila, from 1650 Sicily entered a long phase of crisis that lasted until the 
advent of the Bourbon dynasty. Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 264. 
257 Valania or vallonia is the fruit of the Valonia oak; the powder, obtained by grinding the acorn, 
was used, due to its high tannin content, for tanning hides. See G. Grotti, Le Storie della 
Ranica. Il mulino della Nesa, Ranica, 2017, 36. 
258 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50706. 
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present-day Crete, which had recently come under Ottoman control following a 
long siege against the Venetians.259  
Both vessels from the Ottoman Empire sailed from Izmir, on the Turkish 
Aegean coast. This town in the seventeenth century was one of the main points 
of the French network of échelles in the Ottoman Empire and a port with many 
Christian merchants.260 The two vessels loaded General Cargoes and there is 
no further record on them. Even most of the GA reports redacted in Livorno and 
concerning shipments from Izmir did not specify the loaded cargoes. However, 
according to the documentation in Pisa from 1671 in the AveTranRisk database, 
there are 2 voyages from Izmir to Livorno with loads of hides, cotton and 
General Cargo.261 These cargoes could be representative of departures from 
Izmir in this period also to other ports, such as Genoa.  
Finally, there is a single voyage from Algiers. This involved a vessel, possibly 
Northerner, with a cargo of sugar, wax and “scocoso” (cous cous) bound for 
Livorno, which stopped in Genoa because, due to bad weather, it suffered some 
damages in the Gulf of Lion. Other cases recorded in the database also indicate 
cargoes of sugar, hides and other goods from Algiers to Livorno.262 Although 
small in scale, this was a continuous traffic during the seventeenth century. 
There are no departures from Tabarka, despite the fact that the island was 
gradually concentrating its efforts on the grain trade, often bound for Genoa, 





                                                          
259 G. Ongaro, ‘The siege of Candia: population control, social dynamics and emergency 
management by the Venetian authorities in the face of the Ottoman advance (1645-1669)’, 
Società e Storia 157, 2017, 459-477; A. Anastasopoulos ed., The Eastern Mediterranean under 
Ottoman rule: Crete, 1645-1840, Rethymno, 2008. 
260 On Izmir see M.H. van der Boogert ed., Ottoman Izmir: studies in honour of Alexander H. de 
Groot, Leiden, 2007; J. Barnai, ‘The Development of Community Organizational Structures: The 
Case of Izmir’, in A. Levy ed., Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth Through the 
Twentieth Century, Syracuse, 2002, 35-51; E. Eldem, D. Goffman, B.A. Masters, The Ottoman 
City Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul, Cambridge, 1999. 
261 Voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the ids 10007 and 10008. 
262 Voyage recorded in the AveTranRisk db as the id 10043. 
263 Four voyages a year covered the essential trade between the island and the homeland, to 
which must be added the voyages operated by the so-called venturieri shipmasters who 
operated according to the availability of cargoes. Piccinno calculated that about 1 voyage per 
year resulted in an Average report. However, it is possible, as in this three year period, that 
given the few voyages, there could be no voyages at all declaring an Average report. See 
Iodice, Piccinno, ‘Whatever the cost’, 12. 
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4.4 1698-1700, the ‘French Invasion’ and a New Era for Genoese Shipping 
 
The structure of the trade varies further during the last three years examined, 
comprising the Average reports written or presented in Genoa between 1698 
and 1700. These years have been chosen both on the basis of the availability of 
the sources, and on the fact that this was a relatively ‘peaceful’ three-year 
period as it was situated between two international conflicts which influenced, 
despite the neutrality maintained by the Republic, the dynamics of international 
trade: the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714).264 
The history of Genoese maritime trade in the last years of the seventeenth 
century is fragmentary and there are no systematic reconstruction of traffic 
trends.265 The sources on which Grendi based most of his statistical analysis on 
port traffic in Genoa stop at 1666 and there are no subsequent quantitative 
studies. 
According to Giorgio Doria’s research, based on the trend of the anchorage 
tax, maritime traffic in the port gradually declined in the last years of the 
seventeenth century, starting in 1684.266 The French bombardment in that year 
would have contributed decisively to a decrease in arrivals and the beginning of 
a new phase of stagnation. In 1682, plans to resume Levantine trade had also 
failed.267 It should be remembered that, in the long run, the political 
consequences of the ‘forced’ rapprochement with France would allow the 
implementation of stronger neutrality policies and the promotion of the port as a 
Mediterranean emporium.268 As early as 1693, for example, the Genoese 
ambassador to Madrid reported how the continuing European conflicts were 
                                                          
264 See J. Falkner, The War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714, Barnsley, 2015; K.A.J. 
McLay, ‘Combined operations and the European theatre during the Nine Years' War, 1688-97’, 
Historical Research 78/202, 2005, 506-539; J.A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667-1714, 
London, 1999. 
265 Piccinno, Economia marittima, 10. 
266 The revenue from the anchorage tax fell by 40.4% between 1682 and 1751, partly due to the 
devaluation of the Genoese lira and partly to the decline in traffic. See Doria, ‘La gestione del 
porto’, 179-180. According to a rather rough estimate, however, carried out by Luigi Bulferetti 
and Claudio Costantini and also based on the figures at which the anchorage tax was 
contracted out, it seems that the traffic trend of this period was not very different from the first 
seventy years of the seventeenth century. See Bulferetti, Costantini, Industria e 
commercio, 127. 
267 Giacchero, Economia e società, 73-74. 
268 Bitossi, La repubblica sfida il Re Sole, 20. 
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benefiting the ports and merchants of the Republic of Genoa with the arrival of 
English and Dutch vessels in the free port.269 
With regard to the seriality of the data, there is a gap in the documentation 
that has made some cross-referencing and approximations necessary. In the 
series of Atti Civili of the last decade of the seventeenth century, the 1698 and 
the second half of 1700 archival folders are missing.270 In order to maintain the 
three-year structure and to take into account the years 1698-1700, in addition to 
the documents kept in the files of the Atti Civili, I employed the sources of the 
Testimoniali segreti all'estero registered in 1698 and the paper files referring to 
the folder Esibite in avarie between 1699 and 1700.271 The latter file contains 
various calculations produced at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. For these reasons there is a clear disparity in the distribution of cases 
by year. The total number of cases amounts to 148. They, however, are 
distributed as follows: 25 for 1698, 85 for 1699 and 38 for 1700. It is 
conceivable that the 38 cases for the year 1700 constitute approximately half of 
the total number of cases for this year. 
The structure of the documents kept in these years in the Atti Civili is more 
standardised than in previous years, and it is possible to hypothesise a frequent 
use of declarations for precautionary purposes. Within the three-year period 
there is a greater number of calculations than in the previous sample period, 
perhaps a sign of the greater degree of reliability and control acknowledged to 
the Conservatori del Mare. For 1699 and 1700 there are in fact twenty-nine 
calculations, respectively relating to twenty-seven GA and two PA.272 Similarly 
to what happened in Livorno, these calculations are drawn up in Spanish pieces 
of eight, although the notary/calculator reported each equivalence in Genoese 
lire. Due to the already highlighted discrepancy in the subdivision of the cases 
by year and the different funds used, all the calculations in this sample date 
back to 1699 or 1700. For this reason, the average values refer to these two 
                                                          
269 Giacchero, Economia e Società, 81-84. 
270 Of the 26 archival folders preserving the Average reports written between 1690 and 1700, 13 
are missing. The folders in ASG, CdM 124 and 125, corresponding to the years 1699 and 1699-
1700, have been used. CdM 126, preserving documents produced in the second half of 1700, is 
missing. 
271 ASG, CdM, Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero 285, 1693-1698. ASG, CdM, Esibite in 
avarie 377, 1696-1706. The paper cards were checked against the archival documentation on a 
sample basis to assess their reliability. 
272 The 2 PA, recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50365 and 50820, refer to cases for 
which GA is already present. For this reason only the values of the goods will be taken into 
account in the calculation of GA, to avoid doubling the totals. The same applies to the voyage 
ids 50612 and 50617, for which there are 2 GA in each. 
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years and not to the whole three-year period. The goods’ average value per 
voyage was approximately of 57,112 lire.273 The average value of the vessels in 
the 25 GA amounted to 11,754 lire.274 Finally, the average value of damages 
per voyage was approximately 2,867 lire.275 
 
Table 4.5 Statistical values 1698-1700 
n. of voyages 
























25 11,754  +145% 57,112 +496.7% 3,597 -25.5% 
 
According to Doria's data, wood and foodstuffs prevailed among the goods 
unloaded in Genoa in these years: imports of the former amounted to 20-27,000 
tonnes per year; wheat amounted to 12-16,000 tonnes; salt to 7-12,000 tonnes, 
and wine to around 79,000 hectolitres. There was a sharp increase in goods in 
boxes or packages, which reached and perhaps exceeded 10,000 tonnes 
towards the end of the century.276 
An analysis of Average reports shows a clear predominance of bulky goods, 
which are often more at risk of deterioration or loss in adverse weather 
conditions.277 Wheat ranked first in importance. Wheat is found, alone or with 
other goods, in the holds of 57 vessels out of a total of 148, i.e. in approximately 
38% of cases. This is followed by cargoes of oil (21) and salt (16). It is also 
interesting to note the presence of twenty General Cargoes, almost exclusively 
from Northern Europe or Cadiz. 
Even in this interval, it is possible to find the presence of the main names of 
the Genoese aristocracy, such as the Assereto, Serra, Grimaldi, Rezzonico, De 
Mari and others. Within the calculations, these merchants are the recipients of 
consignments of goods on which are also embarked cargoes destined for 
Marseille merchants such as David and Bernardi and Jewish or Dutch 
                                                          
273 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Total amount of risk for the cargo’ ‘>1’. I excluded a 
calculation made in Naples in ducati, see voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 
50820. 
274 Result obtained by adding the functions ‘Total amount of risk for the vessel’ ‘>1’. The value 
of the vessels was double the figure that would have resulted from the contributing values in the 
calculations. As explained within the same calculations, only half of the value of the vessel 
contributed to the damage apportionment in the calculations drawn up in this three-year period. 
275 Result obtained by adding the function ‘Damages/expanses - total awarded’ ‘>1’. 
276 Doria, ‘La gestione del porto’, 137-140. 




merchants living in Genoa, such as Pascal de Silva or Desmet Vanhouten. 
Among the ‘senders’ in the ports of loading there are also public authorities 
such as the governor of Porto Ferraio or of the Elba Island, in Tuscany. Once 
again, therefore, the potential of Average sources for cross-studies on the 
activities of merchants in Genoa emerges. Let us consider, for instance, the 
presence of French merchants in Genoa. The weakening of relations with the 
Spanish crown led the ruling class of the Republic to a radical change of 
strategy, the results of which, as mentioned, were to be seen in full during the 
eighteenth century.278 Despite a relative weakening of relations between Genoa 
and France after the death of the cardinal and minister Giulio Mazzarino (1691), 
political and commercial contacts between the two states gradually increased 
over the years.279 Average sources examined reveal the activity, for example, of 
the French merchants residing in Genoa Gio. and Guglielmo Boissier, in 1698. 
They sent a cargo of sugar from Lisbon to Genoa on the barca of Gio. Baptiste 
Olivier, a shipmaster from Marseille.280 Their names regularly appear in the 
rental registers of the free port warehouses, together with those of other 
members of the French ‘nation’ in the city, at least until the 1740s.281 As for the 
presence of French shipmasters arriving in the port, the documents examined in 
this three-year period show a relevant increase. In the cases where the 
shipmasters’ nationality was indicated, there are 26 out of 103 French 
shipmasters, about a quarter of the total. It is well known that, in the first 
decades of the eighteenth century, Genoese merchants increasingly used 
French shipmasters. This was not justified by lower freight rates or by the 
greater capacity of their vessels, but by the relative safety that French 
shipmasters enjoyed against North African piracy, particularly Algerian piracy.282 
Graph 4.4 shows a partial return to the situation examined in the first sample 
period, relating to the years 1599-1601, while below is Map 4.6, showing ports 




                                                          
278 M. Herrero Sanchez, ‘The business relations, identities and political resources of Italian 
merchants in the early-modern Spanish monarchy: some introductory remarks’, in Brilli, Herrero 
Sanchez eds., Italian merchants, 1-12, 3 
279 Schiappacasse, ‘Genova e Marsiglia’, 199. 
280 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50627. 
281 ASG, SG, Magazzini del porto franco, 1739-1746, 3.00201. 




My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function. The 
graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than Genoa (11) and those with 























































The map was constructed on the AveTransRisk db by selecting the sources in ASG in the 
interval 1698-1700 and excluding stops for unknown or unforeseen reasons. In addition, I 
removed the frequency cluster of Genoa as it is the destination port for almost all voyages. 
 
Graph 4.4 and the clusters in Map 4.6 clearly shows the renewed intensity of 
traffic on the routes linking Sicily to Genoa. In fact, there are fourty-one voyages 
from Sicily (32%), a proportionally intermediate value compared to those 
recorded between the first (45%) and the second and third ranges (12-13%). 
Arrivals from Apulia, on the other hand, seem to be falling (3) in favour of a 
recovery, in relative terms, of routes from Calabria (10). Moreover, the role of 
the routes from Portugal as an emporium for overseas goods consolidated. 
 
4.4.1 1698-1700, Extra Mediterranean Routes 
 
There were twelve vessels coming from Northern Europe, divided between 
England and Holland, representing about 8% of the cases. Genoa was the only 
port of destination in one voyage only, with an intermediate stop in Cartagena to 
load other goods. On the other hand, a regular traffic circuit emerges, linking 
Northern Europe to the Western Mediterranean and Italy through a series of 
‘nodes’ also observed in the years examined above. Two voyages are generally 
headed to “Italian cities” or “Italy”, while others reports contain more or less long 
lists of destination ports: Alicante, Marseille, Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, 
Cartagena, Alicante, Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Barcelona, Genoa and 
Livorno (1), 'coast of Spain', Genoa and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Marseille, Genoa 
and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Alicante, Genoa and Livorno (2), Cadiz, Alicante, 
Genoa, Livorno, Messina and Calderona [?] (1), Marseille and Genoa (1). As 
can easily be seen, Genoa and Livorno are regularly associated, while Cadiz is 
a frequent stop before passing through the Strait of Gibraltar. 
The Dutch ports of embarkation reported by the sources, as in the previous 
periods examined, were Amsterdam (4), Amsterdam and Texel (3), Texel alone 
(2) or, in general, Holland (1). Only two voyages departed from England and in 
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both cases London was the port of loading. Unfortunately almost all cargoes on 
the routes from Northern Europe are indicated as “miscellaneous goods” (9) or 
are not indicated at all (2), thus not allowing a detailed analysis of their 
composition. The only exception is a voyage from Texel whose cargo consists 
mainly of a heavy and bulky commodity, iron rods, together with other high-
value, low-volume goods such as pepper, carnations, nutmeg and others.283 
There is even a basket of elephant’s teeth addressed to Livorno, worth 300 
pieces of eight.284 This cargo, together with the cargoes of vessels bound for 
Livorno and recorded in the database, confirms the traditional role of the 
Northern ports as exporters of iron, hides and cloths, to which colonial products 
arriving from the main non-European routes should be added. The nationality of 
the shipmasters, where indicated, coincides with that of the ports of departure: 
English from London (2) and Dutch from Holland (3), plus the presence of a 
French shipmaster from Dunkirk on the Amsterdam-Cartagena-Genoa route 
mentioned above.285 It is worth remembering that the Navigation Acts in 
England were still in force, while Dutch commercial shipping had lost its primacy 
in Northern Europe. 
Journeys from Northern Europe included a voyage from the port of Le Havre, 
Northern France.286 The port of Le Havre was, between 1664 and 1709, the 
seat of several French privileged companies trading with the African coast and 
the American colonies.287 A French shipmaster carried out this voyage. He was 
in Le Havre with a cargo of oil, perhaps already on board before this stop. At Le 
Havre his crew deserted and abandoned the vessel, so the shipmaster decided 
to go to Lisbon in search of new freights, perhaps with a new crew. He 
managed to load sugar and General Cargo to take to Genoa and Livorno. The 
exceptional circumstances and the fact that there is only one voyage from 
Northern France might imply that trade from this region was rare, given the 
interests of the négociants of ports such as Le Havre in overseas trade. The city 
of Marseille was also doing its utmost to maintain its monopoly on 
                                                          
283 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50842. 
284 This term probably referred to the animal's tusks, made of ivory. This was a material used in 
the world of luxury arts and crafts of the time, and could have come from Africa or Asia. See 
E.G. Milner-Gulland, J.R. Beddington, ‘The Exploitation of Elephants for the Ivory Trade: An 
Historical Perspective’, Proceedings: Biological Sciences 252⁄1333, 1993, 29-37. 
285 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50885. 
286 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50622. 
287 See P. Dardel, Navires et marchandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIIIe 
siècle, Rouen, 1966. 
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Mediterranean trade, particularly with the Levant, which partly explains this 
‘specialisation’.288 In this three-year period however, as already mentioned, 
shipmasters from the north of France appeared in the Mediterranean for the first 
time in Average records. 
Apart from Northern Europe there are five voyages from Newfoundland. 
These, when specified, were made to bring codfish to Genoa (4) or Livorno 
(1).289 Although in the previous sample periods there were only English 
shipmasters involved on this route, here we find, in addition to the English (2), 
two Frenchmen and a patrone who was probably Italian, Leonardo Russo. Both 
French shipmasters came from Dunkirk and were bound for Genoa. One of the 
two English vessels was travelling under the escort of a warship, perhaps a sign 
of the dangerousness of the area even after the end of the conflict, or of the 
dangerousness of the route into the Mediterranean. 
Moving southwards, there are 22 voyages from the Iberian Peninsula in this 
three-year period. Voyages from Portugal appear to be growing slightly and 
confirm the level of product specialisation already observed above. The 
database contains ten cases, departing respectively from Lisbon (7), Lisbon and 
Porto (1), Lisbon and “other ports” (1), or Porto (1). Links to networks of port 
cities from Portugal to Western Mediterranean emerge. Destinations were: 
Genoa (3), Genoa and Livorno (2), Alicante and Genoa (1), Marseille, Genoa 
and Livorno (1), Cadiz, Marseille, Genoa and Livorno (1) or unspecified (2). 
Sugar cargoes, loaded on board in six out of ten voyages, were often 
associated with tobacco cargoes (4), while only in four cases cargoes were 
made only of General Cargo (2) or unspecified (2). It was common for 
shipmasters on these routes to stop at other ports to load additional cargo. One 
French vessel from Lisbon stopped at Cadiz and Marseille to load General 
Cargo while another, also French and from Lisbon, stopped at Cadiz to load 
quinine - extracted from the chincona tree, it was the mainstay treatment for 
                                                          
288 See Takeda, Between Crown and Commerce. On the good and routes from Marseille see 
also Rambert, Histoire du commerce, IV, V. D. Panzac, La Caravane maritime: Marins 
européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée (1680-1830), Paris, 2004. M. Fontenay, ‘Le 
commerce des Occidentaux dans les Echelles du Levant vers la fin du XVIIe siècle’, in B. 
Bennassar, R. Sauzet eds., Chrétiens et Musulmans à la Renaissance, Paris, 1998, 337-370. 
289 The voyage to Livorno, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the voyage id 50850, stopped in 
Genoa only because of bad weather. On this topic see M. D'Angelo, ‘In the .English. 
Mediterranean (1511-1815)’, Journal of Mediterranean Studies XII 2002, 271-285. 
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malaria for centuries290 - and at Alicante to load wool and salt.291 As many as 
seven out of ten shipmasters were from France. Of these, two were from 
Marseille, one from La Ciotat and one from La Rochelle. 
Moving southwards, there are only two shipmasters sailing from Cadiz. In 
both cases, they loaded General Cargoes. Another voyage concerns a cargo of 
iron and wool from Bilbao to Genoa and Livorno. Bilbao, on the Northwestern 
coasts of the Iberian Peninsula, specialised in the exportation of foreign 
woollens, linens, velvets, silks, laces, and metallurgical products.292 Again, a 
French shipmaster carried out this voyage. 
 
4.4.2 1698-1700, Western Mediterranean and Italian Routes 
 
Nine vessels came from the Mediterranean coasts of Spain, accounting for 
about 6% of the total. Proportionally, the area was still among the most relevant 
for traffic to Genoa. As already observed, some ports in this area played the 
role of ports of call for loading or unloading goods coming from beyond 
Gibraltar. There is an increasing specialisation in cargoes: all the voyages 
started from the peninsula, in particular from Alicante (3), or from the Balearic 
Islands (6), in particular from Ibiza. Departures from Cartagena are completely 
absent from the documentation, probably due to the decline of this port after its 
peak in 1640.293 Salt and General Cargo departed from Alicante. In this respect, 
the analysis of the documentation of the voyage of John Marin Cadiz, a French 
shipmaster, reveals further information about the goods exchanged on the 
Alicante-Marseille-Genoa route.294 The bill of lading attached to the GA 
calculation shows the presence of cash, barriglia (soda), campeccio wood,295 
silk and other goods, indicating a greater variety of goods than in the other 
sample periods. From the Balearic Islands, the cargoes remain essentially the 
same. The shipmasters embarked salt (6), salt and wine (1), or oil (1). The 
                                                          
290 J. Mann, ‘Jesuits' powder’, Royal Society of Chemistry, 2009, available online on 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160923052751/http://www.rsc.org/education/eic/issues/2009Jan/
Jesuit-quinine-cinchona-bark-perkin.asp, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
291 Voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50634 and 50891. 
292 See S.J. Stein, B.H. Stein, Silver, trade, and war: Spain and America in the making of early 
modern Europe, Baltimore and London, 2000, 7. 
293 Franch Benavent, ‘El comercio en Mediterráneo’, 89. 
294 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50365. 
295 Known as Palo de Campeche and Palo de Brasil, it is a plant used for dyeing. In the 
seventeenth century it was imported from Yucatán, Mexico, Santo Domingo or Cuba. See E. 




nationalities of the shipmasters in this region once again show a majority of 
Frenchman (5). Of these, two were from Dunkirk. Genoese (3) and Majorcan (1) 
followed. 
Looking at the departures from Mediterranean France, there are only two 
voyages, both from Marseille. The shipmasters were from Marseille itself and 
from Martigues, a village in Provence. There is no information on the cargo 
carried by the former, but it appears that the shipmaster of Martigues took wool, 
drapes, saffron (a plant used as a dye), salted eels and General Cargo to 
Finale, the Spanish enclave on the western border of the Republic, and to 
Genoa.296 
Trade between Genoa and neighbouring regions such as Provence or 
Tuscany, or the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, relied largely, as already 
mentioned, on the activity of small vessels which, due to the small number of 
merchants and capital involved, are difficult to trace. It is also plausible that, 
given the relatively short duration of the voyages, the shipmasters set out in 
good weather conditions which did not change for the duration of the voyage, 
although weather in the Mediterranean could suddenly change. By sailing close 
to shore whenever possible, they could quickly take shelter from unforeseen 
events although, as Berti points out, entering and leaving ports was a major risk 
factor.297 Few shipmasters from Corsica declared an Average report upon their 
arrival in Genoa. Only three voyages were reported and one of them related to 
the internal trade of the island: it was a load of salt sent from Saint-Florent to 
Bonifacio.298 Salt in Corsica often arrived from Genoa, as shown by two 
voyages in the database concerning shippings of salt to Bastia and Calvi.299 
The other two journeys, carried out on a pinco and a barca by two patroni, 
concern a load of timber and one of oil to Genoa. As in the three years 
examined above, timber is the main export commodity from Corsica. There is 
also a cargo of silver scudi loaded in Portofino to buy firewood in the gulf of 
Porti, on the central west coast of the island.300 
There are five voyages departing from Sardinia. Again, this is a route, 
according to the Average sources, served by Ligurian patroni on small boats, 
                                                          
296 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50867. On Finale and the political 
tensions with Spain see chap. 1. 
297 Berti, ‘The "risk" in navigation’, 280. 
298 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50881. The report was probably sent to 
Genoa to notify the merchants involved. 
299 See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50882 and 50895. 
300 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50633. 
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barche (3) or cimbe (2). All voyages involve the shipment of foodstuffs to Genoa 
(4) or Livorno and Genoa (1). These consisted of cargoes of wheat and 
chickpeas (2), wheat and cheese (1), wheat only (1) or wine, biscuit and cheese 
(1). There is also a report of a patrone in 1699, probably from Genoa, following 
a journey from Sardinia to Villefranche with a cargo of wheat, lard, anchovies 
and pasta.301 
From Liguria there is only one cargo of unspecified goods, transported from 
Finale to Genoa.302 The voyages departing from Genoa, on the other hand, as 
noted, provide valuable information about the cargoes shipped from the port of 
the capital.  
The trade with Tuscany, as mentioned, was also modest. There were five 
voyages, three of which were carried out by Genoese shipmasters, one by a 
Neapolitan shipmaster and one by a Dutch shipmaster.303 On the latter voyage, 
the vessel of the shipmaster Giusti di Egidio van de Brande sailed from Livorno 
in autumn 1700. Genoa was also the port of unloading for a further batch of 
General Cargo worth about 1,640 pieces of eight. General Cargo on board 
allow us to assume that the vessel came from outside the Mediterranean. A 
storm while the vessel was in the port of Genoa caused serious damage to the 
hull and caused the vessel to collide with other moored vessels.304 The other 
voyages involved a cargo of pitch from Porto Ercole, one of wheat from 
Montaldo, one of coal from Bolgheri and one of coal from San Vincenzo. The 
variety of ports of embarkation and the different types of goods involved on the 
routes between Tuscany and Genoa are indicative of the dense network of 
traffic between the two regions, of which the reports provide several examples. 
From the copies of the reports received by the Conservatori del Mare from the 
Genoese consuls in the main Italian cities, we also learn of further traffic 
involving Ligurian patroni operating in ports outside the Republic, including 
those in Tuscany. As far as Livorno is concerned, for example, there is a 
consolato relating to a voyage to load goods in Palermo and another relating to 
a cargo of iron from the Elba Island to Naples.305 In the latter voyage the 
                                                          
301 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50823. 
302 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50413. 
303 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50368. 
304 The total value of the vessel was 5,200 pieces of eight. The vessel sustained damage 
amounting to 465 pieces of eight. This represents 10% of the damage to the vessel, which is 
quite a high percentage compared to the average damage in other GA cases over the other 
sample periods. 
305 Voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50593 and 50820. 
280 
 
patrone, originally from Taggia in Liguria, faced a storm which threatened to 
sink the vessel, but two barche, one belonging to a Genoese patrone from Sori 
and one to a Neapolitan patrone from Gaeta, came to the rescue. Although the 
traffic of small vessels largely escapes statistical analysis, the samples resulting 
from the Average procedures are nonetheless significant portraits of the variety 
and dynamism of Mediterranean trade in the early modern period. 
In this three-year period there were no voyages from the Tyrrhenian side of 
the territories of the Papal State. The only vessel leaving Civitavecchia with 
wheat, hides and General Cargo was bound for Santa Margherita Ligure, the 
residence of the patrone involved. The vessel, however, was damaged, losing 
its cargo at the Arno estuary off the Tuscan coast.306 
The quantity of vessels from the Kingdom of Naples is also clearly 
decreasing compared to the samples analysed in the previous periods. From 
Naples there are only two voyages. One was made by a patrone with his barca 
to take raw material for paper and “carnuccio” (hides) to Genoa. The second 
was a transport of asperino wine from Naples to Genoa on behalf of the patrone 
himself.307 In Genoa, he sold his cargo to Stefano and Pier Francesco Lomellini, 
who bought it and ordered him to send it to Tabarka. The consolato drawn up in 
the final port of destination, which will be examined in more detail in the next 
Chapter, therefore considers Genoa as a port of call in a wider circuit to supply 
the Tunisian island of Tabarka, the Spanish possession run by the Lomellini 
family of Genoa who had established a veritable ‘colony’ of Genoese there, for 
whom they were responsible for food supplies.308 Among the voyages leaving 
the port of Naples, there is also a load of wheat bound for Livorno and 
transported by a Genoese patrone from Prà. 
Arrivals from Calabria are substantially stable compared to the sample 
analysed previously. There are ten voyages, carried out exclusively by Genoese 
or Neapolitan patroni, when specified, on Mediterranean vessels: tartane (5), 
cimbe (5) and a felucone (1). The ports of loading are scattered along the 
Tyrrhenian and Ionian coasts of the region, with no particular trends emerging: 
Crotone (3), Reggio Calabria (2), Cassano (1), Palanuda (1), Calopezzati (1), 
Rossano (1), Marina (1). The patroni involved did not always sail straight to 
Genoa. They had a range of possibilities. Apart from six voyages bound 
                                                          
306 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50603. 
307 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50442. 
308 See Iodice, Piccinno, ‘Whatever the cost’, 10. 
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explicitly to Genoa and one to Genoa and Livorno, the others present a list of 
alternative ports: Livorno or Genoa (1), Naples, Livorno or Genoa (1), or even 
Pietrasanta, Massa (both in Tuscany), Chiavari or Genoa (1).309 The main 
commodity traded on this route was again wheat, alone (6) or with other 
foodstuffs such as cheese and legumes (1). This was followed by two loads of 
oil and one of chestnuts.310 
One of the areas where the quantity of arrivals varies most significantly 
compared to the previous three years is, as already mentioned, Apulia. Only 
three shipmasters come from this region, which in the previous sample was the 
first area of origin of vessels. They are three shipmasters, probably from Liguria, 
of which two are sailing on their cimbe. Again all shipments from this area were 
composed only of grain, coming from Barletta (1), Brindisi (1) and Taranto (1). 
The Adriatic side of the Papal States, present-day region of Marche, 
complete the voyages from the Italian peninsula. From this area there are six 
shipmasters. The route Marche-Genoa is characterised, as in the previous 
intervals, by the regularity of the types of goods and the ports involved. All the 
voyages concern exclusively cargoes of wheat embarked in Ancona (4), in 
Ancona, Monte Santo (present-day Potenza Picena) and Porto Recanati (1) or 
in Senigallia (1). There is also, among the voyages departing from Genoa, a 
cargo of goods loaded on the tartana of a Genoese patrone in the ports of 
Genoa, Livorno, Naples and Reggio. The goods were bound for Ancona, where 
wheat was to be loaded and brought back to Genoa on behalf of some 
Genoese merchants.311 Most of the outward cargo consisted of herring (200 
barrels) and cod loaded in Livorno but there were also, for example, soap and 
sailing equipment loaded in Genoa, straw chairs loaded in Naples and lemons 
loaded in Reggio. Compared to previous intervals, Northern shipmasters are 
absent from this area. Genoese shipmasters and a Venetian patrone travelled 
on these routes. They employed three cimbe, one pinco, one fregatone [!] and 
an unspecified vessel. 
This three-year period is characterised, as already mentioned, by the relative 
increase in the role of French commercial shipping and by the decline in the 
                                                          
309 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50828. 
310 Biagio Salvemini too, in his studies on trade from Marseille in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, points out the marked decrease in arrivals from Campania compared with 
an increase in exports from Sicily and Calabria, with cargoes being transported mainly by 
Genoese shipmasters from ports and settlements scattered along the coasts of these two 
regions. See Salvemini, Carrino, ‘Porti di campagna’, 223. 
311 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50629. 
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number of vessels from the Adriatic area. Trade with the Venetian Republic and 
the Veneto region is absent, with the exception of two departures from the 
Venetian-controlled Ionian islands of Fanò (present-day Othoni) and Merlera 
(present-day Ereikoussa). Two patroni of unspecified nationality left from these 
two islands with, respectively, a cargo of wheat and one of oil to Genoa. Based 
on their names, it is safe to assume they were from Campania and Calabria 
respectively.312 
Sicily returns to first place as an area of origin in this three-year period with 
forty-one voyages, equal to 32% of the total. Wheat, alone (17) or with other 
goods (9), is still the main cargo, present in more than 60% of cases. During the 
seventeenth century in Sicily cereal production remained essentially stable, 
allowing the region to continue to play its redistribution role for the 
Mediterranean market. The theory of the Sicilian ‘crisis’ during the “long 
seventeenth century” would not seem to exist if one looked only at the 
quantitative data emerging from the Genoese Average sources.313 This data 
must be contextualised and compared with other sources and with what we 
know from the historiography on this subject. In the second half of the 
seventeenth century, the internal consumption of the island’s population 
increased significantly and it became difficult to sell the grain that was brought 
to the ports of loading, among whom, in the sources examined, Girgenti (11) 
and Sciacca (6) still predominated. This led to a decrease in the quantity of 
grain sold abroad. Whereas in the sixteenth century, and occasionally in the 
early seventeenth century too, according to Cancila’s estimates, Sicily exported 
annually more than 200,000 Sicilian salme (42,944 tons) of wheat, between 
1699 and 1700 the average was estimated to be 54,195 Sicilian salme 
(11,636.75 tons).314 Based on the Average reports, other goods on the Sicily-
Genoa route were oil, loaded alone (10) or with other goods (3), salt (2) and silk 
(2). The low tonnages of the vessels employed on this route, often mastered by 
Sicilian (9) or Genoese (6) patroni, was perhaps one of the reasons why there is 
a large number of vessels arriving in these years. There are thirty-five patroni 
mastering cimbe (15), tartane (14), barche (3) or other vessels (2), plus six 
                                                          
312 Their names are, respectively, Gavardella (from which the current Gambardella, widespread 
in Campania, derives) and Naucerra (from which the current Nucera, widespread in Calabria, 
derives), see the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50609 and 50630. 
313 On the chronological scanning of Sicilian trade divided into a long sixteenth century (1450-
1650) and a long seventeenth century (1650-1740) see Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 264; Braudel, 
Civiltà e imperi, II, 950-951. 
314 Cancila, Impresa, redditi, 275. 
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shipmasters with unspecified vessels. Only one of them seems not to be from 
the Mediterranean area. From Sicily, there is also a Genoese shipmaster who 
transported a cargo of wheat from Trapani to Malaga, in Andalusia.315 
 
4.4.3 1698-1700, Eastern Mediterranean and North African Routes 
 
Finally, three vessels sailed from the coasts of North Africa. Two of them 
concern the island of Tabarka. The patron and shipmaster involved carried, 
respectively, a cargo of wheat and broad beans and a cargo of wheat, coral and 
money to Genoa. These cargoes constitute an example of the main types of 
goods transported on the Tabarka-Genoa route.316 
The third voyage was from the port of Salé, on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. 
The barca of the patrone Antonio Maria Del Canto, from Sturla, left Salé with 
copper and General Cargo for an unspecified destination, presumably Genoa. 
This is one of the rare examples in which Average sources allow to follow the 
same shipmaster’s activity over multiple voyages. Del Canto, although his name 
was spelled differently by the authorities who wrote his reports - the French 
consul in Salé and the Conservatori del Mare in Genoa - was involved in no less 
than three Average reports between 1697 and 1699.317 His first known voyage 
was a shipment of marble from Genoa to Larache, some 160 km north of Salé, 
on behalf of English merchants living in Genoa: Jean Scadamoré, Jean and 
Giorgio Henstran fils and Carlo Compagni.318 The latter was probably an Italian 
merchant. The cargo was bound for another English merchant living in Tetouan, 
called Espenses.319 After unfortunate events along the route that gave rise to a 
GA report, Del Canto arrived at its destination on 15 August 1697. The alcalde 
of Larache, the local authority, obliged the patrone to go to Salé for his report. 
The alcalde of Salé, however, together with an unspecified “general of vessels” 
named Benache, ordered the patrone to transport his cargo of marble to La 
                                                          
315 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50827. 
316 On the structures of these trades see Piccinno, Un’impresa fra terra e mare. 
317 See the voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the ids 50598, 50999 and 50600. In 
these voyages the patrone's name is recorded in the following ways: Antonio Maria Del Canto 
(Genoa); Antonio Maria Goustou (Salé); Antonio Maria Coste (Salé). The vessel's name does 
not change significantly between the different voyages. 
318 Following the temporary occupation of Tangier (1662-1684), England aimed to control the 
traffic areas from North Africa, where competition from rival European powers was looser. See 
T. Stein, ‘Tangier in the Restoration Empire’, in The Historical Journal 54, 2011, 985-1011. 
319 The shimaster declared in his consolato, drawn up in front of the French consul in Salé, that 
the cargo on board was bound for “monsieur Espenses marchand anglois”. 
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Mamora (probably Al-Ma'Mura, present-day Mehdya), despite what had been 
agreed in the freight contract. Del Canto obtained formal permission to leave 
Morocco only on 29 October 1697, with a cargo of copper and “altre merci”. In 
1699, he is among the patroni on the Sicily-Genoa route with a cargo of salt, 
perhaps following the decision to operate on more ‘crowded’ but also ‘safer’ 
routes. 
 
4.5 1599-1700, Old and New Balances 
 
The data examined in the four sample periods reveal the potential of Average 
practices to investigate and reconstruct the main trends of trade destined for 
and, to a lesser extent, transiting for the port of Genoa. The documentation 
allows further insights into the activity and operational strategies implemented 
by the shipmasters and the merchants involved. 
The seventeenth century was a century of changes in the structure of 
maritime traffic around Genoa although, from a quantitative point of view, 
Mediterranean routes and food cargoes maintained their preponderance. Trade 
remained centred around Italy, Sicily in particular, and the Mediterranean side 
of the Iberian Peninsula. The latter kept its polarization between the Balearic 
Islands and the ports of Cartagena and Alicante, on one side, and the Atlantic 
coasts. However, it is possible to highlight several discontinuities that 
characterise the trends. 
Two factors stand out: the degree of elasticity of the traditional structures of 
Genoese traffic with respect to the arrival of elements that ‘break’ the balance, 
and the role of foreign shipping. First, in order to make an analysis of long-term 
trends, I will briefly discuss the main elements emerging from the analysis of 
Average documents. 
The first three-year period examined (1599-1601) is an ‘elastic’ response to 
an event of such significant importance as the first ‘Northern Invasion’ (1591-
1592). Between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, Average reports reveal the presence of a new, although secondary, 
market for cereals transported from Northern Europe by Northern shipmasters, 
especially Flemish. On the other hand, the Sicilian market seems to be 
dominant after the crisis of 1591, at least if we look at the number of vessels 
arriving in Genoa and declaring an Average report. Mainly Ligurian patroni and 
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French and Ragusan shipmasters operated on the Mediterranean routes 
leading to Genoa. By the second period (1639-1641), shipmasters from 
Northern Europe fully integrated into the main Mediterranean trade and this had 
important consequences. First, the goods arriving from Northern Europe began 
to diversify. Together with lesser and lesser cereal cargoes, other products 
arrived, such as salted fish, hides or metals (iron, lead). Among the Northern 
shipmasters, the English also tended to acquire importance. Furthest routes, 
such as those from Russia or Newfoundland, appeared alongside the voyages 
from Dutch, English or Hamburg ports: cargoes of salted fish from 
Newfoundland, in particular, were a constant during the second half of the 
century.320 Furthermore, in the period 1639-1641 it is evident that Northern 
shipmasters began to stay within the Mediterranean area in search of profitable 
freights.321 They had first arrived carrying cereals, and it was on this type of 
cargo that they focused their subsequent activity as carriers, thanks to their 
large vessels with small crews. The Dutch, in particular, were specialised in 
unarmed, light but capacious merchant vessels.322 They operated 
predominantly on all main Mediterranean routes, on which they carried cereals. 
The Genoese merchants, at the same time, responded to the uncertain situation 
of the Sicilian market, generated in particular by the 30 Years’ War, which was 
devastating central Europe, through a greater diversification of routes. 
Previously ‘secondary’ markets such as Apulia began to gain importance. From 
the first sample period, moreover, it is possible to observe the grain shipping 
from the Lomellini possession of Tabarka, the island off the coast of Tunisia. 
With the depletion of the coral banks, the island became a small emporium for 
grain exports acquired directly in North Africa.323 In addition to the grain routes 
and products from Northern Europe, from the end of the 1630s onwards the 
importance of trade with the Atlantic side of the Iberian Peninsula and the role 
                                                          
320 Heywood, ‘Beyond Braudel's’; G.T. Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland, 1577-1660, 
Toronto, 1969. 
321 M. Fusaro, ‘The invasion of northern litigants: English and Dutch seaman in Mediterranean 
courts of law’, in M. Fusaro, B. Allaire, R. Blackemore, T. Vanneste eds., Law, labour and 
empire. Comparative perspective on seafarers, c. 1500-1800, London, 2015, 21-42; R. Davis, 
‘England and the Mediterranean’, in J.F. Fisher ed., Essays in the Economic and Social History 
of Tudor and Stuart England in Honour of R.H. Tawney, Cambridge, 1961, 117-137. 
322 M. van Gelder, ‘Favouring foreign traders? The Venetian Republic and the accommodation 
of Netherlandish merchantsin the late 16th and 17th centuries’, in U. Bosma, G. Kessler, L. 
Lucassen eds., Migration and membership regimes in global and historical perspective: an 
introduction, Leiden-Boston, 2013, 141-166; J. Parry, ‘Transport and Trade Routes’, in E. Rich, 
C. Wilson eds., Economic History of Europe, Cambridge, 1967, 155-219, 190. 
323 Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Whatever the cost’, 3. 
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of Genoa as an emporium for colonial products such as sugar, tobacco, 
cinnamon, etc. grew more and more. Even in the three-year period 1668-1670, 
which is situated within a time of crisis in maritime traffic, Average reports reveal 
an increase in the quantity of vessels coming from Portugal, usually from Lisbon 
and Oporto, with cargoes of sugar and tobacco. The period 1668-1670 also 
shows another ‘elastic’ reaction: the reduced circulation of capital led to an 
almost total disappearance of Northern shipmasters from Mediterranean routes. 
This also affected the average values of vessels and their cargoes, which were 
significantly lower. The grain trade remained of primary importance, but mainly 
small vessels commanded by Genoese, Neapolitan or French shipmasters 
handled it. 
The last selected period (1698-1700) shows, at least partially, a return to the 
initial balance. On the one hand, the Sicilian market regained its leading role for 
the supply of cereals to Genoa. Cargoes of oil or other goods increased as well. 
Arrivals from Northern Europe, although they doubled compared to the 
beginning of the century, do not reach the values recorded in the second or 
third period. They remain, for example, at about the same level as traffic from 
Portugal, Mediterranean Spain or Calabria. On the other hand, in this phase 
there are shipmasters of different nationalities, with the Genoese and, even 
more clearly, the French prevailing. The French, in particular, were constantly 
present on all the main routes leading to Genoa in the years 1698-1700, without 
specialising on certain routes. They were not only from the Provence area, as 
one would expect for geographical reasons and as it was in the first period, but 
from the whole Kingdom.324 They, for example, mastered some of the vessels 
loaded with salted fish from Newfoundland as well as those loaded with sugar 
and tobacco from Portugal. 
When processed and compared through graphs and tables, data resulting 
from the four periods examined allows a long-term analysis of seventeenth-
century Genoese trade. And several macro-trends emerge. Graph 4.5 
compares the data on different cargo types arriving in Genoa during each 
period.325 
                                                          
324 Evidence is the presence, for the first time, of shipmasters from Dunkirk. 
325 In most cases, sources specify ports of unloading. Sometimes, however, Average reports 
employed vague expressions such as 'Ponente' or 'Levante', or 'Porti d'Italia'. I chose, in such 
cases, to assume that Genoa was a port of unloading. 
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Cargo types are grouped into four macro-categories. The first is ‘cereals’. Being 
a basic commodity of which the Republic was in annual deficit, Graph 4.5 
confirms its relative importance: cereal imports never fall below 38% for those 
voyages which declared an Average procedure. Since cereals (wheat, rye, etc.) 
are bulky goods, these could easily occupy the entire hold of a vessel. In some 
cases, other foodstuffs (broad beans, pasta, chickpeas, etc.), and other raw 
materials or high-unit value goods could be loaded alongside them, albeit in a 
smaller quantity. For example, the vessel of the Genoese patrone Antonio 
Decotto with a tonnage of 1,373.5 mine (about 125 tons) sailed from Tabarka in 
1696 carrying on board 1,300 mine of cereal (94.6% of the total tonnage) and 
small quantities of coral, broad beans, lentils, cous cous, dates and chalk.326  
 
 
My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of 
AveTransRisk db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than 
Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages are between 
parentheses near each sample period. 
 
The second macro-category is 'raw wool'. This category is relevant not only 
because of the importance of this trade, almost exclusively carried between 
Mediterranean Spain and Genoa, but also because wool, like cereals, was often 
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Graph. 4.5 Main cargo types arriving in Genoa, 1599-1700
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the only merchandise on board.327 In Average calculations, magistracies 
distinguished between different types of 'wool' with different values, as shown in 
the bills of lading: “first quality wool”, “second quality wool”, “third quality wool”, 
“reffina wool”, “Barbary wool”, “fioretto wool”, “agnina wool”, and so on. Looking 
at the data from a diachronic perspective, two elements emerge. On the one 
hand, as results from Graph 4.5, wool trade decreased significantly, in 
percentage, over the course of the seventeenth century. This probably 
happened because of the growing role of Genoa as an emporium. Free port 
policies were designed expilictly to attract cargoes into the free port warehouses 
described in the Third Chapter. Raw wool cargoes, used in manufacturing in 
Liguria as well as in Northern Italy, were replaced by other raw materials that 
could stay in the port’s warehouses for a longer period of time, waiting to be re-
exported. Voyages with wool cargoes at the end of the seventeenth century 
were almost a third of a century earlier. On the other hand, there was also a 
change in the places of origin of the wool arriving in Genoa. In the 1599-1601 
period, more than 80% of wool shipments arrived from Mediterranean Spain. 
The same applies to the years 1639-1641. Things had changed by the end of 
the century, as in the interval 1698-1700 only one out of seven wool cargoes 
arrived from Mediterranean Spain, and the others arrived from from Amsterdam 
(2), Bilbao (1), Lisbon (1), Marseille (1) and Sardinia (1). 
I separated the ‘General Cargo’ category. Unfortunately, as already 
mentioned, the sources do not reveal further details on the composition of these 
cargoes. Still, their changing flow emerges through the examined periods. 
General Cargoes were completely absent in first period (1599-1601), were 
abundant in the second period (1639-1641), while their quantity slowly 
diminished during the third and fourth periods (1668-1670, 1698-1700). Almost 
all came from Northern Europe, carried by Northern shipmasters. There were 
occasional loading of General Cargoes on Mediterranean shipmasters’ vessels 
leaving Rome, Messina, Cartagena and other ports. Doria’s research shows 
that between 1688-1690 and 1708-1712 this typology of cargo reached an 
annual average of 5,500 tons, while the average in the eighteenth century was 
10,000 tons.328 
                                                          
327 On wool trade see Bulferetti, Costantini, Industria e commercio, 35, 97. Wool trade was in 
decline in Genoa during the seventeenth century. Registered wool weavers were 88 in 1630, 39 
in the second half of the century. See Massa, Lineamenti, 64. 
328 Doria, ‘La gestione portuale’, 140-141. 
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I grouped the cargoes that do not belong to the previous categories in the 
‘other goods, foodstuff and raw materials’ field. As can be seen from Graph 4.5, 
they were always a minority compared to cereals, yet their percentage is the 
only one showing a constant positive trend through all four periods (1599-1700). 
Such trend reflects, as already mentioned, the growing role of the port of Genoa 
as a commercial emporium, in parallel with the development of free port policies 
and expansion of port’s warehouses. Wide diversification of ‘Other goods, 
foodstuff and raw materials’ category emerges in Table 4.6. In order to show the 
frequency of the arrivals of these goods for each period, a cargo containing fish, 
foodstuff and hides, for example, will count as one in ‘fish’, one in ‘foodstuff’, 
and one in ‘hides’. 
 









Chemicals329 5 6 4 2 
Fish 5 6 3 3 
Foodstuff330 12 13 3 2 
Hides 7 2 1 1 
Luxury goods331 7 3 - 2 
Metals and coal  5 1 5 
Money 1 2 4 - 
Oil 2 14 3 17 
Raw materials for 
paper 
4 4 1 1 
Salt 5 1 9 10 
Spices 4 3 - 3 
Sugar 2 2 6 6 
Textiles 5 2 1 4 
Tobacco - - 2 4 
Tools 3 5 1 - 
Wax 1 3 - - 
Wine 4 9 4 2 
Wood 3 7 4 1 
Unknown 6 15 14 9 
My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of 
AveTransRisk db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than 
Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages per each sample 
period are, respectively, 39 (1599-1601), 59 (1639-1641), 35 (1668-1670), and 46 (1698-1700). 
 
A few elements emerge if we look at specific goods. Totals in the ‘fish’ field, for 
example, do not vary significantly from the first to the last period. However, 
                                                          
329 Saltnitre, Soda, Sulphur, Alum, Pitch. 
330 Legumes, Cheese, Fruits, Pasta. 
331 Silk, Silk shirts, Carpets, Books, Coral. 
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there was a shift in the type of fish from Sicilian tuna (the tonnine) to cod from 
Newfoundland or Northern Europe. The origin of sugar shipments also changed 
as the century progressed. Cane sugar from plantations outside Europe, 
probably coming from Brazil, replaced Sicilian sugar beet, which dominated 
during the first period.332 Tobacco cargoes arrived from Brazil, usually travelling 
alongside sugar. Genoese merchants bought them in Lisbon to redistribute it 
from Genoa in the Mediterranean area.333 The growing importance of these 
products highlights the ability of merchants operating in Genoa to set up 
networks linking the Oceans with the Mediterranean, and to redistribute across 
Italy those type of products from extra-European colonies that would lead to the 
'consumer revolution' in the eighteenth century.334 According to Paolo Calcagno 
the port of Genoa, rather than simply being an example of a decadent port in a 
decadent Mediterranean, can be more effectively described as a reliable 
example of the transformations engendered by trade globalisation in early 
modern period.335 
 
4.5.1 Cereal Trade Long-Term Trends 
 
What follows is a specific example of the Average documents potential for long-
term analysis on maritime trade during the early modern period. The importance 
of Genoese cereal trade, and the abundance of data available, allow to study its 
                                                          
332 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db with the id 50627. On Brasilian sugar 
trade, see M. Edel, ‘The Brazilian Sugar Cycle of the Seventeenth Century and the Rise of the 
West Indian Competition’, Caribbean Studies IX/1, 1969, 24-43. 
333 All shipmasters in the AveTransRisk db who transported tobacco cargoes from Portugal to 
Genoa also carried sugar cargoes. For both sugar and tobacco, Average reports refer to 
“Brazilian weight”. In the case of tobacco, a vessel bound for Livorno that made a forced stop in 
Genoa in 1667 carried a cargo of “Brazilian tobacco”. See the voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db with the id 50645. On Brasilian tobacco trade, see M. Norton, Sacred Gifts, 
Profane Pleasures: A History of Tobacco and Chocolate in the Atlantic World, New York, 2008. 
334 The consumer revolution is a theory formulated for the first time by Neil McKendrick in 1982 
and then applied to early modern England. Scholars today argue on the real impact of this 
‘revolution’. See G. Klark, ‘The Consumer Revolution: Turning Point in Human History, or 
Statistical Artifact?’, SSRN, 2010, 1-21, available on 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1653155, accessed on 29/06/2021. M. 
Kwass, ‘Ordering the World of Goods: Consumer Revolution and the Classification of Objects in 
Eighteenth-Century France’, Representations 82/1, 2003, 87–116; M. Carmagnani, Le isole del 
lusso. Prodotti esotici, nuovi consumi e cultura economica europea, 1650-1800, Turin, 2010. On 
this topic in Italian historiography, see A. Clemente, ‘Consumi e domanda tra XVIII e XIX 
secolo. Acquisizioni e tendenze della storiografia economica italiana’, Storia Economica 2\3, 
2004, 555-580. 
335 Calcagno, ‘La porta di Lisbona’, 532. 
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long-term evolution in some detail.336 Origins of cereal shipments changed 
significantly over the course of the seventeenth century, as shown in Graph 4.6.  
 
My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of 
AveTransRisk db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than 
Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages are between 
parentheses near each sample period. 
 
Grain trade does not seem to have been much affected by the seasons, 
although the data examined show that departures were more concentrated 
between September and May. This was probably because harvest season 
started in June and shipments were ready from September. However, GA 
calculations often indicate that the wheat on board came «from the old 
harvest», so dependence on seasonal variables must have been negligible.337 
On the other hand, concentrated arrivals of ships would have raised some 
problems, as, for example, was the case with the ships traveling in convoy from 
                                                          
336 See, for example, Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Whatever the cost’. 
337 The price paid for wheat of the old harvest was generally lower compared to the average 









Sicily 79.73% 24.14% 21.05% 50%
Apulia 2.70% 19.54% 28.07% 3.85%
Adriatic 2.70% 19.54% 22.81% 13.46%
Other 16.31% 33.03% 20.78% 28.85%















Northern Europe: i.e. price drops at the place of sale, due to supply surplus, and 
difficulties in finding return cargo due to increased traffic.338 
Sicily retained a dominant role as place of origin for Genoese cereal imports: 
at the beginning of the century (1599-1601) on the island were loaded almost 
80% of grain cargoes and, after a period of uncertainty, at the end of the 
century (1698-1700) still accounted for 50% of these. Shipmasters could also 
load their ships in more than one port. For example, in 1600, Antonio Maria 
Germano of Sestri Ponente loaded wheat at Girgenti and then, after a jettison 
during a storm, loaded more wheat in Trapani.339 Voyages could also include a 
call at Palermo or Messina to load other goods, such as silk, wine, or sugar.340 
Shipments from Northern Europe, which had saved the Republic's population 
during the famine of 1591, disappeared during the seventeenth century. Four 
vessels loaded with Northern cereals arrived in the 1599-1601 period, not even 
one in the following ones (1639-1700).341 That is why Graph 4.6 only considers 
Mediterranean cereals. 
After the free port’s edict (1590), the Republic became a redistribution hub for 
Mediterranean cereals. To the initial near-monopoly of Sicilian cereal 
shipments, the disruptions caused by the Thirty Years' War made supplies from 
Spanish territories difficult, and forced Genoese merchants to rely on different 
markets. This is also evident from the growth of 'Other' category in cereal 
shipping, which includes Tuscan ports (accounting for 8% of total voyages 
cases in the 1639-1641 three-year period) but also ports in Calabria, Greece, 
Tabarka, etc. Cereals from the Adriatic region and Apulia became particularly 
common. During the last period examined (1698-1700) there was a partial 
return to Sicilian grain, but the secondary markets maintained their importance. 
Although cereals from Northern Europe may have almost disappeared, 
Northern shipmasters did not. Graph 4.7 shows, in percentage, the origins of 
shipmasters involved in cereal shipping. 
 
                                                          
338 These issues affected Genoa especially following increased trade with Northern Europe. The 
free port aimed at facilitating the arrival of different goods for return cargoes. Costantini, La 
repubblica di Genova, 170. 
339 Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), Notai Giudiziari 636, 23/08/1600. 
340 On the silk industry, see Guenzi, Massa, Piola Caselli (eds.), Guilds, Markets and Work 
Regulations. 
341 This does not imply that no cereal cargoes at all arrived from Northern Europe. Its 
percentage remained significantly lower than the arrivals of Mediterranean cereals. For an 
example of arrivals and costs of Northern cereals, see Lamberti, ‘Mercanti tedeschi a Genova’. 
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My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of 
AveTransRisk db. The graph excludes voyages referred to ports of destination other than 
Genoa and those with Genoa as port of origin. Total number of voyages are between 
parentheses near each sample period. 
 
Almost all shipmasters whose origin was not specified in the sources were 
probably from the Mediterranean, as those from Northern Europe are easily 
distinguishable by their or their vessels’ names. ‘Other Mediterranean Regions’ 
here refers to those captains whose Mediterranean origins were clearly stated 
(John Doe from Naples, for example) as well as those whose origin can be 
deduced. Mainly French, Ligurian and other Mediterranean (like Catalans and 
Sicilian) shipmasters transported cereals to Genoa during the first period (1599-
1601). There were also Dubrovnik shipmasters (8.11%), who later 
disappeared.342 In the second interval, during the Thirty Years' War, the 
dominance of Northern shipping became evident. In the 1639-41 interval 86% of 
shipmasters were Northerners. This shift confirms the data reported by Carmelo 
Trasselli on Sicilian cereal exports. Between 1601 and 1635 most of the non 
Sicilian vessels calling at Sicilian ports were French (39%), followed by Dutch 
(9%), while in the 1640s there was an increase in the presence of Dutch (23%) 
                                                          









Liguria 24.32% 3% 28.07% 23.08%
France 25.67% 1.15% 5.26% 0%
Northern Europe 5.40% 82.76% 3.50% 1.92%
Other Mediterranean
Regions 45.95% 11.49% 57.89% 75.00%















and English (9%) vessels.343 Cross-referencing the proportion of Northern 
shipmasters from Average sources with the data from Graph 4.6 provides 
evidence of these shipmasters’ operations in several Mediterranean 
marketplaces. Maybe the growing insecurity of Mediterranean routes helped 
Northern shipmasters securing a key role in cereal shipments across the 
Mediterranean. Similar percentages apply to the presence of Northern 
shipmasters on Northern Europe routes, or in all those voyages involving 
General Cargoes. My findings confirm also Edoardo Grendi’s arguing for a peak 
in Northerner shipmasters’ arrivals in Genoa in the 1640s.344 After the end of 
the Thirty Years' War, they almost completely disappeared from the grain trade. 
They were replaced by smaller vessels mastered by shipmasters of unspecified 
origins, probably Mediterranean, however they kept their dominance in the trade 
routes with Northern Europe. 
The abundance of voyages involving Sicilian wheat allows us to compare the 
prices that Genoese merchants paid for it in Sicily, as Average calculations 
frequently reported this information. More studies on Average sources and 
crossreferences with different archives will allow to perform the same operation 
for different markets (Northern Europe, Ottoman Empire, other Italian regions, 
etc.) and on different goods.345 Graph 4.8 shows the purchase price for one 
mina (90.985 kg.) of the main types of Sicilian wheat in Genoese lire.346 The tax 
on wheat paid in Genoa and the cost of freight amounted to about 2 lire and 1.5 
lire per mina, respectively. As confirmed by Gertrude Macrì’s studies, reliance 
on different types of wheat, like rocella or carosella (two types of durum wheat), 
was an effective risk reduction strategy, successfully adopted by Genoese 
merchants. Should there be a poor harvest of rocella wheat in a certain year, for 
example, they could purchase another type of wheat.347 
 
                                                          
343 C. Trasselli, ‘Note sui ragusei in Sicilia’, Economia e Storia I, 1965, 40–79. 
344 Grendi, ‘I nordici’, 56. 
345 For example, further studies on Average reports drafted in Livorno will allow a comparison of 
prices and administrative costs paid by merchants and shipmasters during the same periods. 
346 This graph is also published in Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Whatever the cost’, 8. 
347 G. Macrì, ‘Il grano di Palermo fra ‘500 e ‘600: Prerogative e reti d’interesse’, Mediterranea, 
Ricerche Storiche VII/18, 2010, 87–110, 93. 
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My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of 
AveTransRisk db 
 
In the first period, between approximately 1589 and early 1599, prices were 
sharply fluctuating. The price of rocella wheat in 1590, for example, was more 
than 30 Genoese lire per mina. This period coincided with the famine and the 
subsequent Northern Invasion348. Strong price fluctuations affected both 
Genoese and Sicilian markets, with similar trends.349 Based on the data 
provided by Felloni, the price of wheat in Genoa in 1591 almost doubled 
compared to the one of the previous year.350 Prices returned to pre-crisis levels 
only within four years, with a price of 16 Genoese lire per mina.351. Further 
fluctuations, although less significant, marked the following years, with an 
average price of 18 lire per mina. In the second phase, starting from the end of 
1599, prices in Sicily stabilized around an average of 16 lire until the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, when the trend began to show again marked 
fluctuations. Standard deviation in Graph 4.8, i.e. the statistical dispersion 
index, was about 1.8 lire. Hence, using average prices should be sufficiently 
reliable. It also confirms that the Genoese in Sicily could buy wheat at ‘stable’ 
                                                          
348 Grendi, ‘Genova alla metà del Cinquecento’, 117-120. 
349 In 1591, for example, prices peaked in Genoa and Catania. See G. Felloni, ‘Prezzi e 
popolazione in Italia nei secoli XVI-XIX’, in Felloni ed., Scritti di Storia Economica, II, 1231–
1288, 1239. 
350 Northern Italy was among the area most affected by this famine. See G. Alfani, ‘The Famine 
of the 1590s in Northern Italy. An Analysis of the Greatest “System Shock” of Sixteenth 
Century’, Histoire et Mesure XXVI/1, 2011, 17-50. 



































































































































































Graph 4.8 Purchase price for 1 mina of Sicilian wheat in 
Genoese lire, 1589-1703










prices. Prices in Genoa follow a regular trend: after a peak between 1640s and 
1650s, they stabilized at 23 lire from 1670.352 
 
4.5.2 Further Observations 
 
Finally, Average sources allow the observation of further macro-trends. One of 
these is the arrival of French shipmasters’ in Genoa (Graph 4.9). This graph has 
two columns. The first one is the percentage of French shipmasters carrying 
cargoes to Genoa, while the second one is the percentage of French pirates 
attacks’ appearing in Averages’ reports over the total Averages reporting 




My elaboration based on the total cases obtained through the 'advanced search' function of 
AveTransRisk db. Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period. 
Total number of voyages are between parentheses near each sample period. First number 
refers to total shipmasters involved in commercial shipping, second number to total Average 
reports with pirates’ attacks or theft of goods. 
 
In the first period (1599-1601), there was a considerable presence of French 
shipmasters, usually involved in the grain trade. They disappeared abruptly, 
albeit predictably, during the Thirty Years' War when France and Spain were at 
war. During this second period, French pirates were extremely active as 
                                                          
352 Felloni, Pesce, Le monete genovesi, 293 













Merchant Marine 19.25% 1.77% 11.38% 23.20%











Graph. 4.9 French merchant or pirate shipmasters, 1599-1700
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declared by vessels presenting their Average reports in Genoa. The two 
percentages rebalanced in the following period (1668-1670), returning to a 
situation similar to the initial balance during last three-year period (1698-1700). 
This time, however, French shipmasters were no longer specifically involved in 
the grain trade. As reported in Graph 4.7, French shipmasters carrying cereals 
to Genoa, which accounted for more than 25% of the total in the first period 
(1599-1601), disappeared by the end of the seventeenth century. In return, they 
operated on all routes to Genoa, whether from the Mediterranean or Northern 
Europe, including Newfoundland, and they arrived from Northern France’s ports 
as well. 
To sum it up, from Average’s evidence we can clearly see a high 
concentration of French pirates during periods of active warfare, whereas at 
other times peaceful/everyday trade between neighbouring states seemed to 
predominate. Traditional historiography, in particular Giulio Giacchero’s works, 
usually referred to trade between Genoa and neighbouring ports (Livorno and 
Marseille) in terms of conflict and rivalry, although there was certainly a degree 
of ‘rivalry’, everyday exchanges show a higher degree of collaboration.354 
Another field that benefits from a quantitative elaboration of Average data is the 
historical analysis of enviromental risk. Average reports highlight the most 
frequent dangers as they listed the routes and places where the events that 
determined an Average took place, with the date and a description of weather 
conditions. With these information I geo-localised about 87% of the places 
where maritime accidents occurred, corresponding to 833 out of 958 events.  
Graph 4.10 shows the macroareas in which accidents occurred. I grouped 
them by the name of the sea area in which they occurred (Ionian Sea, Ligurian 
Sea, etc.) or by the closest region (Provence, Corse, etc.). Gulf of Lion is the 
only area that follows the sources’ terminology. However, Gulf of Lion in early 
modern period was considered much bigger than today: depending on the 
source, it could extend across the whole area between the Balearic Islands, 
Corsica, and Western part of Sardinia.355 
Events occurring along the coasts and near islands and archipelagos – which 
often have unpredictable effects on currents and winds – accounted for a 
significant proportion of all Averages. According to Marcello Berti’s statistical 
                                                          
354 Rivalry rhetoric is particularly evident in Giacchero, Origine e sviluppi. 
355 Berti, ‘Il «rischio» nella navigazione’, 278. 
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analysis most accidents occurred along the coasts: depending on wind and sea 
conditions, every peninsula, every small island, every beach, could pose 
sudden and unpredictable hazards.356 In particular, the Tuscan archipelago 
(Central Tyrrhenian), the Ligurian Sea and the Sicilian coasts, together with the 
Gulf of Lion, were the most dangerous zones. Graph 4.10 confirm Berti’s 
observations and, once again, is evidence of the potential for compared 
quantitative analysis between Average sources from different archives.  
 
 My elaboration based on the 'advanced search' function of the AveTransRisk database. 
Accidents in port (72) and unknown locations (125) are excluded. 
 
                                                          
356 Berti, ‘Il «rischio» nella navigazione’, 285. 
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Graph 4.10 Sites of accidents, 1599-1700
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It was not unusual for a shipmaster to declare multiple accidents in his report. 
During a single voyage, shipmaster Jo. Battista Rapallo, carrying a cereal cargo 
from Crotone (Calabria) to Genoa in 1670, faced separate incidents of bad 
weather and storms near Sicily, Naples, Livorno and La Spezia.357 
Strong winds and sudden tides and currents pose unpredictable risks and 
hazards in the Mediterranean, perhaps even greater than those encountered 
during coastal navigation in the Atlantic Ocean to and from Northern Europe.358 
Most vessels from beyond Gibraltar, for example, suffered accidents in the 
Mediterranean only. Only ten shipmasters from Northern Europe or 
Newfoundland declared an accident only outside the Mediterranean. 
Storm winds in the Western Mediterranean were, irrespective of the season, 
the Mistral and, sometimes, the Scirocco, a south-westerly wind. Mistral, for 
example, can blow at more than 120 km per hour, is dry and is deemed to be a 
stormy wind, especially in Sardinia and Corsica. Originating from the Rhone 
valleys and the Gulf of Lion, the Mistral blows on the upper Tyrrhenian Sea, and 
the Ligurian Sea. Even Average claims relating to accidents in port (72) were 
primarily caused by extraordinary weather conditions.359 The situation is much 
more ambiguous in cases of pirate or enemy attacks, as will be seen in chap. 5. 
 
The analysis carried out in these pages, based on relatively homogeneous 
three-year sample periods, has therefore allowed two important tasks: a long-
term analysis for the whole of the seventeenth century, and the analysis on 
specific elements: value and composition of the cargoes, main maritime risks, 
etc. The latter elements, in particular, often escaped traditional studies and the 
results show the great wealth of information contained in Average sources. 
The relative homogeneous documents’ structure and data collection and 
processing through the AveTransRisk database are an incentive to extend this 
research to the eighteenth century and to strengthen the hypotheses related to 
the trends observed so far through the study of further years from seventeenth 
century.  
                                                          
357 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50796. 
358 Berti, ‘Il «rischio» nella navigazione’, 285. On maritime risks see also R. Gluzman, ‘Tracking 
Venice's Maritime Traffic in the First Age of Globalization: a Geospatial Analysis’, in Maritime 
networks as a factor in European integration: selection of essays, Florence, 2019, 135-153. 
359 These in turn could give rise to complex and multiple cases of damage between different 
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5. The Twilight Zone. Limits and Illegal Practices 
 
 
Navigation and trade inevitably contribute to determining the technical and 
economic frontiers within which entrepreneurial skills are employed and 
analysed, risk transfer and sharing tools are tested, and market tools coexist 
with mentalities based on apparently opposite concepts such as ethics, mutual 
trust, or religious faith.
1 Thanks to Average sources, I analysed the main features of the maritime 
traffic flows headed to or stopping at the port of Genoa. Although the 
documentation was homogeneous enough to allow statistical analysis, there 
was no shortage of borderline cases or situations out of the ordinary. Fernand 
Braudel and Ruggiero Romano dedicated the conclusion of their brilliant essay 
on the analysis of Livorno’s trade to what they called “aberrant cases”, a fitting 
definition even for borderline cases resulting from Average sources.2 
These cases are exemplary of the unpredictability and variety of situations 
that could arise during a sea voyage. In these peculiar circumstances, the law 
and daily practice had to provide solutions that the involved parties could 
accept. The authors of the reports that make up the following case studies 
placed themselves, knowingly or not, on the border between the Average acts 
and other types of claims, perhaps trying to obtain damage sharing that would 
have allowed them to better bear the unexpected expenses that arose in 
commercial navigation.3 All places cited in this Chapter can be found in the 
Appendix XI. 
As mentioned in the previous pages, the fear of shipwreck or of pirate attacks 
were, in theory, the only reasons that could induce the shipmaster to jettison 
cargo or equipment, the ‘standard’ event at the root of Average.4 The GA acts, 
for example, had to avoid the supreme danger of a shipwreck to be able for the 
calculation to follow. The jurist Targa, in his treatise published in 1692, made 
this distinction clear: 
 
                                                          
1 V. Piergiovanni, ‘Il viaggio per mare. Spunti di diritto medievale e moderno’, in Piergiovanni 
ed., Norme, scienza e pratica, II, 1307-1314, 1307-1308. 
2 Braudel, Romano, Navires et marchandises, 65-75. 
3 On the ‘polysemy’ of the GA and PA concepts and their classification in Western Europe 
during the early modern period, see Dreijer, The Power and Pains of Polysemy, 119-126. 
4 Targa, Ponderationi, 254. 
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If such an accident should occur, due to a serious storm, fire, combat or other 
unforeseen incident, that it reduces the ship to a state of unseaworthiness 
that cannot be brought back to the state of being able to navigate, as it is 
exposed above, then there are no longer the conditions for an average. It is a 
total loss.5 
 
The difference between the positive outcome of a GA act, which allowed the 
partial salvage of the goods or the ship, and a total loss, was what, either in 
good or bad faith, most frequently eluded the shipmasters who asked to 
proceed with an Average procedure. The shipmaster’s report, with subsequent 
questioning of witnesses or not, was an essential requirement to prove any type 
of event that had occurred at sea, regardless of the declarant's purposes. 
Shipmasters just needed a document to shift responsibility for the accident 
away from themselves. As previously stated, notaries in Genoa marked the 
reports indifferently as consolato, testimoniale, manifesto, etc. without 
distinctions based on the function or the formal structure of the document. In 
most cases, reports contained formulas to prove the truthfulness of the 
shipmasters, with expressions such as “and I mean all this to correspond to the 
truth”, or “et hoc est”.6 The shipmaster's report and Average procedure were 
therefore not necessarily equivalent concepts. Casaregi, for example, reported 
the case of a shipmaster whose request to proceed with the GA calculation was 
refused because in his report, drawn up in Cadiz, the shipmaster had not 
requested a calculation: 
 
[…] in his consulate in Cadiz, he made no mention of the accident and he 
only intended to make a consulate so that the truth of the incident would be 
known forever, in order to free himself from the obligation to compensate for 
damage to someone's cargo […].7 
 
However, even in doubtful reports, it was sometime possible to go ahead with 
calculation. These uncertain procedures is evidence of a certain confusion and 
flexibility in the daily practice followed in Genoa. Furthermore, the fact that the 
                                                          
5 “Se poi seguisse tale infortunio, che o per tempesta grave, o per incendio, o per 
combattimento, o per altro incidente impensato si riducesse la nave a termini d’innavigabilità 
non reducibile allo stato da potersi più navigare come si è esposto al succapo all’hora non si è 
più ne termini d’Avaria, ma vien ad essere sinistro totale”. Targa, Ponderationi, 256. 
6 The same formulas are also within the sources in Livorno, as shown by the db AveTransRisk, 
see  
http://humanities-research.exeter.ac.uk/AveTransRisk/search/, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
7 “[…] in eius consolatu in emporio Cadicis facto, nullum de Avaria hac fecit verbum, et solum 
intendebat consolatum facere, ut semper veritas casus sinistri appareret, pro se liberando à 
refectione danni aliquarum mercium […]”. Casaregi, Discursos legales, 1, XIX, 57. 
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same archival folders preserve the documents pertaining to GA acts, as well as 
those related to other kinds of maritime events, raises further questions as to 
how much the authorities clearly distinguished between Average procedures 
and other maritime accidents, such as shipwrecks.8 The similarities in 
shipwrecks and Average reports perhaps determined a specialization of the 
courts and notaries in receiving and recording these documents. 
 
5.1 On the Border between GA and Shipwreck 
 
Shipwreck is part of the macrocategory defined by Targa as “fatal incidents”.9 
The etymology of the word shipwreck in Italian, naufragio, derived from the 
Latin words navis fractio, breaking of the ship.10 Michele de Jorio, a Neapolitan 
jurist involved in the drafting of a Maritime Code in Naples in 1781, drew up an 
exhaustive definition of this concept: 
 
Shipwreck, navis fractio, is the loss of the ship. It happens when the ship is 
sailing, whether laden with merchandise or not, [and it is] due to a sea 
fortune, or to being followed by enemy vessels, or for any cause of 
misfortune. It [the ship] will go ashore, and there it will break up in such a way 
that it will not be able to continue its journey. The same is true if the ship 
sinks. This is the real shipwreck.11 
 
Shipwreck is the sea risk par excellence, and it is the most common of the risks 
included in maritime insurance policies since the very beginning of insurance. 
The most frequent events that could cause a shipwreck, beyond storms, were 
the attacks by enemy vessels or shipmaster and crew’s inexperience. In the 
latter case, however, the insurance policies did not usually compensate for the 
damages occurred. In case of doubts about the shipmaster's responsibility in 
                                                          
8 Only in PA cases it is possible to find the request to draw up a calculation by, usually, the 
merchants owning the damaged goods. The latter probably needed the calculation in order to 
resort to their insurers, see, e.g., the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50490. 
9 Targa also includes in this category the “rovina improvvisa, l’incendio casuale, la tempesta, 
l’impeto di acque, la guerra e la peste ossia malattie, il furto, la forza dei superiori o dei nemici, 
la mortalità imprevista della gente a bordo o del bestiame, la carestia, le rivoluzioni di gente 
[ribellioni a bordo], la fuga degli schiavi o degli animali a bordo, l’ingiustizia commessa da un 
inesperto o troppo esperto [sic], e il disordine commesso per errore”, see Targa, 
Ponderationi, 242-243. 
10 Targa, Ponderationi, 245. 
11 “Il naufragio, navis fractio, è la perdita della nave. Allora succede quando la nave sta 
navigando, tanto carica di mercanzie, quanto senza mercanzie, o per fortuna di mare, o per 
essere seguitata da vascelli nemici, o per qualsivoglia causa di sventura anderà a traverso a 
terra, ed ivi si romperà in maniera, che non potrà essere accomodata per seguire il suo viaggio. 
Lo stesso è se la nave va a fondo. Questo è il vero naufragio”. C.M. Moschetti ed., Il Codice 
marittimo del 1781 di Michele de Jorio per il Regno di Napoli, Naples, 1979 (1 ed. 1781), 1040. 
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the events leading to the shipwreck, the incident was presumed to be 
accidental.12 If the shipwreck was not caused by a shipmaster’s fault, the 
damages following a shipwreck were borne individually.13 Shipwrecks explicitly 
are not Average events. Nevertheless, shipwreck events are, although in a clear 
minority of cases, recorded among the reports preserved in the calcolatori and 
the Conservatori del Mare archival folders. To date, they make up 
approximately 3.73% of the total number of registered cases (32 voyages out of 
858).14 The majority of the shipwrecks analysed thus far occurred inside the 
harbours. They were due to sudden and strong winds that caused the moored 
vessels to collide against one another or against the docks.15 Even if part of the 
goods had been recovered following the accident, this did not start an Average 
procedure. The shipmasters could still obtain the standard payment of the 
freights, and the insurers obtained the sum of the recovered goods if they had 
already paid for it.16 Targa reports as examples two shipwrecks that, 
coincidentally, occurred in the port of Genoa: the shipwreck of the vessel 
Concettione of the shipmaster Tommaso Calcagno, sunken in 1664 in the 
mandraccio of the port, and that of the vessel of a Corsica shipmaster, sunken 
near an unspecified pier.17 
Some theoretical exceptions allowed shipwrecks to be eligible GA events. In 
case two vessels were about to shipwreck in the same storm, for example, and 
the sacrifice of one of them could save the other one, Targa stated that only the 
most important one was to be saved, that is the one “whose salvation is most 
useful for all”. The two vessels would have shared damages and expenses as if 
they were a single entity from a legal point of view.18 He recalled the principle of 
the sacrifice of one part for the greater good, typical of GA, although in this case 
the ‘part’ was an entire vessel with its equipment and cargo. Casaregi also 
reported other exceptions; in the event of a fire in the port, with the flames 
spreading from ship to ship, thus burning all the moored vessels, it was possible 
                                                          
12 Targa, Ponderationi, 246. 
13 Casaregi, Discursos, XLVI, 161. 
14 I selected the following search fields in the advanced search of AveTransRisk db: Archival 
type = Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG); Event type = Shipwreck. 
15 See for example the voyage involving the polacca named Santo Stefano e Domenico 
Buonaventura, of the patrone Domenico Cantello. It sank in Civitavecchia. The entire cargo was 
lost. The corresponding report is in the atti dei calcolatori, but there was no Average calculation. 
See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50270. 
16 Targa, Ponderationi, 246-247. 
17 Targa, Ponderationi, 248. 
18 Targa, Ponderationi, 247. 
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to voluntarily destroy the vessels closest to the flames to stop the spread and 
save the farthest ones.19 The ships voluntarily destroyed and those saved 
thanks to their sacrifice would have split the damages between them. These 
examples allowed to extend the concept of damage sharing even to situations 
other than standard GA acts such as jettisons. In both cases, the initial 
requirement after the accident was a detailed report.20 Shipmasters had to 
declare their shipwreck as soon as possible in the nearest port.21 
The aberrant cases analysed in the following pages differ from the jurists’ 
theoretical formulations. They are apparently inexplicable. Let us consider, for 
example, the voyage of the patrone Gio Grosso of Albissola, with his fregata, 
the San Carlo.22 The patrone left Albissola, a village on Genoese Riviera, with a 
load of pottery, coal, gunmetal and other goods, to bring to Genoa. Once in 
Genoa, a sudden north wind arose while the vessel was moored between the 
Molo Vecchio and the Molo Nuovo, causing its rapid sinking. At first sight, it 
would appear to be an ordinary shipwreck, yet the Conservatori del mare, on 22 
February 1641, ordered to proceed with a calculation. The vessel with its 
equipment contributed to the damage sharing, alongside the cargo and the 
freights. The list of damages was particularly long and included the 
administrative expenses necessary to recover the sunken vessel and the 
damages of both lost and recovered goods. The total damage was of 591.10.6 
Genoese lire, while the contributing values were 3,804.16.6 Genoese lire. A 
shipwreck in port gave rise to a GA calculation in this peculiar case. The 
resulting contribution rate was 15.10.11 lire for every 100 lire. The source does 
not report any justification for this unusual case. Perhaps the possibility of 
recovering the vessel would have allowed to save the hull and part of the 
goods, which would then have contributed to the partial compensation for 
damages against what had been lost, hence the need to have a calculation of 
the contributing goods and of the total damages. In his report, the patrone 
specified that he hoped to recover the vessel and the goods.23 Based on the 
                                                          
19 Casaregi, Discursos, XLVI, 163. This exception is statede also by the Spanish jurist Hevia y 
Bolaños, experts in the Carrera de Indias. He cited Casaregi, Targa and la Lex Rhodia, see 
Ilustracion y Continuacion á la Curia Filípica, vol. III, Madrid, 1790, 323-324. 
20 Casaregi, Discursos, XXVIII, 86. 
21 Casaregi, Discursos, II, 11. 
22 ASG, NG, Atti dei calcolatori 2085, 26/02/1641, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 
50300. 




documentation examined thus far, another similar situation concerns the 1703 
shipwreck of the Santo Bruno, mastered by the Dutch patrone Pietro Coderch.24 
The ship sank in the port of Genoa while it was moored at the Molo Vecchio. 
The calculation included the costs for recovery as well as the interest of 1% on 
a sea loan, perhaps made to find the capital for the recovery operations. The 
unusual presence of a sea loan in the calculation, a credit instrument whose 
functioning has been previously discussed, testifies to the survival of this 
instrument during the eighteenth century, as recent studies also show.25 
Further uncertainties in the formal distinction between Average and 
shipwreck procedures stemmed from the fact that a shipmaster’s report could 
describe both types of events in the same voyage. However, for the GA act to 
be valid, enough time would have to have passed between it and the 
shipwreck.26 According to some authors, including, for example, Baldasseroni, a 
jettison could not be successful if, during the same storm, the vessel 
shipwrecked.27 A case in point was the voyage of patrone Gregorio Graffigna of 
Chiavari with his leudo, the San Cristoforo, from Chiavari to Finale.28 He left 
Chiavari, his hometown, on 17 April 1640 with a cargo of wine, flax, sausage, 
mortadella and salted meat, which belonged to himself, and with benches and 
trestles belonging to the vicario of Chiavari.29 It was a typical voyage of a small 
cabotage vessel, with a low value cargo, headed for the Western Riviera. A 
fellow citizen of Graffigna would have received the cargo in Finale. On 18 April 
1640, at 3 p.m., over the cape of Varazze, a sudden storm pressed the 
shipmaster to order a jettison. Despite this emergency measure, however, the 
waves submerged the leudo, which sank. The patrone with his sailors “came 
ashore naked”, without being able to save anything. The cape of Varazze was 
and still is a stretch of sea subject to frequent storms and bad weather.30 As 
soon as they reached the beach, the patrone and the sailors asked the local 
                                                          
24 ASG, CdM, Esibite in avaria 377, 31/08/1703, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 
50362. 
25 On the functioning of cambio marittimo see par. 3.1. On its survival in the eighteenth century, 
see Zanini, ‘Financing and risk sharing’. 
26 Casaregi, Discursos, XLVI, 163. 
27 Baldasseroni, Trattato delle assicurazioni, vol. 4, 49. 
28 Report partially transcribed in Appendix VIII. Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the 
id 50324. 
29 In 1610, the archbishop of Genoa, Cardinal Orazio Spinola, instituted the charge of vicario 
generale with jurisdiction over all the parishes in the Chiavari district. 
30 In the db AveTransRisk there is also another voyage that ended up in a shipwreck in this 
area, the liuto named Santa Maria, sunken near Varazze around the 29 October 1600. See the 
voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50266. 
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inhabitants for help to recover the vessel, which had sunk half a mile from the 
coast. More sailors came to the rescue, and together with Graffigna’s crew, they 
were able to tie up and pull the sunken vessel ashore, thus managing to recover 
part of the goods still on board. Afterwards, the patrone went to Varazze to draw 
up “the present manifesto consolato in order that it may be known to be true”. 
During the same storm, the patrone had attempted a jettison, and then he lost 
his vessel. Although the document arrived at Genoa, where the Annona office 
approved it on 30 April 1640, there was no subsequent GA calculation. The 
shipwreck occurred immediately after the jettison, which clearly did not manage 
to avoid the sinking. The report only allowed the patrone to go to his insurer or 
could have been useful to him against the owner of the lost cargo. 
The expenses for the drafting of the documents, as well as those for the 
recovery of the ship or the goods, triggered urgent payments that the 
shipmaster had to face in some way. The difficulty in finding the required capital 
for the expenses caused by a shipwreck, which presumably involved the loss of 
all valuables, was indeed not a negligible issue and may perhaps explain why 
the shipmasters tried to ‘disguise’ these incidents as GA events. 
Another case of shipwreck that did not give rise to a calculation is the voyage 
of the patrone Lorenzo quondam Bartolomeo Cappello of Lavagna, a town on 
Eastern Riviera, with its cimba called Nostra Signora del Rosario.31 He left 
Salonika, the modern Thessaloniki, on 26 April 1698 with a load of wheat to 
take to Marseille. Unfavourable winds affected the whole journey, in particular a 
scirocco wind, which changed to a north wind and then back to a scirocco near 
Sicily, 60 miles from the island of Marettimo. At 100 miles from Montalto, a 
mountain in the Aspromonte chain, a strong libeccio wind forced them to move 
away from their route and make a jettison. That jettison was not enough since, 
after a few hours, they had to perform another one “of greater sum”. The ship, 
however, was still at the mercy of the bad weather, to such an extent that it 
could not follow the set course. Bad weather and poor visibility forced the vessel 
to run ashore on the beach of Corneto, namely, Tarquinia, in Lazio, in a place 
called Castellania, perhaps the same as the fortress of Gravisca. The voluntary 
stranding could theoretically compel a sharing of the damages, if it took place 
after due consultation, because it meant sacrificing part of the hull to save the 
                                                          
31 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50441. Report partially transcribed 
in Appendix X. 
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goods and the people on board.32 However, in this case, the stranding on the 
beach, probably without a ‘free’ choice on the part of the patrone due to the 
strength of the storm, destroyed the hull and resulted in a full-fledged 
shipwreck: 
 
[…] and following the route as best we could, not being able to know the 
terrain because the mountains were obscured unless we were on land, we 
had to land in the Cornero beach in a place called Castellania. Seeing that 
we were completely lost and trying to save at least our lives if we could, as 
we were all out of hope, when the hull was broken we tried to recover what 
little we could […].33 
 
The patrone immediately turned to a cardinal of Genoese origin and 
superintendent of Corneto in those years, Giorgio Spinola, for his report. 
Spinola ordered the recovered wheat to be resold to pay the costs of recovering 
the vessel and of the quarantine of the crew.34 The repair costs in port due to 
bad weather, in fact, were theoretically borne by shipmasters and shipowners.35 
Other tools recovered from the destroyed vessel were immediately sold. The 
patrone requested the Genoese consul of the Papal State, Francesco 
Domenico Cicopevio, for a report to certify the accident and his correct 
behaviour. He submitted this document in Genoa on 3 July 1698. Although the 
jettisons had been made while still in sight of Montalto, that is approximately 
200 miles from the place of the subsequent stranding, the Conservatori del 
Mare did not order to proceed with the calculation, and therefore, all the 
expenses remained the responsibility of the patrone and his partners. 
It is interesting to note how, for the smaller vessels, and despite the progress 
in the field of nautical charts, in the seventeenth century, shipmasters still 
preferred to sail near the coast, relying on either the visual memory of the 
landmarks along the route or on the portolani. The latter were volumes 
providing the description of the bays, the ports of call and the coastal elements 
                                                          
32 Casaregi, Discursos, XLVI, 164. 
33 “[…] e seguitando il cammino alla meglio che potevamo, non potendo conoscere terreno per 
essere le montagne offuscate se non quando fossimo in terra, dove ci convenne investire nella 
spiaggia di Cornero in luogo detto la Castellania. Vedendoci affatto persi e seguendo salvare 
almeno la vita se potevamo, essendo tutti fuori di speranza, onde rotto che fu detto scafo si è 
procurato di ricuperare quel poco sia stato possibile […]”. ASG, CdM, Testimoniali segreti 
redatti all’estero 285, 10/06/1698, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50441. 
34 The superintendent was in charge of the temporal affairs of the papal state in a specific 
region. On Giorgio Spinola see D.M. Cheney, ‘Giorgio Spinola’, in Catholic Hierarchy, see 
http://cardinals.fiu.edu/bios1719.htm#Spinola, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
35 Casaregi, Discursos, XLVI, 164. 
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(mountains, towers, etc.) with an indication on the correct manoeuvres to avoid 
dangers.36 This type of navigation, however, forced face waves, shoals, 
maritime traffic, and easily variable currents. Let us take as example the voyage 
of patrone Giuseppe Palermo on his tartana called Il Santissimo Sacramento e 
la Madonna della Lettera. In an attempt to round the island of Capri, he found 
himself facing two different and consecutive storms, first with westerly and 
libeccio winds and then with southern winds, probably caused by the streams 
and natural obstacles that channelled the winds from the mainland.37 
Another reason for a shipmaster, as mentioned, to draft a report following a 
shipwreck was insurance purposes. In these cases, there was usually an 
explicit request for a PA calculation. The voyage of Shipmaster Giacomo di 
Negro, a naturalized French Genoese and citizen of Toulon, on his Nave called 
Santa Maria di Misericordia, is an example of this behaviour.38 He left Genoa 
with a load of chestnuts, probably in April 1600, and stopped in Livorno to load 
wheat and other goods to take to Cadiz. Once in sight of the coasts of 
Catalonia, a storm broke out and forced his Nave to take refuge in the port of 
Salou. Although it was sheltered there, it went “sideways” and sank inside the 
harbour. The shipwrecks inside the ports, as noted, forced costly recovery 
operations to remove the vessels from the bottom of the sea and make the 
docking safe again. The shipmaster had to bear the unexpected and quite 
significant expenses; the vessel, for example, was taken to Barcelona for 
repairs. Once Giacomo di Negro arrived in the port of Tarragona, probably on 
foot, he declared his report with a list of expenses. Although he was a citizen of 
Toulon, he took the report to Genoa to request a PA calculation. Perhaps 
among the shipowners there were some Di Negro from Genoa related to the 
shipmasters, or perhaps the insurers were Genoese and drawing up the 
calculation procedure in their city would have sped up the payment of the 
compensation.39 The report was submitted in November 1600, which is seven 
                                                          
36 On the portolani most used in Genoa see ‘Catalogo di carte ed atlanti nautici di autori 
genovesi, ovvero fatti od esistenti in Genova’, Giornale ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle 
arti, II, 1875, 41-71. On this topic see also R. Unger, ‘Ships and Shipping Technology’, in C. 
Jowitt, C. Lambert, S. Mentz. eds., The Routledge Companion to Marine and Maritime Worlds, 
1400–1800, Abingdon, 221-240, 230-231; T. Campbell, ‘Portolan Charts from the Late 
Thirteenth Century’, in J.B. Harley, D. Woodward eds., A History of Cartography, Chicago-
London, 1987, 371-463. 
37 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50623. 
38 See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50276. 
39 The Di Negro were one of the leading families in the Genoese oligarchy. See A.M.G. Scorza, 
Le famiglie nobili genovesi, Trebaseleghe, 2009. 
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months after the declaration of the accident. It may be that this was the required 
time for the repairs to the ship or to draw up a complete estimate of the 
damages. Unfortunately, there are no notes on this. The calculation seems to 
be a PA for the shipowners, since it reports only the damages to the vessel. The 
value of the vessel 6,000 Genoese lire, and that of the freight collected by the 
shipmaster, 5,964 lire, constituted the risico. The calculation of the damages 
was much more complex. There were: 
 
• 394.0.4 lire to bail out all the water that entered into the hold. 
• 489.11.8 lire to take the vessel to Barcelona. 
• 1,946.4.8 lire for repairs. 
• 313.6.8 lire as compensation to the superintendent, originally paid in 800 
pieces of eight.40 The superintendent was probably the one who followed the 
ship to Barcelona and supervised the progress of the repair work. 
• 45.8.8 lire for the travel expenses of Gio Micone, whose identity we know 
nothing else of, to go to Barcelona to recover the ship after the repairs had 
been completed. He was probably an agent charged with carrying the newly 
repaired ship to the next port of destination. 
• 195.16.8 lire for the expenses of the attorney, another type of agent who 
acted on behalf of the shipmaster and the owners, also sent for the recovery 
of the ship in Barcelona.41 
• 14.17.8 lire for copies of deeds made in Spain, such as the report drawn 
up in Tarragona. 
• 1,250 lire for damage to the Nave after the accident, as resulting from the 
report of the appointed expert. 
• 2,825.18 lire for lost freight rates, calculated per miles with respect to the 
uncompleted voyage. 
• 34.10.4 lire for the submission of the report and the appraisals to the 
calcolatori in Genoa, as well as for the expenses to be paid to them and to 
their notary for the preparation of the calculation. 
 
                                                          
40 According to the exchange rate reported by the calcolatori, 1 real was equal to 0.7.10 
genoese lire, see ASG, NG 637, 04/05/1601. 
41 The ‘procuratore’ or ‘proccuratore’ in the early modern period acted as a defender or accuser 
in a court case on behalf of others. See ‘Procuratore, Vocabolario degli accademici della 
Crusca, 4th ed., vol. III, Florence, 1729-1738, 728. 
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The total damage amounted to 7,509.14.8 Genoese lire, a large figure 
compared to the 11,964 lire of risico, equal to approximately 63% of the total. 
Considering the difference between the total freight rates and the lost freight 
rates, since the total freights contribute to the risico, the damages in the freight 
rates amounted to 47%. If we look at the expenses for the recovery and repair 
of the vessel, instead, they amounted to 77% of the 6,000 lire of the Nave. The 
purely administrative costs for copying the records and drafting the various 
documents related to the calculation procedure amounted to approximately 50 
lire, only 0.4% of the risk. 
This was a significant loss. Only two reasons could have prompted the 
shipmaster to request such a precise calculation: the need to unload his 
responsibilities in front of the shipowners, to prove to them that the damage did 
not derive from inexperience or imprudence — but in such case, theoretically, 
the sea protest would have been enough — or the willingness to turn to the 
insurers for the reimbursement of at least part of the damages. According to 
Felloni's handwritten notes on some PA calculations recorded on paper cards 
relating to those same years but not yet supported by the sources, the 
calculations in these cases were drawn up for insurance purposes: they 
reported the values of freight and vessels, not including the goods on board.42 
According to Casaregi, notarial writing was always necessary in cases where 
part of the insured property had survived to accurately assess the damage to be 
reimbursed.43 In theory, however, chap. IV, book II of the Statuti Civili, De 
Cause brevioribus, clearly stated that in case of lawsuits between patroni and 
merchants, or other interested parties regarding Averages, freights, etc., it was 
necessary to proceed briefly, without the need to resort to administrative 
documents.44 There was no need for any calculation unless, according to the 
Statutes, this request did not come from the insured person himself.45 Average 
                                                          
42 See the paper card in ADG, Felloni 1, n. 100, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 
50276. 
43 “[…] quae fieri solet per assecuratos, in casu, quo mercies non perierunt in totum[…]”, in 
Casaregi, Discursos, LXX, 242. 
44 “[…] in exequendo summariae, et de plano, sine strepitu, et figura iudicii, sine libello in scriptis 
et sine scriptis omnibus, et quibuscumque solemnitatibus omissis et teneantur magistratus 
concedere licentiam expedita actori contra debitorem […]”. BUG, ms. C. III. 13, Statutorum 
civilium Reipublicae Genuensis, Genoa, 1589, 50. 
45 Attached documents made to expedite summary judgements were very common, despite the 
legislative texts. This was especially true for maritime courts, see M. Fusaro, ‘Politics of 
justice/Politics of trade: foreign merchants and the administration of justice from the records of 
Venice’s Giudici del Forestier’, Mélanges de l’École française de Rome - Italie et Méditerranée 
modernes et contemporaines, 126-1, 2014, 
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and other procedures such as the shipwrecks, therefore, probably reached their 
highest degree of connection and interchangeability when they involved the 
insurers or, as I will state in the following pages, in the event of attacks by 
pirates or privateers. 
 
5.2 On the Border between GA and Piracy 
 
According to the list of “fatal incidents” identified by Targa, the second type was 
called Corsaria ovvero piratica. This referred to the plundering of a ship and/or 
of a ship’s cargo by privateers or pirates: 
 
[…] a depredation which is forcefully done to one person of his goods, by 
means of privateering or piracy, which are the principal cases among the 
fortuitous ones; which is committed at sea, or in port, or on the beach, as 
distinct from the depredation which is done on land by means of plunder, or 
robbery […].46 
 
The theft or seizure of the vessel and the goods by the enemies could occur in 
deep waters just as well as in a harbour or near a shoreline. It could take place 
because of a conflict between two warring nations, or without any legal 
justification, and it was perpetrated by a ladro di mare, a “sea thief”.47 According 
to the formal distinction between pirate and privateer, a pirate was a thief who 
acted outside of legal regulations, while a privateer was an auxiliary of the 
state’s navy. A privateer was authorized by a letter of marque to plunder the 
vessels that his nation was at war with.48 This distinction is not so clear in the 
legal sources; according to Targa, a pirate was someone who exercised the 
corsair activity with a regular licence and who, in addition to plundering the 
vessels that his lord was at war with, also attacked and plundered vessels of 
other nationalities.49 According to the jurist Azuni, such behaviour was frequent: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://journals.openedition.org/mefrim/1665, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
46 “[…] depredazione che vien fatta ad alcuno delli di lui effetti violentemente, per via di corsaria 
o piratica, caso principalissimo tra li fortuiti; la quale si commette in mare, o in porto, o in 
spiaggia, a distintione della depredatione che si fa in terra per via di bottini, ovvero di rapine 
[…]”. Targa, Ponderationi, 260. 
47 On the juridical and legal framework of piracy see G. Tellarini, La pirateria marittima. Regime 
di repressione e misure di contrasto, Rome, 2012. 
48 Catalonia rulers invented the letters of marque in the thirteenth century. The reference to the 
‘lawful’ economic gain derived from the privateering activity is implicit in the etymology of the 
Catalan term itself, Patent de Cors. The Latin word cursum was in fact equivalent to lucrum, see 
C.M. Moschetti, ‘Pirateria (storia)’, in Enciclopedia del Diritto italiano, XXIII, Milan, 1983, 873. 
49 Targa, Ponderationi, 261. 
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“they always degenerated into real piracy; it is just a kind of general 
brigandage”.50 For Casaregi, however, a pirate was someone who plundered 
vessels without a licence, acting on the basis of his own authority.51 He himself 
quoted Targa to clarify how those who acted with privateering licences were 
improperly called pirates, according to a widespread misinterpretation. Making a 
clear distinction, therefore, is a misleading operation.52 Even in Average 
practices, such a distinction does not seem to be relevant. For this reason, I will 
use the term pirate only. 
Pirates stealing part of the cargo was an event that had close links with the 
practice of GA. After a shipwreck, with the subsequent loss of the vessel and its 
goods, there were not enough assets left to proceed with damage sharing 
calculations, as all or most of them were lost. The situation was more blurred in 
the event of a theft. Under these circumstances, the ship or part of the goods 
usually survived and, therefore, were liable to contribute to what had been lost, 
albeit under particular conditions.53 According to Casaregi, who also specified 
that other jurisdictions adopted such practice, even the wounding of a sailor in 
the course of a successful defence against a hostile attack and the subsequent 
expenses for his food and medical treatment should have been considered as 
GA damage and, as such, shared amongst the contributing elements.54 
The reports examined to date in which thefts of goods, assault or encounters 
with hostile ships were reported are 58 out of 858. They represent almost 
6.76% of the total number of cases registered to date.55 In 19 of these cases, 
equal to approximately 32% of their total, the shipmaster obtained a GA or PA 
calculation. Where the pirates came from was not always specified (11): they 
                                                          
50 “Ils dégéneraient toujours en vraies pirateries; elles n’étaient qu’une espèce de brigandage 
general”. D.A. Azuni, System universel des armemens et des corsaires en tems de guerre, 
Genoa, 1817, 13. 
51 In a gloss Casaregi reported other legal-commercial dictionaries such as the Dictionarium ad 
utriusque juris of Alberico da Rosate, published in Bologna in 1481, as a confirmation of this 
distinction. See Casaregi, Discursos, LXIV, 228. 
52 Primary sources frequently use both terms as synonyms, see L. Lo Basso, In traccia de’ legni 
nemici. Corsari europei nel Mediterraneo del Settecento, Ventimiglia, 2002, 17. Braudel himself, 
after clarifying the differences between privateer and pirate, resorted to both terms 
indiscriminately. See F. Braudel, Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell’età di Filippo II, Turin, 
1986, 919-948. 
53 The only type of accident that did not allow for any GA reparation, according to Baldasseroni, 
who quoted the Dutch jurist Quintino Weitsen, was the shipwreck. In all other cases there was 
the possibility that something was lost for the common salvation. See Baldasseroni, Trattato 
sulle assicurazioni, vol. IV, 87. 
54 Casaregi, Discursos, I, 163. 
55 I selected the following search fields in the advanced search of AveTransRisk db: Archival 
type = Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG); (Event type = Hostile Encounter; OR Event type = 
Hostile attack; OR Event type = Theft of merchandise). 
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could be Turks (15), French (11), “Turks or French” (2), from the Barbary Coast 
(7), English (8), Majorcan (2), Dutch (1), Spanish (1) or even Genoese (1). 
These events took place on the busiest routes, near straits or archipelagos 
where it was easier to vanish without a trace, such as the area near Gibraltar or 
the triangle between Sardinia, Corsica and the islands of the Tuscan 
archipelago. In some cases, the assault declarations could even be useful to 
encourage the circulation of information and help each other by reporting 
dangerous areas or the presence of specific pirates. An example of this practice 
is represented by the testimoniale privato drawn up by the patrone Cristoforo 
Raynerius from Savona to report the theft of goods on board, destined for the 
Genoese merchant Pompeo Vassallo.56 In his report, with an attached list of 
stolen goods, the shipmaster specified that he had been robbed by the English 
shipmaster named Henrico Puppel on his vessel La Charlé, from London.57 
The main discriminating factor that authorized the transfer of the report to the 
GA procedure was the intentionality in the actions of the declarant and his crew 
to avoid the accident or reduce the damage. In fact, a simple theft, as 
Baldasseroni also clarified, would not have resulted in a repartition of 
damages.58 On the other hand, if, for example, the shipmaster had voluntarily 
given away a portion of the cargo to ransom the ship or any other good or to 
avoid imprisonment, kidnapping and indiscriminate looting, then the rest of the 
goods, freights and the ship itself would have contributed as in an ordinary GA 
act.59 If the ship either shipwrecked or suffered another accident afterwards, the 
assets surrendered to the pirates would have been compensated based on the 
value of the goods and the ship at the time of the theft, without considering 
subsequent events. Even extraordinary expenses, for example those related to 
unexpected stops to avoid encounters with pirates, usually made in a port or 
under a fortress, those for changing and lengthening the route or those for 
tracking down a ship that was abandoned following the arrival of the pirates, 
were eligible for contributions regardless of the achievement of the successful 
                                                          
56 ASG, NG 637, 08/05/1601, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50458. 
57 Another example is the report of the patrone from Sestri Levante Vincenzo Federico 
quondam Giacomo. He specified that the pirate Fransù Moreo from Tolone robbed and 
kidnapped him. See the voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50768. 
58 Baldasseroni, Trattato sulle assicurazioni, vol. IV, 90. 
59 Baldasseroni, Trattato sulle assicurazioni, vol. IV, 90. 
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result. The only condition was that the fear of encountering pirates was 
justified.60 
In practice, however, it was rare that reports submitted to Genoese 
magistracies concerning pirates led to GA calculations. Let us take as an 
example a claim that was tried to be passed off as a GA: the report of the 
journey of the patrone Santino Fugone of Sestri Levante, age 28, on board of 
his felucca.61 Fugone left on Thursday 15 March 1640 from Porto Torres on the 
northwestern coast of Sardinia, with a load of Sardinian cheese, probably 
delivered to Bastia, Corsica. Six sailors made up his crew, and they all testified 
as witnesses. The felucca left Porto Torres on Thursday around midnight, with 
two other felucche led by two patroni of Sestri Levante, Orlando Mulli and 
Domenico Severisio, probably acquaintances of Santino Fugone. Travelling in 
‘convoy’, even if they were only small vessels in this case, discouraged potential 
enemy attacks and allowed them to help one another in case of bad weather. 
This measure demonstrated the patrone’s cautiousness, an essential virtue at 
sea, to be displayed as much as possible when declaring an accident. The 
following day, the three felucche sailed together towards the Sponsaglia tower, 
a small fortification on the southeastern coast of Corsica. The patroni spoke 
with the tower guardian, who warned them of the presence of an unidentified 
vessel in that area that he feared might belong to pirates. Prudence prompted 
the three patroni to stop under the Sponsaglia tower from Friday to Sunday 
morning. However, receiving no further news, on Sunday, they set out in calm 
weather. On Monday evening, they decided to stop in Sari (Sari-Solenzara), in 
Corsica, to enquire about the presence of other ships between Solenzara and 
Bastia. Here, they found another patrone of Sestri Levante and two felucche 
from the same city, as well as a felucca from Bastia. These felucche confirmed 
to Fugone that the stretch of sea from Sari to Bastia was secure. Fugone set 
sail immediately, after only three hours of rest, with rowing and no wind. There 
is no further information on the other two felucche he travelled with, a sign that 
they probably separated after their stop in Sari-Solenzara. 
The felucca had been travelling through the last stretch of its route alone on a 
windless night. There are 50 miles between Solenzara and Bastia. After 
                                                          
60 Baldasseroni, Trattato sulle assicurazioni, vol. IV, 92. 
61 Report partially transcribed in Appendix VII. The feluca was a small Mediterranean ship with a 
single deck and approximately 10 m long, see Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 176-182. See the voyage 
recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50238. 
318 
 
approximately 30 miles, near the Fiorentina tower, a small boat of French 
pirates suddenly appeared on the route to Bastia, rowing towards the felucca. 
They immediately began firing musket shots at the vessel and yelling at the 
patrone to stop. After a brief chase, when the felucca came to be at only “a 
stone's throw from the coast”, the French reached the vessel and jumped 
aboard armed with pistols and melee weapons. The patrone's first thought went 
to the bag of money he kept hidden under a rowing bench. He picked it up and 
tried to jump overboard to save it, but a French pirate pinned him from behind. 
Deprived of the escape route, the patrone threw the bag into the middle of the 
cargo of cheese, hoping it would go unnoticed. The very content of the bag, the 
personal wealth of this patrone of the Genoese Riviera, is an example of the 
dynamism of coastal trade in the Mediterranean in the early modern period. 
That bag, in fact, contained money in all kinds of currencies, valued at 
approximately 600 Genoese lire: seventy-seven levantini, thirty pieces of 
Spanish pieces of eight, two silver ecus, one doppia from Florence, a gold ecu 
from Naples and ten lire of Genoese currency.62 
The pirates proceeded methodically; they transferred four sailors onto the 
small boat and left the patrone with another sailor on the felucca, forcing them 
to sail until dawn, when they reached the main pirate vessel. They tortured the 
patrone and interrogated him by enquiring what he had on board and asking 
him to show them his documents. The pirate shipmaster accused the patrone of 
being a Neapolitan who departed from Naples. The Republic of Genoa 
maintained its neutrality during the Thirty Years' War; an attack on a Ligurian 
patrone would have been an act of open piracy. The French shipmaster, who 
probably had a letter of marque to plunder the vessels of the Viceroyalty of 
Naples, that France was at war with, tried in this way to justify the theft and 
avoid a possible trial for piracy upon returning home.63 The interrogation 
subsequently focused on the money on board. Santino Fugone suspiciously 
quickly revealed the location of his bag, following the requests of the pirate 
shipmaster. Soon after that, in fact, one of the French pirates found the bag in 
the middle of the cheese cargo. Perhaps the patrone hoped that declaring that 
                                                          
62 On this topic see ‘Appendix 1: the coinages of Renaissance Europe, c.1500’, T.A. Brady, JR. 
Heiko, A. Oberman, J.D. Tracy eds., Handbook of European history, 1400-1600: late Middle 
Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation, vol. 1, Leiden, 1994, 671-678; C.M. Cipolla, Moneta e 
civiltà mediterranea, Venice, 1957. 
63 Pirates were formally considered as “enemies of mankind” and were given the death penalty, 
see Azuni, System universel: 18. 
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he had voluntarily revealed the presence of the bag, taken by the pirates 
afterwards, could be seen as a voluntary sacrifice of the money to save their 
lives and the goods on board. The pirates took the bag, all the cheese, which 
was worth approximately 800 pieces of “Sardinian money”, the belongings and 
clothing of the crew for a value of approximately 50 lire, and returned to their 
vessel. On Monday evening, they discussed what to do with the captured crew, 
while the patrone begged them to let them go and return their belongings: 
 
[…] And all the said day they detained us. Even at twenty one o'clock, having 
consulted between them yesterday about what to do with our people, the 
patrone begged for the love of God that they give him what was due to him 
and [that it did not belong] to any Neapolitan. And in the evening the [pirate] 
captain said that he should have hung me from a mast of the boat and that 
he did not want to give me anything […].64 
 
The patrone's alleged prayers and insistence on specifying how they were 
Genoese and not Neapolitans were heard. The French pirates returned four 
rows of cheese and some of the money, along with sails and oars to reach the 
nearest port. It was in this way that the felucca of Santino Fugone arrived in 
Bastia at four in the morning of Tuesday 21 March 1640. Fugone immediately 
declared his report in front of the Conservatori del Mare of Bastia, a magistracy 
perhaps dependent on the Conservatori del Mare of Genoa.65 
Despite the estimates of the damage, the presence of witnesses and the 
transfer of the file amongst the atti dei calcolatori of Genoa, where it arrived on 
24 March, no GA calculation was ordered. The abundance of details and the 
insistence on the good conduct of the shipmaster were probably not seen as 
sufficient elements for a GA, or perhaps the patrone needed this report only to 
privately contact his insurers. According to Casaregi, if a patrone had guided 
the pirates in taking part of the goods and leaving some other, the loss would 
have been comparable to a voluntary sacrifice.66 In this case, however, the 
pirates took everything, and only later did they return part of the cargo to the 
                                                          
64 “[…] e tutto detto giorno ci hanno trattenuti. Persino a ore venti una, havendo tra ieri consiglio 
circa quello dovevano fare delle nostre persone, a quale il patrone pregava per l'amor di Dio 
che mi dessero il fatto mio stante, che era mio proprio e non di napolitani, e da esso capitano ali 
sera fu detto, che meritava che mi appendesse a un pennone di detta barca, et che non mi 
voleva dare cosa alcuna […]”. See Appendix VII. 
65 There are no information on this magistracy in the Statuti Civili and Statuti Criminali of 
Corsica, published in G.C. Gregorii ed., Statuti Civili e Criminali di Corsica, 2 voll., Lyon, 1843. 
66 Casaregi, Discursos, I, 162. 
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patrone following his prayers, albeit at their discretion. This subtle distinction 
may have determined the outcome of this case. 
In the most common cases, an encounter with pirates could simply be 
avoided by means of a jettison that would lighten the ship and favour an 
escape. As in the case of escaping a storm, these cases usually ended without 
problems in a GA calculation. Let us take, for example, the voyage of the 
English shipmaster John Clarveth on his vessel Galera Jacob.67 This voyage 
brings together two common situations in a GA practice: a storm and an 
encounter with enemy vessels. 
The vessel left Gravesham, Kent, on 24 November 1707 with a cargo of 
herring, pepper, and other goods to be delivered to Genoa. While the vessel 
was at anchor in Portsmouth, where it had stopped due to bad weather, a storm 
broke out and forced the shipmaster to order the cutting of the anchor cable to 
speed up departure. Later, between Lisbon and Cape Saint Vincent, the 
shipmaster and his crew encountered three enemy vessels with which they 
engaged in naval combat. Given the impossibility of winning, the shipmaster 
ordered to throw away part of the guns to lighten the ship and escape the battle. 
They arrived safely in the port of Genoa on 7 March 1708 and requested the 
calculation of all the damages suffered. The Conservatori del Mare approved 
the shipmaster's report and ordered the calculation to be carried out on 21 April 
1708. Although the drawing up of the calculation underwent an unusual delay, 
perhaps possibly due to the slowness of communications with the merchants in 
England, all of the damages were admitted to the repartition procedure and 
brought together in a single GA calculation, completed on 10 January 1709. 
This calculation is in Spanish pieces of eight, a very widespread currency in the 
Mediterranean, used regularly in Genoese calculations from the second half of 
the seventeenth century but also in GA calculations made in other ports, such 
as Livorno.68 
Following the calculation of all the contributing elements, worthy of 7,476 
pieces of eight between the goods and the vessel, the damages below were 
recorded: 
 
                                                          
67 ASG, CdM, Esibite in avaria 377, 08/03/1708, recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 
50356. 
68 Dyble, General Average in the free port. 
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• 124.10 pieces of eight for cutting of the anchor’s cable with its anchor in 
port and for subsequent recovery costs. 
• 39 pieces of eight for the jettison of 2 Flemish 18-carat iron cannons to 
escape enemies.69 
• 110 pieces of eight per the cutting of an anchor’s cable, worth “two third 
of its value” that took place during the escape, probably with its anchor still 
connected. 
• 55 pieces of eight used for the consumption of the gunpowder used to 
fire 50 cannon shots and for other damages suffered by the vessel, the 
cordage and the water barrels during the conflict. 
• 83.17 pieces of eight for the administrative expenses for the calculation 
and for all the necessary investigations. 
 
The total 412.7 pieces of eight of damage concerned only the expenses 
pertaining to the vessel, as the goods had not suffered damage in either of the 
two incidents. However, thanks to the GA principle, they also contributed at an 
overall rate of 5.5%.70 
Another common example of GA following encounters and capture by enemy 
vessels, as already mentioned, consisted of the payment of a ransom. This 
could be done in cash or through the voluntary transfer of part of the cargo. Let 
us take as an example the case of the French patrone Lorenzo Dauffin, from 
Martigue, with his tartana named San Pietro.71 
Dauffin left Cagliari on 1 May 1703 with a load of wheat, pasta, rags, 
cheeses, cash and other goods to be delivered to Genoa. Along the way, he 
encountered four Dutch vessels with square sails that captured him and his 
crew and demanded a payment of 600 Spanish pieces of eight, equal to 
approximately 3,000 Genoese lire at the exchange rate of that year. That was a 
huge amount if we consider that the value of the vessel alone in the calculation 
was 1,175 lire. The pirates hoped to gain much money from the ransoming of 
goods or perhaps from some wealthy passengers. Indeed, it was a merchant on 
board, a sailor and the purser who paid the ransom for the release of the ship. 
                                                          
69 Calculators in Genoa often employed carats to describe the quality of lost or damaged goods, 
although it is not clear how many carats was worth each element in total. 
70 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50356. 
71 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50358. 
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In addition, the patrone handed over a small part of the cargo of pasta to the 
Dutch pirates, perhaps as food supplies for their own ship. 
The tartana arrived in Genoa on 16 May 1703, and the patrone made his 
report three days later. We do not know the date of the order of execution of the 
calculation, and hence how long it took and if there had been legal issues. The 
calculation was certainly completed before 20 July, the date of its approval. The 
damages were: 
 
• 72 Genoese lire for the soaking of part of the wheat during the seizure of 
the tartana. 
• 3,000 Genoese lire for the payment of the ransom, paid in advance by 
the purser, a sailor, and a merchant. The sum was reimbursed to them as 
soon as they arrived in Genoa. 
• 170 Genoese lire for three crates of pasta given to the Dutch. 
• 520 Genoese lire as a gift to the purser and the sailor for having paid in 
advance part of the ransom. 
• 104.7 Genoese lire for various unspecified expenses. 
• 241.2 Genoese lire for common expenses related to the procedure, such 
as the drafting of the report, the calculation and any other documents. 
 
Considering the low value of the contributing elements, of only 9,639.2 
Genoese lire, the participants in this voyage had to face a GA repartition of 
4,107.9.8 Genoese lire of damages. The overall rate was approximately 42%. 
As previously mentioned, another valid GA act in the case of pirate 
encounters was abandoning the vessel. The vessel had to be close to the coast 
or it had to have a sufficiently large schifo, and the crew had to be able to reach 
the coast before the arrival of the enemies. However, no such case is present in 
the documentation examined thus far. Even in the case that follows below, that 
of Sant'Anna, the tartana of the patrone of Alassio Giacomo Airaldi, the 
abandonment following the pirate attack did not result in a GA calculation.72 
The patrone, carrying various goods on the route from Alassio to Cagliari, 
encountered a vessel of “Moors” on 2 June 1698 near Cape Sferracavallo on 
the east coast of Sardinia. In the meantime, three other Christian vessels also 
                                                          
72 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50429. Other similar examples are the 
voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50263 and the id 50274. 
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arrived, including one of Neapolitans, and they all took refuge in the nearby 
Porto Cavallo to escape the pirates. The pirates managed to run ashore three 
boats, and they attacked and defeated the defenders of the port. Cornered, the 
crews of the Christian vessels fled, abandoning their ships, which were 
plundered by pirates. Afterwards, they went back on their ships and travelled to 
Cagliari to report the incident. Giacomo Airaldi's testimoniale was sent to Genoa 
but did not give rise to any GA calculation. Perhaps the Conservatori del Mare 
did not order to proceed because of the lack of freedom in choosing to abandon 
the vessel; the crew resorted to this solution only after taking refuge in the port 
and seeing the Moors defeat the defenders on the beach. 
Finally, pirate encounters could also give rise to PA calculations that were 
suffered individually by the owner of the damaged cargo or vessel. This is the 
case for the voyage of the liuto San Antonio Bonaventura, belonging to the 
patrone Giacomo Sanmichele of Lavagna.73 He left Civitavecchia on 1 October 
1638 with a crew of five sailors and a load of hemp and rags bound for Genoa. 
The following day, at just three miles from the coast, between Cala di Forno and 
Castello Marino, a brigantino and a tartana of French pirates suddenly 
appeared near the coast. The distance between the vessels was too short, and 
his liuto, a small single mast vessel, had no way of escaping the assailants.74 
The shipmaster decided to flee with the schifo and take refuge on shore, while 
the pirates boarded the vessel to plunder it. The crew could do nothing but 
watch helplessly as the pirates plundered the vessel and then left the liuto adrift 
offshore. Only later they were able to go back on board and sail towards 
Piombino, the nearest port, to make a report. 
The report was brought to Genoa and delivered to the Conservatori del Mare 
on 25 October 1638. It was opened and read in the presence of the patrone and 
of Stefano Marengo, the merchant who was the recipient of the hemp 
consignment taken by the pirates. This procedure is particularly rich in details 
regarding the bureaucratic process related to the calculation of the following PA. 
On 29 October, the patrone and Stefano Marengo requested a calculation in the 
presence of the Conservatori del Mare Pantaleo Balbi, Geronimo de Marini and 
Alessandro Gentili. The Conservatori approved the request on the condition that 
the crew members had to be questioned first. The document was formally a 
                                                          
73 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50512. 
74 The word liuto could refer either to small service vessels used in ports or, as probably in this 
case, to a slightly larger vessel used to transport goods. See Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 201-211. 
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testimoniale. This was perhaps the reason why the Conservatori requested 
further evidence to complete it.75 
Three crew members were questioned, but the two remaining crew members 
were also required to sign the document. All of them were from Lavagna, just 
like the patrone. In his statement, the sailor Nicolao del Viola denounced the 
operations of the French pirates who infested the waters between Sardinia and 
Tuscany: “[…] who are everyday in these waters, robbing and persecuting the 
poor vessels that pass by”.76 At the end of the document, following the 
additional testimonies, authorization appears to proceed with the calculation. 
The damages were: 
 
• 712.10 Genoese lire for 28.5 cantari (1,357.74 kg.) of hemp stolen by 
pirates, compared to the 99 (4,713.36 kg.) initially on board. 
• 16 Genoese lire for the calcolatori. 
• 20 Genoese lire for the notary of the calcolatori. 
• 2 Genoese lire for the traglietta, the calcolatori’s assistant, who had 
probably witnessed the unloading of the goods. 
 
This damage was borne by the 99 cantari of hemp loaded in Civitavecchia, 
which were worth 2,475 Genoese lire. The damage, therefore, amounted to 
approximately 30% of the contribution values. In the calculation, the cargo of 
rags for Bartolomeo Caneri was not mentioned; neither the calculation specified 
if the pirates also took part of this cargo, nor was there another calculation 
related to it. However, this is an interesting example of collaboration between a 
patrone and a merchant, probably united by the possibility of transferring the 




5.3 Disputed Cases: the Atti Civili 
 
                                                          
75 According to Targa, a testimoniale needed three supporting testimonies to be recognized as 
such. See Targa, Ponderationi, 309. 




Reaching a peaceful agreement between the parties involved in a GA 
procedure was not always possible. The presence of litigations emerges from 
the analysis of the documentation preserved in the Atti Civili archival folders, 
containing the judicial decisions of the Conservatori del Mare, in particular 
concerning contracts relating to the construction of vessels, sea loans, or the 
relations between shipmasters and their crews. According to what has been 
possible to verify, as already mentioned above, the judicial activity of the 
Conservatori strengthened during the seventeenth century, in parallel with a 
decrease in the activity of the calcolatori.77 This process is also accompanied by 
an administrative reorganization of the procedures related to the GA. If the latter 
were previously kept in the atti dei calcolatori folders, for which some notaries 
worked exclusively, starting from about the middle of the century, the practices 
shifted to the Atti Civili of the Conservatori.78 
It is reasonable to assume that the Average calculation procedure at the end 
of the seventeenth century had become a practice that took place at the request 
of the parties when they could not agree on the payment or the appointment of 
a calcolatore. Often, there are orders to proceed with the calculation without the 
presence of an attached calculation. It seems that this practice finally overtook 
the text of the Statuti Civili of Genoa, which continued to be reprinted without 
changes during the eighteenth century and to mention the presence of a 
magistrate, the calcolatori, who seemed to have lost all functions.79 The usually 
low value of damages in Average calculations was perhaps one of the reasons 
explaining the low number of disputes: it was probably better for merchants or 
insurers to pay what shipmasters demanded, even in dubious cases, rather 
than engaging in long judicial cases, which would only increase transaction 
costs. 
In Genoa, following what was stated also in the book of the Consolat de Mar, 
the Conservatori del Mare made summary judgements. They judged de bono et 
aequo, and de sola facti veritate inspecta, that is without excessive formalities 
                                                          
77 See par. 3.5. 
78 Once Gio. Benedetto Gritta's activity as notary of the calcolatori had ended (1636 to 1663), it 
has not been possible thus far to identify other notaries specialized in Average practices. 
Moreover, the activity of Gritta seems to slow down at a steady pace: from 94 cases in 1640 he 
drafted only 44 Average documents in 1654, ending with 7 cases in 1663. See ASG, NG 2084, 
1639-1640, NG 2088, 1651-1663. The amount of reports stored in the Atti Civili, on the other 
hand, increased significantly during the second half of the seventeenth century. See ASG, CdM, 
Atti Civili 84, 1667, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 1699. 
79 An edition of 1707 still reports the Chapter on the calcolatori, without changes. Vedi BUG, 
Laura gg.II.27, Statutorum Civilium Serenissimae Reipublicae Januensis, 1707. 
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and in the least possible number of days.80 As soon as they had the necessary 
testimonies, they proceeded with the judgement. Furthermore, the judgements 
of the Conservatori del Mare were unappealable.81 In the documents from the 
Atti Civili, the shipmasters required the calculations and the appointment of 
experts to obtain compensation for damages either from the merchants who 
were receiving the goods or from their insurers. It is therefore legitimate to 
speculate that these procedures were mainly aimed at the protection of the 
patroni. The Conservatori del Mare were a specific judiciary linked to navigation; 
originally, the magistracy was made of local shipmasters and shipowners. Their 
role seemed linked not only to the resolution of any disputes but also to the 
need to favour commercial navigation by protecting shipmasters who entered 
the port. According to Targa, commercial shipping was a fundamental public 
good; for example, even in the case of a requisition of the assets of a 
shipmaster guilty of some crime, the authorities could not order the seizure of 
the vessel’s equipment, as this would have created a ‘public damage’ to 
commercial shipping.82 
If a shipmaster was unable to appear before the Conservatori to request a 
judgement, it was the shipowners themselves who turned to them to seek 
justice against the merchants. Such was the case, for example, of the 
Neapolitan shipowners of the pitacchio called Nostra Signora del Faro e San 
Francesco. The pitacchio with its crew and its shipmaster was captured by 
“Turkish or French” pirates between Trapani and Marseille. The shipowners had 
their report drawn up in Trapani in January 1668 and sent to Genoa to request 
reimbursement from all the insurers involved.83 
Let us take, for instance, the litigation between the Sicilian patrone Jacobi 
Lolliandro, from Termini Imerese, and the merchants involved in the voyage of 
his tartana the Immacolata Concettione e le Anime del Purgatorio.84 The 
patrone left Marsala to load 490 Sicilian salme (105.2 tons) of wheat in Girgenti 
on 22 February 1699. He arrived in the port the evening of that same day, along 
with two other tartane. He loaded wheat bought by Andrea Rangetti from the 
merchant Stefano Sacco in Genoa. On the afternoon of 23 February, the 
                                                          
80 Targa, Ponderationi, 398. 
81 Targa, Ponderationi, 400. 
82 However, they could order the seizure of the vessel with all its equipment. See Targa, 
Ponderationi, 405. 
83 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50646. Report partially transcribed in 
Appendix IX. 
84 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50617. 
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loading procedures began through four boats carrying wheat from the dock to 
the tartana. Two boats were tied to either side of the tartana, while the other two 
awaited their turn nearby. The wind began to strengthen, but the boats were 
unloading the wheat so that it was not possible for them to interrupt the 
operation. Part of the wheat ended up in the sea, while the vessels collided 
against one another. The patrone told his sailors to hurry loading the wheat, 
while one of the two boats on the flank managed to break free and leave. As the 
weather continued to worsen, the tartana pulled on the sails to move away from 
the coast, dragging the remaining boat with it. The patrone ordered to use all 
the ropes and cables available to reinforce the connection with the boat to avoid 
collisions. The ropes and cables, taken haphazardly from the tartana, were 
unable to withstand the strain for long and were torn. The crew, meanwhile, 
managed to complete the loading operations. One of the boats, a caicco,85 
breaking free from a rope attached to a tartana anchor, broke its hull and sank 
offshore. Lolliandro’s vessel managed to set sail, but the patrone calculated the 
loss of approximately 25 Sicilian salme (5.37 tons) of wheat, in addition to 
damage to the sails and hull, due to the continuous hits and the strong wind. He 
went to Syracuse to declare his report in front of the royal Viceportolano and 
two officials of the city Senate, on 24 February. On 27 February, the tartana set 
sail for Genoa. After leaving Sicily, a series of storms hindered navigation and 
forced it to take refuge in Lipari first, then in Gaeta and finally in Porto Ferraio. 
Leaving Porto Ferraio on 3 May, the wind damaged the sails and broke the 
foremast and the main mast. The tartana had to stop in Livorno for repairs and 
arrived in Genoa only after 5 more days. 
A few days after arriving in Genoa, on 11 May, the patrone Giacomo 
Lolliandro filed a lawsuit against Stefano Sacco, the merchant whom the wheat 
was destined for. The drafting of the numerous documents that led to the 
calculation was quite rapid. It is possible to speculate that the patrone had first 
turned to Stefano Sacco, showing him the report drawn up in Syracuse and 
asking for the payment of his share for the damages suffered. Sacco must have 
refused the payment or demanded further evidence. Unable to find an 
agreement ‘quickly’, Lolliandro had then turned to the Conservatori del Mare, 
where he had the report validated, and he requested an Average calculation. 
                                                          
85 It was a small boat, although it was bigger than a schifo, used as a launch by bigger vessels. 
See Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 236. 
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New depositions were heard among the crew members before proceeding with 
what in the document was referred to as the “election of the calcolatori”. It was 
simply the appointment of the notary in charge, Alessandro Alfonso. On 16 May, 
the sindaco of the Conservatori del Mare compiled an estimate of the value of 
the vessel and of all damages. On the same day, the public measurers of the 
Republic, in charge of verifying the quantity of goods unloaded and its weight in 
the presence of witnesses, carried out the analysis to verify the condition of the 
wheat.86 In addition to these documents, the patrone delivered to the 
notary/calcolatore a note with the prices paid for the purchase of the wheat and 
the bill of lading with the freight. The freight contract was drawn up in Palermo 
by the notary Ippolito di Miceli.87 
With all this documentation, the case quickly proceeded with the drafting of 
the calculation, completed and signed on 19 May. Since there were two 
different kinds of accidents, the calculation was divided into two sections with 
the respective contributing values and damages. In the first section, concerning 
the accident in Girgenti, the freight was not shown, and the batch of wheat was 
valued at the full price of 4,626 pieces of eight. In the second one, the freight 
costs were added, and the value of the wheat was reduced by almost 600 
pieces of eight based on the damage suffered in Girgenti. The first contribution 
was 5,076 pieces of eight, and the second contribution was 4,972. In the first list 
of damages, there are 34.10 pieces of eight paid as administrative expenses, 
along with almost 250 pieces of eight for the damage. In the second calculation, 
drawn up in Genoa, the administrative costs were approximately 24 pieces of 
eight to be added to the damage to the vessel of 68 pieces of eight. The 
quantity of different administrative expenses makes the execution of these 
calculations on average more onerous than those examined in previous years. 
It is also interesting to note that, compared to the calculations drawn up by the 
calcolatori, those kept in the Atti Civili always reported the payment to the 
attorney or lawyer of one of the parties, “for the litigation in the present 
calculation”.88 In all the calculations examined thus far for the year 1699, for 
example, there was a payment of 8 pieces of eight, half of which went to the 
lawyer and half was forfeited directly by the Conservatori as a tax on the 
                                                          
86 On the misuratori pubblici see Piccinno, Economia marittima, 296, 343-351. 
87 Palermo was the privileged place of trading for the loads of grain purchased by the Genoese 
in Sicily. See Piccinno, Iodice, ‘Whatever the cost’,4-6. 
88 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 19/05/1699. 
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procedure. The calculation of the two events was approved following the 
reading in the presence of the involved parties. Stefano Sacco was forced to 
pay at a rate of 5.5% for the first claim and 1.75% for the second. Perhaps the 
initial quarrel had arisen around the fact that both claims did not appear to be 
GA events but rather simple accidents. 
On the same day, the merchant Stefano Sacco was involved in another 
lawsuit concerning a GA claim.89 The lawsuit involved a cargo of rocella wheat90 
and one of durum wheat from Licata, Sicily, loaded onto the tartana of 
Francesco La Barbera, a patrone originally from Marsala. On 17 April 1699, a 
storm 60 miles from the island of Ponza in the Gulf of Gaeta prompted the 
patrone to return to Pozzuoli and jettison part of the load, including 80 Sicilian 
salme (17.18 tons) of wheat. Following the declaration issued in Pozzuoli and 
the arrival in Genoa, it is likely that the patrone turned to Stefano Sacco for a 
contribution to damages, obtaining a refusal. The patrone also loaded 80 
Sicilian salme of wheat onto the vessel on his own account, and it seems that 
these coincided with the wheat thrown away. However, the report drawn up in 
Pozzuoli only mentioned a batch of rocella wheat and durum wheat loaded on 
behalf of “whom it belongs out of the Kingdom”.91 On 26 May 1699, La Barbera 
decided to take legal action at the court of the Conservatori del Mare through 
his causidico Bernardo Paganini.92 Unlike the previous case, Stefano Sacco 
himself asked that the patrone’s sailors be questioned about the jettison. The 
depositions, however, slightly differed from each other. According to some, it 
seemed that the 80 Sicilian salme of wheat thrown away were those owned by 
the patrone. According to the deposition of sailor Vincenzo, son of Filippo, 
however, the 80 Sicilian salme of the patrone were unloaded and sold in 
Livorno after the jettison before arriving in Genoa. It is therefore legitimate to 
hypothesize that La Barbera tried to request a repartition of damages without 
specifying, in his report, that he had loaded 80 Sicilian salme on his own and 
that these had been sold in Livorno. In the subsequent calculation ordered by 
the Conservatori, there is no mention of damage equal to 80 Sicilian salme, 
which would have been evaluated as at least 1,000 pieces of eight, depending 
                                                          
89 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50624. 
90 Rocella wheat was a type of durum wheat widely used in the exportations from Sicily to 
Genoa, alongside other types such as carosella wheat and frumento forte. See Piccinno, Iodice, 
‘Whatever the cost’, 7, and bibliography therein quoted. 
91 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 18/04/1699. 
92 On the definition of ‘causidico’, see par. 3.4. 
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on the type of wheat thrown away. The damage to Stefano Sacco wheat 
amounted to only 8 mine (727.88 kg.) of wheat and 4.5 mine (409.43 kg.) of wet 
and deteriorated wheat. With administrative expenses exceeding 50 pieces of 
eight, the total damage to the ship and cargo was approximately 283 pieces of 
eight. Even though the procedure seems to favour the shipmaster, it was 
possible for the merchants to request further evidence and statements and to 
contest the actions of the declarant who had initiated the case. 
Finally, the shipmasters who turned to their insurers for the payment of 
damages from a Average event constituted another type of dispute in the Atti 
Civili. The compatibility between the Average and insurance policies, as already 
noted, has been formalized since the promulgation of the Statuti Civili of 1589.93 
However, attempts by insurers to escape from paying the contribution were 
going to be a frequent phenomenon, even a century later. 
Let us take, for example, the voyage of the Marseille shipmaster Gio. 
Baptiste Olivier with the vessel called Nostra Signora della Speranza. Olivier left 
Lisbon on 16 October 1698 with a load of sugar, tobacco, and other goods, 
probably headed for Genoa.94 The vessel stopped in Cartagena in November; it 
was probably a scheduled stop during which it loaded up some soda ash. Near 
Majorca, however, it had to face a storm with Greco and easterly winds, while 
the water level in the bilge began to rise. The entry of water into the hold, in the 
case of loose and ‘vulnerable’ cargo such as sugar or salt, was particularly 
feared, as it resulted in its melting. In a short time, the water in the bilge 
reached a depth of two feet, equal to approximately 60 cm. An attempt was 
made to reach the port of Majorca, but the northeasterly winds prevented it. The 
shipmaster therefore decided to moor in a gulf of the island to at least partly 
exploit the natural shelter that the inlet would offer. Three anchors that were 
connected to the strongest cables of the vessel were dropped. As soon as the 
weather improved, Olivier decided to set sail and resume the voyage, but one of 
the anchors was stuck on the seabed, and its cable broke in an attempt to 
retrieve it. The vessel continued its voyage to Marseille, the shipmaster's native 
city. Once before the court of the Admiralty of Marseille, Olivier drew up his 
report on 29 December 1698.95 It is likely that Marseille was one of the ports of 
                                                          
93 See par. 3.4. 
94Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50627. 
95 On the Admiralty of Marseille, see S. Law-Hang, ‘La justice d’amirauté en Provence à la fin 
de l’Ancien Régime’, Revue Juridique de l’Océan Indien, 11, 2010, 123-145. 
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unloading due to the relatively long time that it took for the patrone to bring the 
report to Genoa, where it arrived on approximately 19 February 1699, about a 
month and a half after arriving in Marseille. 
It is possible that Genoa was another port of unloading, as frequently 
occurred in the other cases examined during these years. Genoa also played 
the important role of insurance centre, and it is here, indeed, that most of the 
insurers connected to this voyage were located. Perhaps the shipmaster, who in 
the Genoese documents was indicated as a patrone, turned to his insurers to 
ask for a reimbursement of the damage suffered and obtained a refusal. After 
only 6 days from the approval of the report by the Conservatori del Mare, in fact, 
his lawyer Giovanni Bianchi submitted a note with a request for reimbursement 
of the freight and the damage suffered.96 
The note provided must not have been sufficient, given that Giovanni Bianchi 
turned to the Conservatori del Mare to ask for the official convocation of the 
insurers. The convocation of the interested parties was aimed at giving ‘public’ 
news of the GA event or the accident that had occurred and formally requesting 
the sharing of damages.97 In the document, the lawyer provided a list of the 
insurers involved and asked to call two deputies. The insurers were Gio. 
Battista Nicolò Maria Castri, David Bernard of Marseille, Guglielmo Gio. Buglier, 
probably of French descent, Alessio and Francesco Carrega, and Bartolomeo 
Seporino. Unlike the other Average procedures in the AveTransRisk database, 
in which the insurers involved belonged to the main Genoese patrician families, 
in this case, perhaps also due to the few capitals involved, the names of the 
Genoese and French insurers were not well known. The Conservatori chose to 
call as representatives the first two names on the list, Nicolò Maria Castri and 
David Bernard, a Genoese and a Frenchman.98 In the presence of all interested 
parties or their representatives, on 6 June, the Conservatore del Mare Filippo 
Spinola recalled the approval of the report, and on 10 June, gave the order to 
proceed with the calculation. The case, however, proceeded slowly; the bill of 
lading was submitted only on 2 August. Notary Alessandro Alfonso completed 
and signed the calculation on 12 August. It was finally approved two days 
                                                          
96 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 25/02/1669. 
97 The same procedure, for example, was followed in Venice to obtain reimbursements from 
insurers, see ASV, Notarile atti 134C, 11090, 181v-182r. I am grateful to Dr. Isabella Cecchini 
for this information. 
98 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 20/05/1699. It is interesting to note that a David Bernardi is a 
tenant of a warehouse in the free port in 1693, see ASG, SG, 235 sala 37, 01/01/1693. See 
Piccinno, Zanini, ‘Genoa: colonizing and colonized city?’. 
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later.99 The main consignment of goods on board turned out to be tobacco, with 
137 rolli worth 6,120 pieces of eight and 10 balle worth 230 pieces of eight. The 
tobacco was followed by a batch of sugar worthy 1,200 pieces of eight, washed 
wool for 850 pieces of eight, and soda worthy 720 pieces of eight. In addition to 
the cargo, they also calculated the value of the vessel, 275 pieces of eight, and 
that of the freights, amounting to 429.6.8 pieces of eight. The damage was 
rather modest. The list consisted of: 
 
• 39 pieces of eight for the anchor left in the harbour in Majorca. 
• 47 pieces of eight for half of the cable that was tied to the anchor. 
• 3.10 pieces of eight for the report drawn up in Marseille. 
• 3 pieces of eight for the report drawn up in Genoa. 
• Half a piece of eight for the translation of the report from the French 
language. 
• 1.4 piece of eight for the decrees of the Conservatori del Mare, probably 
the convocation of the insurers and the order to proceed with the calculation. 
• 8 pieces of eight for the Conservatori. 
• 8 pieces of eight for the calcolatore’s fee. 
• 4 pieces of eight for the approval of the calculation. 
• 4 pieces of eight for the lawyer, Giovanni Bianchi. 
• 7 pieces of eight for the sindaco to estimate the vessel and the damages. 
• 4 pieces of eight to the subchancellors of the Conservatori. 
• 1 piece of eight for a copy of the calculation. 
• 0.8 pieces of eight for the traglietta of the Conservatori. 
 
It is significant that out of approximately 130 pieces of eight of damage, 44 
amounted to procedural expenses related to the trial, a figure equal to 
approximately 33% of the total. The contribution rate was only 1.6.7 pieces of 
eight out of 100. The patrone obtained the recognition of his GA and the 
reimbursement of the requested amount. 
 
5.4 False Reports and Frauds 
 
                                                          
99 ASG, CdM, Atti Civili 124, 12/08/1669. 
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In addition to the problems that emerge from the Atti Civili, another 
phenomenon often denounced by the authorities was that of false reports. The 
constant concern of the Conservatori del Mare throughout the seventeenth 
century was how to correctly fill in the shipmasters’ reports.100 Strict compliance 
with the procedure would have allowed to avoid, or at least recognize, false 
reports more easily. Being able to prove the falsity or irregularity of a report, 
however, especially in a phase in which this type of document was undergoing 
increasing standardization and the shipmaster and his crew were increasingly 
the only men on board, was an arduous task and was probably doomed to 
failure. An unscrupulous shipmaster, with the complicity of his crew, could easily 
escape institutional control attempts. This was especially true in small-scale 
coastal shipping. The eighteenth-century economist Ferdinando Galiani, for 
example, considered fraud in this sector almost a “consubstantial” element 
associated with trading.101 This led merchants and businessmen involved in 
maritime trade to seek solutions independently even outside the boundaries of 
ordinary justice. 
In 1654, the Conservatori del Mare wrote to the Senato of the Republic of 
Genoa to denounce how the drafting of the shipmasters’ reports was but a mere 
formality that everyone could carry out to mask any type of accident, wilful theft 
or simple misfortune: 
 
The making of consolati is now reduced to a simple formality, which 
encourages more quickly the committing of crimes of fraud in order to cover 
up those of barratry and theft, than to achieve the purpose for which it was 
introduced by the Statuti Civili in Chapter 16 of book 4, de iactu et forma in 
eo tenenda. The disposition of which statute being manifestly violated, it is 
necessary to mandate its observance by ordering that both here in Genoa 
and in the Dominion, as well as outside of it in those Kingdoms, Provinces, 
Cities, and places where there are consuls of the Genoese nation, the form 
of the said statute be observed by anyone.102 
 
                                                          
100 See par.3.5. 
101 M. Gangemi, Esportazioni calabresi nel XVIII secolo. Le tratte di «seccamenti, salumi, tavole, 
legnami ed altro», Naples, 1991, 83. 
102 “Il far de Consolati è hoggidì ridotto ad una semplice formalità, la quale invita più presto a 
commetter delitti di falsità per coprir quelli delle baratterie e de furti, che a conseguire il fine per 
il quale n’è stato introdotto l’uso dallo Statuto Civile al libro 4 del cap. 16 de iactu et forma in eo 
tenenda, la dispositione del quale statuto essendo con manifesto abuso violata, è necessario 
incaricarne l’osservanza con ordinare che tanto qui in Genova e nel Dominio, quanto fuori di 
esso in quelli Regni, Provincie, Città, e luoghi ove sono consoli della nazione genovese sia ad 




This practice clearly emerges also from the analysis of the documentation 
examined thus far, especially when observing the high number of cases not 
accompanied by calculations or other supporting documents, the presence of 
declarations with unusual events that could not be proven in any way, or the 
numerous complaints filed in by the same patrone. 
For example, a case of ‘extraordinary’ bad luck, to say the least, were the 
voyages of the patrone Prospero Schiaffino, author of four GA reports in one 
year, 1598.103 Schiaffino was a Genoese citizen residing in Majorca, patrone of 
a vessel indifferently mentioned in the sources as San Theramo or San 
Theramo Buonaventura.104 His first known voyage, which took place in April, 
was from Cadiz and Majorca to Genoa and Livorno, with a load of different 
goods, including sarsaparilla, a medicinal plant from the West Indies.105 In the 
second half of the voyage, probably due to bad weather, the vessel took refuge 
at the promontory of Portofino, 15 nautical miles from Genoa, and declared a 
GA.106 Although we do not have much information regarding the calculation, we 
know that the vessel suffered damage equal to 1,023.03.04 Genoese lire.107 
The ship was worth 5,000 Genoese lire, while the cargo of sarsaparilla and 
other goods, including probably other ‘colonial’ products that were re-exported 
from Cadiz throughout Europe, were worth 122,550.6.7 Genoese lire. The 
damages, therefore, amounted to only 0.8% of the value of the contributing 
elements, and the merchants involved probably paid for it without raising any 
issues, rather than investigating the accident or appealing to the Conservatori. 
After a few months, probably in May of the same year, Schiaffino was back in 
Cadiz, from which he departed with another cargo of products from overseas to 
be delivered to Genoa and Livorno.108 Again, he took refuge in Portofino before 
arriving in Genoa to declare a GA report. However, this time, the Conservatori 
del Mare ordered a PA calculation, in which the only contributing element was a 
cargo of leather from India worth 35,000 Genoese lire. The damages amounted 
                                                          
103 These voyages are recorded in the AveTransRisk online db as the id 50075, id 50099, id 
50115, and id 50125. 
104 The name San Theramo and its derivatives was widespread in medieval times. It is a 
deformation of St. Erasmus, saint of sailors. See V. Polonio, ‘Devozioni marinare 
dall’osservatorio ligure (secoli XII-XVII)’, Quaderni di Storia Religiosa, XV, 2008, 243-315, 252-
254. 
105 On its functions and description, see Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia, 
"Monocotyledon", Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017, 
https://www.britannica.com/plant/monocotyledon, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
106 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50075. 
107 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50075. 
108 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50115. 
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to 2,597.4.8 Genoese lire, approximately 7.4% of the total.109 It is possible that 
the voyage from Genoa to Cadiz before loading the cargo happened with an 
empty hold, especially considering the relatively short interval between the date 
of the previous calculation and that of the new one. The problem of finding 
advantageous return cargoes was common in maritime traffic headed to 
Genoa.110 
For the next cargo, Schiaffino sailed to the eastern coast of Spain in the area 
between Tortosa, Ibiza and Ampola.111 Among these ports, probably in October 
1598, he loaded wool, apples, spices and salt to take to Genoa. Even in this 
case, we do not know the drafting date of the report, the nature of the accident, 
or the place where it was drafted, which could have been Portofino again. 
According to the GA calculation drawn up in November, the resulting damages 
were 491 Genoese lire, with a contributing value of 39,837.9 Genoese lire. 
Damage was equal to approximately 1.2% of the total.112 It was an extremely 
low figure, which did not significantly affect the merchants’ interests. Oddly, this 
time, the calcolatori in Genoa estimated the contributing value of the vessel at 
7,000 Genoese lire, compared to the previous 5,000 lire made in April. The 
vessel had probably been more damaged, following the two accidents that had 
occurred in the meantime. This overestimate could be due to some new 
equipment acquired after the previous accidents, or it could be that the 
calcolatori decided to increase the percentage paid by the vessel, by almost 
30%, to discourage the frequent GA claims made by Schiaffino.113 
Schiaffino had yet another accident during 1598.114 The patrone left Genoa 
between November and December 1598 to go to Tabarka, with an unknown 
cargo. He arrived there in December.115 After the unloading and loading 
procedures, he left again on 31 December 1598 and finally arrived in Genoa on 
January 1599. There, he first submitted an Average report drawn up in Tabarka 
on 31 December 1598 to declare that he had faced a storm during the Genoa-
                                                          
109 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50115. 
110 Grendi, ‘Il traffico portuale’, 309. 
111 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50099. 
112 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50099. 
113 It is unlikely that it was a different vessel, as the name would also have had to be changed, 
or at least the new name would have been added after the old one, as was the custom in 
Genoa, see Polonio, ‘Devozioni marinare’, 243-315. 
114 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50125. 
115 As already stated in previous Chapters, Tabarka was a small island belonging to the Spanish 
crown, managed under contract by the Genoese Lomellini family. It was known for the 
redistribution of coral and barbaric products, among which wheat. On the Genoese 
administration of Tabarka and its trade see Piccinno, Un' impresa fra terra e mare. 
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Tabarka route. Then, he had another report drafted because of another storm 
faced on the way back on the Tabarka-Genoa route.116 The declaration drawn 
up in Tabarka specified the vessel’s tonnage, which turned out to be 1,500 
Genoese salme (285.84 tons). This time, the Genoese authorities were 
suspicious of Schiaffino’s reports: both reports were refused, and no calculation 
was ordered. This is the last voyage on which we have information, but it is 
proof of the high level of familiarity of the Genoese shipmasters and patroni with 
the instrument of Average reports. This tool, in Schiaffino’s exceptional case, 
allows us to follow the routes and voyages of a patrone over the course of an 
entire year and over 5,000 nautical miles across the western and southern 
Mediterranean Sea. 
Although there may truly be cases of particularly unlucky voyages and 
shipmasters such as Schiaffino, these situations also highlight the difficulty of 
the authorities in verifying the truthfulness of the claims of the shipmasters who 
came to Genoa to declare their reports. If the shipmaster travelled only with his 
crew, all of them his own countrymen or relatives, perhaps on a small vessel, it 
should not be difficult to agree among themselves to ‘disguise’ ordinary 
accidents and pass them off as GA events. The authorities were well aware of 
this situation, as were obviously the merchants who entrusted their goods to the 
seamen, but they did not always have the tools to discover false reports. Let us 
take, for example, the voyage of the patrone Curzius Priscopus with his tartana 
named San Filippo Nero.117 The vessel left Naples on 6 August 1640, with a 
load of wine to be brought to Genoa on behalf of the local Provvisori del Vino.118 
When Priscopus arrived in Genoa, on 4 September of the same year, the 
patrone made his report in front of the Annona office. The vessel encountered a 
tartana of French pirates when in sight of Mount Sercelli, near the beach of 
Legola, a place of uncertain identification. The patrone and the crew quickly 
beached the vessel and left the place to save their lives. Suddenly, however, 
some unidentified musketeers came down the mountain overlooking the beach 
and chased away the pirates, who, in the meantime, had stolen a bag with two 
                                                          
116 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50125. 
117 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50387. 
118 This magistracy was born in 1588 with the purpose of ensuring and control the supply of 
wine to Genoa, see P. Calcagno, L. Lo Basso, ‘I provvisori del vino della repubblica di Genova: 
una politica annonaria tra ricerca del profitto e finalità di controllo territoriale (sec. XVI-XVIII)’, in 
A. Carassale, L. Lo Basso eds., In terra vineata. La vite e il vino in Liguria e nelle Alpi Marittime 




shirts, a new coat worth three ecus and had broken two barrels of wine (159 lt.) 
out of the seventy (5,565 lt.) which were loaded on board. According to what 
was stated in the report, the patrone decided to donate part of the remaining 
wine to the musketeers to thank them for the help received: “and for this reason 
the wine is almost all there, he took only enough to give it to the persons who 
came to save him”. It would have been impossible to confirm or deny the 
authenticity of this declaration, and nothing could guarantee that the crew had 
not simply consumed an extra ration of wine during the voyage, drawing from 
those very goods that they were supposed to deliver. Perhaps for this reason, 
no calculation followed. 
A similar situation occurred during the voyage of the patrone Andrea Arseno 
de Milani of Lavagna on his pinco called Nostra Signora del Rosario e San 
Giuseppe.119 De Milani left Naples in 1697 with a cargo of wine to sell in Genoa. 
Once in the Ligurian port, he managed to sell the cargo to Stefano and Pier 
Francesco Lomellini, who asked him to take it to Tabarka. Bad weather, 
however, considerably slowed down what would have usually been a couple 
weeks long journey.120 After leaving Genoa on 5 October 1697, the patrone 
stopped in Portofino the following 13 days, waiting for favourable winds. He 
arrived in Calvi, Corsica, on 22 October, where he had to stop again for another 
11 days. Afterwards, he stopped again for 12 days on the island of Asinara, and 
eventually, he reached Portoscuso in Sardinia, where he had to take refuge 
once again due to bad weather. According to the declarations of the patrone, 
the stop in Portoscuso lasted four months and several days, during which they 
had tried three times to leave the port. The cargo reached Tabarka only on 13 
March 1698, more than 5 months after the departure from Genoa. 
Once in Tabarka, the patrone went to the governor of the island, Pier Battista 
Mainero, to declare his report. The governor administered the island on behalf 
of the Lomellini and was responsible, among other things, for the free 
distribution of wine and oil to the inhabitants.121 In addition to reporting the 
                                                          
119 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50442. 
120 For travel times, seasonality of routes, and flows of goods to and from Tabarka, see 
Piccinno, Un’impresa fra terra e mare. The documentation in the AveTransRisk database shows 
two Northern vessels that completed the Tabarka-Genoa route in just 7 and 8 days. See the 
voyages recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50227 and 50540. In two other cases of 
Mediterranean vessels, the voyage time was less than 25 days. See the voyages recorded in 
the AveTransRisk db as the id 50009 and 50125. 
121 The initial Genoese settlement was constituted by approximately 300 fishermen coming 
mostly from the area of Pegli. The population grew during the century to reach 1,200-1,300 
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reasons for the considerable delay and the drenching of part of the cargo, De 
Milani also reported the count of the barrels of wine unloaded in Tabarka. A 
total of 230 barrels (18,285 lt.) were duly delivered, while 89 (7,075.5 lt.) went 
missing after the damage suffered during the storms encountered along the 
way. Finally, the patrone declared that he and his crew had consumed 105 
barrels (8,347.5 lt.) of wine, “for their own use”. All the information was recorded 
regularly in the declaration, to which they added the declarations of the crew 
members and of some of the representatives of Tabarka. It does not seem that 
there had been any further investigations, despite the crew having drunk on 
average more than half a barrel of wine (39.75 lt.) a day during the previous 5 
months.122 The governor did not seem interested in the way in which the goods 
destined for the inhabitants of Tabarka had been used by the crew. Perhaps 
this ‘benevolence’ allowed to avoid formally resorting to legal action. The 
patrone could have theoretically asked for a refund for the unexpected stops he 
had suffered due to the bad weather. In that case, the matter ought to have 
been settled before a judge.123 We do not know if De Milani asked for 
compensation from his insurers. The declaration ends merely with the signature 
of the governor. It was submitted in Genoa on 16 June 1698, where it was not 
followed by any calculation. 
According to the Conservatori del Mare, the main problem linked to false 
reports was that the merchants often colluded with the shipmasters and did not 
report the frauds and unjustified calculations that followed. In a report of 1690 to 
the Senate, the Conservatori reported this behaviour, adducing as an example 
the events linked to the report of the patrone Filippo del Canto.124 The latter 
loaded his vessel with goods, wheat perhaps, at the Cape of Goro, near Venice. 
It is unclear whether the goods travelled on behalf of some merchants or if they 
belonged to the shipmaster himself. Del Canto headed from Goro to Corfu, 
where he sold his cargo and resumed the journey to Messina. In the Gulf of 
Messina, he gave the order to sink the vessel, which was abandoned, while he 
and the crew headed to Messina with his schifo and asked to draw up a report 
                                                                                                                                                                          
individuals at the beginning of the eighteenth century; the Lomellini family provided to the 
sustenance of the population. See Piccinno, ‘Alleanze, conflittualità e diplomazia’, 15-42. 
122 The crew of a pinco depended on the size of the vessel. According to the research of Gatti it 
could vary between 12 and 26 men. See Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 215-216. 
123 Irregular stallie, i.e., not agreed in advance, were regulated by a judge who decreed the 
reimbursement due to the shipmaster. See Targa, Ponderationi, 165-166. 
124 ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 16/09/1690. See a transcription of this 
document in Appendix II. 
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there. In the report, Del Canto declared that he had been attacked by Turkish 
pirates at the Cape of Milo, an unspecified location, probably near Sicily. A 
patrone who insured his vessel and then deliberately sank it was the typical 
case of maritime barratry.125 Nothing could prove the report falsehood. The 
selling of the cargo in Corfu, if bought in good faith by the buyers, was valid and 
nonterminable.126 The owner of the goods that had been loaded and resold by 
the patrone could not ask for a refund from the insurers, who did not cover the 
damage from barratry. He could have only bought back his own goods at the 
selling price from the new owner.127 
One of the sailors, however, thwarted Del Canto’s fraud. Gio. Paolo 
Tarascone, to “ease his own conscience”, reported the incident in front of the 
Genoese consul in Naples, Benedetto Valdetaro, where perhaps the crew had 
stopped after Messina.128 Because of this, the patrone murdered his own sailor. 
This act was the focal point in the report drawn up by the Conservatori of 
Genoa. The patrone Filippo del Canto was judged in absentia for the murder of 
Gio. Paolo Tarascone. However, there was no condemnation for the fake 
report, and it was not possible to impose any criminal responsibility on him in 
this respect. The Conservatori del Mare asked for the possibility of proceeding 
ex officio and autonomously against patroni and shipmasters who issued false 
declarations without waiting for the merchants to denounce them. For the same 
reason, the Conservatori also asked that any informer would benefit from 
immunity, a prize and anonymity to avoid the repetition of similar events. As 
already noted, these frauds led to the enactment of the decree of 1698. The 
decree included the countermeasures proposed by the Conservatori, but did not 
put an end to a phenomenon that was difficult to control, although apparently 
                                                          
125 Rossi, ‘The barratry of the shipmaster’, 80. These frauds usually occurred to cover up the 
deterioration of a vessel: the declaration proclaimed the good quality of a vessel that in reality 
would need maintenance or had reached the end of its useful life. On the widespread 
unscrupulousness behaviour of shipmasters, see the diary of S. Pepys published from Project 
Gutenberg, The diary of Samuel Pepys, daily entries from the 17th century London diary, 
01/12/1663, available on https://www.pepysdiary.com/diary/1663/12/01/, accessed on 
29/06/2021. 
126 Targa reports two similar judgments: one occurred in 1677 in the dispute between the 
patrone Giuseppe Barilaro and Giovan Battista Borrea, of Sanremo; the other one happened in 
1685 in the dispute between the patrone Ambrogio Amoreto of Oneglia who bought 200 Sicilian 
salme (42.94 tons) of rocella wheat in Livorno from a patrone of Sturla. See Targa, 
Ponderationi, 307. 
127 Targa, Ponderationi, 307. On the definition of barratry as an abuse of authority by the 
shipmaster and its legal evolution, particularly as it relates to insurance practice, see Rossi, 
‘The barratry of the shipmaster’, 65-85. 
128 “disgravio della propria coscienza”. On the activity of Genoese consuls in Naples, see 
Brancaccio, “Nazione genovese”. 
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rare. In a report of the same year, a request was made to explicitly extend the 
decree to the owners of pinchi, leudi and tartane, small vessels that had 
previously probably been excluded.129 
In 1705, however, the Conservatori still complained about the existence of 
strategies by merchants that made it difficult to eradicate this phenomenon.130 
The Conservatori, recalling the turmoil preceding the 1698 law and those that 
were still taking place, highlighted the low impact of an edict, which had cost 
almost fifty years of debates and memorials. The false reports led to GA 
calculations that were in good faith validated by Genoese magistracies, thus 
legitimizing the fraud. This unlawful practice caused damage mainly to the 
merchants and the insurers, yet often they did not take any legal action. 
According to the Conservatori del Mare, the reason for this was that the injured 
party preferred to keep the fraudulent shipmasters or patroni in debt, trusting 
that they would be able to reach an out-of-court settlement, rather than risk 
wasting more time and money in official litigation: 
 
[…] the main obstacle, which existed before this law, was that it was not 
possible to proceed in the above cases except at the request of the offended 
party following the former’s complaint, promise and signature, according to 
the Criminal Statutes of Genoa under the Chapter quod accusans, vel 
denunciary caveat. Most of the time, the offenders avoid doing it, in order to 
keep their debtors in the faith of some adjustment, with the aim of recouping 
some portions of the credit, and not to lose their own [money] entirely. Which 
is the main concern for the offended, more than whatever punishment the 
offenders of such abuses may suffer […].131 
 
From such reports there appears to be an ‘informal’ trust and credit system, of 
which no other traces have been found yet, but which might be applied to the 
procedure of the previous years too. This network hindered and circumvented 
the rules of the Republic and the institutional attempts to standardize the 
Average institution. The Conservatori once again insisted that the procedure be 
                                                          
129 ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 16/12/1698. On these different types of 
vessels, see the table in the ‘Terminology’ section. 
130 ASG, CdM, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione 444, 01/08/1705. For a full transcription, see 
Appendix III. 
131 “[…] l’impedimento principale, il quale ostava prima di sudetta legge, si riduceva al non 
potersi procedere ne casi premessi se non ad instanza dell’offeso con la precedente querela, 
promessa e sigortà, secondo la dispositione del Statuto Criminale di Genova sotto la rubrica 
quod accusans, vel denunciary caveat; ciò che il più delle volte li dannificati schivano di fare, 
per tenere li rei loro debitori nella fede di qualche aggiusto, con la mira di riccavare d’accordo 
qualche portione del credito, e non perdere il proprio del tutto premendo più questo a 
dannificati; che qualonque castigo, subire possano li rei di tali eccessi […]”. ASG, CdM, Leggi, 
decreti e pubblicazione 444, 01/08/1705. For the full transcription, see Appendix III. 
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strengthened by renewing the law. The latter was confirmed in 1707 for the 
following 10 years. Alongside this, they also granted the possibility of 
proceeding ex officio, that is, without a formal complaint by one of the parties, 
as well as the total control of the drafting and approval of the calculation and the 
inclusion of the death penalty for those guilty of mendacious statements.132 The 
Conservatori maintained their monopoly of maritime justice as the only 
competent judiciary on Average procedures for the whole Republic. All public 
authorities of the Riviera had to submit to their authority. These measures were 
still not sufficient to fully structure a practice that, in the end, was based on a 
criterion of mutual assistance and trust. 
 
5.5 How Not to Write a Report: the Testimoniali segreti 
 
Finally, there are cases in which the shipmaster's report was openly rejected. 
Following its approval, the consolato or the testimoniale was formally “opened 
and published”. Within the archival folders of the Conservatori del Mare, there 
are two series that presumably reflect the approval or disapproval of the sea 
protest: Testimoniali all’estero segreti and Testimoniali all’estero palesi.133 Most 
likely, for all those cases in which the conduct of the shipmaster was suspicious, 
or when the case was dismissed because it could not give rise to a repartition of 
damages or to an insurance refund, the practice would be classified as a secret 
report, from the Latin word secretum: set aside. The cases in these folders 
ranged from shipwrecks to much more complex events, often completely 
unrelated to the most common Average situations. Although these cases prove 
to be rather useless for the purposes of statistical surveys, due to their 
uniqueness and the total absence of calculations, they can still be a valuable 
source of information on navigation techniques, life on board, and the political 
situation in the context of commercial navigation, particularly that of Genoa 
during the seventeenth century. 
Let us take, for example, the voyage of the 50-year-old patrone Jo. Battista 
Bozano with his leudo called Nostra Signora di Misericordia, with a capacity of 
                                                          
132 France, for example, already applied the death penalty for false reports. See the consolato 
drawn up at the Admiralty of Antibes by the shipmaster Giovanni Maria Cadiz from Marseille. 
Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50631. 
133 On the Testimoniali all’estero segreti see ASG, CdM Testimoniali all’estero segreti 277-301, 




300 mine (27.3 tons).134 The patrone was a native of Savona, and he travelled 
with his 29-year-old son Paolo Bozano and a 75-year-old Alessandro Bozano, 
who was probably his father, both of whom were sailors: three generations of 
the same family. The Bozano left Genoa on 25 September 1698 with a cargo of 
salt transported on behalf of the Magistrato del Sale of Genoa.135 The cargo 
was directed to Ceriale, a village on the western coast near Albenga. The 
departure on that specific date, according to the declaration of the patrone, took 
place at the advice of the Magistrato del Sale himself. Shortly after leaving the 
port, however, the leudo found itself facing severe bad weather. The wind tore 
the sails at Albissola, just 17 nautical miles away from Genoa. The patrone 
therefore decided to stop for repairs in nearby Savona, his birthplace. The bad 
weather lasted several days, and the leudo could return at sea only on 8 
October. The voyage continued towards Ceriale without any other accidents. 
The dock of Ceriale had no pier, so unloading took place near the beach facing 
the village, thanks to several boats that shuttled between the vessel and the 
coast. It was a rather slow and inefficient system but one that responded to a 
precise choice of the Genoese government to control traffic and possible 
competition from minor or peripheral coastal centres.136 Part of the cargo, equal 
to 149.5 mine (13.6 tons) of salt, was unloaded and delivered to Pietro Paolo 
and Gio. Batta, contractors for the Magistrato del Sale. Suddenly, another storm 
broke out and forced the unloading operation to stop. The crew had to wait for 
better weather conditions while the vessel remained anchored in front of the 
beach. At ten in the evening, since the weather had not improved and the 
darkness would have made the unloading even more dangerous, the patrone 
decided to take shelter behind the nearby Gallinara island, a refuge still used 
today against the North and West winds. 
While Bozano’s vessel waited behind the island for the weather to improve, a 
tartana arrived at the mercy of the wind. Its patrone was probably seeking 
                                                          
134 In the source, the lembo is also indicated as a fregata. Both were small vessels suitable for 
cabotage trade, with a capacity between 4 and 29 tons; see Gatti, Navi e cantieri, 183-189, 201-
211. Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50410. The Bozano were an important 
family of Ligurian shipowners operating in the area of Varazze in the eighteenth century, see L. 
Gatti, «Un raggio di convenienza». Navi mercantili, costruttori e proprietari in Liguria nella prima 
metà dell’Ottocento, Genoa, 2008. 
135 The Casa di San Giorgio managed the collection of the tax on salt and its inflow in monopoly. 
According to the governor of Finale in 1614, the revenue that this magistracy earned was the 
most important in the Republic, see Calcagno, ‘Al pregiudizio de la giurisdizione’, 504. 
136 See par. 2.1. This strategy gave rise to a system of ‘widespread portuality' similar to the one 
described by Carrino, Salvemini, ‘porti di campagna’, 209–254. 
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shelter in the same spot, but he had difficulties manoeuvring. This tartana, led 
by a patrone that Bozano could not recognize, collided with the leudo and tore 
the mooring cables out of two of the three anchors on the seabed. After 
evaluating the situation, Bozano decided to perform a very common action 
amongst the cases of GA — he ordered the cutting of the last anchor cable to 
avoid ending up on the rocks and let the leudo follow the wind without sails. 
Navigation alla cappa, which is without sails while trying to keep the bow or the 
mascone in front of the waves, is the safest way to face a stormy sea with a 
vessel.137 However, the storm was such that it managed to inflate and tear the 
mainsail. At that point, Bozano decided to order a jettison to lighten the vessel. 
First, the crew throw the dead weight oversea. The dead weight was usually 
composed of sand and gravel bags placed on the bottom of the bilge to ensure 
the stability of the vessel and reduce rolling.138 However, in the case of bad 
weather, the movements of the cargo in the hold could compromise the vessel’s 
balance. Judging that the jettison was not enough, they also jettisoned 45 mine 
(4.09 tons) of salt that they had not been able to unload at Ceriale. Meanwhile, 
the force of the waves tore the bow ram, a particular type of bow stem, making 
the leudo much more vulnerable to the sea waves.139 The patrone decided to 
head towards Savona to avoid a shipwreck. Above the cape of Noli, at 13 miles 
from the island of Gallinara and only 7.5 miles from Savona, the schifo moored 
at the stern was carried away by the waves, but the vessel still managed to 
reach the port during the night of 9 October. Once in Savona, the first thing the 
patrone and his sailors did, even before declaring the accident, was to go 
barefoot to the sanctuary of the Madonna della Misericordia in Savona, saint of 
the city. The men thanked who they deemed to be their saviour.140 One of the 
sailors, Cesare Caralto, together with the patrone's son Paolo, was sent to 
collect information on the timings and costs to remake the anchors lost in the 
voyage. After the procession to the sanctuary, the patrone, together with his 
                                                          
137 F. Guglielmi, Guida al diporto nautico, San Benedetto del Tronto, 2011, 54. 
138 For a definition of ‘zavorra’ (dead weight) in the early modern period see Vocabolario degli 
accademici della Crusca, 4th ed., V, Florence, 1729-1738, 356. On the concepts of flotation and 
ship stability, see Guglielmi, Guida al diporto, 16-17. 
139 The dritto di prua is the forward end of the keel, usually reinforced and bulged to reduce 
resistance to motion and curb pitching movements in a stormy sea, see Guglielmi, Guida al 
diporto, 14-15. 
140 The promise of a pilgrimage or of a donation to the Church was a common practice, on the 
eve of a casualty or upon safe arrival in port. For an overview of the devotional customs of 
Ligurian sailors see Polonio, ‘Devozioni marinare’, 243-315. 
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son, his father and another sailor, Giuseppe Laura, went to the court of the 
vicario Domenico Solimano to ask for an official report.141 
The report is particularly rich in detail and concerns different fortuitous 
events; however, it is part of the Testimoniali all’estero segreti. This means that 
the case was not “opened and published” by the Conservatori del Mare when it 
arrived in Genoa on 8 November 1698.142 Some of the events reported, such as 
the first tearing of the sails and the stop at Savona and even the clash with the 
tartana near the Gallinara island, certainly did not respond to the requisites of a 
GA event. The damage suffered should have been attributed to the unknown 
tartana, as it came up against a moored ship, but it had not been possible to 
recognize the ship or its patrone.143 The cutting of the anchor’s cable, as well as 
the subsequent jettison, seemed rather to result in a GA calculation. However, it 
must be considered that part of the cargo, equal to half the capacity of the hold, 
had already been unloaded at the time of these accidents. According to Targa, 
if an accident were to occur when the ship had already begun unloading, the 
assets already ashore should not contribute in any way, so perhaps the 
remaining contributing mass was either very low or nonexistent.144 We do not 
know the amount of salt left aboard. If there were any at all, it may have been 
damaged by the water that entered the vessel. Furthermore, since this was a 
voyage carried out on behalf of a single hirer, the Magistrato del Sale, perhaps 
there was no need for the approval of the report and the patrone only needed a 
declaration of the accident to exempt himself from any responsibility and to 
request either the payment of the freight rates or exemption from 
reimbursement for a missed delivery. Finally, another hypothesis is that the 
report, drafted in Savona, the patrone's hometown, was made with the sole 
intent of seeking compensation from the Magistrato del Sale for the damages 
suffered by the vessel. Again, according to Targa, who also refers to Chapter 
181 of the Consolat de Mar, if the hirer insisted that the vessel should go at any 
cost to a certain port to embark or disembark the goods, he would implicitly 
                                                          
141 Ceriale in medieval times was under the authority of the bishops of the diocese of Albenga. It 
is probable that even after the passage under the control of the Republic the main authority 
maintained the title of vicario. On the history of Ceriale see the contribution of the scholar 
Francesco Demichelis on 
https://www.comune.ceriale.sv.it/servizi/Menu/dinamica.aspx?idSezione=568&idArea=4191&id
Cat=4292&ID=4292&TipoElemento=categoria, accessed on 29/06/2021. 
142 ASG, CdM, Testimoniali all’estero segreti 285, 08/11/1698. 
143 On damage resulting from collision between vessels see Targa, Ponderationi, 234-237. 
Targa also cites an unidentified treatise of Benvenuto Stracca (1509-1578). 
144 Targa, Ponderationi, 177. 
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assume the maritime risks: “which is to be understood by providing it with 
assistance, and provisions in other forms”.145 It was for this reason, perhaps, 
that in his statement, the patrone mentioned the order to set sail in spite of the 
bad weather, issued by the Magistrato del Sale of Genoa. 
Unfortunately, there are no other documents that might shed light on this 
matter, which in any case provides interesting insights. It highlights, as has 
already been mentioned several times before, the role played by small Ligurian 
vessels in supplying the coastal territories of the Republic, for which it was 
easier sending good by sea routes than on the few available roads. Further 
elements that depict the characteristics of coastal traffic in that area between 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the details on the crew members, 
with three generations of the same family on board, and the importance of the 
shipmaster's port of residence. The elements relating to the protection and 
‘salvific’ role of local saints also reveal elements of the devotional practices of 
the Ligurian maritime communities. Turning to the protection of a saint, which 
could occur through pilgrimage, donations, onomastics of vessels, etc., was 
something that could attenuate the risks out at sea as much as any ‘modern’ 
instrument such as a partnership agreement, insurance, or other.146 
Another significant case found within the Testimoniali all’estero segreti is the 
travel of the Genoese patrone Aloisio Losardo on his tartana named Nostre 
Domine dell’Acquasanta.147 The first part of his voyage was a typical example of 
cabotage trade. On 25 November 1697, the patrone was in Portopino [or 
Portospino], in the city of Palma on the island of Majorca, to load oil that would 
be transported to Genoa. He drew up his report on 13 January 1698 in front of 
the Genoese consul of Trapani, Giovanni Bernardo Desiderati. How was it 
possible that regular travel from Majorca to Genoa had taken so long and ended 
in Trapani, completely off course? The Spanish authorities, to which the 
Republic of Genoa was politically linked, were responsible for this complex 
voyage. While the patrone of the vessel was in the port waiting to load the oil, 
he was summoned by commander Gute of the royal galleys of Sicily, whose 
                                                          
145 Targa, Ponderationi, 188. 
146 See Polonio, ‘Devozioni marinare’, 243-315. A. Cabantous, Le Ciel dans la mer. 
Christianisme et civilisation maritime (XVIe-XIXe siècle), Paris, 1990. 
147 Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id 50445. 
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squadron was also moored in Majorca.148 The latter asked Losardo to rent his 
tartana to carry the crew of two galleys to Palermo. The two galleys of Gute’s 
squadron had sunk in the previous days, one in the seas of Lisa [Libya?], and 
the other near Majorca. The patrone tried to protest, explaining that he already 
had a freight contract for a load of oil to take to Genoa, but the Spanish 
commander told him that his request would have been a service for the Spanish 
Crown and that he could not refuse. He was right. As Targa states, in such 
situations, the Prince [that is, the higher authority] could break freight contracts 
made with private parties and force any individual to make his property 
available for the public good. These cases were known as “accident caused by 
the power of the Prince”. Insurers could reimburse these kinds of damages.149 
The report of the Genoese patrone does not state the value of the lost freight 
on the oil shipment. Gute forced Losardo to accept a contract of 750 Sicilian 
scudi (4,125 Genoese lire) for the transport of the two crews to Palermo. From 
his report, it seems that this sum was not enough to compensate for the lost 
freight. The two crews of the galleys were loaded aboard the tartana, and 
Losardo remained in port awaiting further orders from Gute. We do not know 
how many men were loaded on the tartana. However, considering that the crew 
of a galley consisted of at least a hundred men to which space for provisions 
had to be added, it is likely that the vessel was at the limit of its carrying 
capacity.150 After a month, however, it was still moored in Majorca. It seems that 
Gute forced Losardo to wait for two tartane mozze that had to deliver supplies 
for the passengers.151 Even after the two tartane arrived, however, Losardo was 
still forced to keep waiting. After a few more days, he formally raised a 
complaint to the commander of the galleys. Gute allowed the departure, but at 
the same time, he decided to modify the contract by reducing the hiring price to 
650 Sicilian scudi (3,575 Genoese lire). The patrone obtained 200 Sicilian scudi 
(1,100 Genoese lire) as a deposit and promised to receive the rest of the money 
once he arrived in Palermo. The tartana left Majorca on 24 December 1697, on 
                                                          
148 On the role of the general commander of Spanish galleys in the seventeenth century, see M. 
Lomas, Governing the galleys: jurisdiction, justice and trade in the squadrons of the Hispanic 
monarchy (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries), Leiden-Boston, 2020, 22-25. 
149 Targa, Ponderationi, 103-114, 187-188. 
150 On the structure of galleys, see Gatti, Navi e cantieri: 157-162; V. Favarò, ‘La Escuadra de 
galeras del Regno di Sicilia: costruzione, armamento, amministrazione (XVI secolo)’, in R. 
Cancila ed., Mediterraneo in armi (secc. XV-XVIII), Palermo, 2007, 289-314. 
151 Food supplies represented the main expenses for the royal galleys, coming to exceed even 
50% of the total. Favarò, ‘La Escuadra de galeras’, 300. No further information is available 
regarding the features of a tartana mozza. 
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“the eve of the nativity of Our Lord”, bound for Porto Colombo [Porto Colom], in 
Menorca. Here, it would have had to wait to rejoin the royal galleys before 
continuing to Sicily by sailing in convoy. Bad weather in the channel between 
the two islands, however, forced him to stop at Port Mahon. Commander Gute 
was supposed to arrive the following day, but after 14 days he had still not 
appeared. In the meantime, the supplies on board were running out, and due to 
the cold weather, the passengers began to fall sick. The patrone obtained 
authorization to leave from the castellan of Port Mahon, despite Gute's previous 
orders. The castellan drew up a special report in which he indicated the scarcity 
of supplies and the presence of sick men on board as reasons for immediate 
departure.152 On 7 January, the tartana finally sailed to Sardinia, its last stop 
before Palermo. However, their odyssey was not yet over; from the following 
day on, the weather got so bad that it made it impossible to keep following the 
original route, and so the vessel had to head towards North Africa, that is, 
southward. The wind tore the mainsail and the topsail. This set off the patrone’s 
decision to proceed with a jettison of the superfluous equipment, water, wine, 
and other barrels of provisions of the passengers who were above deck, as well 
as part of the dead weight. 
The patrone led the vessel back to Sardinia, but bad weather and poor 
visibility forced him to decide to steer directly towards Sicily, following the 
direction of the wind. On 11 January, the tartana arrived at approximately 20 
miles from the island of Marettimo, west of Trapani. Once in sight of the coast, 
the vessel tried to make forza di vele, that is, it tried to exploit the strong wind at 
the cost of damaging the sails to reach Palermo. During the night, the wind 
changed again and forced them to move away from the mainland. Out of 
caution, Losardo decided to spend the night without sails and to try reaching 
Trapani the following day. When, at one a.m. on 12 January, the passengers of 
the galleys learned of the decision to wait for dawn of the following day before 
approaching the coast, they complained strongly, assuring the patrone that they 
had the necessary skills to navigate and make the landing even in the dark and 
“with their eyes closed”. When faced with Losardo's refusal, the galleys’ sailors 
took possession of the tartana by force, promising to lead it to safety. That is 
how at three a.m. that morning, near the Sant’Antonio a mare tower, the tartana 
                                                          
152 Illnesses that affected the crew and deprived the vessel of the sailors, perhaps forcing the 




ran aground on the rocks. As they could not see exactly how they were 
positioned, they lowered an anchor from the left side of the vessel to try to 
immobilize it. 
The patrone managed to regain control of his tartana and ordered to fire a 
few shots to attract the attention of any nearby vessel. In the meantime, he 
decided to lighten the vessel further by jettisoning more equipment into the sea. 
The passengers, fearing that the patrone wanted to escape with his crew 
aboard the schifo, began to crowd into the small boat, despite the attempts of 
one of their officers to stop them by drawing his sword. Perhaps also due to the 
excessive weight, the schifo had to be loosened from the tartana and left to drift. 
It sank immediately, causing many of its occupants to drown and the others to 
return on board. After an hour and a half in this precarious situation, the only 
cable holding the tartana in place tore and, since because of the jettison they 
had nothing else to use to reinforcetheir mooring, the hull ended up smashing 
against the rocks. After another hour from the shipwreck, the patrone dived in 
from the wreck of the tartana “into the sea, naked and without anything, as his 
mother made him”. Due to an alleged miracle of the Holy Virgin of Trapani, a 
ship coming from Trapani immediately rescued him. This vessel had probably 
set sail at night to come to their aid after hearing the shots. Losardo, almost 
frozen to death, was taken to a larger vessel, given some dry clothes, and kept 
warm by a brazier. After that, he was transferred to the tartana of a Genoese 
patrone, Francesco Lupo. The following morning, Lupo helped him return to the 
wreck of Nostra Domine dell’Acquasanta to save the surviving crew and 
passengers, check the damage and recover the chest that held Losardo’s 
money and documents. His chest, however, had been forced opened overnight, 
resulting in missing goods worth approximately 350 pieces of eight. Sailors 
Matteo Villa and Gio. Batta Lavaggi reported that they could only save a bag of 
10 Sardinian ecus, possibly part of the payment received from the commander 
of the galleys. Similarly, the goods that the patrone, his pursue Francesco 
Russo and some other sailors had loaded had been lost or damaged. The 
shipwreck also caused the loss of the logbook and all the documents relating to 
the cargo, so it was difficult to quantify the amount of damage. 
The statements of the seamen who were part of the crew accurately matched 
the declaration of their patrone. However, it was suspicious that even the 
moments when Losardo found himself alone were recounted by the sailors with 
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the same wealth of detail. This suggests that the crew had ‘agreed’ in advance 
to issue uniform declarations. The report also includes the declaration of 
Michael Honphrius Silvera, soldier of the royal galleys. This statement is 
interesting, as it represents a glimpse into the perception of the journey and the 
obstacles posed by a passenger. It is a short statement. The soldier claimed to 
have been partly above deck and partly below deck and recounted how his 
companions “wept” at the news of being headed for Barbery, probably fearing 
being captured by the local pirates. The sailors of the tartana, on the other 
hand, “wept” when they were forced to move away from the coast of Sicily after 
the first attempted approach. The patrone's report clearly shows the intention to 
place the responsibility for the accident on the crews of the two galleys to free 
himself and his crew. Silvera himself said he had heard the patrone complaining 
about how it was their fault that they had been shipwrecked on the rocks.153 
Silvera’ story depicts a much more ‘empathetic’ narrative of what happened, 
with moments of shared despair of both the sailors and soldiers, all of them at 
the mercy of an unknown and unpredictable fate. 
The dynamics of the facts and the statements mentioned lead us to wonder 
why this complaint is among the Testimoniali segreti all'estero. During this 
troubled voyage there were two jettisons. The first was made on 7 January to 
head towards Sardinia after the bad weather had forced the vessel to deviate 
towards Barbery. However, even after the jettison, the patrone could not follow 
the route, so the jettison had been unable to increase the manoeuvrability of the 
vessel. The next jettison had been made to free the vessel from the rocks, but 
that attempt still resulted in a shipwreck, so even in this case, the jettison had 
proved useless. In addition, it is good to remember the very same principle 
underlying an act of GA — it is necessary for common salvation, but its ultimate 
goal is the distribution of damages among all parties involved in the shipment. 
In this case, there were no goods belonging to different owners. All the goods 
loaded on board were the property of the patrone and his men. The provisions 
and the crew's assets, provided they did not exceed the value of each 
canterata, did not contribute in the event of a jettison. The two crews for which 
the freight had been paid could not be considered ‘cargo’. Moreover, the 
                                                          
153 Spanish legislation explicitly protected soldiers in the galleys. In the military ordinance of 
1632, an article specified that no magistrate could charge a soldier with any crime except 




passengers and their assets did not contribute to a GA calculation. The most 
likely reason why the patrone decided to declare his report, beyond simply 
reporting the news, could have been due to the need to go to Palermo to ask for 
the rest of the agreed freight or at least a percentage of it for the journey to 
Trapani. The freight was not due in the event of nondelivery of the goods, 
except in the case of either jettison or germinamento.154 Perhaps by blaming the 
crews of the galleys, Losardo could free himself and his crew from any 
responsibility for the accident and seek compensation directly from Commander 
Gute. The revolt of the passengers on board was a classic case of a fatal 
accident, which usually occurred when there were soldiers on board, as in this 
case.155 Targa himself was wary of such situations, as they were particularly 
difficult to keep under control. He mentioned the authority of the Gospel and of 
classical authors such as Ovid to encourage harmony among the passengers. 
Moreover, the abandonment of the schifo with the men on board and their 
subsequent death was a serious matter that probably had to be amply justified 
and documented. Even in this case, however, there are no further documents to 
shed light on the accident. On 5 June 1698, approximately 6 months later, the 
report had been submitted and kept in the Testimoniali all'estero segreti folders. 
The Average acts, as has already been remarked in the previous pages, are 
not limited to the jettison and voluntary sacrifice of equipment required to 
escape a storm, as the jurisprudential literature would suggest. Although the 
Lex Rhodia and its subsequent regulations, including the Genoese statutes, 
mainly focused on this aspect, the progressive expansion of this institution led 
to ever new and different situations. Furthermore, the relative simplicity and 
speed of the procedure allowed a certain margin of action to the shipmasters, 
who could exploit the legislation for different and rarely explicit purposes at the 
time of drafting their report. Those same authorities, as noted regarding the 
memoranda drawn up by the Conservatori del Mare, tried to favour the 
shipmaster’s reporting at their chancellery to avoid extrajudicial agreements and 
possible fraud, but this inevitably resulted in simplifications to speed up the 
procedure. 
While jurists could also provide partial justifications for the extension of the 
GA concept towards liminal practices such as shipwrecks and encounters with 
                                                          
154 Targa, Ponderationi, 103. 
155 Targa, Ponderationi, 289-290. 
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pirates, the sources examined often seem to move in an autonomous direction 
and, in a certain sense, towards a more external ‘front’ than the legislation. The 
Testimoniali all’estero segreti go even further, situating themselves in a sort of 
no man's land, where each aberrant case was unique in terms of the variability 
of situations and the impossibility of applying a uniform procedure. The jurists, 
with their judgements, pursued different types of practices, specifying case by 
case the behaviours to follow when the content of the rules was not enough. 
However, they could not encompass the entire variety of situations that 
occurred during sea voyages. Despite this dynamism, moreover, the Statuti 
Civili and the many regulations of the judiciary remained unchanged. The laws 
underwent only slight and slow changes. They represented a most formal 
authority that was inevitably sliding towards a way of facing the current reality 
and whose role was increasingly a ‘façade’ — unmovable landmarks with 









This dissertation offers preliminary insights into how an economic-quantitative 
approach to Average documentary evidence, can help to reconstruct the 
structure of European maritime traffic, providing insights into the links and 
relationships between the players involved in the shipping business. The 
analysis of more than eight hundred Average procedures, preserved in the 
State Archives of Genoa and drawn up between 1590 and 1700, allowed this in-
depth study. Average procedures proved to be a sufficiently homogeneous and 
representative source: depending on the year chosen, they account for up to 
60% of the total number of vessels over 1,500 cantari, (71.46 tons.) annually 
entering the port of Genoa.1 The analysis on this source allows to formulate 
multiple hypothesis on hitherto hardly investigated aspects of the Genoese 
maritime trade, which underwent significant changes between the sixteenth and 
the seventeenth centuries. It was possible as well to investigate in detail the 
‘asynchronous’ configuration, compared to other European markets, of the 
Average procedure in Genoa and the way in which this procedure was applied 
and overseen by the institutions involved. 
The analysis follows two research axes, the normative/procedural one and 
the historical-economic one, based on data analysis. I frequently compared the 
abundant data coming from Average procedures with the regulations adopted 
by the Republic of Genoa. The analysis of the normative sources allows also to 
contextualise procedures followed in Genoa into the wider European context. 
The application of the rules was evaluated for each of the cases examined, 
especially in the last Chapter, in order to assess their actual impact on daily 
practices. Relying on the wealth of information extrapolated from the 
procedures drawn up under the jurisdiction of the magistracies of the calcolatori 
or the Conservatori del Mare, and applying a methodology that allowed for both 
a quantitative long-term approach and a qualitative one, I analysed the maritime 
trade and routes headed to the Republic of Genoa in the seventeenth century. 
The choice of the Republic of Genoa as an observation point allowed the close 
examination of some phenomena such as the different importance of foreign 
shipping in the seventeenth century Mediterranean Sea, its evolution, or the sea 
risks connected to early modern shipping. In this context, the port of Genoa 
                                                          
1 See chap. 4. 
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played a fundamental role, not only within the ‘economic policies’ of the 
Republic in the seventeenth century, as shown in Chapter Two, but also in the 
general economy of European trade, for which it played as an important 
regional role. 
This analysis allowed a wider reflection on the question of the existence of 
shared rules within the Mediterranean. For a long time, historians have 
identified Average legislation in Europe as evidence of the existence of a Lex 
Maritima, universally adopted and shared by merchants, intended as the law 
and customs developed in seventeenth-century Europe to govern international 
commercial shipping.2 William Tetley, in particular, presented GA procedure’s 
history as a straightforward evolution of rules shared by most European 
countries.3 The Lex Maritima historiographical debate is part of the wider debate 
on Lex Mercatoria.4 The English writer Gerard de Malynes first popularised this 
idea in 1622.5 He opposed Lex Mercatoria to contemporary English common 
law. The contemporary supporters of Lex Mercatoria argue that non-institutional 
actors, when allowed to thrive, provided more efficient solutions to the problem 
of mercantile justice than state institutions.6 In this perspective, Lex Mercatoria 
and Lex Maritima are presented together as evidence of the historical existence 
of a natural solution for mercantile justice, without the interference of states. 
According to Emily Kadens, there is no historical evidence of such universal set 
of rules, but rather of “iura mercatorum, the laws of merchants: bundles of 
public privileges and private practices, public statutes and private customs”.7 
The state, however, played out a vital role in the Average rules process of 
formation and consolidation. The simple fact that the basic principles of the 
institution of GA survived with few changes from classical Greece to the 
contemporary period encouraged scholars between the nineteenth and the 
                                                          
2 ‘Lex maritima’, in A.X. Fellmeth, M. Horwitz, Guide to Latin in international law, Oxford, 2009. 
See also A. Cordes, ‘Lex Maritima? Local, Regional and Universal Maritime law in the Middle 
Ages’, in Blockmans, Krom, Wubs-Mrowewicz eds., The Routledge Handbook, 69-85. 
3 W. Tetley, ‘The general maritime law: the lex maritima in arbitration law and the conflict of 
laws’, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 20, 1994, 105-45. 
4 On this topic, see Cordes, ‘Lex maritima?’; E Kadens., ‘The Myth of the Customary Law 
Merchant’, Texas Law Review 90, 2012, 1153-206. A. Cordes, ‘The Search for a Medieval lex 
mercatoria’, in Piergiovanni ed., From lex mercatoria, 53-67. 
5 G. Malynes, Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria: or, the Ancient Law-Merchant..., London, 1629. 
On the conceptualization of the Lex Mercatoria, see D. De ruysscher, ‘Conceptualising lex 
mercatoria: Malynes, Schmitthoff and Goldman Compared’, Maastricht Journal for European 
and Comparative Law, forthcoming. A recent reconstruction of the debates linked to Lex 
Maritima and GA is in Dreijer, The power and pains, 37-41. 
6 Kadens, ‘The Myth’, 1153-1154. 
7 E. Kadens, ‘Order within Law, Variety within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Law 
Merchant’, Chicago Journal of International Law 139, 2004, 39-65, 42. 
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twentieth centuries to look at the set of Average rules enacted in the early 
modern period as a simple linear development. This evolution originates from 
the multiple law systems following the end of the Roman Empire and culminates 
in the ‘neo-classical’ return to a shared set of rules accepted by different 
countries following the adoption of the York-Antwerp Rules (YAR), established 
for the first time in 1890. The YAR, the international convention which still 
regulates the GA procedure today and which is subject to periodic revisions, 
perhaps resembles more the ancient Lex Rhodia than the various European 
regulations, which developed in the course of the early modern period. 
The historical development of regulations in the Mediterranean area, often 
simplified by jurists and scholars by referring simply to the Consolat de Mar and 
the Lex Rhodia, was in actual practice a complex and original phenomenon. 
The Consolat imposed itself, without doubt, as an important point of reference 
for the European legal world and for subsequent normative elaborations. This 
did not imply, however, an a-critical acceptance by each legislating state of its 
rules. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Three, the Consolat itself was largely the 
result of influences coming from outside the Catalan city of Barcelona and, in 
relation to the Genoese case, from set of rules such as the statutes of the 
Genoese colony of Pera.8 
The analysis of the legislation produced and adopted in Genoa, therefore, 
challenge the concept of the Lex Maritima defined above: the Genoese Average 
legislation reflects the peculiarities of the Republic of Genoa in the early modern 
period. Such peculiarities clearly emerge in the process of state formation of the 
Genoese Republic, examined in the First Chapter. The Republic of Genoa was 
an oligarchy of merchants, financiers and businessmen. The ruling elite 
legislated on the basis of their own political and economic interests. 
In Genoa the Statuti Civili, the main corpus of laws of the Republic from 1589 
to the eighteenth century, regulated Average and other institutions linked to 
shipping, such as insurance. These Statutes contain two Chapters on the 
Average procedure: one regarding the operations to follow in navigation in case 
of a GA event, in particular in the case of jettison, while the other regarding the 
institution of the calcolatori magistracy, in charge of drawing up the 
apportionment calculations for GA and PA procedures. This legislation did not 
                                                          
8 As stated in par. 3.3, it is believed that the statutes of Pera were a copy of the statutes 
adopted in the capital, Genoa. The influence on the Consolat, therefore, derived in part from the 
normative production of Genoa. 
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change in the following centuries. Genoese jurists at the end of the seventeenth 
and at the beginning of the eighteenth century, therefore, published legal 
treatises providing extensive interpretations of these rules in order to better 
frame Genoese practice in the context of ‘international law’. For example, 
according to the jurists Casaregi and Targa, and despite what was written in the 
Statuti Civili, daily practice in Genoa followed the procedures of the Consolat de 
Mar. According to Casaregi, in addition to the Consolat de Mar, the Genoese 
magistracies also followed the Lex Rhodia as described in Justinian’s Digest: a 
typical example of Lex Maritima. Everyday practice, however, belies these 
statements. 
One of the most important elements of divergence between Genoese 
regulations and those of other Mediterranean countries can be found in the 
different contribution criteria for GA calculations in the first half of the 
seventeenth century. The analysis of the procedures preserved in the State 
Archives has shown that in Genoa an original system was used to calculate the 
contribution to the value of the ship: the vessel contributed for its entire value, 
and not for half or a third, as was the case in other ports such as Livorno. The 
contribution for the whole vessel value has two interconnected consequences: a 
higher contribution for shipowners and a wider redistribution of damages among 
all involved capitals for merchants. 
In the course of the damage apportionment procedure in a GA calculation, all 
the involved parties formed a sort of temporary partnership. The same principle 
is evident across all European legal traditions, and also in Islamic regulations on 
Averages.9 However, from a technical jurisprudential perspective, the whole 
issue of whether GA was effectively supported by a ‘tacit’ partnership remains a 
contested matter.10 
An evidence of this silent partnership could reside in the different criteria 
followed in the assets’ estimate. In many ports, for example, the vessel only 
contributed for half of its value, determining lower transaction costs for the 
shipowners. It is possible that a sort of ‘compensation’ was given to the 
shipowner, who in the past often coincided with the shipmaster, because he 
                                                          
9 A.L. Udovitch, ‘An Eleventh Century Islamic Treatise on the Law of the Sea’, Annales 
Islamologique 27, 1993, 37-54, 51. 
10 See Fusaro’s and Addobbati’s contributions in Addobbati, Fusaro, Piccinno eds., Sharing 
risks. For a contemporary analysis of GA as an ‘implied contract’ see also the considerations of 
G.M. Gauci, ‘Of Piracy and General Average: Contribution in General Average for Ransom 




physically took part in the voyage. The protection of the ‘partner’ who risked his 
own life during a sea voyage, for example, was established in other credit and 
risk management instruments such as the medieval commenda: in the 
commenda the socius tractans was better protected than those who invested 
goods and capitals without undertaking the voyage.11 The equal treatment in 
Genoa, i.e. the absence of specific incentives for shipowners, probably reflects 
the atypical nature of the Genoese government. Although the aristocracy 
maintained an interest in the shipowning sector, the merchant marine 
experienced a decline in the second half of the sixteenth century. The 1589 
Statuti Civili were drafted at the height of this downward phase in Genoese 
shipping. This factor may have influenced the application of a principle that 
seemed to benefit only merchants. In the years immediately following the 
promulgation of the Statuti Civili grain shortage had led to the ‘Northern 
Invasion’, which caused an increasing presence and availability of foreign 
vessels in the Mediterranean. No one argues anymore that the Northerners’ 
arrival led inevitably and relatively quickly to their pre-eminence in 
Mediterranean maritime trade, and it is true that the Northerners had little 
impact on the structures of cabotage, but this process had important 
repercussions, particularly on the medium to long-distance trade, which the 
Northerners quickly came to dominate.12 Perhaps it was the growth of trade and 
the growing role of the port as a neutral emporium, although the Republic 
remained formally an ally of the Spanish Empire, which prompted a review of 
this policy. Between the 1660s and the end of the century the value of vessels 
in GA calculations drawn up in Genoa began to contribute only for half. This 
procedural convergence, in line with what happened in other ports, aimed at 
requesting shipowners lower costs in the event of an Average calculation. Free 
port policies, which were more or less ‘liberal’ depending on the economic 
situation at the time, also reflected the same concerns: creating incentives for 
foreign shipmasters. 
We have also observed another peculiarity in Genoese Average legislation: 
the existence of an official body of state sanctioned calcolatori. In Livorno, for 
                                                          
11 See par. 3.1. 
12 M. Fusaro, ‘After Braudel: a reassessment of Mediterranean history between the Northern 
invasion and the Caravane Maritime’, in M. Fusaro et al. eds., Trade and cultural exchange in 
the early modern maritime Mediterranean, London, 2010, 1-23; M. Greene, ‘Beyond the 




example, sometimes it was the shipmaster himself, autonomously or in 
agreement with the merchants, who proposed to the local magistracy of the 
Consoli del Mare the assessment of the goods and the damages in an Average 
calculation: it was then the magistracy, almost taking for granted the 
shipmaster’s tendency to increase the value of the damages, who ordered an 
apportionment for a lowered sum.13 The creation of the calcolatori magistracy in 
Genoa, which on the basis of current studies is unique in the European 
legislative context of the sixteenth century, reflects the logic of the patricians 
ruling the Republic. A specialised magistracy would have guaranteed protection 
to the party who invested more capital in a sea venture: the merchants. In the 
seventeenth century the value of the vessels was generally lower than the total 
value of the cargo, and there was always the risk that one of the parties could 
contest an incorrect assessment of their goods, leading to litigations. 
Merchants probably afforded a greater trustworthiness to a magistracy with 
specific jurisdiction over Average calculations. Each element, relating to the 
contributing mass or to the damages, was calculated and validated by the 
calcolatori – first a special magistrate, then a notary/calcolatore – before 
proceeding with the approval of the calculation and the contribution rate. 
Requests by merchants for the recalculation of the value of goods or damages 
are very rare in the documentation examined. Although the contribution of half 
or the entire vessel could have a more or less significant influence on the 
apportionment phase, the contributing value of the cargo was the key element 
in the procedure. Genoese legislators were aware of this and perhaps, precisely 
for this reason, they created a magistracy of experts that could provide fair and 
uniform valuations of the assets involved. With this in mind, it will be interesting 
to assess in subsequent research the evolution of Average rules and practices 
following the formation of a new specialised magistrate during the eighteenth 
century: the Magistrato d’Avaria.14 
                                                          
13 See Dyble, General Average. However, this is an issue that has not yet been fully 
investigated, as the procedure seems to vary significantly from case to case. 
14 ASG, CdM 451-453, Sessioni diverse del magistrato d’avaria ed altro, 1720-1817. The 
eighteenth century is a period hardly studied by the historiography on Genoa, in particular as far 
as the maritime trade is concerned. Felloni's cards have already shown that it is possible to 
reconstruct the traffic headed to the port also regarding these years. Moreover, the archival 
documentation concerning the eighteenth century is wider and does not present significant 




In addition to an in-depth analysis of the legal framework of Average 
institutions and their evolution in the seventeenth century, this research allowed 
me to analyse the main characteristics of the traffic arriving in the port of 
Genoa. The vessels involved in Average declarations, about eight hundred 
cases distributed over four three-year intervals taken as a sample in the Fourth 
Chapter, came from the Tyrrhenian area as well as from more remote regions 
such as the island of Newfoundland, Russia or Egypt. The historiographical 
tradition concerning Genoese maritime trade during the seventeenth century 
generally refers to a decline in maritime trade in this period. This decline 
emerges both from the analysis of the data on the annual arrivals of vessels 
studied by Edoardo Grendi and from studies on the maritime-commercial 
policies implemented by the Republic in the seventeenth century. According to 
Thomas Kirk: 
 
Two threads run intertwined through Genoese political discourse during the 
latter half of the sixteenth and the better part of the seventeenth century […] 
relaunching Genoa as a maritime power (for many as a maritime military 
power), and creating an emporium market as a means of enhancing the city’s 
importance as a commercial hub in the Western Mediterranean […].15 
 
Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Genoese patricians 
prospered thanks to their relationship with the Spanish crown and its global 
empire. The weakening of Spain and of its hegemony in the Western 
Mediterranean, as well as the increasingly recurrent Spanish financial crises, 
forced the Genoese to redefine their diplomatic and commercial strategies. The 
decline of Spanish hegemony and the rise of English and Dutch as a presence 
in the Mediterranean forced a transformation on the Genoese economy 
comparable with the one made in the fifteenth century, when they had lost the 
Levantine colonies and markets.16 During the seventeenth century, the Republic 
gradually and non-linearly developed a commercial policy that favoured 
Genoa’s role as a maritime emporium, for example through the free port and 
projects for a return to the Levantine trade. It is also for this reason that the port 
continued to play a key role in seventeenth-century government policies, as we 
have seen in Chapter Two, allowing Genoa to maintain its independence.17 
                                                          
15 Kirk, Genoa and the sea, 186. 
16 Kirk, Genoa and the sea, 198. 
17 Kirk, Genoa and the sea, 202. The Republic was dependent on its port also for its annual 
food imports, of which it was structurally in deficit. See par. 2.2. 
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Giorgio Doria’s studies showed the importance of the Genoese port system, 
moreover, the trend in port taxes he studied increased in the last decades of the 
seventeenth century, but further data are lacking to verify the extent and 
resilience of this. 
The role of neutral port of call, particularly following the weakening of Spain 
and the consolidation of free port policies, represented one of the possible ways 
for a small state like Genoa, to survive in an increasingly imperialistic and 
mercantilist early modern Europe.18 It was convenient for a small state to 
become a hub for several other countries as this made them natural allies, as 
they would not want to see their maritime hub fall into the hands of an enemy 
power. This strategy is feasible if the small state in question, for example, 
occupies a strategic position for sea and land routes, specialises in the handling 
of particular types of goods or responds to the economic interests of several 
larger countries. All these characteristics apply well to the Genoese scenario, 
beyond its undoubted peculiarities.19 
The analysis of Average procedures, and their degree of representativeness 
which has emerged with respect to total traffic, has allowed the detection of 
further factors which had so far escaped historical analysis. One of the most 
significant elements emerging from the macro analysis allows a better 
understanding of the modalities and dating of the arrival of Northern 
shipmasters in the port in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. 
Although Grendi had already identified the presence of specific ‘waves’ of 
arrivals, the current analysis allowed to observe in detail the tonnages of 
Northern vessels, the different ports involved in sending goods to Genoa and 
the main routes followed. In the first three years examined, from 1599 to 1601, 
there were very few Northern vessels, probably arriving in the same quantity 
even before the well-known cereal crisis of 1591. On the other hand, analysing 
                                                          
18 The expression ‘Mercantilism’ refers to a debated theory that broadly focuses on the finite 
nature of the world’s wealth and the ways Kingdoms and Empires in early modern Europe could 
seize the bigger share for themselves. See L. Magnusson, The political economy of 
mercantilism, London, 2015; S. Pincus. ‘Rethinking Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British 
Empire, and the Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, The William and 
Mary Quarterly 69/1, 2012, 3–34. ‘Imperialism’ broadly refers to the complex of intentions and 
material forces which predispose states to an incursion into the sovereignty of other states. See 
C.A. Bayly, The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760–1830, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 26/2, 1998, 28-47. 
19 This role fully developed during the eighteenth century. See, for example, the role Genoa 
played for Switzerland merchants in L. Codignola, M.E. Tonizzi, ‘The Swiss community in 
Genoa from the Old Regime to the late nineteenth century’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 
13/2, 2008, 152-170. 
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their presence in the years 1639-1641, the trading network in which they 
operated emerges and, in particular, the cereal routes in which their vessels, 
with their capacious holds and relatively low freight rates, were most used.20 
The high number of shipmasters involved in cereal trade allows also to 
reconstruct the main flows directed to Genoa and their evolution over time, both 
in terms of markets and price trends. 
A further element which emerges from the analysis of the data is the role of 
French merchant marine in the traffic directed to the port of Genoa. The growing 
presence of French shipmasters in the 1698-1700 sample period reflects, on 
the one hand, the political balance in the Mediterranean at the end of the 
seventeenth century and, on the other hand, the will/necessity of the Republic 
to act as a purely neutral emporium in competition with the nearby Livorno. 
Despite the free port policies, the number of French shipmasters arriving in 
Genoa and declaring Average was significantly lower in the previous sample 
years. From Genoa point of view, two factors are particularly noticeable during 
the seventeenth century: the already mentioned weakening of the Spanish ally 
and the constant French attempts to bring the Republic under its influence. The 
French bombardment of 1684 led to the disarmament of the new Genoese 
galleys, but the Republic maintained its independence and further strengthened 
its policy of neutrality. During the three-year period 1698-1700, however, French 
shipmasters in Average procedures rose to about a quarter of the total 
shipmasters calling at the port of Genoa. This figure is even more significant if 
we look at their precise origin: while in the first three quarters of the century they 
came from nearby Provence, especially Marseille, in the last years of the 
century they arrived from all ports in France, including those on the Northern 
coasts like Dunkirk or La Rochelle. This element is perhaps an indicator of 
greater integration of French ‘national’ shipping following the establishment of 
free port of Marseille in 1669, and the promulgation of the Grande ordonnance 
de la marine in 1681.21 
                                                          
20 This confirms the classic literature on the Netherlandish in the Mediterranean. See Van 
Gelder, ‘Favouring foreign traders?’; M.Van Gelder, Trading Places: The Netherlandish 
Merchants in Early Modern Venice, Leiden-Boston, 2009; P.C. Van Royen, ‘The First Phase of 
the Dutch Straatvaart (1591–1605): Fact and Fiction’, International Journal of Maritime History 
2/2, 1990, 69-102. The GA calculations may reveal further information regarding transaction 
costs and damage sharing for Northern vessels in comparison to Mediterranean vessels. A 
specific study on this aspect is underway and will be published in collaboration with Luigi Oddo 
(University of Genoa). 
21 See J. Horn, ‘Marseille et la question du mercantilisme: privilège, liberté et économie politique 
en France, 1650-1750’, Histoire, économie et société 2, 2011, 95-112 ; A. Smedley-Weill, ‘la 
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Moreover, processing of data from sea voyages can be cross-referenced with 
the studies produced so far to investigate further elements, like the 
dangerousness of Mediterranean navigation. The case studies analysis in 
Chapter Five, moreover, allowed specific considerations on the concept of 
Average and on the way reports were written by shipmasters. The first cases 
examined showed that Genoese magistracies did not classify Average reports 
and did not always clearly distinguish different cases like Average acts (GA and 
PA), shipwrecks, pirate attacks. Legal (‘learned’) texts often were peremptory in 
their distinctions, and jurists constantly referred to them. In the face of the 
complexity of cases, however, law could at best offer a broad general frame of 
reference, leaving room for interpretation by the competent authorities when 
faced with the specificities of each case. 
The analysis of the documents preserved within the Atti Civili of the 
Conservatori del Mare also allowed to identify and analyse in details some of 
the strategies available to shipmasters and merchants in the event of litigation. 
In par. 5.1 I detailed the voyages involving Stefano Sacco, a merchant in Genoa 
who received damaged goods and refused to pay his due share in the resulting 
GA calculation. The shipmasters carrying the goods addressed to him, 
Lolliandro and La Barbera, took months to reach the port of Genoa and the 
cargoes were seriously damaged by bad weather. Nevertheless, they turned to 
the Conservatori del Mare and succeeded in obtaining payment of Sacco’s GA 
share. In the second case, however, Sacco's claims demonstrates the 
possibility for a merchant to request further evidence to support the GA 
procedure, before proceeding with the calculation. In fact, the Conservatori 
requested additional evidence following Sacco's request and perhaps the total 
damages were lower than those the shipmaster had initially asked for. Another 
example is the voyage of the shipmaster Gio. Baptiste Olivier, which shows the 
close interrelationship between Average and insurance. The Conservatori del 
Mare acted as a bridge between shipmasters, merchants and insurers: in the 
case of Olivier, for example, at his request the Conservatori summoned and 
ordered the payment of the contribution to the insurers involved. The 
relationship between Average and insurance, unlike in other port cities such as 
Venice, seems to have been complementary since the promulgation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
gestion du commerce français au XVIIe siecle: impulsions gouvernementales et besoins des 
échanges’, Histoire, Économie et Société 12/4, 1993, 473–486. 
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Statuti Civili in 1589 which put an end to the disputes mentioned in the 
judgments of the Rota Civile in the previous decades.22 In legal proceedings 
involving insured goods or vessels, it does not seem to have been difficult for a 
shipmaster to ask the Conservatori del Mare to summon the parties concerned 
and oversee the apportionment of damages, as Olivier successfully did. 
Finally, the cases cited as ‘false reports’ and those preserved within the 
Testimoniali Segreti best capture the complexity of a sea voyage. Cases of 
barratry and false reports, such as that of the shipmaster Filippo Del Canto cited 
by the Conservatori, were probably a minority compared to the total procedures 
preserved in Genoa. Del Canto sold his cargo, sank his vessel and claimed to 
have been attacked by the Turks. He even went so far as to kill his crew 
member who decided to report the fraud. Borderline cases of this kind allow us 
to shed light on events outside the institutional narrative and put the legislation 
in a dynamic context. The voyage of the patrone Andrea Arsenio de Milani, who 
took months to travel the Genoa-Tabarka route that usually took one or two 
weeks, also leads to questions about the presence of informal practices that 
otherwise do not emerge from the legal sources. Real life business that 
historians and economic historians often ignore emerges from the informal 
agreements. It is possible that involved parties preferred to avoid legal disputes, 
as was probably the case in de Milani’s voyage, in order to accommodate a 
business partner or for other reasons. 
These decisions are also an indication of long-term business strategies that 
challenge the simplifying schemes with which scholars often explained actors’ 
behaviour in pre-industrial period. Such schemes state that social actors act 
only on the basis of immediate profit maximisation, as an archetypical homo 
oeconomicus.23 According to Walter Friedman and Geoffrey Jones: 
 
Entrepreneurship is an area in which business historians have made an 
important contribution, but in which most of the recent conceptual work has 
been done by economists and management scholars. Their theories provide 
a more powerful set of tools for examining the history of entrepreneurship 
                                                          
22 K. Nehlsen-von Stryk, L'assicurazione marittima a Venezia nel XV secolo, Rome, 1988. In 
Florence integration started earlier, see Addobbati, ‘Italy 1500–1800’, 46-77. 
23 This archetype, first theorised by John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century, refers to a rational 
agent with consistent and stable preferences. He is entirely forward-looking, and pursues only 
his own self-interest. When given options he chooses the alternative with the highest expected 
utility for himself. See ‘homo economicus’, in Oxford Reference, available on 




than any that were available to the pioneering business historians in the 
1940s and 1950s. […] Huge areas of uncertainty regarding the causal links 
between entrepreneurship, innovation and growth still call for explanation.24 
 
In this sense Average sources, linked to a mutualistic form of protection, offer a 
different perspective, thanks also to the rich available quantitative data. In their 
everyday businesses, merchants could choose to bear higher transaction costs 
in order to recover their credit at a later stage, also reinforcing the bond of 
business and trust with other merchants and shipmasters. The same can be 
said for institutions and their functioning. They are often seen simply in terms of 
immediate efficiency, whereas the behaviour of actors, whether institutions or 
individuals, must necessarily be contextualised in the historical moment in 
which it occurred.25 Average procedures preserved in Genoa and analysed in 
this dissertation may well constitute the first step of further studies aimed at 
shedding light on the way of doing business and managing sea risk in an 
atypical Ancien Régime society such as the Republic of Genoa.  
                                                          
24 W.A. Friedman, G. Jones, ‘Business History: Time for Debate’, Business History Review 85/1, 
2011, 1–8, 5. See also C. Casson, M. Casson, ‘The history of entrepreneurship: Medieval 
origins of a modern phenomenon’, Business History 56/8, 2014, 1223-1242. 
25 Ogilvie, ‘Whatever is, is right?’; an example of historical contextualisation for medieval Genoa 
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Liber Primus. 19. 
De calculatoribus et eorum officio. Cap. XI. 
Quotiescumque patronus, magister, seu prefectus navigii, aut alius ad quem 
de iure spectet, petierit fieri calculum de iactu, seu avaria contra mercatores, 
seu dominus, bonorum in navi oneratorum, seu contra assecuratore, 
magistratus calculatorum intelligat partes, examinari faciat testes, et quicquid 
determinaverit, seu in calculo posuerit debeat comprobari per magistratus, ad 
quos spectat, et secundum illud procedi, salvi praetensionibus et actionibus tam 
dominis rerum quam assecuratoribus contra quosvis. 
Possint dicti calculatores mandare que voluerint patrono, magistro seu 
praefecto navigii praetendenti fieri calculum, tam circa exonerationem mercium, 
seu bonorum, quam circa acceptandum custodes in navi usque ad perfectam 
exonerationem, sub poena scutorum centum pro qualibet vice, et interesse 
iactu, seu avarie secutae. 
Et antequam patronus, magister seu praefectus, ut supra admittantur ad 
examinandum testes super iactu, seu avaria secutis, teneantus calculatore 
habere ab eis promissionem et idoneam fideiussionem de solvendo duodecim 
pro quolibet, quod exonerassent contra formam statuti de iactu. Et seu de quo 
fraudassent, seu fraudem commisissent, aut committerent ad praeiudicium 
calculi, que poena sit applicata pro tertiis calculatoribus et pro aliis duobus 
tertiis patribus communis, nisi fraus detecta esset medio alicuius, quia tunc 
tertia parse poenae debetur delatori etiam secreto. 
Merces, seu stipendium faciendi calculum sit de libri decem, usque in libras 
centum quinquaginta pro quolibet, taxanda per conservatores maris et dimidia 
sit ipsorum calculatorum et alia dimidia solvatur conservatoribus maris 




et pro eo, quod dictis usibus supererit, dando patribus communis in impensas 
portus et moduli erogando. 
Si qui calculatores dandi, vel eligendi essent in aliqua causa, et in eorum 
election, seu nomination partes essent discordes, eligantur per magistratus, seu 
iudices causae, exclusis magistratibus forensibus, qui calculatore non eligant ; 
sed de huiusmodi magistratuum forensium mandato per notarium causae fia 
notitia in scriptis Senatui, de qualitate causae, et nominibus partium. Et electio 
fiat per Senatum citata parte et remotis removendis ; et calculatores teneantur 




Liber Quartus. 154. 
De iactu et forma in eo tenenda. Cap. XVI. 
Patronus, sive praefectus cuiusvis navigii, eligens ob adversam 
tempestatem, seu aliam iustam causam, facere iactum pro salvatione navigii, et 
eius inventarii, et hominum, et mercium, teneatur 
[155] 
ante iactum alicuius rei facere consultam cum omnibus officialibus navigii, et 
mercatoribus in eo existentibus, et si duae tertiae partes praedictorum 
concurrerint in faciendo iactu pro dicta salvation, eligantur eo casu tres 
consules, quorum duo sint ex dictis officialibus, et unus ex dictis mercatoribus, 
et non existentibus mercatoribus, duo sint ex officialibus prorae, et unus ex 
officialibus puppis, qui tre consules auctoritatem habeant proiiciendi in mare 
quid eis necessarium videbitur pro residui salvatione. 
Quicquid per consultam de qua supra deliberatum fuerit, et quicquid de 
ordine dictorum consulum iactum fuerit, scribi, et annotari debeat per scribam 
navigii, in suo libro in praesentia dictorum consulum cum eorum 
subscriptionibus, si scribere scirent. 
Omnia iacta (servatis solennitatibus praedictis) seu eorundem iactorum valor 
cedat damno, dividiq; debeat secudum aes, et libram inter navigium, naula, 
merces et ormnes alias res existentes in dicto navigio tempore iactus, 
compraehensis pecuniis, auro, argento, iocalibus, servis maribus et foeminis, 
equis, et aliis animalibus existentibus in navigio de transitu. 
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Secuto iactu, non liceat patrono, seu prefecto navigii, nequem alicui pro eo 
onerare in dicto viagio aliquid in quovis loco (seu scala) nisi tantummodo 
victualia pro usu et necessitate navigii, merces subtiles et capsias 
passageriourum, nisi quando iactus factus fuisset antequam navigium 
recessisset ab oneratorio, seu a portu, in quo onerasset, quo casu liceat 
navigium in totum onerare, seu nisi navigium sive eundo, siuc redeundo deberet 
exonerare aliquas merces in aliquo loco ; quia tunc liceat in loco exonerationis 
onerare tantum, quantum fuerit exoneratum, non tamen possit onerare loco 
iactus facti, et si patronus oneraret, vel onerari faceret aliquid loco iactus facti, 
et si patronus oneraret, vel onerari faceret aliquid loco iactus, teneatur ad 
satisfaciendum omne damnum in casu novi iactus, et naula oneratorum ut 
supra spectent pro tertia parte assecuratoribus, et pro residuo conservatoribus 
maris. 
Nullus patronus, sive praefectus secuto iactu possit in itinere exonerare 
aliquid nisi in locis, ad quae merces seu alia onerata fuissent destinata, cum 
appodisiis carricati, et in dictis locis non possint exonerare nisi de die, et nisi 
portatis mercibus, et aliis exoneratis in 
[156] 
duganam, seu loca publica deputata secundum qualitates rerum; a quibus 
duganis seu daceriis portare debeant fidem authenticam de rebus exoneratic 
cum declaratione cui spectent: et patronus, seu praefectus, qui haec non 
observaverit, non possit fieri facere aliquem calculum pro damno, imo damnum 
iactus spectet ipsi patrono, seu praefecto. 
Possit etiam idem patronus, seu praefectus exonerare in quocunque loco ad 
requisitionem supracarici, seu mercaoris, aut alterius, cui res spectarent, 
dummodo exoneret de die cum interventu consulum electorum tempore iactus, 
et cum interventu consulis nationis Genuensis existentis in dicto loco, et eo non 
existente, cum interventu magistratus dicti loci; a quo consule, seu magistratu 
portare debeat fidem ut supra, sub poena predicta, sine praeiudicio iurium 
mercatorum contra navim. 
Si patronus, seu praefectus in aliquo ex dictis duobus casibus exonerasset 
aliquid plusquam contineretur in fide, cadat in eandem poenam. 
Pro rebus vero sicut supra aliquo modo permisso exonerati, teneatur 
patronus, seu praefectus ante exonerationem, et consignationem se cautelare 
de rata iactus, et damnorum obveniente dictis rebus exonerandis: et non possit 
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contra alios dominos rerum, nec contra alia bona, seu res, quae in navigion 
remansissent aliquid pretendere ratione dicti iactus, et damnorum; imo si quid 
esset contribuendum pro dictis rebus ut supra exonerati, tenatur ipse patronus, 
seu prefectus, et navigium, cum eius inventario erga alios, et quaemlibet eorum 
pro his, quibus facta fuisset consignatio ad refectionem, et contributionem iuxta 
calculum fiendum cum damnis et interesse. 
Facto iactu patronus, seu praefectus cum appulerit in aliquem portum, seu 
alium locum commodum, tenatur diligenter inquirere quid iactum fuerit, seu 
proiectum in mare in praesentia dictorum consulum, et scribae navigii, a quo de 
praedictis fieri debeat diligens scriptura. Et praedicta iustificari,et probari 
debeant per testimonium officialium, et mercatorum seu existentium de transitu 
in navigio, non existentibus mercatoribus, et ipsis etiam non esistentibus per 
testimonius officialium; aliter iactus factu eo usque 
[157] 
cedat damno patroni, seu praefecti, et dictae iustificationes fieri debeant coram 
consule nationis Genuensis, et eo non existente, coram magistratu loci, et 
patronus, seu praefectus teneatur portare secum copiam praedictorum 
authenticam, et sigillatam. 
Navigia, quae iactum fecerint, appulsa ad locum destinatum exonerentur 
primo, et ante alia, etiam si alia prius appulissent, sine preiudicio solitorum 
allegiorum, si eo in loco aderit ordo exonerandi. 
Patronus, seu praefectus, qui iactum fecerit, reversus cum navigio ad locum 
destinatum, antequam manum apponat exonerationi alicuius rei, tenatur 
notificare cum iuramento magistratui deputato ad praedicta in dicto loco, si 
aderit, aliteri iudici ordinario loci, mensem, diem, et horam iactus facti, et 
quantitates rerum, seu res iactas circum circa iudicio suo; et teneatur 
incontinenti mittere scribam, qui producat librum, in quo sit notata deliberatio 
iactus faciendi, et nota rerum iactarum; qui scriba dare debeat copiam 
praedictorum notario dicti magistratu, qui eam conservare debeat ad hoc, ut 
serviat in faciento calculo, et in aliis, quae occurrerint. 
Officiales, et nautae exonerantes sua, vel aliena bona, etiam pro eorum 
portatis, veld antes auxilium contra formam presentis capituli, amittant 
exonerata, et privati remaneant officiis. 
Si bona fuerint reperta exonerata contra formam praesentis statuti sint 
effecta patrum communis, et conservatorum maris civitatis Genuae aequaliter, 
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nisi si intervenisset accusator, seu qui contrafactionem denuntiasset, et in claris 
posuisset, quia tali casu tertia pars sit ipsius, et teneatur secretus. 
Ultra poenas praedictas qui contrafecerint, subiaceant aliis poenis que 
viderentus Senatui. 
Quod supradictum fuit de patronis navis, sit et intelligatur dictum de 
capitaneo, seu quocunque alio nomine vocetur prefectus magister, seu 
praepositus navigii. 
[158] 
Liber Quartus. 158. 
De securitatibus. Cap. XVII. 
Non possint fieri assecurationes in appodisiis, quae non habeant clarum et 
expressum nomen illius, qui se assecurari faciet, et hoc antequam aliquis 
assecurator in ea se subscribat, nec possit dimitti spatium album pro ponendo 
nomine, alias appodisia non valeat, et assecuratio non teneat. 
Securitates non possint fieri pro se, neq; pro aliis, nisi extet risicum, vel in 
mercibus, vel in navigiis, vel rebus, quibus vis essecuratis mediatem, vel 
immediatem, principaliter vel indirectem, et nisi pro quantitate, seu valore risici, 
sive valoris et aestimationis tantum, excluso consteo securitatum, quod non 
intelligatur in ipsa securitate compraehensum, nisi expressum fuisset. 
Si inter partes non fuerit appositum pretium mercibus, vel aliis assecuratis, 
intelligatur pretium, si casus advenerit ante medietatem itineris confecti, 
consteum ipsarum cum expensis usquem ad earum onerationem: si vero ultra 
medietatem itineris confecti, casus occurrerit, intelligatur pretium illud, quo 
velerent in loco, ad quem fuissent destinatae. 
Si factae fuerint securitates importantes plusquam sit risicum, vel quia factae 
fuissent in diversis proinciis, seu locis, vel quavis alia de causa, priores in 
tempore intelligantus cucurrisse, et currere risicum; pro reliquis vero consteum 
restituatur, et inter pare tempore quilibet teneatur pro rata summae 
assecuratae. 
Casus sinister non intelligatur nisi navigium assecuratum, sive super quo 
merces, aut alia fuerint assecurata, redactum fuerit casu fortuito in eum statum, 
qui providentia humana reparari non possit, intra tempus declarandum per 
consulem nationis, si aderit in eo loco, ubi erit navigium et consule non 
existente, per magistratum loci, dummodo dictum tempus non excedat mesem 
unum, aliqua ratione, seu accidenti, vel nisi navigium iussu superioris loci, ubi 
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fuerit, esset interceptum, aut saxitum, vel ut dicitur de eo factum imbarcum ita et 
taliter, quo sit coactum capere aliud viagium et merces assecuratas exonerare. 
Assecuratus in quocunquem casu sinistro, possit securitates in totum exigere 
[159] 
si voluerit, et res assecuratas, seu ut vulgo dicitur, implicitam relinquere 
assecuratoribus, quibus tali spectent, vel possit, si voluerit, calculum fieri facere 
super damno iuxta formam capitulorum; et ubi damnum foret exclaratum 
ascendere ad quinquaginta pro centenario, liceat assecuratoribus integram 
summam assecuratam solvere et habere pro se res assecuratas, vel damnum 
declaratum solvere, et rem assecuratam assecurato dimittere in electione 
ipsorum assecuratorum, quam electionem habeat etiam in quocunque casu, in 
quo fieret calculus pro emendatione damni, quod praetenderetur ratione legitimi 
casus secuti, re assecurata existente in esse in totum, vel in parte. 
Assecuratore, si cum assecurato super infrascriptis nullum licitum pactum 
fecissent, tenantur de iactu secundum formam statutorum facto, et probato, et 
etiam teneantur de avaria, quae est omne damnum quod casu fortuito sequitur, 
seu contingit in navigio cum inventario, et seu rebus assecuratis ultra expensas, 
quae contingere possunt, etiam si non sequatur, taliter quod possit dici casum 
sinistrum per toto secutum esse, et haec pro rata sive iactus, sive avariae 
spectantis rei assecuratae. 
Securitates factae post casum sinistrum secutum tali tempore, quod de eo 
habita prius fuerit notitia saltem per formam legitime probatam vel tali tempore, 
quod notitia verosimiliter haberi potuerit, non valeant, nec teneant, et consteum 
restitui debeat, et intelligatur habitam verosimiliter fuisse notitiam, quando fuerit 
transactum spatium tanti temporis, quo a loco ubi secutus fuerit casus sinister, 
calculatis milliaribus duobus pro qualibet hora ad locum, in quo facta esset 
securitas, haberi potuisset: et si casus secutus esset in mare longinquo, adeo 
quod notitia deferenda esset per mare: antequam pervenire posset in terram 
firmam, calculetur tempus ad rationem predictam a loco, in quo primo venerit 
dicta notitia, seu novum. 
Assecuratores non teneantur de barataria patroni navigii, nisi aliter factum 
fuisset. 
Sine licentia Senatus, non possint fieri securitates, vadimonia, seu partita 
super vita pontificis, neque super vita Imperatoris, neque super vita regum, nec 




Episcoporum, nequem aliorum Dominorum, aut personarum ecclesiasticarum, 
seu secularium in dignitate constitutarum. 
Non possint etiam fieri super acquisitione, amissione, seu mutatione 
Dominorum, statuum, regnorum, Pronvinciarum, Ducturum, civitatum, terrarum, 
seu locorum. 
Non possint similiter fieri super felici, seu infelici successu exercituum, 
classium, seu expeditionum neque eorum adventu, neque recessu; neque 
super expugnatione, aut defensione aliqua. 
Non possint pariter fieri super matrimoniis contrahendis, vel nou contrahendis 
super uxoribus ducendis, aut non neque super partu mulierum neque navium 
aut aliorum appulsu aut recessu. 
Non possint fieri super futura, vel non futura peste, aut bello, neque super 
electione Ducis, aut magistratuum Republicae: et demum super aliis quibusvis 
habentibus speciem seu formam vadimonii, securitatis, seu partiti ; sed omnia 
intelligantur, et sint prohibita. 
Contrafacientes alicui de praedictis cadant in poenam tantundem summae, 
pro quanta fuerit facta assecuratio, vadimonium, seu partitum pro qualibet vice, 
et censarii, qui in praedictis se immiscuerint tanquam contrafacientes cadant in 
eandem poenam. 
De praedictis sic ut supra prohibitis, non possit ab aliquo reddi ius ; neque 
aliquis audiri sine licentia. Et si casu aliquo quicquam fuerit solutum, sit sempre 
ius salvum repetendi ; et nullus possit de eis instrumenta, seu scripturas 
conficere sub poena scutorum viginti quinque pro quolibet, et qualibet vice. 
Non possint fieri loti sine licentia Senatus sub poena scutorum centum, et 
ammissione raubarum, seu rerum positarum ad lotum: et in eandem poenam 






Appendix II Law against barratry and false reports, 1690 
Source: ASG, CdM 444, Leggi, decreti e pubblicazione, 16/09/1690. 
 
Serenissimi Signori, 
La frequenza de delitti che si commettono da capitani e patroni de legni, in 
pregiuditio del trafico, con l’uso de consolati falsi, da giusto mottivo al 
prestantissimo magistrato dei Conservatori del Mare di procurare il riparo, 
mentre per le falsità che in essi si commettono rimangono il più delle volte i 
delinquenti impuniti per faltà di parte che ne faccia instanza, come ultimamente 
è seguito nel consolato fatto dal patrone Filippo del Canto, il quale dopo haver 
preso il carrico de grani con sua tartana a Capo di Goro si partì a Corfù, et ivi 
vendutili se ne venne alla volta di Napoli e, gionto nel golfo di Messina, sfondò 
la tartana, e col caico andò in detta città di Messina dove fece testimoniale 
asserendo esser stata presa da turchi col carico sudetto sopra capo di Milo. E 
perché un tal Gio. Paolo Tarascone d’Alassio, che fu presente a detto fatto, per 
disgravio della propria conscienza, manifestò con giuramento avanti al 
magnifico Benedetto Valdetaro, console in Napoli, la vita di detto delitto, fu da lì 
a pochi giorni dal medesimo patrone ucciso. E quantonque detto homicidio 
habbia detto prestantissimo magistrato procedato in contumacia contro detto 
patrone, restono con tuttocio si esso patrone come li corsi per detta baratteria e 
falsità del consolato impuniti, mentre contro di essi non si può procedere se non 
ad instanza della parte. 
Pertanto, il prescritto prestantissimo magistrato sottopone alla benigna 
censura delle vostre signorie serenissime, ogni volta che stimassero accertato, 
provedere a simili inconvenienti per mezo de Consigli della Serenissima 
Repubblica, se fosse bene di stabilire per nuova legge: 
Che in l’avenire chi in sudetto genere commetterà tanto in Dominio come 
fuori di esso et in qualsivoglia parte del mondo, delitto di baratteria, o farà 
Consolato falso, resti soggetto, oltre alle pene statutarie, alla pena corporale 
che da il statuto, de Furibus, etiamdio dell’ultimo supplicio inclusive, e ciò 
secondo la qualità e gravezza per delitto ad arbitrio di detto prestantissimo 
magistrato quali si come secondo le regole in questi casi opera sempre con uno 
dei magnifici Auditori della Rota Criminale, tanto maggiormente si assicurerà di 
accertare, e che a tutto ciò possa procedere contro li rei tanto instante la parte 
quanto ex officio, acciò che il Fisco non resti pregiudicato. 
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Et perché la speranza del premio conduce molte volte li medemi delinquenti 
a scoprire li delitti commessi, perciò si stima anche sarebbe benefizio pubblico 
che restasse proposta, e deliberato, premio et impunità a chi si sia, marinaro, 
passaggiero, sopracarrico, o mercante, purché non fusse l’autore principale, il 
quale rivelasse o mettesse in chiaro a giudicio di detto prestantissimo 
magistrato, li delitti commessi da capitani, patroni o marinari, o altri che sotto 
ogn’altro nome esercitasse la marinaria o navigatione de vascelli, tanto di falsità 
per consolati quanto de furti e baratterie, o altri delitti concernenti il trafico 
marittimo, e si costituissero nelle forze della Giustitia. 
Il premio da darsi a chi revelasse, e comparisse come sopra, potrebbe 
essere di scudi cinquanta sino in cinquecento, a giudicio di detto prestantissimo 
magistrato, regolato sopra il maggiore o minore pregiudicio di mercanti, da 
cacciarsi da beni di delinquenti oltre le pene corporali e pecuniarie alle quale 
per dispositione delle leggi della serenissima repubblica fussero soggetti. 
Et se rispetto all’accennato di sopra delitto di baratteria e consolato falso 
stimassero accertato di conferire facoltà di poter procedere et ca. senza 
instanza della parte, si sottomettono alla loro somma precedenza et questo 
exponi decretum serenissimi presentissimi SS. Conservatores Maris ad 
Calculos hac die 16 septembris 1690. 
 
[handwritten signature of the Conservatori’s notary] 
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Appendix III Conservatori del Mare’s memorandum on false reports, 1705 




Li disordini preceduti alla legge fatta nel 1698, e che frequenti andavano 
seguendo, in danno del marittimo traffico del pubblico e privato bene, per i 
sinistri accadevano ne vascelli, et altri bastimenti, loro respettivo scarico con 
dolo, lasta o lastissima colpa de loro capitani, patroni, ufficiali, marinari ed altri 
trafficanti ne medesimi con l’unico fine di causare grosse avarie, procurare 
baratarie, far danni e pregiudicii di non poco rilievo a terzi, fondati e stabiliti 
sopra testimoniali et altre studiate scritture ritrovate insusistenti, per forza de 
quali riccapiti conveniva si facessero li calcoli de pretesi accaduti danni, ne 
sinistri supposti, con quali venivano a paliarsi quasi legalmente le frodi 
commesse dalli di sopra nominati. O almeno la cooperazione loro a medesimi, 
con malitia e colpa pregiudicievoli all’interessati; perloche furono i Serenissimi 
Collegi obbligati nell’anno già detto 1698 ponere alla truttina delle considerationi 
loro precedentemente la sorte di quanto sopra per rinvenire le maniere più 
proprie, giuste da pratticarsi, et efficaci per andar al riparo di tutti sudetti 
inconvenienti. Et avendo conosciuto che l’impedimento principale, il quale 
ostava prima di sudetta legge, si riduceva al non potersi procedere ne casi 
premessi se non ad instanza dell’offeso con la precedente querela, promessa e 
sigortà, secondo la dispositione del Statuto Criminale di Genova sotto la rubrica 
quod accusans, vel denunciarii caveat; ciò che il più delle volte li dannificati 
schivano di fare, per tenere li rei loro debitori nella fede di qualche aggiusto, con 
la mira di ricavare d’accordo qualche portione del credito, e non perdere il 
proprio del tutto premendo più questo a dannificati; che qualonque castigo 
subire possano li rei di tali eccessi; onde tali riflessi et altri più degni e 
prudentissimi che sovennero alla prudenza somma, et intelligenza de soggetti 
de Serenissimi Collegi, diedero a medemmi moltivo promulgare in 1698 la qui 
innestata legge, la quale (come spirata) di nuovo 
[1v] 
si soggetta alla Censura et applicazione loro, con qualche aggionte considerate 
per essentialissime alla condotta di un ben regolato traffico; perché conosciuto 
dal finissimo intendimento di vostre signorie serenissime necessaria la proroga 
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di essa legge, con le addizioni delle quali nella medemma dell’infrascritto 
respettivamente tenore possana farla o ristorarla, e prorogarla per quel tempo 
comanderanno, ò provvedere in quei modi e forme saranno conosciute più 
proprie dalla suprema loro intelligenza. 
Che per l’avvenire in detti delitti si commettessero per i casi sinistri 
apprezzati, baratarie, testimoniali o consolati non susistenti, et altre 
qualsivogliano frodi seguissero e si commettessero da cuiusvoglia da oggi 
nell’avvenire con dolo, lasta e lastissima colpa, nello e per lo comercio 
marittimo, negotii della navigatione sopra qualsiasi vase navigabile dipendente 
da viaggi di marine, da fatti e negotii della navigatione, così da capitani, patroni, 
ufficiali che da marinari, soldati et altri chi che sia dell’equipaggio loro, et 
ogn’uno imbarcato sopra detto qualonque vase navigabile in pregiudicio tanto di 
ciasched’uno de medemmi respettivamente vasi navigabili, di essi respettivo 
carico mercisti, cambisti et interessati qualsiasi tanto nel corpo e noli, quanto 
nel carico e merci, quanto parimente di qualonque contratto quasi contratto di 
strazzo et interesse di qualsiasi sorte, o dipendenza dalle navigationi da farsi da 
medesimi respettivi vasi navigabili si possa principiare, procedere, terminare, si 
principii, proceda e termini criminalmente, anche senza querela, instanza, 
denoncia o accusa dell’offeso, dannificato et in altro modo pregiudicato a 
cagione de sudetti respettivi delitti, et ogn’uno de medemmi, ma ex officio 
semplicemente del Sindico et agente per il fisco del magistrato prestantissimo 
de Conservatori del Mare per condannare lo reo, li rei, complici, fautori, 
ausiliatori, o in altro qualonque modo interessati ne delitti sudetti, annessi loro, 
connessi, dipendente, incidenti et emergenti in qualsivoglia 
[2r] 
pena corporale compresa la capitale di forca, o testa, come se fossero delitti di 
vero furto servate però nel procedere solamente le regole di esso magistrato 
prestantissimo. Che venire più facilmente in cognizione de suddetti respettivi 
delitti possa lo stesso magistrato de Conservatori del mare concedere e far 
publicare impunità in forma solita per cuiusvoglia sarà il primo a volerne godere 
con palesarli entro del termine averà stimato proprio di prescrivere aciò nella 
concessione e publicatione sudetta, et indi ponersi in chiaro a giudicio de 
serenissimi Collegi mentre detta impunità non sii lui lo reo principale, ne di già 
indiciato, processato ne carcerato per il delitto stesso, per il quale vorrà godere 
del beneficio dell’impunità, con oblatione a simil impunità d’un premio, quale 
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però eccedere non possa in ciasched’uno caso scudi ducento argento della 
stampa e corona di Genova, pagabili de denari della Camera di detto 
magistrato dopo la servita condanna del reo, et rei, et altri come sopra, che 
doverà prima restarne da beni del condannato e condannati reintegrata non 
altrimente. Che li giusdicenti dell’una et altra Riviera, i quali non hanno veruna 
giurisditione di procedere criminalmente ne di castigare per sudetti et altri delitti 
seguissero in mare, restando ella per dispositione delle leggi, statuto criminale 
e constituenti di detto magistrato unicamente all’istesso, appoggiata privative 
quo ad alios in qualonque caso pervenisse a notizia loro extragiudicialmente o 
ricevendolo di essi cancelliere o sdottoro attuaro denoncia, querela, o accusa o 
in altro modo ad haver per detti respettivi delitti et ognuno de medemmi 
commesso o commessi per caosa di navigare, merci, denari, vasi navigabili, 
accessori loro fatti, e negotii della navigatione, e dipendenze di quella, et essi 
siino tenuti darne aviso di subito al magistrato sudetto con lettera e 
trasmissione in essa in autentica forma dell’atti perciò ricevuti di che se ne 
debba fare aggionta nella di quelli instruttione 
[2v] 
per domandargliene conto nel sindicato. 
Che se ne corso de processi quali accederà formarsi da detto magistrato 
accorgesse che alcuno reo, rei, complice o complici del delitto, o delitti et altri 
eccessi come sopra intieramente reintegrasse i dannificati, o interessati in 
qualonque modo per il caso sinistro o alcuna delle sopradette frodi, doli, laste o 
lastissime colpe commesse in tutto come avanti si è detto, debba in ogn’uno di 
questi casi et in tali termini solamente detto magistrato prestantissimo darne 
notitia a serenissimi collegi, quali prima di fatta la sentenza o contumaciale o 
diffinitiva, habbino facoltà di ordinare che non più oltre si proceda quando così 
conoscano convenirsi al dovere sotto li modi e forme loro parerà. 
Che i calcoli delle avarie ne sudetti e simili casi, come pure tutti li calcoli da 
farsi in qualsiasi altro caso, fare si debbano, e regolarsi, con direttione, decreti 
et altre provvigioni di detto magistrato prestantissimo, o suo diputato, sino alla 
di essi approvatione inclusivamente, altrimenti siino nulli non habbino alcuna 
fede ne esecutione. 
Che niuno possa essere riconosciuto per capitano di nave, pinco, polacca, 
altro bastimento de gabbia che non sii approvato prima per tale, conosciuta la 
sufficienza e fedeltà dal detto magistrato, e che nell’istesso tempo non facci 
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promessa e dii caotione idonea della bona amministratione, vendimento di 
conto, pagamento e sodisfattione del reliquatto a giudicio di quello, o suo 
diputando per la somma ben vista, qual caotione debbano prestare similmente li 
patroni tutti di qualonque altri vase navigabile del Dominio del serenissimo in 
arbitrio di detto magistrato, et a fine che quanto sopra possi avvere la dovuta 
esecutione, incarricare al magistrato prestantissimo della sanità lo ingiongere a 
suoi ministri tanto in Genova che nell’una et altra Riviera del Dominio 
Serenissimo perché nell’avvenire non diino la Patente di sanità ad alcuno de 
sudetti capitani e patroni de sudetti respettivi vascelli,  
[3r] 
navi, bastimenti, et altri vasi navigabili si di terraferma che di tutto lo Regno di 
Corsica, che da medemmi respettivamente et ogn’uno di loro non le sii prima e 
per una volta solo dalla pubblicatione della presente, presentata fede 
sottoscritta dal Prestantissimo diputato del mese pro tempore di detto 
magistrato prestantissimo de Conservatori del Mare, e dal di esso cancelliere, 
quale giustifichi avvere loro osservato quanto sopra in esecutione della 
presente legge et alla forma della medemma. 
Che li capitani tutti, e respettivamente singoli li patroni di qualsiasi vase 
navigabile di questo serenissimo genovese dominio, compresi quei tutti del 
regno di Corsica, minori per anco d’anni venticinque con padre, o senza padre 
vivente, et anche maggiori di detti anni venticinque ma per anco figli di famiglia, 
li quali concepiranno obligationi di cambii maritimi o altra qualsivoglia per caosa 
di qualonque vase navigabile da medemmi repsettivamente comandato, suoi 
accessorii, carrico, et altro per la navigatione, quantonque la stiplulatione segua 
illegittimamente e contro la dispositione delle leggi e statuti, particolarmente del 
civile di Genova sotto la rubrica de contract. Min. et mul. in maniera che restino 
tenuti legalmente non solo ne beni et agenda ma etiamdio nella persona 
vallidamente verso li di essi respettivamente creditori veri, et altri nel di essi 
debito interessati, onde possano per tali loro contratti debiti et anche minori di 
età essere pignorati, dettenuti, carcerati, sequestrati, e costretti per giustizia in 
tutte le maniere al pagamento de da essi dovuto, come se fossero maggiori di 





navighino ben corredati e provisti tanto di equipaggio che di ogni altra cosa, 
come richiederà la qualità di essi, a giudicio di detto magistrato o del deputato 
di mese pro tempore, con continuare a tal’effetto la visita si prattica di fare in 
essi vascelli da gabbia prima della loro partenza. 
Che si continui lo già cominciato libro, nel quale tutti quelli, li quali 
nell’avvenire, prima però della partenza di qualonque vase navigabile, faranno 
notare di avvere dato danari, robbe, merci, mercanzia, et altro a cambio 
marittimo di qualsivoglia sorte, o in participatione di qualonque vascello, 
bastimento o vase navigabile, colonna, implicita, accomenda, o in altro 
qualonque modo, a capitani, e respettivamente patroni, che comanderanno li 
medesimi come sopra, o a chi avvesse persona legittima per essi, constandone 
però per scritture pubbliche (esclusi però sempre li privileggiati dalle leggi) 
habbino sopra de medemmi repsettivamente et accessori loro, e merci 
essistenti carricate con obligo per detti creditori dal giorno che in esso sudetto 
libro sarà stata fatta detta nota, ipoteca per detto loro interesse anteriore a tutti 
gli altri interessati su li vascelli medemmi, accessori loro, il credito de quali non 
sarà notato in detto libro, o sarà notato posteriormente dichiarando a caotela 
che se si troveranno più crediti notati nel detto libro sotto lo stesso giorno in 
tertiis habbino fra di loro uguale anteriorità, e così fra di loro haveranno pari 
anteriorità quelli che saranno notati sotto lo stesso giorno in vesperis, saranno 
però posteriori a quei notati sotto lo medesimo giorno in tertiis. 
Che nelle note quali si faranno in esso libro, come sopra, debba epprimersi la 
somma del credito et enonciarsi l’anno, giorno del rogito dell’instrumento, e nelli 
atti di qual notaro sii stato fatto, et i nomi de contraenti, per il quale instrumento 
consti del detto credito, e se non si  
[4r] 
troveranno poi vere dette espressioni et enonciazioni resterà detta nota invalida 
e come se fatta non fosse. 
Che sia obligo ad ogn’uno di detti capitani e patroni respettivamente quali 
averano preso danari, robbe, merci et altro a cambio marittimo di qualonque 
sorte, o in participatione di qualsivoglia vascello, bastimento, o vase navigabile, 
colonna, implicita, accomenda, o in qualonque altra maniera, et in tutto come 
sopra in debito, de quali saranno state in detto libro fatte le note di essi cambii 
marittimi, participationi, et altro come sopra, terminato da loro ogni viaggio, o 
passato il tempo del risico eppresso ne medesimi contratti, all’arrivo qui in 
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Genova o nel dominio, dal viaggio, o almeno prima d’intraprenderne altro, di 
portare al cancelliere di detto magistrato le quittanze autentiche di essi, o 
l’instrumenti di detti cambii, per potergliene dare il credito al loro conto in detto 
libro. 
Che tutti quelli i quali hanno o averanno dato in danaro nelle caose sudette 
dopo spirata la legge per ciò fatta nell’anno 1698 et in approssimo al giorno, 
che dall’uno et l’altro conseglio verrà la presente approvata e susseguita 
pubblicatione, non possano ne debbano respettivamente ricevere pregiudicio 
alcuno nelli di loro repsettivi crediti, ma restino le loro raggioni, et attioni illese, 
conforme ad essi competevano prima della comprovatione di questa legge, 
purché constino per instrumento publico e che rispetto a quelli che ne averanno 
polizza, o polizze private, non debba parimente ricevere pregiudicio alcuno ne 
detti loro crediti, con che però debbano far registrare in esso libro dette polizze 
dentro lo termine di mesi tre rispetto a quei che sono nel dominio, e di un’anno 
rispetto a quelli che sono fuori di detto dominio, quale termine di mesi tre e di 
un’anno habbi da cominciare dal giorno della publicatione della legge 
[4v] 
si farà sopra sudetti capitoli; e perché ben spesso succede che li capitani e 
patroni de vascelli et altri bastimenti prendono fuori di questo dominio denari 
per ultimo espedimento di essi, deliberare che in simili casi, e termini, siino 
tenuti essi capitani di vascelli e patroni di qualsivogliano altri bastimenti, far 
notare dentro lo termine di giorni quindici dal giorno dell’arrivo in questo porto, 
et altra qualonque parte di questo dominio, e che avveranno avuto prattica, nel 
detto libro, le somme de denari presi come sopra, il nome di quello, e quelli, da 
cui, e da quali, l’avvevanno pigliete, come pure il luogo, et altre avanti dette 
circonstanze, ciò che non facendo loro dentro del sudetto termine, senza 
pregiudicio minimo delle raggioni, attioni et ipoteche competenti al creditore, o 
creditori dal primo fatto contratto, instrumento, polizza o altro ricapito contro de 
vascelli, bastimenti, accessorii tutti, partecipi, noli et altro, quali siano tali e quali 
restino detti inosservanti respettivamente tenuti et obligati nomine proprio non 
solo per il capitali, cambii, et accessorii, ma etiamdio verso cuisvoglia 
all’emenda di ogni danno, spesa et interesse, venisse per tale inosservanza in 
qualonque modo caosata per dette somme prese, ma non denonciate. 
Con dichiaratione che chi fuori del dominio di Genova non solo darà a 
cambio marittimo in genere, ma etiamdio per ultimo espedimento di qualsivoglia 
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vase navigabile a capitani e patroni sudetti respettivamente dentro del termine 
da dichiararsi da detto magistrato a proportione della distanza di questa città al 
luogo dove saranno stati detti danari dati come sopra, possa per mezzo di 
qualsivoglia persona anche illegittima far notare in detto libro a credito di chi 
avesse 
[5r] 
dato a cambio marittimo o per ultimo espedimento come sopra la somma con le 
altre tutte già sopradette circonstanze, non resti però in questi anche termini 
liberato il capitano o patrone che l’avverà pigliati dall’onere di far scrivere nel 
detto libro in tutto come sopra et ad effetto che quanto sopra possa restare 
adempito pienamente, ordinare la publicatione di questa legge, non solo nella 
presente città ma etiamdio in tutte le giurisdizioni dell’una et altra riviera e regno 
di Corsica, e che altresì ne sii data notizia giontamente con la copia della 
presente a tutti li consoli che per la natione genovese ritrovansi fuori stato, 
perché possano valersene respettivamente secondo sarà loro prescritto da 
detto magistrato. 
Che nel detto libro da continuarsi per sudetto effetto non sii lecito ad alcuno il 
scrivervi solo, che al cancelliere o in sua absentia da uno de sotto cancellieri di 
detto magistrato e tutte le note che saranno scritte in quello si dall’uno che 
dall’altro de sudetti debbano esser firmate dall’istesso cancelliere, altrimenti non 
habbino vigore alcuno e restino come se fatte non fussero, qual cancelliere non 
possa partirsi dalla cancelleria così la mattina, che la sera, senza che prima 
revisto non habbia detto libro, fatte tutte le note, che come sopra gli saranno 
state presentate, e sottoscritte le notate da uno de sottocancellieri. E ciò sotto 
pena del sindicato, privatione della cura di cancelliere, riffaccimento de danni, il 
tutto a giudicio di detto magistrato. 
E perché detto libro si fa solo perché siino noti li delitti che sono o saranno 
caosati sopra de vascelli et altri bastimenti, come sopra doverà perciò restar ad 
ogniuno palese con che però lo cancelliere, il quale ne avverà cura, non lo lasci 
alle mani di chi che sia, ma si veda da lui o da uno de sottocancellieri ad 
instanza de terzi, a quali potesse in qualonque 
[5v] 
modo spettare, et alla loro presenza le note quali desiderassero vedere. 
Che sia cura di sudetto magistrato il far dar essecutione intiera circa quanto 
sopra, con rinovare lo stabillimento già fatto della mercede da scuodersi da 
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ministri per fare quanto sopra, purchè non ecceda un ottavo di scuto di argento, 
o sua valuta, per ognuna delle sudette note da ripartirsi fra di loro secondo al 
stile di detta cancellaria, e se insorgeranno qualche difficoltà, differenze o 
dubietà fra ministri, e fra gl’interessati circa le sudette note state fatte, o 
tralasciate di fare nel detto libro, et in altro qualonque modo nascessero 
debbano le medemme restar giudicate, e terminate da detto magistrato salva in 
reliquii l’autorità che compete all’istesso per la sua institutione, o regole. Et ita in 
omnibus ut antea instari decretum illustrissimus magistratus dd. Conservatorum 
Maris Janua in quarto et legittimo numero congregatus ad calculos omnibus 
favorabiliter concurrentibus, absente illustrissimo d. Clemente De Maris relinquo 
ex dictos collega, die prima mensis augusti 1705. 
 




Appendix IV Election of the calcolatori, 1594 
Source: ASG, NG 631, Atti dei calcolatori, 11/07/1594. 
 
+ MDLXXXXIIII die XI julii 
 
Magnificus Joannes Baptista Zerbinus electus ad officium calculatorum per 
tempus solitum per sermentum senatum ad calculos.  
 





Appendix V Election of the calcolatori, 1667 
Source: ASG, NA 8478, UGG 10, 11/05/1667. 
 
Electio calculatoribus 
1667 die 11 may 
In Nomine Domini Amen. Excellentissimus Domini Antonius Grimaldus ex 
una, et Patronus Benedictus de Moro ex altera parte spontes et omnimodo. 
De communi concordia, et consensu elligunt in calculatorem ad faciendum 
calculum danni iactus, et aliorum de quibus in Consulatu dicti patroni Benedicti 
postentati in Cancelaria Illustrimus DD. Conservatorum Maris Ganuae D. 
Nicolaus Bivium absentes. 
 
Cum Bailia opportuna, et solita condi in similibus 
Promittentes 
Homologantes, et acceptantes sub hipp.ca et obbligabimus  
Denunciantes  
De quibus omnibus 
 
Per me Jo. Jacobum infrascriptum notarium actum Genus in saloto ad 
planum ause domus habitationis dicti exce.mi Antonii Grimaldi site in viculo 
Sancti Mathei an.o ex nativitatem Dominus millesex.no Sex.mo Sessag.mo 
septimo Ind.e quarta secundum Genus Corsu die mercury, undecima may in 3y 
Presentis Simone Grixella, Jo. Maris et Matheo Sebiaphino et Thomas testibus 
ad pred.a vocatis et rogati. 
 




Appendix VI Report of the patrone Giacomo S. Michele, 1638 
Source: ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei calcolatori, 09/10/1638. Voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id50512. 
 
[…] congregate, sedentes, nihil omnimodo audito dicto p. Jacobo Sanmichele 
petente apperiri, et pubblicari consolatum in actis per eum presentatum 
clausum et sigillatu, illumque approbari videndum maxime quia fuit ad eius 
Intentiam citatus dicto Jo. Stephanus marenghus ut interessatus qui nihil 
opposuit et quicquid ad Calculos mandaverit apperiri dictum consolatum ut 
supra presentatum per dictum Jo. Jacobum quo aperto cum approbaverit et 
approbant salvis juribus et exceptionibus novoru cumque Instec. Habentium in 
eo, et instec. Testes Joannes Bapta Casanova et Thomas Monteverde vocati 
 
Testimoniale dell presente Jacomo di Sanmichele di Lavagna 
Al nome di Dio amen a dì 9 di ottobre 1639 ab Incarnazione stilo di piombino 
Il patrone Jacomo sanmichele di Lavagna dominio di Genova con suo 
giuramento deferitoli e da esso preso in forma sponse qualmente venerdì 
prossimamente passato primo dello stante, partitosi da Civitta vecchia con il 
suo vascello leuto nominato Santo Antonio Bonaventura con cinque marinai 
carico di 42 caratelli di stracci peso di napoli, 52 cantara di canepa dell'istesso 
peso e navigando per la volta di Genova dove deveva e deve scaricare e 
consegnare la detta mercantia al signor Gio. Stefano Merengho, cioè la canepa 
et al magnifico signor Bartolomeo Caneri le stracci, gionte a ponto a cala di 
farro e castello marino lontano da terra da tre miglia l'uscì all'incontro una 
tartana e brigantino de francesi et esso con li marinari fuggiti sopra lo schifo a 
terra a salvarsi, li detti tartana e bregantino abbordati al nostro liuto presero 
quello, volsero e poi se ne andorno via al fatto suo. E visto che di già ci 
potevano assecurare a tornare a vascello, ci tornammo e cominciammo a 
navigare e presero questo primo terreno di Piombino nel porto del quale hora ci 
troviamo e fatto diligente ricerca, e perquisitione della robba che manca e stata 
predata da detti francesi trovo che mancavano le infrascritte robbe e mercantia, 
cioè un quartarolo de vino, quattro o cinque scudi di pane, robbe di dosso come 
cappotti, camice e altro, trenta balle di canepa in circa che a pesa seranno da 
quarantaquattro cantara in circa e come si vederà e troverà nella consegna, 
ventisette pezzi da otto di danari che presero dalla cascia la quale scassorno, 
385 
 
sette canne di dobletto commesso da amici e quattro canne di ferrandina, et a 
fine consti della verità domanda essaminarsi li infrascritti noi marinari e 
vicedersi il detto che ciascheduno e tutto in ogni miglior modo 
 
Nicoleo del Viola, di Lavagna 
Lorenzo Conti, di Lavagna 
Angelo Poleri, di Lavagna 
Stefano Casteletto 





Appendix VII Report of the patrone Santino Fugone, 1640 
Source: ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei calcolatori, 21/03/1640. Voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id50238. 
 
[…] 
Idem Santino Fugone di Sestri di Levante con suo presente denuntia, e 
manifesta in tutto come in appresso. 
Cioè che retrovandosi nel porto di Porto Torres con sua feluca, e sei marinai 
carica di formaggio sardo sopra quale vi era cantarelli cento tre peso sardo et 
essendo già spedito, e dovendosi partire da questo detto porto il giorno de 
giovedì passato che furono li quindeci del presente in sera di mezzanotte partiti 
da detto porto con detta sua feluca in compagnia di altre due una di presente 
Orlando Mulli, e l'altra di Domenico Severisio ambi di detto luogo di Sestri, quali 
tutti navigassimo il restante di detta notte con li venti da terra et al giorno 
arrivassimo sopra dell'isola Rossa, nel qual luogo si diede il vento a 
mezzogiorno, et arrivasimo circa a sere venti il venerdí procedendo a detta 
notte alla torre della Sponsaglia [Corsica] alla qual torre si prese parlamento li 
diede nova il Torregiano di essa de una barca senza neminare di che fusse, la 
quale andava navigando per quelli contorni, la qual barca havendola essi vista 
di permesso in detto luogo tutto il detto giorno di venari et il sabbati, e domenica 
procedenti per causa di detta barca, la quale si stava tratenendo in quelli luoghi 
detti giorni. Domenica la mattina circa hore quindeci havendo fatto la loro solita 
scoperta, e non vedendo piú la detta barca si partirono tutti, e tre di conserva 
con calma e vento in terra navigando con reme, et arrivassimo la sera di detto 
giorno di Domenica all'Isola delli corsi nel qual luogo stettero tutta la notte et il 
lunedì mattina, nel far del alba ci partissimo con calma alle reme, e navigassimo 
tutto detto giorno et arrivassimo circa ore venti nella fiumara di Solenzara, nel 
qual luogo trovassimo patrone Martino di Sestri con due filuche pur di Sestri, et 
un leuto della Bastia alli quali demandati se vi fusse niente di nuovo alle parte di 
qua verso la Bastia dissero che non vi era niente di nuovo e stato in detto luogo 
circa tre hore ci partissimo da loro circa le venti tre hore passate con bonaccia 
senza venti alle reme navigando detta notte arrivassimo circa a sere di 
mezzanotte alla torre della Fiorentina [near Monte Cristo] con il vento in terra, e 
mentre eravamo sotto la detta torre, che venivamo verso la Bastia a reme, e a 
vela, ne uscí da terra una lancia de francesi, la quale subito venne alla nostra 
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volta a suon di muschettate dicendo amaina Canaglia che tutto in un tempo ci 
venne da poppa, e ne saltarno detti Francesi sopra la nostra Filuca con arme 
alla mano cinque pistole armi bianche cortelle, et altre arme dicendo abasso 
Canaglia amaina tirando continuamente delle moschettate, il che visto esso 
padrone, e retrovandosi lontano da terra circa un tiro di pietra diede di mano di 
subiti al sacchetto che teneva sotto un banco di detta feluca dentro del quale vi 
erano da £ sei cento circa di moneta cioé in numero settanta sette levantini, e 
pezze trenta tre da otto reali dua scudi di argento una e doppia, e mezzo d'ore, 
cioé la doppia era di Firenze et un scudo d'oro di Napoli, e più lire dieci di 
moneta genovese, qual sacchetto haveva nella mani, e procuró lanciarsi in 
mare per andare a terra, e salvare detti denari, ma cosí tosto, che li detti 
francesi cioé uno di essi lo afferró di dietro, e lo tenne forte il che visto esso 
padrone pose detto sacchetto da mezzo al formaggio alla staminara della filera, 
e dopo poi detti francesi hanno preso quattro de mei marinari, e portati sopra 
della loro lancia , et a esso patrone con un altro marinaio, et il patrone lo 
lasciarono su detta loro feluca che ponendosi sopra di essa tre francesi armati 
et furono fuori con detta nostra feluca navigandosi, et volteggiando tutta la notte 
la mattina nel far del alba avendo essi francesi visto la barca, che restava di 
fuori a detta torre lontana dal terreno due miglia circa ne portarono dove detta 
barca, et ivi prima fecero montare a detto patrone, et lo inuminciorono a intero 
per che roba havessi dentro la filera; gli respose che era formaggio sardo 
caricato a mio conto proprio per portare in terra ferma a vendere, videro anche 
la mia patente quale diceva che quella era falsa, et che eravamo napolitani 
montati in detto luogo di Napoli. Di piú il capitano di detta barca domandó a 
esso primieramente che denari avesse imbarcati, li respose che li denari, che io 
l'aveva erano da lire sei cento circa in un sacchetto fra denaroni, pezze da otto 
scudi di argento, e doppie d'oro et moneta genovese come io detto sopra, et 
essendo anche sopra la nostra filuca li francesi che ho detto sopra, uno di quelli 
havendo retrovato detta sacchetta la presentó al detto capitano alla mia 
presenza dal qual capitano fu pigliato tutto il formaggio, che aveva che era file, 
che constava pezzi otto cento di moneta sarda sopra detta filuca come presero 
con tutta la nostra roba cosí mia come de marinaie fece tutto pressare sopra 
detta barca, e tutto detto giorno ci hanno trattenuti persino a ore venti una 
havendo tra ieri consiglio circa quello dovevano fare delle nostre persone a 
quale il patrone pregava per l'amor di Dio, che mi dessero il fatto mio stante, 
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che era mio proprio e non di napolitani, e da esso capitano ali sera fu detto, che 
meritava che mi appendesse a un pennone di detta barca, et che non mi voleva 
dare cosa alcuna al fine peró fece prendere sei file di detto formaggio pezzo di 
moneta genovese, che era in detto sacchetto, et mi le diede relavandomi la 
filiera con la vela, tende a reme, e poi licenziato a me con miei marinai, che 
remarono sopra la sua barca, e lasció et da ivi partiti siamo arrivati la notte 
seguente qui nel porto della Bastia senza toccare in altro luogo a ore quattro di 
notte circa, et il fatto é seguito in tutto come sopra. […]. 
Hanno presi sopra la detta sua feluca robbe sue proprie, un trapuntino pieno 
di lana, un moschetto con sua fiasca, una coltella, tre camiscie, due parre 
calzonetti, due parre di calzoni i quali un paro di drappo e l'altro di cattisso [?] 
due casacche di drappo, una camiciola bianca, et un panno di calzetta che fra 
tutte le suddette robe erano a valuta de lire cinquanta e piú tutte le robe delli 
suoi marinari; quali tutti sono restati senza alcuna cosa come da loro sará 




Appendix VIII Report of the patrone Gregorio Graffigna, 1640 
Source: ASG, NG 2084, Atti dei calcolatori, 19/04/1640. Voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id50324. 
 
[…] hier mattina giorno di mercoledí a hore 15 circa essendo sopra il capo di 
Varazze detta l'aspera con fortuna di mare e vento cominciando alleggerire e 
buttare in mare per vedere di salvarsi detto leudo si abuió e annegó lontano da 
terra mezzo miglio circa e cosí annegato e sommerso detto leudo se ne 
vennero in terra nudi  
[…] carico di mosta, balle quattro al saio, un sacco di lino, 14 tra salcissoni e 
mortadelle, rubbi due in tre carne salata in tre pezzi, spettanti le suddette cose 
al detto patrone e altri interessati con esso si cosí aumenta cosí in altra 
maniera, e più casse tre serrate, quattro carreghe da giorno di cairo, un 
caratello nuovo di capacità di una mezzarola, due cavalletti da letto di legno 
spettanti al signor vicario di luogo di Chiavari in quali li avevano caricati per 
condurle al Bogheto, un fagotto di roba per consegnare a Finale, e che hier 
mattina giorno di mercoledí a hore 15 circa essendo sopra il capo di Varazze 
detta l'aspera con fortuna di mare e vento cominciando alleggerire e buttare in 
mare per vedere di salvarsi detto leudo si abuiò e annegò lontano da terra 
mezzo miglio circa e così annegato e sommerso detto leudo se ne vennero in 
terra nudi dove gionti chiamarono aiuto per vedere di recuperare detto leudo 
che pareva et essendovi andati molti marinai con cavi e altro lo tirorno in terra 
traverso assai maltrattato si nel corpo come negli attrezzi e con detto leudo si 
ha salvato straquato in terra balle tre d'assaio, il sacco lino, carne salata 
carratello, carreghe, li due cavalletti et una cassia la quale aperta per vedere 
che roba vi era alla presenza di molti marinai sevi è ritrovato robba di dosso da 
huomo e donna si acciò non patisca, due piatti di stagno, due piccolini ed una 
pezza di formaggio a segno che vi manca due casse di salsiccioni e mortadelle, 
una balla alsaio, tutti li attrezzi di detto leudo escluso la vela et arbore, cioé le 
tende d'arbagio, due ceroni di tela, il ferro, due agumene, destre e parone, 
sacchi due di roba de marinai, cinque cabani e tre coperte di detti e piú detto 
fagotto di roba da solo di andava consignato ad un nostro di Chiavari che 
travaglia a Finale che perció ne fanno la presente manifestazione consolato 




Appendix IX Report of the shipowner Diego Tipa, 1667 
Source: ASG, CdM 85, Atti Civili, 12/01/1668. Voyage recorded in the 
AveTransRisk db as the id50646. 
 
[…] comparse innante noi D. Giuseppe Lo Burgio et Antonio d'Amico consoli 
della regia corte del consolato di genti di mare di questa invictissima et fidele 
città di Trapani Simone Tipa di questa presente città, procuratore di Dieco Tipa 
della città di Napoli, uno delli figli e coherede unito del quondam Giuseppe Tipa, 
curatore et legittimo administratore di Antonio et Domenico Salvatore Tipa, 
fratelli carnali d'esso Diego, figli et coheredi umili similmente del detto quondam 
Giuseppe, loro comune padre olim patrone principale del Pitacchio noto nostra 
signora del fraro e san francesco di Paula di portata di salmi ottocento incirca 
che si capitanizava per capitani Michele Lombardo di questa presente città in 
virtù di procura a noi exhibita e presentata fatta nella città di Napoli e per gli atti 
di notario Pietro Giacomo Ferrigno a ventinove di dicembre prossimo passato 6 




Appendix X Report of the patrone Lorenzo Cappello, 1698 
Source: ASG, CdM 285, Testimoniali segreti redatti all’estero, 10/06/1698. 
Voyage recorded in the AveTransRisk db as the id50441. 
 
[…] procedendo da Salonich per andare a Marsiglia con scirocco che durò 
tutto il giorno seguente, e poi si girò a Tramontana, quale mancò e di nuovo si 
mise scirocco lontano dal Marittimo sessanta miglia incirca, et qual provai a 
seguitare il mio cammino, e ritrovandoci sopra Montalto lontani dal terreno circa 
cento miglia, si mise un libeccio si forte la notte delli tre maggio passato che ci 
necessitó a mollar in poppa et a far gettito, ma rinforzando il tempo cattivo ci 
necessitò di nuovo a far gettito di maggior somma e fossimo forzati a correr 
sempre col treglio a discretione del mare, e del vento, e seguitando il cammino 
alla meglio che potevamo non potendo conoscere terreno per essere le 
montagne offuscate se non quando fossimo in terra, dove ci convenne investire 
nella spiaggia di Cornero in luogo detto la Castellania. Vedendoci affatto persi e 
seguendo salvare almeno la vita se potevamo, essendo tutti fuori di speranza, 
onde rotto che fu detto scafo, si è procurato di ricuperare quel poco sia stato 
possibile, che è stato grano quale era presso la spiaggia, quale si è venduto ad 
un macolino per pezza centocinquanta, e questo per ordine di monsignor 
illustrissimo Giorgio Spinola Governatore di questo luogo, col qual denaro si 
sono pagate alcune spese di quarantena. Furno ricuperate ancora due ancore 
piccole, essendosi perdute le due maggiori con la gumina. Parimenti, si sono 
ricuperati due cannoni di ferro assieme con nove patieri, e dieci sartie mascoli, 
si sono ricuperati ancora l’arbore del trinchetto assieme con sua antenna, et 
antenna di maestra con sua vela latina, con suoi pennoni e vele quadre e 
diversi altri attrezzi di detta barca, la qual roba è convenuto vendere per 
pagarne altre spesa; perciò io sono venuto a darne notitia a Vostra Signoria 
signor Console, acciò mi facci le testimoniali, e facci esaminare li testi, e per 
informatione di quanto io ho detto potrà esaminare alcuni miei marinai, che qui 




Appendix XI Maps of places cited in chap. 4 and 5 
Source: My elaboration based on the ‘Map’ function in the AveTransRisk 
database. 
 
In Chapters Four and Five I cite places located between Northern Europe, 
the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. I built the following maps to 
facilitate the reader finding each place cited. I excluded Newfoundland, 
Arkhangelsk and the Canary Islands since they are clearly recognisable in the 
maps included in the Fourth Chapter. 
 












Map XI.3 Mediterranean Spain
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